


RUSSELL BRINES

*...until  
they eat  
stones*











# UNTIL THEY EAT STONES





---

# UNTIL THEY EAT STONES

by

RUSSELL BRINES



J. B. Lippincott Company

Philadelphia      New York

COPYRIGHT, 1944, BY

RUSSELL BRINES

PRINTED IN THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FIRST EDITION

*Under Government regulations for saving paper during the war, the size and thickness of this book have been reduced below the customary peacetime standards. Only the format has been affected. The text is complete and unabridged.*



TO BARBARA,  
Walking along beside me toward The Peak





Library Special  
State  
10-15-45  
51838  
Add. copy

## CONTENTS

Foreword . . . . .	9
--------------------	---

### THE PHILIPPINES

<i>Chapter One</i> —Manila Falls . . . . .	17
<i>Chapter Two</i> —Rule by Torture . . . . .	33
<i>Chapter Three</i> —Hostage Army . . . . .	48
<i>Chapter Four</i> —Spoils of Conquest . . . . .	57
<i>Chapter Five</i> —Phony Freedom . . . . .	71
<i>Chapter Six</i> —Mental Chains . . . . .	87
<i>Chapter Seven</i> —The Unconquered . . . . .	103
<i>Chapter Eight</i> —Prisoners of War . . . . .	116
<i>Chapter Nine</i> —"Three or Four Days" . . . . .	129
<i>Chapter Ten</i> —Interned But Not Interred . . . . .	156

### THE SOUTHERN EMPIRE

<i>Chapter Eleven</i> —Indo-China Drama . . . . .	177
<i>Chapter Twelve</i> —The Western Bulwark . . . . .	187
<i>Chapter Thirteen</i> —Imperial Treasure House . . . . .	201

### THE CONTINENTAL EMPIRE

<i>Chapter Fourteen</i> —"Repentant" Murderer . . . . .	221
<i>Chapter Fifteen</i> —Tale of Three Cities . . . . .	232
<i>Chapter Sixteen</i> —Exploitation Laboratory . . . . .	253

### THE HOMELAND

<i>Chapter Seventeen</i> —"Until We Eat Stones" . . . . .	269
<i>Chapter Eighteen</i> —Ragged Kimono . . . . .	292
<i>Chapter Nineteen</i> —Oligarchic Battles . . . . .	307
Epilogue . . . . .	327
Index . . . . .	331



## FOREWORD

"We will fight," the Japanese say, "until we eat stones!" The phrase is old; now revived and ground deeply into Japanese consciousness by propagandists skilled in marshaling their sheeplike people. The government radio and controlled press repeat it continually. It is echoed by both the hysterical fanatics and the subjugated masses. "*Ishii wo kajiru made*," say the commoners; "*Ishii ni kajiritsui te made mo*," say the educated. The phrase means they will continue the war until every man—perhaps every woman and child—lies face downward on the battlefield. Thousands of Japanese, maybe hundreds of thousands, accepted it literally.

To ignore this suicide complex would be as dangerous as our pre-war oversight of Japanese determination and cunning which made Pearl Harbor possible. It springs from deep racial characteristics which the militarists have cultivated for generations. It is emphasized by the unshaken hold of emperor devotion and strengthened by popular realization that defeat means loss of the empire—which has cost so much—and Japan's reversion to a second-class power; a national humiliation so great that many Japanese would rather die than live under it.

The Japanese militarists are directing a diabolic war to advance detailed and timeless plans. They intend that their own people, whom they hold by physical and psychological chains, and the rest of their 400,000,000 subjects, dominated by force, shall fight until they eat stones.

They bluntly have voiced their current strategy—to fight as long as possible while inflicting maximum losses upon the Allies. The immediate purpose is to create sufficient war weariness among their enemies, particularly the United States, to win a favorable compromise peace. That would be a Japanese victory, for the peace they will demand must leave them part of their empire and much of their

strength—to become the foundation for their already-planned next war.

Barring that, many Japanese leaders already foresee military defeat in the Pacific. They anticipated it, in fact, before we smashed into the Marshall Islands, the outer defense arc of their first tremendous empire. Still, they insist they are ready “to fight a hundred-year war, if necessary. . . .” They mean it.

This is the fifth war the Japanese have entered to further imperialistic dreams, considering their ultimate motive in World War I. Those dreams began with the two-sworded *samurai*, the professional warriors of old Japan. Succeeding generations of militarists, united in the belief in conquest, inherited and expanded these early schemes into a craving for world rule. They have followed a consistent pattern in this drive for power; advancing until opposition became too strong, then halting and preparing for the next move.

To them, defeat in the Pacific now would mean only one setback along the pathway to world hegemony. They are confident there will be other conflicts, and they will start them. Regardless of military fortunes at the moment, the Japanese militarists will count as victory any postwar world enabling them to begin that next struggle; which is as clear in their minds as the grab for North China after Manchuria's seizure, six years earlier.

The conquerors are busily laying the seeds of that next war throughout their vast new empire. They are indoctrinating subject peoples with a Japanism which they hope will tie them to Tokyo in the future, regardless of peace table generalities. Already they are marshaling the legions they believe will follow the Rising Sun some years hence in a new and greater conflict; maybe an uprising of the Orient against the West.

To men with such minds, a century of intermittent warfare is a small price to pay for the world. Time is plentiful. Human life is cheap.

Prolonged warfare is their big gamble for current victory. Beyond that, it will permit more time for steady indoctrination of present and future slaves. Years of fighting and huge casualty lists,

they reason further, will produce renewed postwar isolationism in the United States and Great Britain, causing our vigil to relax and enabling them to re-emerge precisely as Hitler did after Versailles.

That is why American fighting men back from the front have been trying to tell America this is a war of extermination. They have seen it from foxholes and barren strips of bullet-strafed sand. I have seen it from behind the enemy's lines. Our picture coincides. This is a war of extermination. The Japanese militarists have made it that way. Neither their abilities nor their determination should be underestimated. Heartless and single-purposed, they hold Occupied Asia in a grip so tight that, by late 1944, no important internal challenge to their power had arisen.

The militarists will employ every trick, every subterfuge, every brutality before they capitulate. They will drain conquered Asia of all its wealth and drive its millions into the battle as soldiers or workers. Without the compromise peace they want, they will not quit until their means of resistance have been smashed.

Their group character dominates the following pages. Deep and fundamental is the sense of "face"; the universal and exaggerated oriental pride. Face requires individuals and groups to emerge from any contact, however trivial, with superiority or equality unimpaired. With Japanese militarists this concept is twisted often into abnormality. It is one cause of horrible brutalities. Other vital traits will emerge with the facts—from intense emperor and clan loyalty to power-lust.

Since Pearl Harbor, there has been a virtual blackout of reliable news from Occupied Asia, except for the information of repatriates on the two voyages of the exchange liner *Gripsholm*. I returned on that vessel in December, 1943, after spending the first 21 months of the war in Manila and Shanghai; interned most of the time. Despite prison walls, we internees obtained a clear picture of events swirling around us, from our contacts with the outside world, from moments of freedom, even from a backhanded reading of the censored press.

During the voyage, I talked to reliable repatriates from Japan, Manchuria, North China, South China, Hong Kong, French Indo-China and the Philippines. I checked and rechecked all vital infor-

mation, to sift out uncolored data; and tried to evaluate it against the background of my ten years as a newspaperman in the Pacific area, most of them as a correspondent for The Associated Press in Hawaii, Japan and the Philippines. I talked to people who had been confined in all of the twenty-eight civilian internment camps represented aboard ship.

This book is not a personal experience story. It is an attempt to cover the major wartime developments in Occupied Asia and Japan, particularly during that vital period, 1942-43, when the Japanese program was accelerated. It is manifestly impossible to avoid gaps in the story, because of Japanese censorship. But the available information gives a clear picture of the conquerors' imperialistic methods and shows trends which will continue so long as they rule.

Part of flaming Asia's story concerns more than a hundred thousand Occidental prisoners of war and civilian internees. Their adaptation to what are, at best, disagreeable circumstances is a tale of courage and perseverance. They are at their captors' mercy and subject to every harsh wind blowing across the empire. I want to salute them all, particularly a number of close friends. Less fortunate than I, they remained behind when the exchange ship sailed.

After serving a number of years in Hawaii with the Honolulu *Star-Bulletin* and The Associated Press, I was transferred to Tokyo by the latter agency in 1939. There I witnessed the final consolidation of the Japanese home front for the Pacific conflict. During the bloody miniature war at Nomonhan in 1939, I lived with Japanese troops and acquired another view of their dominant characteristics.

Eight months prior to Pearl Harbor, I was transferred to Manila. There I saw the final training of boys who were to become heroes; the last days of a city which never seemed to realize fully what happened to it, or why. War prevented my departure for Bangkok on a new assignment. During the battle for Manila, I was an accredited war correspondent with the USAFFE (United States Army Forces in the Far East), commanded by General Douglas MacArthur. With my wife, Barbara, and our 12-year-old daughter, Coralie—brave ones, both—I saw the final capitulation of the Philip-

pinas capital. On January 5, 1942, we three were deposited in the Santo Tomas internment camp.

That September, I thumbed a ride to Shanghai on a Japanese transport, a "shot in the dark" attempt to better our condition. The venture was such a gamble that Barbara and Coralie remained in Santo Tomas where they then had relative security. I made the trip under cattle boat conditions with five other correspondents and one hundred and twelve other internees. Much to our surprise, we were turned loose upon arrival in Shanghai, where civilians were not interned until later.

This freedom ended abruptly for me six weeks later when I was reinterned on the clammy morning of November 5, 1942. I was among the three hundred and fifty "political prisoners" confined in Shanghai's first civilian camp, at the former U. S. Marine barracks, Haiphong Road. My shipmates were taken to other camps when general internment began three months later. We met again aboard the Japanese exchange ship, *Teia Maru*, leaving Shanghai September 19, 1943. My family and I were reunited aboard the *Teia* off northern Luzon, a year and a few days after I had left them. They had been interned continuously for 21 months, and I was imprisoned for a total of 19 months.

My own experiences seem unimportant to me, against the tremendous backdrop of Asia's drama. If I appear hereafter in the story, it is only as part of the crowd.

To the countless sources who have supplied the necessary information for this book, I express sincere appreciation. Most repatriates requested anonymity; because, when I talked to them, the cruel spell of Japan's military or secret police—the gendarmerie—hung over them and their friends still in Asia. After returning to this country, I augmented my information with material from the Office of War Information, the Netherlands Information Bureau, the British Information Service, The Associated Press library and many well-informed individuals. It was woven together with my wife's constant help, support and encouragement.

*San Francisco*







# THE PHILIPPINES





## chapter one

# MANILA FALLS

THE wait for Japanese occupation was agonizing. We civilians isolated in Manila feared another Nanking—with its raping and looting and wanton killing. There was little we could do to prevent it, if the conquerors so willed, but each man had resolved to stand with his family, defending them as best he could.

For two days the invading forces had been in the suburbs, somewhere behind the smoke and flames of demolition fires. In hours, perhaps, the vanguard would drive unopposed into the wounded Philippine capital. Then some six hundred thousand Filipinos and over six thousand Occidentals would be at the mercy of a triumphant army whose commander, General Masaharu Homma, was one of the most sincere anti-whites in Japan's hierarchy of fanatics.

It was a dismal New Year's morning, 1942. American and British women remained in hotels or homes, listening anxiously for foreign sounds; fearing the arrival, yet impatient for it. Children, sensing the tension, were silently restless. The men gathered in quiet groups on street corners, never straying far from their families. They peered down empty streets toward the smoke, for a glimpse of the invaders. Cinders drifted over the city like melancholy leaves.

The southern Japanese army, which would take Manila, arrived December 30 at Parañaque, a small suburb only five miles distant. It had landed six days earlier from forty transports at Antimonan, some two hundred and fifty kilometers southeast of the capital. First units had been decimated by a relatively small defensive force; subsequently withdrawn to join the main American-Filipino troops

seeping into Bataan, where the final stand would be made. The invaders then pushed steadily toward the city, meeting only rear-guard action.

The larger, northern Japanese army—which made its first main landing December 22, from eighty transports in Lingayen Gulf and later was reinforced—had wheeled and headed for Bataan.

While there was still time, thousands of Filipinos had fled Manila for the country, traveling in overcrowded, horse-drawn carts which wound along jammed highways. A few Americans had slipped away to Bataan, choosing the hell of continued warfare over the threat of occupation. Those who remained were trapped between the advancing forces and the sea.

At the last moment, all felt the need for human companionship. Americans locked their comfortable homes and moved into hotels or doubled up with friends. Bathtubs became beds, and scanty food supplies were pooled. Men maintained a ceaseless, nervous vigil, never leaving their houses long, for fear they would encounter the conquerors and be cut off from their families.

This desire for companionship had packed the American-owned Bay View Hotel where most of the remaining correspondents had joined forces. We were disemployed when demolition men smashed radio facilities. American businessmen had not gone to their offices for several days. All we could do was wait.

Peculiar problems soon created a sense of unity among the Bay View's three hundred-odd men, women and children. Food was limited to supplies in the hotel's storeroom, and most of the Filipino help had fled to the country. The guests approved a suggestion to conserve food for a vigil we felt might be indefinite, by serving only two meals daily, eliminating lunches. At a general meeting they also authorized a governing committee of guests, which included Dr. C. N. Leach and Dr. Frank Whitacre, of the Rockefeller Foundation in China; Henry Carpenter and Henry Heesch, American business representatives in the islands; Ed and Don Kneedler, sons of the co-operative hotel owner, Dr. H. D. Kneedler.

Guests volunteered to take over the empty kitchen, evolving meals from cans and washing the dishes. Others started a library

and organized games and story periods for the children. At night, the men patrolled the building to reassure women who feared wandering Japanese soldiers. Without fully realizing it, we had established our own rather elaborate internment camp days before Japanese imprisonment began.

Outside our stucco fortress, the old Manila died excitedly. The streets had been left to bands of Filipino looters who roamed downtown districts, smashing the windows of closed stores, principally those owned by Japanese and Chinese. Police, disarmed to conform with Manila's status as an open city, made little effort to stop them.

Half a mile away, in the bomb-raked Port Area, near the piers, other Filipinos formed a fighting, clawing mob, seeking additional booty. American military authorities had authorized "legal looting" to dispose of army stores there which otherwise would be confiscated by the Japanese or destroyed. Long files of Filipinos for days had streaked across the Luneta to get these supplies, returning with everything from telephone wire and dressmakers' dummies to cases of canned goods and clothing. The first good-natured jostling grew into intense excitement when the designated goods disappeared and latecomers demanded their share. They broke into bonded warehouses and took personal baggage and expensive rugs. The articles themselves seemed of little value to the looters—one American bought a case of beer for fifty cents—but the frenzy of the moment possessed them. Their shouting swelled and died like a distant surf, always ominous, always sawing on our already thin nerves.

Our tensed minds saw broader implications in the looting than mere lawlessness or the possibility that it might cause Japanese viciousness. We wondered if it represented the Filipino reaction to the American defeat; if the frenzy stemmed from resentment against Americans for involving the unprepared Philippines in war. Emotions were volatile. We on the spot weren't too sure if forty years of a lenient, if sometimes confused, colonial policy had built unshakable loyalty to the United States.

The war had been a succession of shocks. Our fear was mingled

with the deep frustration of a defeat which the majority believed had been unnecessarily swift. Most Americans and many Filipinos felt we had shown only weak and confused resistance to the attackers' hammer smashes. "Now we're running away," they said, "without a fight; giving up." Bataan was yet to come.

The Japanese timed their assault with fine precision. Dribblets of supplies, including a few new bombers and men, had been arriving in Manila during the weeks preceding the war. At least sixty more heavily laden transports reportedly were scheduled to reach the Philippines before February 1, 1942. Fifteen of them were en route when the attack started. They would bring some of the power that Tokyo's politicians had warned against in repeatedly saying: "We must not let the Philippines become strong enough to threaten us." Air and sea forces based on Luzon, the archipelago's main island, could dominate the sea lanes running from the east to Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies. The Japanese needed the resources of these regions, particularly petroleum, to maintain their war machine. They had to strike before Philippine forces could smash their southward shipping.

At the start of the war, we had only three hundred and sixteen planes in the archipelago, most of them already outmoded. Mechanized equipment was infinitesimal; heavy artillery almost completely limited to the fixed fortifications of Cavite and Corregidor; most of the few anti-aircraft guns had a range of less than ten thousand feet. Corregidor itself had retrogressed to a third-class base, the result both of observing the Washington treaty and prewar indolence. Only a handful of the one hundred thousand American and Filipino defenders were seasoned men. American forces totaled about nineteen thousand men, most of them recruits. A few thousand seasoned regulars included the 31st Infantry and the 4th Marine Regiment, transferred from Shanghai. About twelve thousand experienced Philippine Scouts were supported by some sixty thousand Filipino graduates of a six weeks' basic training course. That was all.

Ever-present Japanese agents, operating with remarkable freedom in the islands, knew this. The civilians did not. Most Manila



Americans agreed with a staunch "old-timer" who gave me a friendly tip soon after my arrival from Tokyo in March, 1941. Following a luncheon with some of his friends in the Manila chamber of commerce, he turned to me and said:

"You don't think the Japanese will attack the Philippines, do you? They're pretty weak, aren't they? Haven't they used up about everything in China?"

I replied with the clear memory of forces I had seen in Japan which were driving that nation toward war in the Pacific. "I think they will attack. We can't afford to underestimate their air force. And we can't forget that their navy has never been tested."

The statement met grim silence. Later my friend drew me into a corner and said, "Better be careful what you say in Manila, young fellow. These folks don't like to hear statements like that. They'll accuse you of being a Japanese agent."

Even the minority who anticipated hostilities believed generally that the Philippines would remain on the side lines. "Why," said one young American, "our interceptor force is so strong that no Japanese bombers will get as far as Manila. We'll be able to sit on the sea wall and watch our boys knock them down, like shooting ducks in a barrel."

Japan's thwarted war effort in China had seduced these people, as it did the residents of other key areas soon to be under attack. Newspaper warnings that the Japanese had better equipment and better men than they had been using in China were dismissed as products of Tokyo propaganda mills. Manila, like Singapore and Hong Kong, continued its comfortable country club life until the first bomb blasts. When they came, the city had no air raid shelters and only a pitifully inadequate civilian defense system.

In the first three days of hostilities Japanese land-based planes from Formosa, six hundred miles northward, virtually demolished our air force. They struck furiously and extremely accurately at key air bases, and after December 10 we never saw an American plane over Manila, except for a single fighter in late January.

Unanswered questions rankled, even while the city attempted to steady itself for the ground campaigns that would follow antici-

pated Japanese landings. Why did we lose eighteen B-17 bombers, half of our heavy force, on the ground at Clark Field at 1:30 P.M. the first day of warfare? Why were they lined up in neat rows, the pilots lunching or showering, after two previous Japanese attacks on the same field? Why had we failed to strike a single blow at Formosa before this loss when our pilots were begging for the chance? Why did we lose virtually three-fourths of our fighters at Eba in the north, later that same afternoon? Why were most of them also aground?

There were more queries, but no one answered them. The full extent of these losses was twisted and hidden behind vague official communiqués, optimistically worded to deceive the enemy agents and to quiet the city's populace so that refugees would not stream to the countryside along narrow highways, impeding military transportation. War correspondents accredited to the USAFFE were denied permission to visit Clark Field after the attack, and were handed only a single paragraph of "information" concerning Eba. But the news of what had happened, and the questions, circulated throughout Manila. Censorship barred the story from the papers and the people at home, but it could not hide it from Manila or the enemy.

(General H. H. Arnold's official report, issued in 1943, said fourteen B-17 bombers escaped to Australia, but hostilities destroyed the remainder of the Philippine force of thirty-five B-17's, thirty medium and eight light bombers, two hundred and twenty fighters and twenty-three other airplanes.)

Day after day Japanese planes lazed high over Manila like tiny silver crosses in the hot sunlight, insolently bombing at will; aloof from our feeble antiaircraft fire and unchallenged in the air. They could have destroyed the city, but generally they confined themselves to military objectives; for the Japanese knew their troops would capture Manila and they wanted it intact. Impotent rage spread through the human ground moles below, so that men often shook their fists at these planes while running for the insufficient protection of walls or doorways or the foxholes they had dug in private gardens.

Uneasiness was increased by the activities of many Filipino fifth columnists whom Japanese agents had prepared well in advance. Actual sabotage was limited, but flares and signals of all kinds directed enemy bombers to prime objectives, and information was steadily relayed. The officers of a well-hidden advance American air base believed they were invisible from the air until a surprise attack disclosed the field was surrounded by mirrors which in the sunlight flashed a neat circular target to Japanese bombers. An American pilot who flew one night from the northwestern coast of Luzon to Manila said his entire route was illuminated by flares, accurately guiding him into the city. They were set off in succession by Filipinos upon hearing what they thought was a Japanese motor.

Civilians eagerly accepted the optimistic official statements which said "our lines are holding" even after military leaders knew the capital was doomed. Uninformed, most of them still believed Manila was safe, until a swift series of events, beginning December 24, foreshadowed the end. General MacArthur departed "for the front," accompanied by U. S. High Commissioner Francis B. Sayre, the late President Manuel L. Quezon, Vice President Sergio Osmeña, their families and principal staff assistants. Quezon appointed Jorge Vargas, his personal secretary and thereby the executive secretary of the commonwealth, as the acting head of the government remaining in the Philippines. Sayre left his executive assistant, Dr. Claude A. Buss, a State Department careerist, in charge of his office.

The city soon knew that they were bound not for the front but for Corregidor—"impregnable Corregidor" we thought then. American and Filipino civilians, awaiting an explanation which never came, were baffled and hurt by these departures. They knew nothing of the political and diplomatic factors which might have necessitated the move. They felt, and many still feel, that they were abandoned by officials seeking personal safety.

The fires began with a terrific midnight blast on Christmas that destroyed the Cavite naval base and with it, for the time being, America's naval prestige in the Far East. No planes had been over-

head for seven hours when the first explosions, from nine miles across the bay, rocked slumbering Manila. I watched in tense awe from the Manila hotel room of Clark Lee, a close personal friend and at the time an Associated Press correspondent.

We both realized the message of white-hot flames which were devouring the already bombed base. They danced hundreds of feet in the air, illuminating the entire bay as if with a gigantic searchlight. Repeated explosions rumbled in the distance. This was the prelude to defeat; destruction of the installations to render them useless to the enemy. Clark and I drank a silent toast to the men who first planted the American flag, years before, on that curving elbow of land. I don't think either of us ever felt so completely beaten as that night.

The next day Manila was declared an open city, and preparations were made for the withdrawal of all military garrisons and equipment. This was followed by two low-flying Japanese bombing attacks which destroyed the historic Santo Domingo church and adjacent buildings at the eastern end of the Walled City. The rage swelling through Manila was greater because it sprang from a renewed realization of helplessness; a sense of being cornered without escape. The damage was done and the reaction, particularly among the religious, was bitter; even though the Japanese said they were aiming at two river boats, anchored in the Pasig River, a few hundred yards distant.

For days the demolition fires erupted through the city, rocking houses and re-emphasizing the dolorous fact that defeat was certain. They destroyed other military installations, oil stores along the Pasig and quartermasters' supplies in the Port Area; anything that might be of value to the enemy. Some of them were hastily started and slipped their bounds, demolishing more than a hundred houses and claiming at least eight Filipino lives. For a time burning oil on the Pasig threatened near-by warehouses, until the tide carried the flames seaward.

The fires became personal enemies, symbolic of our hopelessness. They threw a rough arm across the city, starting from Cavite and stretching along the Pasig, which bisects Manila. There were less

than a dozen of them, but their thick black smoke rolled upward and formed a continuous mountain range, hiding from us the business and residential districts which lay eastward of the river. Shreds of smoke climbed higher, darkening the sun and covering the city with perpetual gloom. The air was acrid and heavy with heat. At night the fires glowed like giant cauldrons.

Both bombs and demolition had spared most of Manila, except for houses adjacent to the destroyed military installations and the Santo Domingo church district. Most of the piers in the Port Area were whole, although some were blackened by intentional fires and surrounded by bomb-scarred buildings; and in the bay several sunken ships thrust awkward arms through the oily gray water. Utilities continued to operate; the occasional clang of a streetcar could be heard. The conquerors were acquiring a city that still functioned.

It was a bitter moment, heightened by the prevalent belief that no adequate defense had been attempted. Actually, the USAFFE command had no other choice. Overpowered, our sole chance was to withdraw into Bataan's jungles for delaying warfare, to await reinforcements or—as happened—to slug it out alone. By a mixture of subterfuge and skillful rear guard action, American-Filipino forces slowed the advance of numerically superior Japanese armies and made their juncture. Then came the magnificent and vital last stand on Bataan.

The Japanese vanguard roared out of the mist late the next afternoon, January 2. Forewarned by an American who had been driving through the streets, we crowded onto the sidewalk fronting the Bay View to watch. A five-car caravan of high officers shot past us down Isaac Peral, turned on whining tires to Dewey Boulevard and hurried to the Manila Hotel. We saw them for only an instant but details stood out clearly, so sharpened were our senses. The lead car was a confiscated black sedan. Behind it was an army truck, followed by three other passenger cars.

A lone soldier stood in the truck near a machine gun mounted on its cab. He stared at us with hard, vicious eyes. As we stared

back, I could not fail to notice the unusually small bore of the 25-caliber machine gun. The Japanese employed that type of gun generally in the Philippine campaign, but at the moment it seemed doubly ironic—an American city subdued by a popgun.

Throughout their swift journey, the cars hugged the right of the street, another evidence of the thorough Japanese intelligence reports on American customs. Traffic is routed on the left side throughout Asia, including Manila. The next day the ever-observant Japanese put their cars back in the proper lanes.

Later we learned that the initial group of officers had walked proudly into the Manila Hotel where the guests, as apprehensive as we were, huddled in one corner of the spacious lobby. A dapper staff officer stepped up to the desk and in quiet, precise English said: "Please have all floors above the fourth evacuated at once." Guests hastily removed their possessions, doubling up with friends. As soon as rooms were available, the Japanese went upstairs. During the evening, other officers walked through the lobby but ignored the guests who were still free to use the hotel's facilities.

Dinner for us in the Bay View, a quarter of a mile away, was a quiet meal of canned corned beef and tea. Suddenly we heard the soprano whine of Japanese army motorcycles, followed by the deeper cough of heavy vehicles. Another cavalcade of Japanese jostled down Dewey Boulevard. It was formed by a number of confiscated private cars which led three large red and yellow busses, formerly used on lines running to the interior of Luzon. The broad-seated busses were filled with soldiers, and sandwiched among them were several Japanese civilians who had been freed from the internment camps maintained by the Philippine government. All were hilarious. They waved little paper Rising Sun flags, shouted "Banzai!" in voices already hoarse and sang the "Pacific March," the fighting song which so frankly detailed Japan's anticipated conquests. Every drunk in Tokyo had been singing that piece for two years.

This new group disappeared somewhere in the distance. It left tenseness in the dining room, for the shouts and the singing seemed

to promise the unlicensed celebrations that we had dreaded. Quickly we finished the meal and went upstairs to our rooms.

Later in the evening, we saw the sight we dreaded. Barbara and Coralie were with me when another group of Japanese officers occupied the American high commissioner's residence, across Dewey Boulevard from the Bay View. We watched through half-curtained windows. Floodlights suddenly were turned on, illuminating the front of the building and the empty flagpole. Two soldiers marched from the darkness. Almost nonchalantly they hoisted the Rising Sun.

Barbara turned away abruptly. In her eyes were the first tears she had shown during the war. While we sat in glum silence, the conquerors began an all-night celebration in the building that once symbolized American authority in the islands.

(The Japanese never captured the American flag which had waved over the commissioner's building. It had been removed for the last time the previous sunset, in a quiet, sad ceremony attended by Buss and other American officials. Following military regulations, the flag was burned, carefully and thoroughly, so that not a shred remained.)

No one came to the Bay View that night. The guests tried to sleep fitfully, while cars raced through the streets and the victory celebration became raucous. The party finally adjourned in the early morning, with the last arrogant "banzai" and the roar of stolen automobiles.

In the morning the city was quiet and still. Little traffic moved on the streets, and only a few Filipinos ventured out. Sentries in slovenly uniforms stood on nearly every corner, with bayoneted guns. Japanese flags waved from all parts of the town. Manila had changed owners with no more fanfare than a few drunken shouts.

Late in the morning a Japanese lieutenant, flanked by two surly sergeants, came to the hotel. They were met by a committee of Japanese-speaking guests. The officer, in order to get his bearings, pulled out a detailed map of Manila that would have covered a table top. I winced at its size and house-by-house detail, knowing that American officers had been forced to use road maps distrib-

uted by gasoline companies, for the lack of more suitable documents.

The lieutenant stationed a guard at the front of the hotel, politely told the interpreters to keep everyone inside, then departed after bowing formally. That was all. The letdown left us all a little giddy and quite talkative. It seemed as if we were being granted a momentary reprieve; yet some of us had become so suspicious of good news that it was several weeks before we finally accepted this renewed sense of security.

We stayed in the hotel for three days, continuing our self-imposed internment life. Officers and Japanese civilian interpreters visited the hotel several times, principally to ask for automobile keys. Americans living in private houses also were told to remain inside, by proclamations and visits of officers and men. There was some gruffness during these visits and some looting, particularly of wrist watches, which fascinated the enlisted men. As far I know, there was no serious maltreatment of Occidentals at that time in Manila. The general Japanese attitude toward Americans and British was polite, almost patient, condescension.

The invaders obviously were under strict orders. Advance troops were held for two days at Parañaque while the high command came up to head the occupation. The Japanese had lost too much international "face" by the holocaust of Nanking, which portrayed their soldiers as barbarians. They wanted to gain prestige abroad by an orderly occupation of Manila. Even Japanese army leaders, in their own way, normally are sensitive to the world's opinion, unless at the moment their judgment is warped and their control over their men loosened by the desire for vengeance following such bitter resistance as occurred in Hong Kong and later at Bataan.

Undefended Manila fell like a ripe plum into their laps. Officers could more easily restrain their men because they did not enter the city with the psychology of fighters who anticipate death at the next street corner. Moreover, the Japanese then were triumphant and confident. It pleased their sense of face and the inferiority complex dominant among them to be gracious conquerors.



That, I think, is why we Americans escaped the fate we expected.

These considerations applied only to the actual entry into the city and the general physical treatment of the majority of the Occidentals later interned in Manila. They were no restraint to the activities of the gendarmerie; nor, in the conquerors' minds, did they apply to such policies as outright confiscation of property and business, without compensation, or their subsequent disinclination to assume adequate responsibility for the internment camps. Treatment of civilians also was generally harsher in outlying cities, such as Baguio, Cebu and Davao, where less responsible officers were in command.

Plans for the occupation had been made well in advance. The conquerors brought their own printing press currency, enforcing its use wherever they landed. They retained Philippine denominations in these plain notes, printed on paper so cheap they disintegrated when carried in a pocket for any length of time. They ranged from one centavo to one hundred pesos. The bills were unadorned, except for a bit of scrollwork and the nonexplanatory phrase: "The Japanese Government." Serial numbers and the usual promise to repay bearer were eliminated. The Japanese posted sentries in all the major markets to make sure the new money was accepted at par value with the legal peso, temporarily allowed to circulate, which had a prewar rate of two pesos for one U. S. dollar. All foreign currency, including the dollar, was banned.

Squads of gendarmes visited American business establishments and sealed their safes, probably protecting the money for future distribution among themselves. The seals pasted across the hinges of the Bay View safe told their own story. Mimeographed and written in English, they promised dire punishment to anyone tampering with what had become property of "His Imperial Majesty." The date, as originally typed, was "Jan. —, 1942." These forms obviously were prepared weeks before in Japan or China. They showed that the invaders had reached Manila earlier than they anticipated; for they could easily have entered the city in late December.

Hotels, apartment houses, clubs and certain buildings had been allotted in advance to the army, navy and gendarmerie. They were occupied as soon as the Occidentals who then lived in them were interned. The navy also took over private homes along the bay front, which had been declared a "strategic area." But the majority of American residences were undisturbed, so long as Filipino servants remained loyal and guarded them. Unoccupied houses attracted both Japanese and Filipino looters.

Meanwhile, soldiers were scouring the town to confiscate every American-owned automobile. Often they were peasant boys who knew little about cars, and they promptly smashed most of them into uselessness. The banging of fenders could be heard regularly as these untrained drivers hit curbs, telephone poles and other machines; but they drove so slowly that there seemed to be a disappointingly small loss of life from motor accidents.

In the Bay View we prepared ourselves for inevitable internment; and, with the restlessness of close confinement and uncertainty, sometimes became impatient with what seemed an unnecessary Japanese delay in determining our status. But negotiations were going on quietly for the selection of an internment site. Dr. Buss and his American businessmen-advisers had submitted to the Japanese command a list of the most suitable establishments, if general internment were decided on. Foremost on the list was the University of Santo Tomas, located on Quezon Boulevard about three miles from the heart of town. A modern institution, with a fifty-two-acre campus surrounded by walls, the university was the only place in Manila that could begin to accommodate the thousands of prisoners; and even it was woefully inadequate.

The Japanese promptly accepted this suggestion, dependent upon the approval of the Spanish Dominican Order, which owned the university. These Catholic Fathers agreed at once, without compulsion.

Finally, a Japanese civilian interpreter told us that we were going away soon, without specifying where, and that we should take enough food and clothing for "three or four days." In the fluctuating emotions of the moment, his peculiar phrase generated great

optimism among the guests. Many accepted the statement literally, assumed that we would be held only for questioning, then freed. Some even began to plan where they would live when "we're released again." We learned later that the same hopeful expression had been utilized by other Japanese elsewhere in the city—probably deliberately, to avoid exciting people who were still an unknown quantity to them—and was received with equal optimism.

We were advised that we could take only what we could carry, and the remainder of our luggage would be deposited in sealed storerooms in the hotel. Packing began at once, in an air of suppressed excitement. Personal property had become meaningless, and many gave away the clothing for which they had no room in their baggage. When the Japanese inspected the possessions we were taking to camp, they confiscated only cameras, binoculars and knives, of all sizes.

On the morning of January 5, a hot dusty day, we stumbled out of the hotel with suitcases, boxes, loose mosquito nets and other gear, and walked across the street to await a bus which would take us to internment. Despite our impedimenta, we made that short walk with as much dignity as possible, for behind the sentries' bayonets we saw several score Filipinos, watching curiously with expressionless faces. None of us wanted to display his humiliation before them.

The Japanese remained indifferent, almost impersonal while we grouped ourselves on the curb and gratefully gulped the fresh air, welcome after our confinement. But this time it was a watchful indolence. Soldiers, guarding the entrance to the hotel, made no objection when a number of guests returned for forgotten articles; yet they grasped their guns tighter each time an American approached. Half a dozen sentries near the massed Filipinos constantly looked over their shoulders at them. In the center of Isaac Peral, which had been closed to traffic, several uniformed gendarmes stood with their usual arrogant slouch, one foot advanced. Their eyes were narrowed, and at first they seemed to be dozing. Actually, they were watching closely and carefully to see if we would make any move to escape or to reach the Filipinos with

notes. Such an attempt would have snapped them into swift and ruthless action.

How typical, I thought, and how symbolic, that they should assume this unconcern in an effort to throw us off guard; thereby possibly making us disclose, in some rash venture, any schemes that might require close watching after we were interned. It was a similar indolent slouch in the China campaign that enabled the Japanese army to deceive the West about the strength of its first-string ground and air fighters.

Grateful for even this abbreviated freedom, several of us correspondents remained on the curb throughout most of the day, avoiding the "last ride" as long as possible. Our group included Royal Arch Gunnison of *Colliers* and Marjorie Gunnison of North American Newspaper Alliance, Carl and Shelley Mydans of *Life Magazine*, Jack Percival of the *Sydney Morning Herald* and his wife, and my family. Finally, in the late afternoon, we could delay no more.

We climbed into the bus—a faded blue object screened with wire, giving it the appearance of a patrol wagon—and started up Isaac Peral. Some of the fires smoldered, and smoke drifted through purpling shadows. I looked back. My last picture of "free" Manila was a gendarme, still spread-legged in the middle of the street, still watching the Filipinos through slitted eyes.



## chapter two

# RULE BY TORTURE

THOSE squat, vicious gendarmes spread throughout the archipelago as the spearhead of Japanese military rule. Even while army officers were treating Manila's Occidentals with astonishing politeness, the military police apprehended other Americans and British, Chinese and Filipinos against whom their agents had been collecting data for years before the war. Whisked away suddenly from their homes, and sometimes never seen again, these were the first of hundreds arrested by this nefarious power in the Philippines alone.

The gendarmerie, predecessor and counterpart of the Nazi Gestapo, is the right hand of Japanese rulers whose imperial control is based upon torture and brutality. Its thousands of officers and men stand behind every Japanese edict and every Japanese policy in Occupied Asia and the homeland. Through cultivated cruelty it attempts to throttle all active and potential opposition to the militarist masters. No resident of the new empire, including high-ranking Japanese, is too big or too unimportant to escape its constant scrutiny.

This is the formal agency behind the concentrated program of force which the militarists believe is essential to insure obedience or "co-operation." The Japanese soldier is subject to severe beatings or worse from his officers. In turn he is taught as part of his basic training that he cannot expect obedience from natives without demonstrating his superiority by brutality. The result is endless viciousness, ranging from kicks and blows to murder. When

disciplinary force is intensified by hysterical vengefulness over defeat—or loss of face—it erupts into the mass horrors of Bataan or the assassination of whole Chinese villages. Gendarmes usually instigate concerted atrocities.

The militarists also believe in propaganda and use it extensively. But propaganda is secondary, in their opinion, and must be coupled with ruthlessness to be effective. Cleverer or more responsible Japanese civilians have been appalled by the wastage or horror of this policy, depending upon their viewpoints. But they cannot halt it, because it springs from sources too powerful for them to oppose. Consequently, directly antagonistic programs of viciousness and friendship are in effect throughout the empire.

Gendarmes have arrested hundreds of Occidentals and thousands of natives in the Occupied Areas. Specific charges seldom are made. Questioning reveals a desire to obtain information, to punish “anti-Japanese” acts, to ferret out real or imagined spies, to retaliate for complaints against internment camp treatment and to intimidate the populace through the maltreatment of hostages. Brutality is rare in civilian internment camps and, for the present, in most war prisons. Every inmate, however, can be taken without cause to a gendarmerie station for unrestrained torture.

The military police epitomize the worst in the Japanese army—from their sadism to the corruption that has made the gendarmerie a vast kidnaping and blackmail ring, auxiliary to its disciplinary duties. In outlining its methods, I shall combine incidents from the Philippines with others occurring elsewhere, purposely generalizing to protect from possible retaliation those of my sources still remaining in Asia.

The gendarmerie is an army organization, staffed with army officers and men, but its powers of investigation are so great that it can involve even the highest ranking officer, if his conduct becomes suspicious. The gendarmerie is responsible directly to the emperor, through the anonymous militarists who actually rule. Only they would have the power to soften its barbarity, if they were so minded.

The secret police were vital in maintaining Japan's long unbroken

dictatorship, beginning with the first shogunate in the twelfth century. Through the centuries they developed oppression into a fine art, and their methods were not changed when the islands threw off feudalism in 1871. The militarists continue to rely on this super-legal force in controlling the thought of modern Japan. Today, every Japanese desperately fears and hates the gendarmerie.

Officers with particular aptitude for enforcing discipline, by any means, are given gendarmerie duty for varying periods. Former Premier Hideki Tojo once was commander in chief of the Manchuria Military Police and earned the reputation as the army's sternest disciplinarian. The most bullying, aggressive young men in each group of conscripts are earmarked for eventual gendarmerie service. Once they are transferred to that branch, they undergo a calculated course in brutality from their superiors which includes some of the punishment they are expected to inflict upon their subsequent victims.

Uniformed gendarmes, retaining their regular army rank, accompany the troops, to enforce discipline among their own soldiers in the field, captured prisoners of war and the civilian populations of occupied territories. They are distinguished by a white armband on the left arm which, curiously, bears in red the English letters "M.P." alongside the Japanese characters for "kimpei." They also wear two small gold-plated chrysanthemum crests on their coat collars, indicating their direct responsibility to the emperor. It is not uncommon to see regular army officers of superior rank treating gendarme sergeants with scrupulous courtesy.

Plain-clothes gendarmes conduct the more secret investigations, which include a thorough check on the spoken thoughts of the populace. They infest every hotel, café, night club, sporting arena, train and ship, pretending to be customers in order to overhear conversations which might give them information concerning the involved political situations in occupied cities, or might point to the source of anti-Japanese activities. Like the fabled American "flatfoot" whose appendages always give him away, the eaves-dropping gendarme generally is recognizable by his cruel face, his

intense interest in his neighbors and the sometimes amateurish methods he uses to appear nonchalant.

But others are more clever. Experts have studied not only the languages but the most minute habits and characteristics of other Asiatics. They operate in numerous disguises, especially as fishermen and coolies. They are particularly adept in passing as Chinese. In occupied Shanghai, for example, they constantly prowled around the homes of suspected foreigners. The victims, sighting what appeared to be a dirty Chinese thug, hesitated before driving him away, because they never knew whether they were being investigated or robbed. Violence against a gendarme in disguise would have given the secret police a neat excuse for doing their worst.

The Japanese have a third method of guarding the thoughts of their subjects. By bribery, brutality and threats of force, the gendarmerie have coerced thousands of people into their service as stool pigeons. Throughout Asia today, literally, every man is suspicious of his neighbor. He can never be sure that by trusting even prewar friends he is not betraying himself to gendarmerie informers.

As in every country where the secret police operate, long-standing grudges, jealousies and animosities have delivered many victims to the Japanese vultures, through the false testimony of an informer. The victim's denials are meaningless, for once the gendarme accepts a lie from whatever source, he usually supports it to save his own face.

These thousands of active gendarmes and tens of thousands of actual or potential informers are engaged in what amounts almost to a person-to-person campaign to crush opposition to the conquerors. In enforcing this program, the Japanese attempt to reach even the commonest coolie. Typically, they are not discouraged by the prospect of intimidating over 400,000,000 people, including their own. Instead, they recognize the potential value of every human and the potential dangers of the unconvinced, however insignificant they might appear on the surface.

The gendarmerie enlarges this control by requiring every subject to carry a residence certificate, issued by the regular police,



which contains his picture and thumb print. This card, useful for prompt identification in an emergency, also helps the secret police to eliminate the subterfuge of names. Permission also must be obtained from the gendarmerie to travel, to change residences or places of business, to establish new businesses and, in some cases, to sell personal possessions.

Enforcing the numerous edicts issued by the military administration in occupied areas, the military police take charge of every disciplinary case, whether the prisoner is accused of being a guerrilla or saboteur or whether he is merely suspected of dealing in foreign currency or listening to a short-wave radio. In each case the severity of the treatment has nothing to do with the original suspicion; it depends more upon the mood of the inquisitor or the prejudices he might have against the victim's nationality.

No specific charges are required for gendarmerie investigation and usually none are made unless sentence is passed. Dozens of Occidentals and natives have been thrown into gendarmerie stations, kept there for varying periods and often tortured, then released, all without knowing specifically why. Some have been dumped into filthy cells and ignored for months, then freed without even being questioned. Prisoners have no rights and no standing except the sufferance of their captors. Any request for rights or for specific charges is answered by instant brutality.

Most of the victims are men. But a number of women are known to have been confined in various gendarmerie stations, where they were subject to any type of treatment their captors decreed. These included Russians and French in Shanghai, as well as native women; among them a few Chinese girl guerrillas. A few cases have been reported involving American women.

In Manila the main gendarmerie station is at Fort Santiago, an old Spanish building in the Walled City. Its long-disused dungeons were reopened by the Japanese, and many prisoners put in them. Others are kept in barren cells, sleeping on the floor, or, at best, on thin tatami matting. In Shanghai during extremely cold winters, one blanket sometimes is issued to ten men, huddled together on the concrete floor for warmth. Often their shoes are taken away

while in the cell. All races are mixed together—part of the attempt to humiliate the Occidental. Most of the women who were arrested were thrown in with the men.

Food is limited to two small balls of dry rice daily, about enough to fill the palm of the hand. In time, men of all social ranks fight bitterly for even this unpalatable and unsanitary mess, standing around the door at feeding time like ravenous dogs. Drinking water is scarce; washing facilities nonexistent and sanitary facilities primitive. Permission must be obtained to use them or to get a drink. Smoking is prohibited and so are books and all forms of recreation, except an occasional short exercise period under strict guard.

Sometimes, after weeks of persistent effort, relatives obtain permission to send small amounts of food and clothing to the victims. Infrequently, guards have been known to take bribes to procure food. Otherwise, the prisoner wears his same clothes constantly, and neither they nor he is washed. Vermin of all types are prevalent. He loses weight and strength rapidly on the gnat-sized diet. If his treatment is of average viciousness, he soon becomes so weak that after each inquisition he slinks back to his cell and lies still and ignored, easing his wounds the best he can. Even the hard concrete floor appears welcome, after a session in the torture chamber. Medical treatment is nonexistent, and doctors are summoned only for the severest cases, when the gendarmes feel that the man has a disease that threatens them or when the life of an important witness is endangered.

The strong survive, the weak die. The moans of many victims have ceased abruptly in the night, and the next morning their stiffened bodies are carted away like refuse.

Some of the tortures used by the Japanese are too vicious to be described. Others are well known through the appalling testimony of repatriated survivors. Death is not the aim, although it occurs frequently. The purpose is to break a man's spirit, to leave him alive but permanently scarred mentally, whether the immediate intent is to extract information, to punish or to use the victim as a spiritless symbol of gendarmerie might.

The most notorious method, perhaps, is the "water cure." The

victim is stretched out on his back, often on a medieval rack which stretches his arms and legs. Then gallons of water are poured down his nostrils through thin rubber tubes. The body swells painfully, blood trickles from the mouth and nose, due to internal hemorrhages, and the prisoner goes through the first choking stages of drowning. If he loses consciousness, he is jerked to his feet and slapped back to sensibility, then the treatment is continued. Several Americans have undergone this torture, some of them many times. They describe it as a "horrible nightmare."

The rack itself is used also, as are the lash, hanging by the wrists, electricity and chemicals which burn sensitive skin. Beatings are frequent and regular, usually with a heavily leaded club. The prisoner is often prodded with sharp bamboo spears, generally resulting in internal injury. Many are forced to sit all day, Japanese-style, in a half squat, with an iron bar through their doubled legs to increase the pain. The inquisitor may add his weight to heighten the pressure on knees which seem about to burst.

The Japanese are masters of mental torture as well. They capitalize on even the smallest detail to keep their victims and possible victims in a constant turmoil. Hostages, picked at random, are apt to disappear quietly from the streets, then reappear weeks later, haggard and worn, as examples to their relatives and friends. The secret police stage periodic "drives" in occupied cities. Sometimes these mass arrests are in connection with specific investigations, but generally they materialize for no apparent reason. Word spreads, and the individual remains under constant apprehension that he, or close friends, will be next.

Arrests often are made late at night, heralded by a loud pounding on the door. Gendarmes stalk in, their boots scuffing on the floor, and brusquely order the victim to dress. Sometimes they are accompanied by vicious, highly trained police dogs whose job is to prevent escapes. In a few moments the prisoner is hustled away into the night.

From then on, he is treated worse than a mongrel cur. All commands are given in a hoarse bark and generally in Japanese. The prisoner may be shoved around roughly for not understanding the

language. Taken to the station, he is thrust into a dark, filthy cell. He stumbles over the shadowy forms of perhaps a score of others, closely wedged on the floor, some of them too weak to move. The night is long and full of ghosts.

Prisoners often are required to witness the torture of another victim, sometimes a close personal friend. They are told that unless they "confess" to the fantastic crimes invented by the gendarmes, their wives or sweethearts will be arrested and raped in front of them. Sometimes they are bathed and shaved by a barber called in from the outside, while a gendarme intimates release is imminent. In this hope, the captive anticipates each day, only to realize at last that it was only another trick.

Every effort is made during questioning periods to arouse the prisoner's anger, by false accusations, endless repetition, gross personal insults. If he is goaded into attacking a gendarme, retaliation is horrible. Finally, the questioner issues a "friendly" warning. Unless he takes a "last chance" to satisfy the inquisitors, the prisoner will be shot the next morning.

The Japanese never have been able to understand why this threat fails to move their victims, to whom a bullet seems welcome at the moment. The Japanese soldier has been trained to believe an Occidental will do anything to avoid death; a type of "decadence," the teachers say, which demonstrates the superiority of the Japanese, whom they picture as universally unafraid of a violent end.

Even if he avoids the torture chambers, the victim carries to the outer world the deep nightmare of imprisonment and Japanese cruelty. He has seen the full measure of degradation within the satanic world of the gendarmerie station, even, perhaps, the diabolic "amusement" of off-duty military police. Often they place two native prisoners at opposite ends of the hallway and command them to run full tilt at each other, cracking their heads together until both are unconscious. They are beaten if they show pronounced gentleness.

These incidents and more like them occur within the relative secrecy of the gendarmerie stations. Each released prisoner is warned strictly against repeating his experiences. But the police

know he will. They know, too, that the moans of their victims can be heard at night for blocks around the station.

They intend that versions of Japanese power-cruelty be widely circulated throughout the populace to increase the intimidation of those the gendarmerie is too busy to arrest. For that reason, the jails generally are filled with more prisoners than the captors actually intend to question. They do not know it, but they have been designated as "observers" to witness all that goes on and to report what they have seen in whispered conversations after their release. That also is the purpose of the hostages.

By these efforts the secret police in the Philippines attempted to smother an underground movement before it could be born. Their agents also visited important cities and villages (barrios) and either arrested leading municipal and provincial authorities or gave them a clear understanding of what would happen to them if they failed to co-operate with the conquerors. The gendarmerie became the force behind the Japanese puppet government.

The general punishment for guerrillas and saboteurs is torture and then decapitation or the firing squad. That has happened to a number in the Philippines. We have every reason to believe this was the fate of American pilots, captured after the Tokyo raid of 1942, and possibly other airmen, forced down after attacks on Occupied China. At least one bomber crew was confined in the notorious "bridge house," Shanghai's central gendarmerie headquarters, before disappearing.

This also was the fate of Kuangson Young, the cultured Chungking Chinese consul general in Manila; twenty members of his staff and an unknown number of other Chinese were involved in the gendarmerie's vicious efforts to wipe out support of Chiang Kai-shek among the city's numerous Chinese. Hundreds of others were arrested and tortured. Weeks later, the controlled press reported that a number of prominent Chinese had made "voluntary" financial donations to the Wang Ching-wei government and had announced their "wholehearted" support of that puppet regime. They were buying protection from gendarmerie officers.

Torture without the death penalty is the punishment for less

serious "crimes" and, of course, is used whenever the victim possesses desired information or refuses to sign a bogus "confession." Maltreatment, or the threat of it, has been employed against American newspaper correspondents and engineers in an attempt to force them into employment by the Japanese. All of us correspondents were considered as spies and repeatedly reminded of the fact. Some of the known American and British informers were tortured into that degrading status. They carried on their activities in constant fear of a gendarmerie rearrest.

The extent of gendarmerie retaliation is exemplified by several months' imprisonment of three Manila newspapermen, as punishment for publishing articles against Japanese aggression before the Pacific war! They were Roy Bennett, editor of the Manila *Daily Bulletin*; Theo. H. Rogers and McCullough Dick, both of the Philippines *Free Press*. All were released subsequently. The first two then were interned in the Santo Tomas camp, while Dick went to a hospital.

In Shanghai, general internment of Occidental civilians did not begin until fourteen months after the outbreak of war. While relative freedom was permitted within the International Settlement areas south of Soochow creek, the gendarmerie was extremely busy among foreigners, and everyone fell under its menace. The secret police were interested particularly in accusing a number of innocent victims of espionage, simultaneously attempting to extract information concerning the city's political affairs. Within these general charges, a number of prominent Shanghailanders were incarcerated for months at a time. In some instances the arrests were clearly intended to humble men of important prewar positions and to extend, through them, the gendarmerie threat to unarrested Occidentals.

A number of retired U. S. naval men, most of whom had served in lower ranks, suffered the might of gendarmes who thought they possessed data concerning American naval affairs. One man who was prominent in a well-known American fraternal order was brutally grilled by kimpei who insisted that the organization was in

reality a secret patriotic-espionage group—such as Japan maintained in the United States—and that as an official he was a spy.

The gendarmerie disciplinary threat constantly shadows war prisoners and civilian internees. The military police are quick to move against real or imaginary infractions of rules and to grill any man suspected of possessing important information. In one civilian establishment a pompous Japanese official sent to a kimpei station an internee official who refused to serve decayed Japanese-issued fish to the prisoners and another internee who attempted to inform the Swiss Consulate about the camp's inadequate sanitation, unsafe buildings and deplorable food. They lived under the appalling conditions of gendarme custody for five months without being questioned or told the reason for their confinement. Finally, they were sent to another internment camp with the final advice that their experience would be an "object lesson" for the men with whom they previously had been interned.

No one knows how many Occidentals have died as the result of gendarmerie treatment, or, for that matter, the exact total of the thousands of natives. The secret police seldom advise the families of deceased prisoners. One case in which this was done is illustrative. Sir Vanderlur Grayburn, chief manager of the Hong Kong-Shanghai bank and one of the most prominent Britons in Asia, was taken to the Hong Kong gendarmerie station located in the former Stanley prison, within the confines of the Stanley civilian internment camp where his wife was kept. For three months he remained there, but his wife heard nothing about him, although she sometimes walked past the building. Then in September, 1943, the Japanese announced that he had died from beriberi, a painful dietary ailment. They delivered the body to interned doctors, but it was so badly decomposed they could not determine the actual cause of death.

Once I saw another British civilian gendarmerie victim a few hours before he died as the result of torture. He was William Hutton, formerly chief detective inspector, Shanghai Municipal Police. He had left the Haiphong Road camp merely as a witness for a friend, accused of violating a camp regulation. He was a husky,

good-natured chap who seemed able to take care of himself in any situation. Ten days later, when he was returned, the man was unrecognizable. Only half-conscious, he was out of his mind and continued so during the remaining forty-eight hours of his life; his face twisted in a horrible snarl, his shrunken body inert and helpless.

Hutton had lost forty pounds during the ten days. The only visible marks on him were welts from the thongs which had bound his arms and an inexplicable series of thin, razor-like scratches on his legs. But the full extent of the experience was plain in his face. Only one thing lifted him out of his coma—the sight of a Japanese uniform. When a soldier came into the room he occupied in the camp hospital, he raised up in instant recognition and started to crawl out of bed toward him, hatred clearly written across his twisted lips. The soldier fled.

Transferred to an outside hospital, Hutton died without regaining his senses. His wife was notified on the day of the funeral. The Japanese attempted to explain the incident by claiming the prisoner had attacked the gendarmes. Yet, even if this were so, the ferocity of the reprisal not only was unwarranted, but it appalled some of the regular Japanese army officers who knew the details. The few Japanese civilians who heard the story were plainly shocked and apologetic. The average Japanese, particularly in Japan, has no conception of the extent of gendarmerie oppression, although he is aware of its methods, which have been used against his own countrymen.

Most of the Occidentals apprehended by the military police were released after their inquisitions. A number of them were repatriated, and the remainder now are interned, still subject to gendarmerie rearrest. A few foreigners received formal sentences, usually for "espionage." Some of them now are in Oriental jails under conditions only slightly better than those of the gendarmerie stations, but minus the maltreatment. In most instances the sentences were suspended for a period of years. A few have been "granted" amnesty or had their sentences reduced on special occasions, such as the emperor's birthday and the so-called anniversary of the empire, when this practice is customary.



One elderly Occidental had a typical experience with this type of Japanese "justice." He was taken by the gendarmerie from a civilian internment camp, questioned and tortured for two weeks in an attempt to force the confession that he had been a spy. Finally, when he was so weak he could not walk, he was told that the "charges" had been dismissed and he would be returned to the civilian camp. In his state of mind the ordinary camp was a haven, and his spirits revived when he left the gendarmerie center. They died soon. He was whisked to a regular jail and there informed that he had been sentenced for three years as a spy. It was the first he knew of any hearing which convicted him. Disconsolately, he spent the night in jail, contemplating suicide. The next day he was hustled out again and taken to his regular camp. Gendarmes said he had been pardoned on the occasion of the emperor's birthday.

These amnesty lists customarily affect only a small proportion of the prisoners under sentence. The extent of gendarmerie activities among all races in the Philippines is indicated by the fact that a total of two hundred and eight prisoners were pardoned and seventy-six others given a reduction in time on three of the occasions when such "generosity" was shown, including a "special" list after inauguration of the new "republic." All of these men, who were mostly Filipinos and Chinese, had been sentenced under martial law. In other words they formed a small percentage of those receiving formal imprisonment after gendarmerie investigation; in turn only a fraction of the total number were "investigated" by the secret police.

With the gendarmerie omnipresent in the background, military control over civilians in the Philippines was emphasized with daily regularity. The Japanese well know the necessity of constant repetition when dealing with Orientals. Officers and men swaggered among the Filipinos, often beating them or jabbing them out of the way with sheathed swords, for no apparent reason except to reiterate the might of conquerors. Many were beaten for bringing parcels to the Americans and British interned in Santo Tomas; but the Japanese did not prohibit the practice, and hundreds of Filipinos visited the camp daily.

The Japanese often marched gangs of Filipino men barefooted through the city's streets or forced them to lie for hours on their backs, unsheltered from the broiling sun—the infamous “sun treatment.” Apparently this was the punishment of forced labor crews whose efforts were too slow. It was a type of humiliating treatment which the Japanese expected to spread respect for their power, but actually it only increased the people's hidden rage.

Such a deliberate campaign of force was behind the two most atrocious incidents which occurred in the Philippines—the “March of Death” across Bataan and the March Through Manila of captured American and Filipino soldiers. Those of us who were there at the time heard most of the details through the grapevine. The stories of escaped survivors reaching the United States were absolutely correct, although probably incomplete.

All Manila knew what happened on Bataan after the capitulation—the decapitation of men found with Japanese souvenirs; the murder of wounded and sick soldiers unable to keep up with the straggling columns in the seventy-five-mile march to Pampanga; the burial alive of some of them; the refusal to give food or water to the starving and the thirsty; the beatings and the torture; the venom of the “sun treatment”; then, later, the forced labor of sick and weakened men, hundreds of whom died; the beating and killing of those who tried to escape; the agonizing deaths, thousands of them, from disease, for which there were neither medicines nor even primitive hospital facilities.

Some of these atrocities doubtless resulted from the hysterical vengeance created by the stout American-Filipino defense of Bataan with the subsequent loss of face to the Japanese. But behind it was the cold, calculating, far more reprehensible hand of the gendarmerie and the regular officers who deliberately sought to break the spirits of their captives to prevent disciplinary problems in the prison camps. Simultaneously, they intended to impress the Filipinos with their might through the humiliation of the “proud” Americans.

That cold-blooded attempt to crush the spirits of worthy opponents was demonstrated time and again. It was shown by the length

of the march required of these war-weakened men, by the denial of food and water. That was why the prisoners were forced to retrace their steps of a half day's march; why they were repeatedly given the "sun treatment." The first men who attempted to escape from prison camps were horribly tortured, then killed; later, other escapees were beaten but not shot. At the outset, any attempt to buy food from Filipinos outside the camps brought the death penalty; subsequently, the practice was permitted.

On a lesser scale, the same motivation more clearly marked the March Through Manila, shortly after the fall of Corregidor, May 6. The captured Americans and Filipinos from that fortress, dazed, sick and weakened after their prolonged siege under terrific bombardment, were kept for ten days without shelter on one of the fortress' seaplane ramps, with only a handful of rice and a dribble of water.

Taken to Manila in launches, they were forced to wade ashore, so that they appeared even more bedraggled than their experiences had made them. Throughout the five-mile march they were goaded every step of the way by bayonets and the flat side of officers' swords. Hundreds of American and Filipino civilians witnessed the spectacle, among them wives and babies of the maltreated men. Many tossed them food and ices, but the Japanese snatched them from the prisoners' hands. The mournful parade proceeded down Dewey Boulevard and through the center of the city. There were none of the assassinations of Bataan; just a heartless attempt to humiliate and cow brave men, to enhance "respect" for the conquerors.

The next Japanese attempt to capitalize upon the wretched conditions in the prison camps was so patent that it, too, might have been planned beforehand around some diabolical conference table.



## chapter three

# HOSTAGE ARMY

FILIPINO soldiers who survived the weary days of Bataan shared the accumulated misery of prison camps with their American comrades; shared it until their spirits were so broken that no price seemed too great for release. There was a price when thousands of them finally were granted "freedom"—continued military service, under the Japanese.

Within six months after Bataan's capitulation, the conquerors began a systematic release of Filipino war prisoners. The ill were sent to special isolation hospitals, and the able-bodied were reunited with their families. Propagandists screamed about the "generosity" of this policy. But before leaving the camp, each man signed a pledge of "co-operation" with the invaders and enrolled himself for immediate or future service in the Philippine constabulary.

Before the war, that organization was the police force for the archipelago's outlying districts, with a deserved reputation for integrity and bravery. Today it is the openly labeled army of the bogus "republic." It will be sent to the battlefield when Allied forces attack the Philippines, supporting Puppet President Jose P. Laurel's oft-repeated pledge to "defend the fatherland." Behind the Filipino troops will be Japanese machine guns.

The fact that large numbers of Filipino prisoners still were imprisoned when we left Asia shows how thoroughly the Japanese investigated before permitting releases. They were not interested in humanitarianism or in winning popular support by freeing war captives. They wanted trained men for their new army. Those

whose pro-Americanism or anti-Japanism had not been destroyed by hardship were left to rot, at least until they were more amenable.

The Japanese claim fifteen thousand former Filipino soldiers are free now and working, including two thousand "employed by Japanese firms." The total undoubtedly is too high. But several thousand were involved in the widely publicized releases, occurring every few months, usually one thousand at a time. Many were required to report for constabulary duty within forty-eight hours. The remainder, most of whom were ill, were given more time.

The new lives of these men inexorably are being diverted toward war. They are praised by Japanese propagandists as examples of the "rejuvenated Filipino spirit." The controlled newspapers constantly urge the employment of ex-soldiers. In some cases civilians are ordered to show special courtesy to them. The emphasis is upon creating a military class, with its own war psychology, in a nation whose prolonged vassalage has prevented the emergence of such a group heretofore. Indirectly, the conquerors intend to win support by supposedly overlooking the "sin" of their prior service with American forces.

Constabulary service has become a new career for both the ex-soldiers and other able-bodied young Filipinos, seeking either to evade Japanese forced labor or to ride the crest of acclaim being given that organization. At first, under the Japanese, the constabulary continued its normal police functions. Slowly, through special schools, the Japanese extended the training of regular members and new recruits beyond the small arms they usually used. They were indoctrinated with Japanism.

First instructors included several high-ranking officers of the former Philippine army, released early from imprisonment, flanked by Japanese "experts." Later the Filipino officers were given high constabulary positions.

Under the stress of wartime disemployment, force and persuasion, the constabulary grew from its normal complement of ten thousand men to more than thirty thousand by the time the "republic" was established in October, 1943. Its police duties continued, but they were more nefarious. The press declared it had co-op-

erated with regular Japanese army units in several forays against Filipino guerrillas. Unconfirmed reports also said the constabulary had renewed its long battle against Moro tribes in the southern islands, some of whom appeared to be resisting the Japanese as fully as they fought the Americans at the turn of the century.

Early in 1944 the constabulary was militarized openly and placed under the command of a Filipino general, "assisted" by Japanese commanders.

This standing army is being groomed for the prospective battle of "defense." Its training undoubtedly has been intense, while propagandists continue their attempts to increase military consciousness through persistent flattery of "warriors" and emphasis upon "protecting" the new republic. The survivors of one war campaign will be forced into service for the second, as the nucleus of this auxiliary Japanese force. Well before the Allied attack is expected, it is likely the Japanese will compel President Laurel to decree universal conscription.

The first step toward that move apparently was taken in February, 1944. A Japanese broadcast said President Laurel received from the National Assembly virtually dictatorial power under the Japanese to "take and adopt any measure that may be necessary for the safety, protection and relief of the population."

Several provisions in the new Philippine constitution legalize compulsory military service for Filipinos, although the document does not specifically mention conscription. The president is named the commander in chief of all armed forces and "whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawlessness, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. . . ." Another constitutional clause specifies: "It is the duty of every citizen to render personal and civil service as may be required by law. . . ."

What influence would these Filipino troops have on another Philippine campaign? The answer is clouded by a number of intangible factors. The full extent of Japan's program of force and persuasion will not be known until an emergency arises. Undoubtedly there are some in the new army who are or could be convinced that they would be fighting for their homeland against an "ag-

gressor." All indications are that this viewpoint is rare and not shared by the majority of Filipinos on Luzon, at least. Nevertheless, the ruthless force which has produced ostensible conformance to Japanese rule also will send thousands into the fight.

The conquerors expect that Filipino troops will be a deterrent to an Allied attack on the islands, which they anticipate. They believe we will be loath to risk the future enmity of the Filipinos by killing their troops or destroying their cities. (Yet the majority of Filipinos, in Manila anyway, are living primarily for the day when the Americans return.) The Japanese reason further that several thousand native troops, placed in exposed positions, can be made to fight for their lives, thereby providing an added obstacle to the Americans, at minimum cost to the Japanese themselves.

The new army also represents a Japanese dodge to avoid ultimate responsibility for the archipelago's defense. If their resistance is overcome and the Philippines are lost, the Japanese—from their viewpoint—could retire without too much loss of face by saying they had supported a "free people" in their battle as fully as defense requirements elsewhere allowed. Through President Laurel they are attempting to transform the prospective campaign into purely a Filipino fight for the "homeland" with Japanese "support."

For the Japanese, as well as the Allies, the Philippines are a vital military objective. The archipelago contains over seven thousand islands, flung across more than one thousand miles of ocean. It has become an important link in Japan's imperial system, centering shipping lines which fan out to the southern areas. Its raw resources, many of them war essentials, are being sent regularly back to the homeland. It has become a repair and recuperative center for military units back of the front.

The archipelago, with Formosa, forms a major part of the conquerors' "secondary" defense arc, protecting the southwest's war material regions and the communication lines linking them to the homeland. Severance of those sea routes by Allied units based in the Philippines or Formosa would be a major blow to Japanese resistance, forcing them to tap the stock piles of supplies accumulated during the exploitation of newly conquered areas. One or

both of these objectives would be an indispensable staging base for the assault on South China, promised in 1944 by Admiral Chester Nimitz.

Mindanao, the most important island in the southern Philippines, is approximately seven hundred miles from Balikpapan, center of the Borneo oil fields. Once regained, that island could anchor a great wheeling amphibious attack against Borneo and other points in the Netherlands East Indies.

All indications are that the Japanese will fight bitterly to retain the Philippines, and that Allied attackers will find there some of the Empire's best troops and stoutest defenses.

Since 1943 Japanese newspapers openly have discussed the "inevitability" of an Allied assault on the archipelago. They expect the first blows to be struck at Mindanao and other southern islands, including Cebu, Negros and Panay. These islands, they said at first, are "well prepared" for the attack; but even if the Allies should take Mindanao, they will not move against Luzon whose "defenses are too strong for the Americans to take the risk."

The theme changed after the American invasion of Saipan island in the Marianas in June, 1944. Then, the controlled *Manila Tribune* implied Japanese anticipation of an assault against the entire archipelago. It said: "The Philippine fortress . . . a gigantic flotilla of unsinkable aircraft carriers," is ready to repel any invasion and to launch "last and consummative operations" as Japan again "takes the offensive." The paper added in late July: "It is lucidly clear that the foe will eventually turn to the Philippines. . . . We of the Philippines realize that the enemy of our freedom, sober dignity and happiness is now staring us in the face."

Defense corps were organized among civilians to increase war-awareness through instruction in air raid precautions, first aid and similar activities. The Central Luzon Defense Corps produced a new development in August, 1944, to extend Japanese thought control. It organized what Domei, the Japanese news agency, called "comrade groups," designed "to further strengthen the defense organizations and to promote a sense of responsibility among its members." Each group consisted of five members, selected by the nature



of their "work" (presumably in civilian defense) and their residence. Each was headed "by a teacher or by a person qualified to teach." By this, the news agency added, "the past shortcomings are expected to be eliminated and defense preparations are expected to be perfected to meet the enemy's counteroffensive."

But the Japanese name for these groups was *keibodan*, which can be translated as "defense police." The "instructor" easily could be a Japanese or a Filipino whose loyalty had been tested, and might be a military officer. The "comrade groups" probably were intended to augment gendarmerie control over civilians who, the Japanese recognized, would be a potential menace during a new military campaign.

A cabinet reshuffle in August, 1944, also seemed to be connected with the imminence of direct warfare. Laurel relinquished two of the ministries he had been holding concurrently and added two new men to the cabinet. Justice Minister Teofilo Sison, a former associate justice of the supreme court, succeeded the president as home affairs minister. Pedro Sabido moved from secretary of the economic planning board to economics minister. Quintin Paredes, former resident commissioner in Washington, became the new justice minister. His old position, minister of public works and communications, was filled by Jose Paez, director of the Japanese-organized Philippine Red Cross and prominent in civilian defense.

None of these men is known for blatant pro-Japanism. The ministries affected are most directly concerned with domestic problems in times of stress. Probably the Filipinos were adjusting their government in an attempt to prepare for future hardships within the country. The heavy Japanese hand seemed missing from the reorganization.

The Japanese began to rebuild defenses almost as soon as they occupied the Philippines. Their usual tenacity, determination and ruthlessness have gone into the program. They used hundreds of forced Filipino laborers and, in at least one instance, captured American technicians on a number of major projects. Labor troubles, reported occasionally, were stopped with gendarmerie brutality.

The masters do not worry that the usual pay for the Filipinos, one peso daily, is literally a starvation wage.

Distrusting the Filipinos, the conquerors have taken elaborate precautions to preserve secrecy. There have been stories, unconfirmed but possible, that they killed the workers after completion of key projects. Others have been transferred from job to job, before any reached an important stage, to prevent espionage. None but Japanese have been allowed on Corregidor for more than a year, during which, presumably, the final touches were applied to that island's defense. In early reconstruction, ten captured American engineers and hundreds of Filipinos were required to work on the fortress. It is possible the war prisoners sent to Davao, Mindanao, for forced labor have been employed on defense measures, as well as roads.

The Japanese are known to be using most of the former American military sites, including Cavite. Reports circulating in Manila said they were transforming a former Spanish underground aqueduct system into an ammunition dump, and were attempting the construction of hidden aircraft hangars, sunk into mountains, such as those they employ on Truk and Formosa. It is certain they have flanked these preparations with fixed heavy artillery on strategic heights, particularly behind potential landing points, plus numerous pillboxes and blockhouses in such important areas as Bataan.

The best estimate of the Japanese Luzon garrison, in late 1943, was less than one hundred thousand men. They could be easily reinforced from Formosa prior to any attack. Reports from Chungking in August, 1944, said Japanese reinforcements had been sent to the Philippines.

From all signs, the Japanese defensive strategy will be twofold. They will attempt to inflict severe losses on landing forces; then, particularly on Luzon, their intention will be prolonged toe hold fighting, to hold out as long as possible and to extend the entire war. Islands as large and as numerous as those in the Philippines have too many potential beachheads for a defensive power to protect each possible site adequately, without employing tremendous forces.

Several indications underline the prospect that the Japanese hope to transform Luzon into another New Britain when the crisis comes there. Unconfirmed but persistent reports in Manila said they had rushed the completion of a string of pillboxes in Cagayan valley, at the northeastern extremity of the island. Removed from all important battlefields by a series of mountain chains, the valley pursues a tortuous pathway toward Aparri, the northern hamlet where the Japanese made their first landing. It is a short hop from there to Formosa.

These stories apparently were supported, in 1944, by a Japanese broadcast which reported completion of a road from the northwestern coast of the island to the valley. The Cagayan blockhouses would enable sizable Japanese units to remain on the island long after Allied forces had swept down the central plains to Manila. Eventually they would have to be rooted out, in what might be a costly campaign. Meanwhile, they could live off the rich terrain, while propagandists boasted the Allies had "failed" to subdue the Japanese "allies" of the Filipino "defenders." Luzon itself totals about forty thousand square miles, more than twice the size of the entire Bismarck Archipelago, of which New Britain is a part. It has many other remote regions where fugitive troops could live.

The conquerors apparently also believe they can siphon American forces into a second battle of Bataan in the ultimate struggle for Manila Bay. The theory of fortified Corregidor is that it can be made too powerful for direct assault by sea. Despite its retrogression, the "Rock" was too formidable for Japanese naval assault. Undoubtedly strengthened now, it may be able to inflict greater damage on even our sizable fleet than is warranted. The only other approaches are across the bay from Manila, which the Japanese tried with heavy loss of life, and via Bataan which ends barely three miles from the tadpole-shaped fortress.

If we are forced into the peninsula's jungles, another costly campaign is prospective. American-Filipino forces held off an enemy outnumbering them perhaps two and one-half to one for five months, without sufficient food, munitions or relief; with no air power, no blockhouses and little artillery. After more than two

years' intensive preparation, the Japanese could make the road difficult even against our increasing power.

They intend to make the Philippine campaign as extended and as costly as possible. Our return to the islands is necessary strategically and also politically. If we do not regain them by assault, the Japanese, even in general defeat, could say to the Filipinos and their Asiatic brothers:

"Look at the Philippines. The Americans promised independence, then delayed. We gave it to them. The Americans brought war to their islands, then fled. We stayed until the end, and they were afraid to drive us out."

But we are going back to the Philippines. The Japanese know it, and the Filipinos are waiting for it. But the conquerors will be fighting for time, every inch of the way, not only in conformity with Tokyo's central war plan, but to perpetuate their exploitation of the natural and human resources in the new empire.

:



## chapter four

# SPOILS OF CONQUEST

**F**LYING from Tokyo, Japanese civilian exploiters followed the troops into Manila. They came in waves—bespectacled technicians, mining engineers, chemists and agriculturists; well-dressed bankers, economists and businessmen; government experts, with fat portfolios and a cocky manner; thin, nervous propagandists and “newspaper correspondents.” They were to co-ordinate long-prepared plans, consolidating the Japanese hold on Manila and northern Luzon, and preparing for the fullest exploitation after the islands capitulated.

While the Battle of Bataan continued—so viciously that Japanese soldiers who went there told friends they never expected to return—and thousands of Filipinos subsisted on near starvation rations, these Japanese transformed Manila into a gay rendezvous. Most of the night clubs and restaurants were kept open and new ones appeared later. Captured liquor stocks seemed plentiful. Theaters continued to operate. The conquerors established a red-light district in the center of town, utilizing camp followers who accompanied the troops and local girls. Soldiers and colonists weaved through streets made empty at night by a sundown curfew. Officers and top-ranking civilians drove gaily around the city in confiscated automobiles which became more battered each day. When captured gasoline stocks were exhausted, the cars were transformed into charcoal burners.

Manila was brighter and more comfortable than any city in Japan, even though the blackout was re-established in January after the

one-plane American raid. Food for the conquerors were plentiful and better than they could get at home. The buildings they occupied had been untouched by bombing. Utilities continued to function, maintained by American engineers who were confined to their office premises for months, until Japanese technicians finally understood the plants and took them over. Then the Americans were interned.

About three thousand five hundred American and British men, women and children were confined in the Santo Tomas. Perhaps another thousand were released from the camp for several reasons on passes that sometimes were good for months. They lived in their own homes and generally avoided the downtown districts. So did the majority of Filipinos, except those continuing their jobs. The poor struggled for a living. The more fortunate subsisted on supplies cached before the war or on purchases from high-priced markets. They tried to fashion a social life centering around their homes. Many planted vegetable gardens to ease the food problem, and turned to bicycles for transportation and sports for recreation.

The Japanese civilians felt good. They were winning the war. They were top dogs in a former American community, and Japan's might was being spread throughout the archipelago. Their nagging inferiority complex could be stilled. The civilians moved into former American offices. They wore well-tailored sharkskin suits and smoked big cigars, a form of tobacco seldom seen in Japan. In the best hotels and former American clubs they drank American whisky and ate American food. Other Japanese—serious, fanatic—were trying to spread the culture of Japan. "*Hen, desu ne?*"—"Strange, isn't it?" The men at the top were going American, in everything but language and fundamental outlook. They liked the western comforts that Tokyo's extremists had been condemning for many years.

But that was all on the surface. That was Manila. There was work to be done, and they turned to it with typical intensity. The civilians brought out prefabricated plans for a stranglehold on every phase of the economic, political and social life of the archipelago's sixteen million citizens.

The visiting businessmen and bankers worked closely with the

militarists for a "redistribution" of the archipelago's assets. American, British and Dutch banks and trading concerns were closed, the stocks of the latter being distributed either to army units or Japanese profiteers for resale on Asia's black markets. Other businessmen took over the "enemy alien" small manufacturing plants and retail businesses which were not involved in the war effort. Filipino banks, closed at the occupation, were reopened under Japanese supervision a few weeks later. Three newspapers resumed publication under the conquerors' control—the *Manila Tribune*, in English; *Taliba*, in Tagalog, and *La Vanguardia*, Spanish, all belonging to the Filipino-owned T-V-T Publishing Company. Other Filipino enterprises, notably the government cotton-spinning mill, were maintained ostensibly under Filipino management, but with hidden Japanese hands guiding policy and sharing the profits. Interisland communications were restored by sailboat within a few months, on the same basis. Chinese merchants continued to monopolize Manila's retail trade, while the gendarmerie visited them to assure their "loyalty" to the new regime.

The archipelago's twenty-one good harbors were all being utilized within a short time after the final capitulation. For "strategic reasons" they remained under the control of the military administration. Railroads outwardly were administered by the puppet Filipino government, with Japanese experts in control and Japanese soldiers riding the trains and guarding key bridges, most of which had not been destroyed. Extensive programs for agricultural development of public lands and the control of essential foodstuffs were inaugurated under semiofficial control organizations, dominated by the Japanese. The government-owned Manila Hotel was taken over by the army, without missing a day's service. The Bay View and adjacent apartment houses went to the navy.

Great Japanese banks, the Yokohama Specie and Bank of Taiwan, shared the official Japanese business in the islands. They received large loans from Tokyo, in printing-press money, to finance the exploitation of former American-dominated mines, sugar mills and plantations. Monopolistic contracts for developing vital resources were given to the financial "pets" of the army and navy—the oli-

garchic houses of Mitsui and Mitsubishi. In late 1943, these affairs were consolidated under the newly created Southern Development Bank, a huge control company for all the southern regions.

This bank, which has a counterpart in every imperial area, supervises all phases of economic exploitation, granting contracts only to those Japanese businesses in military favor. The scheme was evolved in Manchuria, the militarists' imperialistic experimental laboratory. It guarantees big profits for key officers and businessmen, intensifies the "development" of occupied areas and preserves them as the exclusive hunting grounds of the privileged few.

Enemy property was confiscated without so much as a receipt. Liquidation was never even mentioned, except for an abrupt call on loans by the Philippine National Bank, shortly after the Japanese allowed it to reopen. Japanese profiteers were impatient for every centavo they could add to the individual fortunes upon which they hoped to live after the war. Every Japanese who was allowed to come to the islands got his share of the "squeeze," from the businessman to the army private.

Soon the Japanese were tapping the islands' wealth. Despite reported sabotage by American engineers, most major mines were restored to production quickly. The conquerors sent hundreds of boats, of all sizes, loaded with cargo back to their home industrial areas during their first two years' work. Many were sunk, but most of them completed the voyage. Until our submarine campaign was accelerated, the route was relatively safe.

The Philippines, rich in natural resources, provide many important materials for the Japanese war machine. Foremost among them are copper and manganese and chromite, for making steel. Chromite deposits are considered high-grade and plentiful. Copper, neglected under American-dominated economy, was one of the first resources the invaders sought. The invaders also attempted to exploit reported deposits of wolframite, the chief ore of tungsten, used for armor-piercing steel. They have allowed no word to leak out concerning the results.

The islands have sizable deposits of low-grade iron ore, for which Japan was the principal customer before the war, lead, zinc and coal.



Petroleum has been reported. Two of the richest resources, gold and silver, are temporarily useless to the conquerors; but, within the limits of wartime mining, Japanese profiteers will take all of these precious metals they can, to hold for the day when the world returns to these monetary standards.

Agriculturally, the archipelago produces abaca, or Manila hemp, copra, timber and other products. Sugar, the main crop, has been extremely useful for industrial alcohol, and the Japanese are utilizing all they can produce. At the outset of occupation, raw sugar was the most prevalent commodity in Manila, because several thousand tons, awaiting shipment to the United States, never left the warehouses. Today, the Manilan is limited to about a tablespoon of sugar every other day. This essential is scarce throughout the empire, but rations are noticeably lower in the main producing areas, which include Java and French Indo-China. In addition to the current use of alcohol for explosives, the Japanese apparently are storing large quantities for the artificial rubber they expect to manufacture in Manchuria after they lose Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.

At the outset of the occupation, propagandists announced grandiose schemes for diverting "unnecessary" sugar cane lands to cotton and rice production. A year later they boastfully announced more cane was being planted, further evidence of that crop's increased war value.

Nevertheless, extensive "five-year" plans are under way throughout the empire to increase the output of cotton and essential foodstuffs. (The five-year plan also came from the Manchurian laboratory, developed under Soviet-hating officers who ignore its imitation of Russian methods.) In the Philippines cotton was to become a major crop within a year. Prewar experiments proved good short staple could be grown quickly. Useful as a war essential, it was intended also as a future economic link with the islands in the post-war world. "The Filipinos," said Japanese economists, "will have to sell their cotton to Japan. No one else will buy it."

Extensive areas were planted in cotton, and propagandists enthusiastically reported "excellent" results. Yet, in late 1943, the

archipelago was placed on a clothing ration which, in the tropics, means principally cotton. Each individual was limited to eighty points annually, entitling him to about six yards of cloth. While this policy does not prove total failure of the plan, it shows that war industries absorb all production. An open cotton market amid war would have permitted a propaganda boast the Japanese would not have ignored.

The Philippines had great potentialities as the "breadbasket" for occupying forces and troops on near-by fronts. In peacetime the islands imported considerable rice from Indo-China to augment their insufficient production of three million tons annually. But only about a seventh of the arable land was cultivated when the Japanese arrived. They planned an extensive increase in rice and other foodstuffs, using force to circumvent tropical indolence. Propagandists scolded the farmers for neglecting their "opportunities" and promised the islands would reach self-sufficiency. Instead of the usual one crop a year, the conquerors proposed that two and possibly three be raised.

The entire production and distribution of edibles is under a central Foodstuff Control Association, whose officials in Manila determine the price to be paid the farmer, an inflexible price which he must accept. The Japan Cotton Growing Association works the same way for that commodity. "Producers' associations," formed in every agricultural center, take over each crop, after harvesting, for the enforced price. By August, 1944, the names, but not the method, had changed.

But the Japanese encountered difficulties in their planned agricultural self-sufficiency. The goal is far distant, although they evidently have increased production. When American repatriates traveled by train across Luzon, in the fall of 1943, to meet the exchange liner, they saw Filipino workers in numerous rice paddies guarded by bayoneted Japanese soldiers. They also saw vast sections of untilled land.

The controlled Manila press has published several pictures of ships unloading imported rice, presumably from Indo-China. Labeled as evidence of Japan's "concern" for the Filipinos' welfare, this was

more like an admission of defeat. Rice continuously has been available on the capital's market, but it is of inferior quality. That indicates the Japanese army has absorbed whatever increase has been forced out of the farmers, and the citizens eat the less desirable imports. It is likely the people's sullen indifference shown in a few other instances, has sabotaged the Japanese program.

Nevertheless, the conquerors are still trying. The virtual dictatorial powers granted to President Laurel in February, 1944, allowed him—said Domei—to “take over farm lands in order to put to use all available land heretofore not in cultivation.” The “republic” thereby shoulders the blame for renewed gendarmerie force to obtain greater production. The same Domei report said the decrees further permitted the president to “take over all unproductive industrial and commercial establishments to insure continued normal production.” With war approaching the islands, the Japanese rein tightens.

Food has been a consistently grave Philippine problem which the conquerors, typically, have not attempted to solve. Throughout Asia, their sole concern with people who are growing hungrier is to give them enough to prevent discomfiting riots. Otherwise the populace can starve.

Widespread distress followed the Japanese into Manila. Farmers, fleeing to the hills from the advancing army, had left their fields, and fighting in the interior had destroyed much additional agricultural acreage. Communications were severed between the capital and farming areas. Only a dribble of food came into the city, dependent upon normal day-to-day deliveries.

The Japanese military administration ignored the problem of feeding Filipinos and Occidental internees. The task fell upon the Philippine Red Cross, a branch of the American Red Cross. The latter's American officials were interned. At best, their preoccupation preparations were inadequate. They broke down completely when military authorities sealed the organization's warehouses and froze its bank account. Judge Manuel Camus, who headed the Filipino branch, and his assistants talked for days to stubborn officers before obtaining some of their locked foodstuffs. They solicited

financial donations from Filipinos and Chinese to handle cash transactions for weeks before the Japanese permitted bank withdrawals.

In late January, the Philippine Red Cross by these catch-as-catch-can methods was feeding approximately eighty thousand of the city's destitute Filipinos. In long lines they received this daily ration: 150 grams of cracked wheat, a small quantity of dried fish and some sugar. Other Filipinos went hungry or scurried for underpaid jobs for purchases in under-supplied markets.

Months later the Japanese made a gesture toward easing the emergency for propaganda reasons. They granted small amounts of their military currency to the Filipino organization. Eventually they supplanted it with their own "Philippine Red Cross." The military administration also gave tiny food supplies to some Manila neighborhoods whose reputation for restlessness implied serious trouble with increased want. At best, however, relief was minute and limited to less than a seventh of the population. Japanese efforts were all surface show. The average Filipino was left to shift for himself. There was probably a not unplanned corollary: Thousands of the disemployed, unable to support themselves, became conscripts for the first Japanese labor gangs.

Hesitant farmers were enticed back to their fields by propaganda stories that "peace and order" had been restored; and, more effectively, forced back by gendarmerie threats of retaliation upon relatives and friends. This promise was circulated in half deserted interior barrios by military police agents, reaching the fugitive farmers through the omnipresent grapevine. Even so, the peasants at first refused to make the long, dangerous trek into Manila. Sentries so robbed and browbeat them that the journey was unprofitable, a situation familiar in China. In time, however, the situation eased. Filipino officials, who actually feared the city's starvation, relaxed.

There were rice and some fish, although Japanese "military necessity" prohibited deep-sea fishing. Tropical fruits were plentiful, and vegetables were available. Canned goods and beef could be obtained for a price for the few months that stocks imported before the war lasted. In time meat was limited largely to carabao (water buffalo)

which tasted of mud wallows, then the Japanese prohibited further slaughter of these essential agricultural animals. Flour was scarce and moldy; dairy products nonexistent, except unpalatable carabao milk; poultry, always limited, soon disappeared, except ducks and their strong eggs.

Prices began to climb immediately, forced upward by profiteers who preyed both upon the scarcities and popular suspicion of the bayonet-backed currency. The Japanese clamped strict rations on fish, rice, sugar, meat and other items. As usual the official ration was less than ordinarily consumed, and those who could afford it were forced to buy additional supplies from the flourishing black market.

The Filipino puppet "executive comission," the first occupation "government," established a Price Stabilization Board, under Filipino officials. It lacked power, however, to enforce the elaborate list of official prices. Generally the Japanese paid little attention to universal infractions. Their "economic police," who in this case were gendarmes, ignored Filipino profiteers unless their violations became too flagrant, because they were interested in courting good will. But they made numerous raids on Chinese retailers and confiscated their stocks for charging the then current prices. Everyone guessed the stocks were resold to Japanese profiteers for the black market. The Japanese consistently attempted to convince the Filipinos the Chinese retail monopoly was being broken.

By the middle of 1943, all imported items virtually had disappeared, even from the black market. Only limited supplies of Japanese canned foods and no textiles had arrived; due to the severe curtailment of commodity production within Japan and the shipping shortage. Even if they were willing, however, the Japanese could not have replaced vital medicines and such essentials as canned milk which they lacked themselves. A tall tin of canned milk soon sold for \$2.25; and Klim, when obtainable, was \$20 a pound.

The Japanese reaction to this one situation was typical. When American Red Cross supplies, shipped on the *Gripsholm's* outward 1942 voyage, reached Manila in January, 1943, they included many cases of canned milk consigned to civilian and war prisoners. None

ever reached the Americans. But soon the newspapers advertised "American Carnation Milk—for mothers and children" at 28 cents for each large tin. The sale was designed to influence Filipino opinion, while some Japanese profiteer pocketed a small but secure profit. Thousands of American cigarettes which the Red Cross intended for the captives, also were sold this way.

Most of the medicines were removed before the Red Cross comfort kits finally were delivered. They went to the Japanese army. Drugs and medical supplies of all kinds are alarmingly scarce in the islands. A single aspirin tablet costs 15 cents, and then the purchaser gambles, for medical counterfeiters manufactured thousands of spurious and harmful tablets.

In late 1943, sugar, which once sold for 5 cents a pound, averaged \$1.40 per pound. American soap cost \$2.25 a cake; corned beef, \$6.25 per can; peaches, \$3.25 for a small can. Native fruits and vegetables kept pace. A small pineapple was 60 cents; a tiny carrot, 13 cents for one; a cucumber, 15 cents; bananas and native oranges, 5 cents each; a small onion, 25 cents; white potatoes, which were scarce, 85 cents a pound; camotes (native sweet potatoes), 20 cents a pound. The lowly duck egg was 18 cents each, and garlic reached the ultimate—\$6.25 a pound.

(Prices are computed on the basis of the former 2/1 rate for the American dollar; the only accurate criterion, regardless of the Japanese currency's worthlessness, because bank account withdrawals and private loans were based on that rate.)

These living costs paced and were part of the sad, nervous life in Manila. That life was built upon the distrust and despair brought by the conquerors, mixed with the constant hope that American forces would return. As prices skyrocketed, the frenzy to make money increased; any kind of money, including Japanese notes, then circulating almost exclusively. The Philippine peso was circulated slowly, because hoarders trusted its postwar redemption value. Chinese and Filipino profiteers spent wildly and were willing for any gamble. Their Japanese currency would be valueless when the Americans returned.

Extensive loans were made to Americans, interned and free, on

the basis of dollars or Philippine pesos. Generally they were unsecured, usually unwritten. Personal checks also were cashed, to be held for postwar redemption. The creditor took a "modest" profit, sometimes as high as  $33\frac{1}{3}$  per cent. He reached the internees through regular and sometimes official channels. Japanese discovery of such a transaction usually brought a severe gendarmerie grilling to both parties.

Big profits came to only a relatively few in the capital. They lived high, many of them openly associating with the Japanese. Night clubs and theaters were augmented by the reopening of horse races and jai alai, the Basque glorification of handball, Asia's biggest gambling sport. Professional boxing shows were staged regularly, for stiff admission prices, as part of a Japanese-encouraged sports program which included amateur softball and basketball. The conquerors found athletics to be a valuable diversion for the populace. The blackout eventually was rescinded, and Manila was comparatively gay on the surface. Japanese propagandists truthfully could tell the moneyed people that they were living better than anyone in Japan, but they did not voice the sentiment openly enough to be relayed home.

But on the whole Manila had become a city of apprehension, waiting constantly, sometimes fretfully, only for the passing of a blight. The average Filipino struggled for a living under the gendarmerie's constant cloud. You could almost feel his resentment of the bright upper circle; sometimes by assassination he spoke forcefully against it. Hundreds in better circumstances were trying proudly to get along the best they could. The controlled press gloatingly printed numerous stories of former society girls who sold artificial flowers for a living; of private libraries being peddled from street-corner shops; of former race horses now drawing calesas, the small carts which provide much of the city's transportation. Some of the drivers once earned comfortable salaries. Newspaper stories said these examples demonstrated the "adaptability" of the Filipinos. To what—hunger?

By May, 1944, the food situation had become so acute that the Japanese were obliged to make another gesture toward helping their

subjects. Public feeding centers were opened in Manila, Japanese broadcasts said, to serve free meals to the poor and help them "tide over the emergency." Simultaneously, new regulations were issued (presumably by the gendarmerie) against possession of firearms, due to an increase of crime. The situation was attributed in broadcasts to the serious rice shortage and "acute" unemployment.

The Japanese supposedly had handed the complete control of rice to the Philippine government the previous December. Through *Biba* (National Rice Warehouse) the government technically distributed that basic commodity, purchased at controlled prices through the Rice Producers' Guild (the new name for farmers' co-operatives). The demands of the occupying army, however, had made impossible the adequate feeding of the populace. Numerous makeshift remedies had been attempted, ranging from special "grants" of rice by the Japanese to announcement of a "new substitute" for rice. Farmers' conferences were frequent, during which the Japanese reiterated their demands for increased production. Intensive efforts were made to drive back to the land most of Manila's swollen population—reported by the Japanese as 1,300,000 persons, double the prewar total. One method was a continual warning that the city soon would be under aerial attack, and that "nonessential" civilians should leave.

Finally, the Manila radio in June announced "military intervention" of an undisclosed nature, coupled with the promulgation of new rice measures. The militarists were taking over openly again, in face of the imminent invasion threat and probably to quiet internal restlessness.

Public health officials had stayed with their jobs, and there were no serious disease epidemics. But in time the diminished nourishment of the diet began to tell. Consumption, always a dreaded disease in the islands, had eighty thousand sufferers in 1943. Pneumonia also increased alarmingly. Malaria and dengue fever were more frequent than previously, because the city had begun to become shabby. Mosquitoes bred in stagnant rain pools around once well-kept homes. Flies swarmed from piles of refuse, now no longer collected by the municipality but left to the individual to bury in his back



yard. Some Filipinos reasoned that keeping up the city would be assistance to the conquerors; the majority lost interest, and no one prodded them.

The Japanese interest in public cleanliness is based upon their fear of disease. Once that problem seemed to be solved, as it affected them, they were little concerned with Manila's appearance. They made no attempt to repair the bombed houses, and the blackened skeleton of Santo Domingo church continued to loom tauntingly over surrounding wreckage in that corner of the Walled City. Months after the occupation, even the streets in the Port Area were rutted with bomb craters and adjacent buildings still bore their war scars. The rusting wreckage of hundreds of stolen automobiles had been dumped in vacant lots near the water front, probably awaiting transshipment to Japan as scrap. Sunken ships still dotted the bay.

Manila had become strangely silent. The continual symphony of automobile horns, blown incessantly by enthusiastic chauffeurs, once had made it famous, even in the noisy East. Now its streets were largely deserted, except for calesas and innumerable bicycles. Its sounds were hoofbeats, the occasional rumble of a military truck or tank, the loud hoarse battle songs of marching Japanese troops.

In the country, life was less tense on the surface. The peasants had fewer worries over their day-to-day livelihood. They lived closer to the earth, subsisting principally upon fish and rice, with a few greens. Their wants were simple: a tiny home, a bit of palm wine, regular cock fights. But they had felt war, and they knew the conqueror. Hostilities had drawn a wide path across central Luzon. In their wake the island's second city—San Fernando, Pampanga province—was nearly destroyed. Its burned buildings were never rebuilt. Refugees from Bataan crowded up to the plains, and the homeless gradually constructed simple nipa shacks. Most of them never went back. They had seen too much.

Cebu, in the south, had been razed by its fleeing defenders. This second largest city of the archipelago at last report was still largely wreckage. The rebuilding was limited principally to warehouses and buildings essential for the port.

The Japanese took their laborers mainly from the peasants, groups of men from each district whose absence in itself would not impair the agricultural program. Most of the army officers had been peasants themselves. They respected the toughness of the country people. But they recruited them with the brutality familiar in the city, so the methods of the conqueror had additional word-of-mouth circulation even in remote areas. These people may become extremely important. The Filipino insurrection in 1897, one of the most important native uprisings in Asia, began among the peasants of Pampanga, not in the capital.

It was a shabbier Philippines—whose people lived under a sharp heel—that became Asia's newest "republic."



## chapter five

# PHONY FREEDOM

INDEPENDENCE" for the Philippines was among the conquerors' long-prepared plans, freedom without cutting the umbilical cord with Japan. They always intended granting this status to the islands, despite the sometimes coy tone of propagandists who insisted that it must be "earned." There were several reasons.

Ruling through puppets is a favorite policy of Japanese strong men, both domestically and colonially, because if anything goes wrong they can shift the blame to the nominal leader and thereby escape devastating loss of face. The fact that Burma and the Philippines at present are the only two "independent" sections of the newly acquired empire indicates that the militarists expected serious trouble there before it struck Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Japanese intended through this "benevolence" to arouse Filipino desire to oppose an Allied attack. Cultivating the most independence-minded people in Asia, they attempted to delude the non-thinking masses into believing that a forty-year-old dream was realized only through the Japanese. The plan was clever and might have been fatal for our future position in the islands, if brutal militarists had not made the rebuttal.

Curiously, the Japanese at home applaud this ostensible policy of conquering areas and then setting them free. Although they now believe they are fighting to defend the empire, most Japanese commoners still are imbued with the quixotic desire to "free the oppressed races of Asia from western domination." Granting freedom

to a race coincides with their conception of the army's generous superiority.

At first, however, the prospect of independence was only an indefinite lure for the Filipinos, in Japanese propaganda. The conquerors worked toward it slowly, through definite prearranged steps.

Upon occupying Manila, the Japanese interned the remaining American officials of the consulate and the high commissioner's staff in a large private residence near the bay front. They recognized only Vargas—President Quezon's choice—as the head of the government, in which, of course, the Americans no longer had a voice.

For three weeks Vargas administered affairs from Malacañan palace as a one-man government, operating through department heads. It was the final gesture of the Philippine Commonwealth. That government was inaugurated in 1935 as the prelude to American-granted independence, the first time in Asiatic history that a western power had granted autonomy to its colony. Government employees remained loyal to Vargas, and there was little disruption of municipal services.

While allowing this system to continue temporarily, the Japanese were preparing final details for their first chosen government—a twenty-five-man executive commission enlisting, on paper at least, all of the prominent Filipino politicians remaining in the city. The Japanese named Vargas as its chairman.

The commission emerged January 23, 1942, with a loud blast of propaganda, an innocuous charter and a profuse statement of "co-operation" between the Filipinos and their masters, signed by all twenty-five members. The *Tribune* carried large pictures of reciprocal toasts drunk in the former high commissioner's residence, accompanying them with a verbose editorial praising this evidence of Japanese "generosity." That night the lone American-Bataan raider dropped a few bombs somewhere near the city. It was our last political-military gesture in the capital.

Despite the executive commission, the Japanese military administration openly ruled the islands and made its supremacy plain. Virtually every aspect of individual life was regulated by a series of

more than one hundred military decrees issued over a period of months. For instance, they provided the death penalty for interfering with the Japanese armed forces or transmitting information to the enemy; prohibited owning or operating short-wave radios; regulated travel by requiring permits; announced "severe" penalties for transactions in any currency except military notes and the former Philippine peso.

The basic decrees were so inclusive and so vaguely phrased that, for example, an individual's refusal to work for the Japanese services might be construed as an overt act against them.

The executive commission was merely an administrative organ whose actual function was to keep intact the existing municipal and provincial governmental machinery, so that routine policing and other public services could continue. The commission apparently had no voice in policy, although it, too, issued decrees to regulate civil life. Vargas seemed to be fencing with the Japanese at the outset, in an attempt to retain as much Filipino autonomy as possible. But it was manifestly impossible to obtain anything more than minor concessions from conquerors of the Japanese militarists' mentality.

The legislature merely faded away and political parties died. The next Japanese step was establishment of their own party, in the form of a rather vague pseudo-patriotic organization called the *Kalibapi*. Its foundation was the onetime enigmatic *Sakdalista* Society. An obscure opportunist, Benigno Ramos, had organized the Sakdalistas in 1930, without attracting much attention. The group first became widely known in the 1934 elections when it surprisingly won two seats in the legislature, a provincial governorship and several municipal posts.

The organization, then numbering thousands, wrote a clear threat across the blue Philippine skies in May, 1935. Upon carefully made plans, the Sakdals staged an abortive uprising in an attempt to win control of the new commonwealth government. The movement began with riots at three points. The Sakdals seized public buildings, destroyed property and defied the constabulary in sharp skirmishes. More than one hundred Sakdals and several constabularymen were

killed or wounded before the revolt was stifled. When his plans failed, Ramos fled to Japan and lived there until the war.

The organization had never presented a definite program, beyond its leaders' statements that they wanted immediate independence, waiving the ten-year transition period as provided in the Tydings-McDuffie act. They also enumerated several grievances, mainly against political graft. After 1935, the society seemed to sink into obscurity. It was regarded as a potential menace, but few persons paid much attention to it. "Oh, the Sakdals," said Americans and Filipinos. "Yes, they might be troublesome someday. Have another drink."

Actually, the Sakdalista organization was one of the Japanese spearheads of penetration in the islands. Ramos spent several months in Tokyo before the 1935 uprising, living at the headquarters of the Seiyukai, then one of Japan's major parties. A number of Japanese officers visited him. When he returned in exile to that country, he was supported by Japanese funds and continued to be active. The results were apparent at the outbreak of the war. Most of the captured Filipino fifth columnists confessed they were Sakdals.

So this long-nurtured group was utilized by the conquerors as the backbone of the Kalibapi. The new organization was intended as the Philippine counterpart of Japan's Imperial Rule Assistance Association. That meant, theoretically, that members of the society were to assist the government in explaining its will to the people, becoming the cohesive element joining the commoners and their leaders together in greater unity. They were not supposed to question governmental policies or to suggest new ones. They were to be merely government propagandists, themselves committed to blind acceptance of any program adopted by the authorities.

Membership in the Kalibapi was open to all who demonstrated willingness to co-operate with the Japanese. Extensive propaganda "coverage" of the society's slow growth reported that it had been received with "hearty enthusiasm" by even the non-Christian Igorot tribesmen who still live primitively in the mountains behind Baguio. All government officials, both national and local, were required to join. Nevertheless, the membership in late 1943 was reported to

have been less than four hundred thousand. The gendarmerie meanwhile kept a close watch upon all members, to prevent any attempt to spread pro-American or anti-Japanese sentiment. The Japanese were grooming the Kalibapi carefully, because they had great plans for it in the future.

The closest the average Filipino came to a definition of the society's purpose was a vague enunciation of its necessity to prepare the islands for "independence." Here is one typical splurge from an official speech: The Kalibapi is "a powerful society of action which is the nucleus of the new Philippines in the making, and its immediate task is to reform the spirit and disposition of the Filipinos toward this end." This "spiritual mobilization" drive, proclaimed by the society in mass meetings and rallies, was a wholesale importation from Japan. Its purpose in both countries was to create a wave of emotional patriotism sufficient to silence all opposition to the government's policies.

The Japanese brought Ramos back from Tokyo and gave him a job in the organization, to insure further adherence of the Sakdalista members. But he was not important enough to head it. Benigno S. Aquino, a former Philippine Commonwealth official who had delivered some of the most fiery pro-Japanese speeches after the occupation, became director general of the Kalibapi, after resigning as commissioner of the interior under the executive commission.

"Independence" seemed to blow both hot and cold. No one appeared to be interested in it, except the Kalibapi, the professional politicians and the Japanese. The question of "earning" this asserted freedom appeared more frequently in propaganda. As premier, Hideki Tojo visited Manila twice, in 1943, during a rapid trip through the conquered areas. When he returned to Tokyo, he announced in the Diet that Burma would be granted independence before the end of the year. But the "Filipinos would have to work hard" to acquire that doubtful status.

This was an obvious attempt to win more support from a generally disdainful people. But suddenly the "independence" tomtoms began to beat more loudly and more insistently. The emphasis upon "earning" freedom disappeared abruptly. It became evident the new

Philippines would be launched soon after Burma. The apparent reason was the steady acceleration of the American Pacific offensive. This did not immediately menace the islands, but it indicated counterattacks driving toward the archipelago would be started possibly sooner than the Japanese first anticipated. They wanted the Filipinos well established as a "republic" before the time for defense arrived.

Within Manila the Filipinos' answer was direct. Jose P. Laurel, commissioner of the interior who had been mentioned in connection with the forthcoming regime, was shot three times by an unidentified assailant, while playing golf, June 5, 1943. One bullet penetrated Laurel's chest, and he just barely lived. During a long hospital convalescence, he was publicized by the controlled press and termed a "valiant and courageous leader."

A series of other killings and attacks started. Andang Roces, an owner of the T-V-T Publishing Company, and his wife were shot and killed in their home. The former's father, Don Alejandro Roces, was present during the assault and died from a heart attack. The motive probably was retaliation for continuing publication under Japanese control.

The Japanese permitted publication of a long eulogy of Don Alejandro who, at his death, was head of the T-V-T Company and president of the Japanese-organized Philippine Red Cross. No mention was made of Andang's death. Nor would the Japanese permit publication of subsequent assaults which included the fatal shooting of Yai Liyo Pan of the erstwhile Philippine *Herald* and the mortal stabbing of Pedro de Jesus, then a bank commissioner. Many other attacks were reported, some of them doubtless an expression of Filipino resentment, although others appeared to be personal retaliation, undertaken amid temporary confusion.

Despite these activities and general public apathy, the Japanese carried through their stage show. A twenty-man "Preparatory Commission for Philippine Independence" was established to prepare a constitution. Laurel, whom everyone knew was slated for a high office in the forthcoming government, was president of the commission. He had been the temporary chairman of the 1934 con-



vention which drafted the Constitution for the Philippine Commonwealth. Claro M. Recto, the permanent chairman of that more legitimate meeting, was a member of the new body. At least three other prominent Filipino politicians likewise served in this ironic repeat performance—Former Resident Commissioner Camilo Osias, Manuel C. Briones, a member of the old legislature, and ex-Representative Manuel A. Roxas.

Other preparatory commission members who signed the new Constitution were: Ramon Avanceña, first vice president; Acquino, second vice president; Jorge B. Vargas, Teofilo Sison, Jose Yulo, Miguel Unson, Vicente Madrigal, Emiliano T. Tirona, Pedro Sabido, Antonio de las Alas, Rafael R. Alunan, Quintin Paredes, Emilio Aguinaldo, Melecio Arranz, and Alaoya Alonto Sultan Sa Rmain. The executive secretary was Proceso E. Sebastian.

Emilio Aguinaldo, now elderly and rather subdued, was the colorful leader of the Filipino insurrection against the United States at the turn of the century. Stubbornly anti-American for many years, he subsequently became as strongly pro-American. Since the occupation, the Japanese have used him to make several appeals for "cooperation." The usual impression in Manila was, that the old general, like many other prominent Filipinos, is merely drifting along with the tide, feeling that opposition to the conquerors would be useless and personally catastrophic.

Among the commission's other outstanding names were: Avanceña, former chief justice; Paredes, former resident commissioner in Washington; Yulo, once speaker of the Philippine House and chief justice under the Japanese; Madrigal, a leading businessman, and Sison, former associate justice of the supreme court.

The document they produced, under obviously strong Japanese pressure, was completed September 3, 1943, and published in the *Tribune* two days later. Copies of that newspaper were smuggled out of the Santo Tomas camp.

A "special session" of the assembly approved the Constitution on September 7. Before the final denouement of the "independence" drama, the Japanese followed their customary formula by sending a "good will" mission to Tokyo. It was headed by Mayor Leon

Quinto of Greater Manila, and included Laurel, the president-designate, and Vargas, who remained in the Japanese capital as the first envoy of the "republic." The Japanese added another touch of flattery by making that post an ambassadorship. Shozo Murata, who had served for months in Manila as a special adviser to the military administration, was named a "special ambassador" to the islands.

The republic was inaugurated formally October 15, 1943. In a proclamation, President-designate Laurel praised Japan as "the great power of East Asia" whose grant of independence to the Filipinos was "an example of justice in the history of mankind." It added:

"The empire of Japan, which in this great war has the mission to liberate the oppressed races, has banished Occidental domination from the Philippines and has collaborated with all the means at her disposal in the formation of the independent Philippine nation. We have now attained the glory of seeing the honor of the national race restored.

"Before the world we are now a free and independent people. Henceforth, we shall not belong to any foreign power. All rights and interests of the nation will be reintegrated and guarded. For national defense and in order to maintain our independence, we pledge all our resources for the defense of the fatherland."

Prior to Laurel's inauguration as president, the Japanese commander, General Shigenori Kuroda, issued an order officially "dissolving" the military administration. Actually, of course, that bit of fanfare had no effect upon the real military and gendarmerie hold over the islands, nor did it mean the withdrawal of any troops. General Kuroda also seemed to warn the Filipinos of impending warfare by saying in his decree that their future was "brilliant and promising, but that radiance must not dazzle your eyes to overlook the many hardships that lie before you."

On the surface, the new Constitution is a rather mocking parallel of the former commonwealth charter. It retains the single-chambered assembly, inserts in one way or another the elements of the customary "bill of rights" and even continues the Philippine flag of red, white and blue, with a sun and three stars. But the document has amazing exceptions, cunningly inserted, which provide the legal

basis for continued tight Japanese control over the government. Behind that written authority is the constant gendarmerie threat, demanding continued obedience from the puppets nominally placed in power.

In the written document the president, who serves for six years without re-election, is the key man, with wide appointive power. There is no vice president. This follows the Japanese preference for the elevation of a single man whom they can control directly. Moreover, the president is elected and can be impeached by the legislature, which in turn is a fantastic body tied by Japanese strings.

Under Section 2, Article III, of the Constitution, the "National Assembly shall be composed of the provincial governors and city mayors as members *ex-officio*, and of delegates to be elected every three years, one from each and every province and chartered city." At present that means a legislature of ninety men. The next sentence of that section provides the key to the whole setup. It reads: "The date and manner of their election and the method of filling vacancies shall be prescribed by law, *which shall not be subject to change or modification during the Greater East Asia War.*" (The italics are mine. They illustrate how minutely the Japanese intended to protect their control.)

That law, promulgated and for the present unalterable, provides that the Kalibapi shall choose these men. An organization now numbering between three hundred thousand and four hundred thousand hand-picked adherents to the conquerors' program becomes thereby the sole electorate in a "republic" of sixteen million persons!

That clever subdivision of the legislature also means that even such a circumscribed electorate has the authority only to elect half of the national assembly. The governors and mayors, appointed by the president and thereby carefully selected by the Japanese, can be expected to vote as the masters decide. Therefore, even if the Kalibapi did the impossible and chose men who, disregarding personal safety, planned to oppose the Japanese, they could not control the legislature. Important legislative matters are to be decided by a two-thirds vote.

Frankly admitting that the Constitution is a temporary wartime

expedient, a special provision requires the establishment of a successor government within one year after termination of the Greater East Asia War; a section which contains the only reference to popular suffrage in the entire document. In that time, Article XII reads, “. . . the National Assembly shall by law provide for the election by popular suffrage of delegates to a constitutional convention, which shall meet not later than sixty days after their election in order to formulate and adopt a new Constitution which shall become effective upon its approval by the people at a plebiscite to be held for the purpose. After such approval the National Assembly shall forthwith provide for the election of the officers of the new Constitution and the inauguration of the government established thereunder.”

The joker phrase “popular suffrage” explains the real reason for this peculiar section. The Constitution mentions “the people” in two other places. One provides that amendments may be proposed by the National Assembly by a two-thirds vote, but they are not valid “. . . unless approved by the people at a plebiscite *or convention* especially called for that purpose. . . .” Any controversial amendment, therefore, could be decided by a convention of the controlled Kalibapi. The second reference to “the people” was contained in a similar article for the ratification of the constitution. But the people had no chance to vote on the document.

The bold use of “popular suffrage” is highly inconsistent with the constitution’s safeguards and with general Japanese policy. It is unlikely that the conquerors, who always like to make doubly sure of everything, would insert the phrase if they expected to be around when it became operative, especially since it was so unnecessary.

By this phrase, the Japanese evidently were attempting to rule us out of the islands politically before we returned, virtually admitting their impending defeat there. The motive apparently was threefold: To minimize our postoccupation influence, with its tendency to uproot the carefully tended seeds of Japanism; to further the chances for a free and undefended Philippines, and to establish a propaganda peg for the future.

(Nine months later, in June, 1944, President Roosevelt signed

legislation promising independence to the islands as soon as possible after their reoccupation. The congressional resolutions also authorized establishment of United States land, sea and air bases in the archipelago, for mutual protection. The president said in a statement that freedom can come to the islands upon accomplishment of "two tasks of great importance: Those who have collaborated with the enemy must be removed from authority and influence over the political and economic life of the country; and the democratic form of government guaranteed in the Constitution of the Philippines [the Commonwealth Constitution] must be restored for the benefit of the people of the islands.")

The Japanese made no immediate comment on this legislative action and apparently did not announce it within Asia, for obvious reasons. But when the appropriate time comes, one of their propaganda themes doubtless will be the claim that the United States was forced into the declaration by the "Republic" Constitution's provisions. They consistently have contended that the original American independence act was an unfulfilled promise and that the ten-year transition period was merely a dodge to keep the islands anchored to the United States. The conquerors, on the other hand, had "freed" the archipelago swiftly and without equivocation. "You owe it all to us," will be the boast. The Japanese want to separate the United States and the Philippines so completely that the next time they go after the islands there will be no American opposition.

The "Republic's" Constitution also contains a specific safeguard against any effort to deprive the Japanese of full authority to utilize economic resources during the war. It retains from the commonwealth government the specification that exploitation of natural resources shall be limited to Philippine citizens or corporations of which at least sixty per cent of the stock is owned by citizens. But, smuggled later into the document is this phrase: "The prohibitions and limitations provided for in this Constitution, notwithstanding, the President of the Republic of the Philippines may enter into an agreement with *any foreign nation* for the utilization of natural resources and the operation of public utilities, which agreement shall expire upon the termination of the Greater Asia War."

Further, so long as the Japanese have control of the islands, their businessmen and militarists will retain the property rights they plundered. A clause which seems to promise future individual Japanese property claims against the Philippine government, regardless of the war result, provides that all property rights and privileges acquired by an individual or group since the outbreak of the war "shall be subject to adjustment and settlement upon the termination of the said war."

The Japanese have inserted other major safeguards in this bizarre document. One of them provides that a legislative bill vetoed by the president may be repassed by a two-thirds vote of the assembly, but it cannot be adopted in the same assembly session after a second veto. The legislature meets once annually for not more than sixty days. Thus the subservient president can block any measure. The legislature also lacks the complete control over financial expenditures which has been one of the foundations of continued republicanism. It cannot, for instance, bring pressure upon the president by refusing to vote appropriations, because the constitution specifically provides in that event that previous appropriations shall be carried over. This is a basic point in the Japanese Constitution which nullified that country's incipient democracy and made the Diet largely impotent.

In addition to appointing provincial and municipal officials the president is empowered to appoint the seven-man supreme court, with the advice of the cabinet, and all judges of inferior courts, with the advice of the supreme court. The legislature is not consulted. The president selects his cabinet and department heads, all ambassadors and diplomatic representatives, high-ranking army and navy officers, etc. In addition, he appoints a council of state, not exceeding twenty men, whose function is to advise him on matters of national policy.

The president has the power to declare war and conclude peace, with concurrence of two-thirds of the assembly; and to conclude treaties, with a concurrence of a legislative majority. Also he declares martial law and has the power to suspend habeas corpus in cases "of invasion, insurrection, rebellion or when the public safety

so requires." That phrase is taken verbatim from the former Constitution with the notable insertion of the word "or" which makes the entire clause more embrative.

In addition to the right of habeas corpus, other guarantees which are normally associated with the bill of rights have been placed in the new document under the "duties and rights of the citizen." They include, with sheer audacity, the customary protection that "no involuntary servitude" shall exist except as punishment for a crime. The Japanese have slipped in another "joker," legalizing their suspension of several of these rights. "Subject to such limitations," the Constitution says, "as may be imposed by law in the interest of peace, morals, health, safety or public security," these rights are assertedly granted: security against unreasonable search and seizure; privacy of communications and correspondence; right to form associations or societies; freedom of religion; liberty of abode and changing it; freedom of speech, the press and peaceful assemblies. (With the partial exception of religion, none of these privileges is granted now.)

Without a vice president, the president is succeeded by the ranking minister in event of death in office or impeachment. The assembly is headed by a speaker, chosen from its ranks. Aquino now holds the post, in addition to his position in the Kalibapi.

Under this personalization and numerous safeguards, the Japanese felt sufficiently protected to allow the remainder of the Constitution, on the whole, to parallel the former document. One of the small but notable exceptions provides that all educational institutions are under the supervision and regulation of the state, a highly important basis of the invaders' efforts to Japanize the islands.

President Laurel is a small, rather frail man of about sixty years who has become somewhat of an enigma in Manila. The man has few of the characteristics of Japan's usual puppets. His entire career contrasts sharply with, for example, that of Wang Ching-wei, the sometime brilliant, ambitious, avaricious Chinese leader who broke violently with his "boss," Chiang Kai-shek, and left the Chinese stronghold to come over to Japanese-occupied territory.

When war struck the Philippines, Laurel was a justice of the su-

preme court, a position he had held since 1936. Long a strong and apparently sincere supporter of the late President Quezon, he had always been known as a modest, rather retiring jurist, never a spell-binder, and never apparently desirous of personal acclaim or influence. Lawyers considered him a good legal scholar who had written a competent book about the commonwealth Constitution that he helped draft. Before his judicial career he was a successful attorney.

As a young man, in 1911, Laurel started as an office boy for the late Thomas A. Street, then a member of President Taft's court commission to the Philippines to recodify Spanish laws, subsequently becoming the senior American justice in the islands. Mr. Street was impressed with the youth's ability and was instrumental in obtaining a government grant for him to continue his education abroad. Laurel completed graduate study in 1920, at the Yale Law School. Subsequently he received an LL.D. from Tokyo Imperial University.

Until all the facts are known it is impossible to assess accurately the motives of Laurel and others caught in the kind of trap that closed around the Philippines. The large percentage of prominent Filipinos in positions requiring at least theoretical collaboration with the conquerors illustrates both the diverse strains running through current Filipino thought and the practical difficulties confronting all who were caught in the islands.

Doubtless many of these collaborationists are convinced that the new government is at least a step toward the independence they always have desired. This generality probably applies to a large number of the Kalibapi, among whom are the sincere anti-American elements which existed before the war. Others obviously are motivated by a desire for personal fortune or political prestige in a period of uncertainty. A few had lost hope of an American return to the islands, after nearly two years had elapsed without, to their eyes, a tangible American movement in that direction. The vast majority, however, felt themselves confronted by an impossible situation from which collaboration was the only escape. Among them were some who felt it their duty to work, in whatever way they could, for the state's ultimate welfare.



Any man selected by the Japanese for public office usually serves if he wants to live. A Japanese broadcast reported April 13, 1942, that Jose Abed Santos, peacetime chief justice of the supreme court, had been captured in Cebu. It was said he accompanied President Quezon that far, then remained when the president continued to Australia. Months later an entirely unconfirmed, but plausible, story circulated—that the Japanese had commanded Santos to accept the presidency and had killed him upon his stout refusal. Such incidents occurred often in China.

I am not attempting to place Laurel or his Filipino henchmen in any specific category. As commissioner of interior the new president nominally was in charge of the Japanese-constabulary "clean-up" campaigns against Filipino guerrillas; in that capacity he must share responsibility for their subsequent torture and deaths. Acceptance of that post made him appear, in many Manila eyes, as a political climber under the Japanese. His selection as president by the masters appeared to be a compromise between Vargas, who had handled his job with quiet dignity on the surface, and Acquino whose apparently ambitious pro-Japanese bombast made him unacceptable to most Filipinos. The president's son, Jose, Jr., is head of the provincial department of the Kalibapi, an important post in that organization.

The Japanese had gone to great efforts to sell the Constitution to the Filipino people and to convince them that the military administration over the islands had ended—without removing a single soldier or gendarme. A little more than two weeks after the "republic" emerged, Premier Tojo in Tokyo carried this duality a bit farther and once again emphasized—if there were need for emphasis—the exact basis of "independence." He addressed a conference attended by the puppet leaders of five Japanese satellite "states"—President Laurel, Premier Wang Ching-wei of China's Nanking government, Prince van Waithyakorn of Thailand, Premier Ba Maw of Burma and Premier Chang Ching-hui of Manchukuo. The Japanese-sponsored Indian "leader" and head of a "provisional government" of India—Subhas Chandra Bose—attended as an observer.

The premier, as quoted by the Tokyo radio, bluntly declared

that a "superior and haughty attitude" toward the peoples of occupied areas would make it difficult for Japan "to develop various resources of these nations."

"Of course," he added, "we intuitively feel that we are superior. However, just because we are superior, we are inviting eventual troubles if we should hold the attitude of looking down on others. Even if they are inferior to us, we must treat them with love and understanding. . . ."

That is the charter of Japan's "benevolence," and the Filipino people recognize it.



## chapter six

# MENTAL CHAINS

**A**NNOUNCEMENT of the "republic" highlighted an intensive Japanese propaganda campaign through which the conquerors are seeking to win the people currently and to spread Japanese culture and thought as a permanent link for the future. These efforts are ceaseless and parallel throughout the new empire.

In general, Japanese propaganda follows an integrated pattern. It proclaims the conquerors' "friendliness" and "benevolence," the position of Japan as Asia's "leader," and the indomitability of her forces. Every effort is made to alienate the subject peoples from the West, by creating hatred, contempt, mistrust and fear of the white man. Public humiliation of war and civilian prisoners is one method. Conjured apprehension of restored western "overlordship" is another. Westerners, once pictured as so cowardly they fled from Japanese battle cries, now are portrayed as strong and determined to "regain control" of Asia.

The Japanese try to harness nascent nationalism to their banner. Only through Japan, they say, can the subject peoples oppose the West successfully to regain their "racial strength." They must return to the "glories" of their past, breaking with recent cultural and social importations from the "decadent" Anglo-American civilians. Their "dreams" are linked to those of all Asia and must be realized through a Japan-led pan-Asiatic "reawakening." But the present demands great sacrifice and hardship—even bloodshed—and unquestioning obedience to the Japanese.

Soon after Manila's occupation, bands of Japanese propagandists

visited every barrio under the conquerors' control on extended lecture tours to preach these gospels. They distributed pamphlets and illustrated magazines, which apparently had been printed before the war in Japan or China, purporting to show the "kindly" nature of the Japanese and the beauties of their culture. They made ostentatious overtures to children. They appealed to the Filipinos as "Asiatic" brothers and promised them an important place in the "co-prosperity sphere."

Manila's controlled press described the United States as a greedy conqueror which had forced its will on the Filipinos, driving them into bloody, hopeless battle. President Roosevelt, said the propagandists, had precipitated the war through his desire to personally dominate the world. Japan had taken up arms in "self-defense" and to "liberate Asia from the shackles of western oppression."

On the Bataan front, Japanese broadcasters addressed the Filipinos in American slang, telling them the campaign was "hopeless" and promising them "immediate freedom to return to your families if you throw down your arms." In Manila at the same time the *Tribune* announced that Japanese aviators would carry letters from relatives to Filipino soldiers, promising to drop them in the defenders' front line trenches. The idea, in addition to picturing Japanese superiority, was to make the Filipino soldiers homesick and perhaps apprehensive about their families.

Leading Filipino politicians made speeches and issued statements, under Japanese prompting, to urge full co-operation with the conquerors "for the future welfare of the Philippines." In addition to Ramos the Japanese also brought back the almost forgotten General Artemio Ricarte, one of the strongest leaders of the insurrection against the United States in 1899 and the only Filipino who persistently refused allegiance to the American authorities. Ricarte, whom the Americans eventually deported, lived with his family for forty years in Japan. Reaching Manila shortly after the occupation, he was appointed to the council of state under the Philippine Executive Commission. His job was to join General Aguinaldo in reviving Filipino memories of the insurrection.

English street names in Manila were replaced by Japanese or

Tagalog. Dewey Boulevard is now known as "Heiwa"—"Peace"—Boulevard, and Taft Avenue is "Daitoa," "Great Asia." American motion pictures soon were banned, in favor of Filipino or Japanese films. English traffic signs were translated into "katakana," the simple Japanese characters which are being taught throughout the new empire. Japanese is required in the schools and for all government employees. Lessons appear regularly in newspapers and are given over the air. Periodic campaigns are held to stimulate interest in the language. Its study is the most effective short cut to understanding many Japanese peculiarities. English is allowed, but the official languages are Tagalog and Japanese.

Dozens of these more open appeals are used, and the campaign never flags, even for a day. Behind it, the invaders have a deeper, more thorough program to enchain the people. It reaches every subject, whose life already has been changed profoundly.

Religion is one method. The army's "religious section" can produce upon short notice "clergymen" and "priests" of every faith, from Mohammedanism to Occidental Protestant sects. These men wear uniforms and usually are officers of fairly high rank. They have specialized for years in their individual religious fields, not to serve as chaplains for their own troops at the front, but to augment the army's extensive program of social and military penetration into occupied and coveted countries. Many of them were highly trained regular officers before they adopted religion as a cloak.

About two-thirds of the Filipinos are ardent Roman Catholics. The Japanese tried immediately to harness this potentially important force to their program. Most of the leading churchmen, including the papal legate, were confined to their official residences, virtually imprisoned, as soon as the conquerors entered Manila. Then representatives of the religious section, blithely disregarding the fact that destruction of Santo Domingo church had created bitter resentment among the faithful, attempted a variety of dodges to win the open support of these ecclesiastical leaders.

In a series of meetings—news of which leaked out, despite Japanese efforts to maintain secrecy—the uniformed army "experts" at-

tempted first to convince the top churchmen by argument of a "distinct relationship between Catholicism and Japanese ideals." They were dealing, however, with brave and resolute men. Most of them were Spanish and, therefore, technically entitled to the personal privileges of neutrals. The churchmen answered each Japanese argument calmly and convincingly. The ideals of Japan as a nation, they said, were political; as churchmen, they were aloof from politics and would remain so.

The Japanese "experts" became somewhat nettled after losing the first verbal skirmishes. During one session, a major delivered a long harangue about Japanese emperor worship; then, before any reply could be made, abruptly ended the meeting. Another time, the Japanese hinted strongly that unless the churchmen issued a statement fully endorsing Japanese occupancy and calling upon church members to support the invaders, their easiest fate would be indefinite confinement to their quarters. The quiet reply was that the army could win this support only by its actions, and if the church issued such a statement concerning a field over which it had no jurisdiction, none of the parishioners would believe it anyway.

The church authorities were held in virtual captivity for some time. Finally, under apparent compulsion, some of them attended a dinner of high Japanese and Filipino authorities. A picture of that gathering was hailed by the Japanese as evidence of the "co-operation" of the church, but no statement of support was issued by the Catholic leaders. Their liberty eventually was restored, because the conquerors were anxious to avoid trouble with the Spanish government. They also were attempting to maintain their toe-hold in South America—Chile and Argentina then were neutral—and wished to avoid alienating the Catholic people of those countries.

Nevertheless, a "Catholic Friendly Society of Japan and the Philippines" was soon formed to expedite the use of the religion. A number of alleged Japanese practitioners of the faith arrived in Manila. A Japanese Catholic bishop was installed in Manila as the actual head of the institution. One of his first acts was to legalize divorce within the church, catering to the fickleness of some of his parishioners.

In late 1942, the Tokyo radio broadcast: "The Catholic religion in the Philippines has been rather indulging itself in mere formalities in the past. However, stimulated by the activities of the religious department of our military administration, it has returned to its original mission of a religion of spiritual activities and is showing evidences that it intends to co-operate in the establishment of a new Philippines, through the Catholic movement."

The Japanese issued a spurious report that the Vatican had recognized the Philippine "republic," a deception of potential value, because the Vatican's prompt denial could never reach the majority of Filipinos through the censorship.

Meanwhile, other religious representatives as "brothers" approached the Mohammedan Moros of Mindanao and the Sulu Sea. They said nothing to them, of course, about the great Japanese interest in Catholicism. They told the Moros that Japan always had shown a "benevolent" concern over their religious principles and reminded them that, a year previously, Tokyo, had called a "great Moslem congress" to reaffirm that interest. Renegade representatives of the faith had attended that highly publicized meeting through which the Japanese hoped to appeal particularly to Moslems in India and the Netherlands East Indies. Resolutions were passed praising Japan's leadership in summoning the congress and declaring there were no barriers to the full co-operation of Shinto and Mohammedanism.

The exact situation in Moroland today is unclear. In prewar years the Japanese of Mindanao obtained more co-operation from the Moros of that region than other foreigners or Filipinos. Their methods, then, were peaceful. It seems a safe assumption that traditional Japanese army ruthlessness would produce great hatred among these hard-fighting tribesmen who have opposed every effort to encroach upon their lands.

Yet the Japanese program in the Philippines has been far less vicious than in China, where whole villages have been burned for guerrilla activity such as occurred in the islands. This indicates a general softening of the Japanese militarist methods, within bounds, designed to fully augment efforts to win popular confidence. The

Japanese may have handled the Moro tribesmen carefully, capitalizing upon their previous success in winning their friendship. If so, many Americans familiar with Moro psychology foresee a possibility the Japanese may have acquired strong tribal allies in the southern islands.

Japanese religious representatives also came into the Santo Tomas internment camp to further their program. In late January, 1942, they released approximately three hundred American and British missionaries of many denominations, the majority of the clergymen who were interned at the outset with other enemy aliens. The release, allowing them to live in their own homes and to move with relative freedom in the city, was followed in a short time by the request they sign what amounted to a pledge of co-operation.

A copy of the five-point pledge reached me later. In it the signers promised they would not obstruct the Japanese army but would co-operate in the restoration and reconstruction of the Philippines. No meetings were to be held for "hostile citizens" or for other than religious purposes. The army retained the right to use churches and other buildings at any time. The meat of the document was in point four. I quote it from my recollection, checked with others who saw a copy shortly before they left Manila. It said approximately this: "We will instruct our followings [denominations] to co-operate with the Japanese military authorities, knowing that the Co-Prosperity Sphere is well on the way to realization and that its aim is an expression of the Will of God." In its original form the last phrase read: ". . . its aim is world peace." Strong objection on the part of the missionaries resulted in the substitution.

Some of the released missionaries refused to make this pledge and subsequently were reinterned. The majority remained free, however, either signing the document themselves or being covered by the signatures of the head officials in their missions. Many Filipino Protestant missionaries also signed. As in all wartime instances, motives for this incident are difficult to analyze accurately. A number of the signers, particularly heads of missions, obviously did so in the belief they had no alternative and it was to the best interests of the Americans, including children, dependent upon them. There



is no evidence that the Occidentals preached along the designated lines. In July, 1944, the Japanese reported the arrest and confinement of an undisclosed number of missionaries. The explanation was that they were guilty of "espionage."

These incidents illustrate the utilitarianism underlying Japan's asserted continuance of freedom of religion. Because Shinto is so powerful in Japanese life and has become such an effective means through which the militarists can rule, they have recognized the power of other religions. They do not attempt to eliminate them at once. Instead, they seek to nurture these, to them, potentially useful forces, superimposing Shinto later. On the surface, of course, they can boast of their "respect" for the religious principles of the peoples under their control. Underneath, they seek to employ every religious doctrine, from tribal worship upward, for the present and future extension of Japanism.

In the Philippines they failed in what obviously was their ultimate aim—the open support of dominant high church leaders. But if the church did not spread open co-prosperity sphere propaganda from the pulpit, it likewise had been silenced as an open organ of anti-Japanism. It was recognized fully that this "freedom" of religion existed only upon sufferance of the conquerors, and its continuation depended upon "good behavior."

Furthermore, scattered fragments of Japanese thought soon were preached by Japanese and Filipino priests and ministers. These included the idea of self-denial and the complete subjugation of the self to the group; elimination of frivolities and the adoption of a life of frugality and hard work; unity of thought, without protest, for the benefit of all. Taken separately, these and similar tenets are merely simple rules of behavior, and the rather normal theme of sermons in times of stress. Woven together and strengthened by parallel ideas from other sources, they become the foundation for the Japanese mode of life.

That manner of living is based upon the conception that the individual is born only to serve. Primarily and perpetually, he serves his emperor, the descendant of gods and the all-wise "father" of his people. Parallel with this, the individual serves his family, in this

life and the afterlife, and various other groups, from the neighborhood to the province, and finally his own section of the armed services. In each group he is expected to submerge himself for the welfare of all members, and from them he takes their combined strength.

This idea of selfless service in a clannish society was one of the fundamental principles of Japanism the conquerors wanted to introduce at once. The concept of service is strengthened by a frugal life in which the desire for luxuries, and sometimes comforts, is minimized, thereby freeing the mind from thoughts of personal gain, leaving it receptive to the stern demands of duty. Spartanism, too, was one main wedge the conquerors used in their attempt to pry the Filipinos from American influence. They tried to make the juke box, not the school, into the symbol of America's contribution to the islands. The emperor concept was to be the final magnetism guiding the future Philippines toward the Japanese orbit.

The family system, foundation of the new society, existed loosely in the Philippines before the war. It was neither as strong nor as elaborate as in Japan or China. But, like most peoples living close to the soil, blood was a tighter bond among the Filipinos than it has become in more mechanized countries, and filial respect was strong. The Japanese attempted to strengthen this concept by constant propaganda, behind the blunt official injunction that "the family system must be restored."

Simultaneously, the conquerors introduced their next gradation in this society of service—the neighborhood association, modeled upon similar organizations in Japan. In the Philippines each ten families in a neighborhood are banded together under an appointed leader, as a sort of ward club for mutual co-operation and group service for the government. Through these associations, the Japanese also exercise one form of their tight control.

The conquerors quickly made the neighborhood groups into a vast, unpaid, auxiliary police force. All able-bodied male residents are required to take their turn, in three-hour shifts, on a nightly patrol covering their association's district. Exemptions are granted

only for old age, physical incapacity and illness certified by the municipal health officer.

The ostensible purpose is to guard against crime or fire in the district. Beyond that, the Japanese utilize the patrol in an attempt to throttle anti-Japanese activities and to prevent asylum being given to fugitives from the military authorities. Each neighborhood leader, and through him each householder, personally is held responsible for the discipline of his section. For any real or fancied offense against the authorities occurring within the district—the operation of a secret radio, for example, or the hiding of a saboteur—any or all of these residents can be taken to gendarmerie headquarters for torture. The secret police expect that, by this constant threat of force, weak spots will develop in each neighborhood; and informers, seeking to save themselves, will report not only actual anti-Japanese activities and fugitives but will “squeal” on neighbors whose actions are suspicious.

“If a crime is committed under the jurisdiction of the committee [patrolling group] where you live,” said an official Manila announcement, “all the members of the committee shall be punished for the crime unless they turn over the criminal.”

The neighborhood associations were legalized by executive orders of the former Philippine Executive Commission and nominally placed under municipal governments. They are further pyramided into district associations, each composed of from five to fifteen neighborhood groups. All have leaders who possess a certain amount of authority. The Japanese, in 1943, claimed 12,577 neighborhood and 121 district associations had been formed.

The Japanese persistently attempted to foster group consciousness within these organizations. Each individual then “belonged” to a collection of people, and there was no such thing as the man who walked alone or who had no place in society. The “liberalistic” individualist was to go, supplanted by a nonthinking member of a small society, under hand-picked leaders whose thoughts the gendarmerie groomed, more conscious of his neighbors and, therefore, more aware of their opinions. The neighborhood as a group might be expected to react more readily to the Kalibapi’s emotional pa-

triotism than individually, to accept governmental decrees more complacently. The rulers wanted thinking replaced by mass emotion which the government could turn on and off.

The individual at once became dependent upon his neighborhood association leader for ration cards, for the announcement of important government measures, and for direct relief in the infrequent instances when the Japanese Philippine Red Cross distributed supplies. Newspapers carried innumerable stories concerning the associations and finally devoted regular columns to "neighborhood news" and to answering questions concerning night patrol duty. This is one sample, appearing in the *Tribune* of April 29, 1943:

"... a Neighborhood Association is something of intimate necessity. The relationships involved are human and lasting. For the first time we begin to see that we have neighbors, that they are people like us, a bit suspicious in the beginning, but soon prepared to tell us about their troubles and their problems and their more cheerful experiences.

"Having the same troubles ourselves, we learn to join in our common fund of problems and, together, they turn out to be not impossible of solution. The results so far are such a pleasant surprise that we can't help wondering why we never thought of Neighborhood Associations before.

"We doubt, though, if the idea could have triumphed in an age when everyone of us lived in his own castle, self-sufficient, self-contained. All our Christian charity and all our democracy would never have induced the 'big shot' next door to lose a wink patrolling the block."

These paragraphs appeared in an anonymous column. The author, trying to analyze the "enthusiasm" for the acceptance of neighborhood associations, concluded that the institution had demonstrated its practical worth and its necessity. The column added, revealingly: "There are, of course, artificial reasons—like force, or fear—but only the natural reasons compel people with enduring effect. . . ."

Although this blast may be considered extreme, the idea of the

neighborhood association has an appeal for Filipinos. They are a crowd-loving, emotional people themselves. Their record as "joiners" shows their common desire to belong to some sort of a society. The masses in the decade before the war responded more readily to the emotional appeal of independence, for instance, than to any logical consideration of it. Forty years is too short a time to instill in any previously enslaved people, as were the Filipinos, the intense desire for freedom of thought that underlies democracy.

These people were to be knitted, finally, into the Japanese pattern by a slowly heightened awareness of the "benign" emperor. Whenever the Japanese demonstrate one of their rare acts of official generosity—the pardoning of convicted gendarmerie prisoners or the granting of funds for relief—it is done in the emperor's name. Yet brutality also is committed in his name on the occasions when the victim is accused of acts against "his imperial majesty's army."

The Filipinos naturally were absorbed into the Japanese calendar of holidays, of which the most important is the emperor's birthday, April 29. Part of the 1943 celebration of that event was a compulsory parade of Filipinos which, the controlled press said, would demonstrate that they were "wholeheartedly joining the people of Japan in offering felicitations to His Majesty the Emperor. . . ." Throughout the archipelago, the story said, Filipinos "will demonstrate their gratitude to the August Virtues of His Majesty, which alone have made possible the liberation of East Asia from the malicious influence of the Anglo-Americans, and to the Imperial Benevolence which has been bestowed upon them." This fantasy appeared under the banner headline:

#### 18 MILLION FILIPINOS PAY HOMAGE TO EMPEROR

With typical Japanese exaggeration, the propagandists had increased the archipelago's population by two million over its pre-war sixteen million total.

The Nihon Cultural Association in Manila, central agency for Japanizing the Filipinos, conducts these propaganda activities incessantly. Yet Domei (the official Japanese news agency) reported

in May, 1944, that the effort to return the archipelago's millions to their "original oriental ways" was difficult, because the Filipinos have been so "bewitched" by American "motion pictures and dancing." The report added that "our cultural war in the Philippines is devoted mainly to destroying and removing the materialistic culture introduced by America and restoring the original cultures of the Philippines and Oriental culture." The latter apparently means Japanese.

The conquerors went even deeper. They assumed complete control of the schools, which had been closed since a few days before the start of the war. While the Battle of Bataan was still under way—that is, within a few weeks of Manila's occupation—they reopened the primary grades. The press reported that completely rewritten textbooks were being used, "to conform to the true situation." The Japanese were reaching out to young and impressionable minds with their philosophy of force, giving them their first picture of life entirely through Japanese eyes.

"Education" has become one of the militarists' prime weapons for furthering their own ideas among the Japanese people. School curricula are determined by the education ministry, over which the militarists always have exercised considerable control by their participation in the government. Further, the numerous secret patriotic societies, which the militarists fostered, always are ready by implied or direct force to intimidate anyone whose doctrines are "unpatriotic" enough to challenge the emperor concept or other basic essentials of the philosophy of warfare.

Every Japanese child learns in reading his first characters the Shinto mythology of the emperor's divine origin and also the divinity of the Japanese islands themselves. He learns the blood-tinged "glories" of the past. He is taught that strict obedience, unswerving loyalty and unreasoning devotion to duty are desirable and essential characteristics of the Japanese. Step by step, through the years when his character is being formed, the child receives at school a steady induction into the mental groove desired by the militarists. Liberalism, in the sense that we know it, never has been taught. Any attempt by Japanese thinkers to propound theories that might

undermine these ideas is throttled either by the patriotic societies or, in some cases, the gendarmerie. There is, then, little contrary evidence to the doctrines the student receives at home and in the school.

The same methods were introduced in the Philippines. Students of primary schools were most important. Time was short. Every day could be spent profitably in training the generation selected as the future link between the Philippines and Japan.

Filipino boy and girl toddlers are introduced to Emperor Hirohito as a benign "father" who has graciously consented to watch over them as well as his own Japanese people. In "gratitude" they bow every morning to his picture, just as their Japanese "brothers and sisters" do in Japan. The Filipinos hear stirring stories about gods and brave warriors, fighting on the side of the right against the "villainous" Americans who already have brought much hardship to the Philippines and who want now to "enslave" the islands again.

They are taught that, as Filipinos, they are the descendants of a great and noble people; racially aligned throughout history with the Japanese and other Asiatics who are helping them bring world leadership to the Orient from the "decadent West." They learn Japanese and Tagalog and are instructed in Japanese customs and manners. Yoshio Uchiyama, director of the education department of the military administration, predicted: "The Philippines will be a Japanese-speaking nation in ten years."

There is much in the thunder of Japan's early romantic military history to appeal to the pugnaciousness that is perhaps inherent in every boy. The Filipinos are no exception. The Japanese paint for these youths a beautiful picture of future great deeds and stimulating battles, in which they can swagger to personal glory, in defense of Oriental unity under the all-seeing emperor; a unity in which through their own efforts, the Philippines would become a great nation. The invaders reconcile Shinto and emperor worship with Catholicism just as, with equal felicity, they couple them with Mohammedanism by portraying the emperor as a sort of

modern Christ or Mohammed who fights against evil, although in his heart he wants only peace and prosperity.

This training is coupled with a widespread youth movement, called the Tanauan Youth Movement because it ostentatiously started in President Laurel's home town. Each member is required to maintain a home garden, with poultry and swine projects. Meetings are held regularly for the "revival" of native Filipino dances, songs and poems—returning, says the press, "to Filipino virtues." The children are encouraged to stage poetical "tilts" (Balatagasen) and similar contests.

Boys are sent to youth camps where they learn the obedience and the pride in physical prowess which have become familiar in the youth movements of Japan and Germany. They march regularly in the schools, and the older boys drill with wooden guns. The girls, meanwhile, are instructed in the Japanese idea of subservience and loyalty. Regimentation is universal throughout the schools, and even the toddlers are marched into classrooms.

But the youngsters do not meet directly the conquerors' brutality or callous superiority. They may see some of it on the streets or may hear of the gendarmerie from relatives who have been arrested. In the Philippines, the children generally were spared much of the frightfulness that, for example, characterized the Japanese entry into China. Instead, they have been shown special consideration by most of the occupying soldiers.

Dozens of Filipino boys boldly walked into the Santo Tomas camp regularly to visit the Japanese guards who showed them their guns, organized them into miniature armies and wrestled with them. I have never seen one of these soldiers lose his temper with a youthful visitor, although sometimes the wrestling matches produced a juvenile punch in the nose. When the boys left, after the visits, they often hummed the "Pacific March," Japan's fighting song, which they had learned from the soldiers. Many parents may find it difficult, when they can speak freely again, to convince their children of Japanese brutality, because they have seen only the conquerors' other side.

At first, school instructors were Japanese, brought to the Philip-



piners in the initial wave of civilian workers. As rapidly as possible they were replaced by Filipino teachers, mostly young women, who had learned Japanese in special streamlined courses. Their teaching was closely watched, to prevent the introduction of contrary thoughts, but the Japanese recognized that their program could best be facilitated through the Filipinos themselves. Most of the latter probably accepted the jobs in order to eat, but among them there may have been some convinced by the propaganda to which they had been subjected.

Both in Japan and Germany the future military value of such hothouse "education" has been proved amply. For full effectiveness, however, these ideas must be allowed to incubate in youthful skulls without counter arguments from parents or friends. Hence in the Philippines the educational program was bulwarked by the subtle and apparently innocent sermons of ministers and priests; the organization of neighborhood associations, the Kalibapi and other features of modern Japanese society; a constant propaganda campaign to sell Japanism; and, above all, the ominous activities of the gendarmerie to stamp out anti-Japanese activities and, by the threat of force, to smother "liberalistic" or anti-Japanese thought.

Other schools, with similar Tokyo-tailored curricula, eventually were reopened. Many prewar institutions still remain closed, and the emphasis is on the primary grades. But the full range of courses from kindergarten through the university operate today under Japanese tutelage. That control is assured as long as the Japanese remain in the islands by the constitutional provision placing all education under the state. As an example of Japanese thoroughness it may be noted that universities today are concerned almost exclusively with agriculture, forestry and mechanical arts. Of practical value for the conquerors' archipelago-wide development programs, this policy also coincides with numerous peacetime Filipino laments that too many doctors and lawyers and not enough farmers were being trained.

Many young men and women of prominent Filipino families have been sent to Japan to complete their "education," including sons and daughters of puppet officials. One purpose obviously is closer

liaison. Another may be a Japanese attempt to insure the father's greater co-operation, through the realization his children are potential hostages, just as the old Japanese shoguns used to require the families of *daimyo*, the local clan chiefs, to reside in the capital to prevent insurrection.

Education is one of the most vital aspects of the Japanese program. By controlling the children, particularly during the years when their characters are being formed, the conquerors are trying to build their future link with the boys and girls who will be the archipelago's leaders in twenty or thirty years. Not until then, perhaps, will the full results of their occupancy be apparent in the Philippines and elsewhere in the new empire, where these methods are being paralleled. No one can tell how much anti-white sentiment is being distilled. No one can determine now how extensively the Japanese are spreading among formative boys' minds the lust for battle or the swaggering ruthlessness that is so characteristic of both the Japanese and Prussian militarist. The conquerors intend to groom future soldiers to join Asiatic legions under the banner of the Rising Sun in the next war. The possibility of success is heightened by each year—each month—that their control continues.



## chapter seven

### THE UNCONQUERED

FILIPINO adults generally saw the Japanese militarists as they are: bloodstained conquerors, whose march toward national glory and individual wealth has brought suffering, privation, hardship. They saw a diluted but nevertheless terrifying program of force. They felt the weight of skyrocketing prices and decreased foodstuffs, the menace of expanding disease. Herded toward sacrifice, they were embraced by an underpaid forced labor program which, in May, 1944, officially was extended to every citizen between 16 and 60. To the average Oriental commoner, personal welfare is far more important than ideas.

Opportunists, sincere anti-whites, independencias and men who felt they were trapped shut their eyes to these sights and became collaborationists of varying sincerity. However, the vast majority of Filipinos, particularly on Luzon, have succumbed neither to the conquerors' propaganda nor their brutality. On the whole, they are compliant outwardly, but they have demonstrated that fires of resistance still smolder. Adversity has drawn them closer to the Americans than ever before. The gallantry and courage of American soldiers have molded a foundation for genuine friendship between the two races.

Stories of individual Filipino loyalty to American friends or masters are legion. Some of them should not be told, even now, for their publication might bring repercussions to Japanese-dominated Americans and Filipinos. But the conquerors saw, and resented, in-

numerable example of spontaneous friendship, brightening bitter days.

All along the gloomy pathways of the March Through Manila and the Death March across Bataan, Filipino bystanders braved the conquerors' wrath to shower food, cigarettes, ices, beer and sometimes precious medicine upon the captives. Many were badly beaten for doing this. Others showed the stumbling men tight-lipped nods of encouragement or furtively displayed forked fingers in the sign of the "V." Later a number made persistent and personally dangerous efforts to send supplies to war prisons.

For American and British civilians, one of the most dramatic examples of loyalty occurred the third day of their internment in Santo Tomas. From early morning, the camp's front gate and adjacent grilled fence was packed with Filipinos for several hundred yards, three and four deep. They had brought food and clothing for the new internees. Many Americans were surprised to see their own servants or friends among the throng, for they expected all Filipinos to avoid the "taint" of contacting Occidentals. The newcomers, ignoring momentarily bewildered Japanese guards, shouted encouragement and waved to imprisoned friends.

Finally, Japanese officers attempted to disperse them, using sheathed swords to club those on the crowd's fringes. This treatment was repeated periodically, but the Filipinos persisted. Although the visits later were permitted officially, Japanese guards frequently beat individual Filipino visitors for unspecified reasons which undoubtedly included a desire to discourage the practice.

One Filipino doctor, who worked in the internment camp hospital, bicycled cheerfully through the guarded front gate each morning for weeks. One day, without warning, Japanese soldiers yanked him from the machine. They beat him so badly that he could barely walk and threw him into the outside street with his smashed bicycle. The next morning, the physician returned on a borrowed cycle, still grinning but visibly gaunt. The soldiers permitted his entry.

More than nine hundred free Manilans, mostly Filipinos, came to the camp daily, walking miles in hot sunlight or drenching rain,

to deliver packages upon which the internees depended. In many cases former houseboys and cooks continued to receive pay from imprisoned employers. Most of them, however, had only meager salaries from other jobs. Internees often received unexpected packages from Filipino friends, usually containing some expensive gift which might have cost the donor several days' pay.

Internees released from the camp for temporary periods constantly were greeted on the streets by Filipino smiles and the ever-present sign of the "V." Sometimes they were unable to buy cigarettes from Filipino storekeepers who offered them free. Often a Filipino or Chinese insisted upon paying their bus fare. Frequently, a passer-by would slip a small gift into the Occidental's hand. These and numerous similar expressions of a deeper feeling always were in evidence throughout the city.

In the summer of 1943, the Japanese transferred eight hundred American men from Santo Tomas to a newly established camp at Los Baños in the interior. Before the departure, several Filipinos quietly moved from Manila to homes in the barrio near the new camp, so they could continue to send supplies to the internees. And when gendarmes inspected the rough barracks which Filipino workmen had constructed to house the transferred men, they discovered guns and ammunition secreted in the rafters. Presumably the native carpenters had left them for the American occupants.

The Filipinos were perennially optimistic. Even in the dark days following Corregidor's capitulation, their conversation was predicated upon, "When the Americans return . . ."; never "if" they come back. Manila seemed to be living in a sterile present, always waiting for that future day.

Despite persistent Japanese efforts to arouse Filipino hatred and contempt for Americans, I know of no instance in which this attitude was displayed. The conquerors would have permitted physical "reprisals" against American civilians, so long as they were not concerted enough to become face-losing for the masters, who were responsible for policing. Yet during all the months that uninterned Americans remained in their unprotected homes, not one Filipino attempted assault or even threw a stone through the window. Loot-

ing of unoccupied homes by roving bands or sometimes unfaithful houseboys was the only depredation. These obviously represented an impersonal desire for gain, not anti-Americanism.

But Filipino hatred for the Japanese was real. Generally it remained hidden, but on one occasion it was paraded notably. Japanese officials, through their Filipino politicians, assembled a vast crowd to hear Tojo speak during his first visit in 1943. At the end of the rally, as customary, all loyal subjects were supposed to follow a leader in shouting "Banzai Nippon!"

The response this time was tremendous, but the Filipinos substituted the phrase, "Bankai Hipon!"

Upon hearing it, a Japanese official turned to a Filipino on the reviewing stand and demanded, "What is the meaning of those words?"

"Oh," answered the Filipino. "They say 'Banzai Nippon,' but you must excuse my people; they cannot get the pronunciation quite right."

Sometime later the Japanese learned that "bankai hipon" in Tagalog means "you wrinkled shrimp."

Weeks after this, a Filipino comedian, appearing on the stage of a Manila theater, needled the Japanese for the looting, particularly of watches, after the city's capture. Wearing a plain, nondescript uniform, he walked to stage center and stopped before a stooge who said: "Oh, you're a soldier?"

The comedian nodded.

"What kind of a soldier are you. British?"

"No."

"American?"

"No."

"Well, what kind are you?"

Silently, the comedian opened his mouth in a toothy grin and pulled up one sleeve. His arm was covered to the elbow with wrist watches.

That night the actor was hustled to gendarmerie headquarters to an unknown fate.

During the early weeks of occupation, the Japanese discovered

they could not push the Filipino people—particularly the commoners—too far in any fundamental readjustment of their living habits. On one occasion the Japanese military administration by decree banned cockfights as part of the “frivolous” habits which the invaders intended to eliminate. But cockfighting is almost a Filipino national sport and a favorite method of gambling, an almost innate Filipino instinct. In peace or war the cockpits of each barrio were crowded on Sundays with bettors and owners. The peasant often gave more attention to his fighting birds than to his family or his lands.

The decree was pursued with the usual Japanese viciousness and thoroughness. But the sport continued surreptitiously. Soon the press announced repeal of the ban as a reward for the people’s “good behavior.” The Japanese had lost too much face trying to enforce it.

By another decree the military administration demanded that all knives and bolos (a cleaver-like knife) be turned in to the authorities. It promised rewards for so doing and drastic punishment for failure to comply. The average Filipino grows up with a knife in his hands. To him it is a weapon, a handy tool for cutting weeds, brush and sugar cane, almost a close personal friend. Naturally, the response was slight. Gendarmes reportedly went into several villages to demand compliance. In at least one barrio they lined up the male inhabitants and beat each man over the head with the weighty steel handle of a confiscated bolo as warning that more vigorous measures would be used to obtain the knives. But neither that village nor others responded. Again avoiding further loss of face, the Japanese dropped the matter.

Perhaps referring to such incidents, Domei once complained the Filipinos had conditioned themselves to “view every law and measure as something to be ignored.” The story attributed that characteristic to the islands’ long history under foreign domination.

These instances of sullen opposition demonstrated more than the stubbornness with which country folk intend to retain old customs. It revealed a hard core running through the Filipinos, despite the tropical indifference they often display. The Japanese forgot,

in trying to rule by force, that some of the earliest battlers for independence in modern Asiatic history were Filipinos who suffered and died under Spanish wrath which often equaled that of the Japanese themselves. They ignored the lessons of Filipino *insurrecto* warfare against first the Spanish, then the Americans, lasting for more than three years. They paid no attention to the bravery shown by Filipino soldiers, notably the well-trained Philippine Scouts, in opposing their own first landings and later at Bataan.

Most American civilians living in Manila before the hostilities also seemed to have ignored the sometimes reckless courage, ardent love of homeland, and the still inadequately expressed desire for freedom that are mixed with baser elements in the Filipino character. Perhaps war was necessary to fully temper these qualities. Anyway, Filipino refusal to succumb at once to the new conquerors surprised many Americans, as well as Japanese. Modern weapons and swift communications had given the invaders stronger control over a larger part of the Philippines in six months than the Americans had in 1901, two years after the Spanish-American war. Yet there were Filipinos—how many no one can tell—whom they could never reach, with all their ruthlessness and their power. They sprang from the same island blood strain that produced José Rizal, the patriot who opposed the Spaniards and died before a firing squad, and, as one modern example, Captain Jesus Villamor who led a Filipino flight of six outmoded training planes against fifty-four Japanese bombers over Batangas, in this war, and who still lives.

These people with the hard, bitter hatred against the conquerors sometimes walk the streets of Manila, speaking constantly but discreetly against the Japanese; or they work their fields in the interior under stern Japanese surveillance, slowing up the exploitation program and always awaiting their revenge. Many of them are in the hills, engaged in a sporadic guerrilla war which, when fully described, will produce some of the most dramatic stories from the wartime Philippines. As a military factor their efforts are still unimportant. As a symbol to hot-blooded countrymen, they are important.



In late 1943, the guerrillas appeared to be quiet, although they were still hiding in remote mountain strongholds—living well, reports said—and periodically raiding Japanese supply trucks. Manilans generally believe they will reappear when American forces attack the Philippines. The bands are scattered and unco-ordinated. They cannot become a major military factor until their activities are directed centrally for archipelago-wide blows against key objectives.

The guerrillas were most active on the islands of Luzon, Mindanao and Cebu. Thousands of Filipinos and many Americans, including some army officers, formed these bands, after escaping the conquerors' march. On Luzon they fled to the hills, away from the lowland highways across which the Japanese were advancing. Most of them were civilians, because army men were needed for the subsequent defense of Bataan and Corregidor. On Mindanao, however, the reports say several American officers organized guerrilla units when they reached the northern part of the island, ahead of Japanese forces advancing from the southern port of Davao. The Japanese assault on the city of Cebu was made on April 10, the day after Bataan's fall. It was opposed at first by all able-bodied men, including American soldiers and civilians. They held out for a while, but attacking pressure was too great. Many escaped to the hills, after setting fire to the town, and formed harassing units.

The Japanese press, in repeatedly announcing the "smashing" of all guerrilla opposition, has betrayed the command's interest in these bands. In the summer of 1943, Tokyo declared that the "last of isolated resistance" in the Philippines was destroyed with the capture of an unidentified American major in northern Mindanao. The story admitted he had eluded Japanese and constabulary units for months.

Later, on September 5, when "independence" was near, the *Manila Tribune* said that twenty-eight guerrilla leaders and an unspecified number of followers surrendered in the province of Rizal, adjacent to Manila. The account said among them was a man named Pedro Santos whose rank was "lieutenant colonel," presumably in the guerrilla army. He probably was Pedro Abad Santos,

the elderly but still fiery Pampanga socialist leader, a onetime presidential candidate. Although often opposed to the administration in peacetime, Santos a few days before Manila's occupation urged the government to mobilize and arm the masses for a final defense battle, offering to lead a unit himself.

An intensive "conciliation" campaign toward the guerrillas preceded "independence." They were promised immunity if they surrendered, and the controlled press undertook to convince them resistance was futile. Thousands of these fighters were said to have capitulated, together with fantastic amounts of equipment. These claims obviously were pure propaganda. But the fact that propaganda agencies reported such large numbers of anti-Japanese elements—the radio said fifty thousand had "surrendered" on the small island of Leyte alone—indicated the conquerors regarded them seriously.

In January, 1944, the Japanese triumphantly announced smashing a "far-flung espionage" ring which included one hundred Americans, British, Chinese and Indians. They also were said to have organized guerrilla bands and to have operated a secret radio on Mindoro island, near Manila. The Japanese broadcasts claimed the "ringleaders" included Blanche Jurika and Charles Parsons, both well known in prewar Manila.

Six months later, a joint announcement by the Filipino government and the military administration threatened execution to saboteurs, "other than guerrillas and bandits." Japanese broadcasts said sabotage damage to transportation and communications and other military facilities was "fast increasing." The "conciliation" program toward guerrillas evidently was still supposed to be in effect.

Other anti-Japanese activities are continuous. For some months after the occupation, an underground radio was operated, broadcasting pro-American material. After prolonged search the Japanese announced capture and "punishment"—assassination—of the unidentified Filipino who spoke from it as "Juan de la Cruz," the Filipino equivalent of "John Doe." It is likely that successors have assumed the job. Small whispering campaigns against the conquerors have

not been completely eliminated. In many similar ways, brave men are risking their lives to keep the flame of resistance burning.

Even in the rigidly censored press, the Filipinos occasionally put a mild stiletto into their masters by innuendo or more openly, as in the previously quoted comment about neighborhood associations. In September, 1943, when the "spiritual mobilization" program was in the midst of its demands for frugality, a Filipino writer made this comment:

"As far as we Filipinos are concerned, rice is more important than battles. We are far more interested in the prices of commodities than in the movement of troops or arms. Our problem is not supply but distribution. . . . Rice shipments have to arrive at Manila regularly. A hungry man is neither a good man nor a good patriot, as one's stomach has no pride.

"We know independence means sacrifice, but it is of supreme importance that we all should be amply provided with food, shelter and clothing, without which it would be impossible to enjoy the progress of the war or independence."

In the broad panorama of the Philippine story these actions have been small. They did not prevent application of the Japanese military and economic program nor creation of the puppet "state." On the surface the people appear to be accepting the situation. But they have talked back to their masters—in the incidents of cock-fights and bolos and the more recent series of assassinations. They have shown that, with encouragement, they are ready to resist the conquerors with greater strength.

The guerrillas and their less dramatic supporters in the cities helped keep alive popular hope of an American return for nearly two years, when it appeared from the islands as if American forces were bogged down in the Pacific and Washington had forgotten the Philippines. One of our last propaganda blasts before the occupation was a Washington-dictated statement issued by the High Commissioner's office, which said: "Help is surely coming—help of such adequacy and power that the invader will be driven from our midst and will be rendered powerless ever to threaten us again."

That may have been a laudable long-range program. But at the

time a fragment of our army was cornered without air power and the occupying forces were about to take the city. The statement sounded more like the irresponsible prewar boasting used by American officials to hide our military inadequacy. Succeeding developments made it appear even more so. For Filipino watchers our Pacific offensive, until recently, was dismayingly slow and our primary concern seemed focused, perhaps for years, on Europe.

Meanwhile, our propaganda agencies made only vague and fumbling efforts to counteract the intensive Japanese activities in the islands. At the outset they were concerned primarily with great victories in Africa and Russia and growing American production figures in broadcasts which Filipinos often heard despite the strictly enforced Japanese ban against short-wave radios. The islanders were glad that America was making progress somewhere, but these propaganda efforts gave them no tangible reasons for opposing the Japanese and risking their brutality. What the commoner needed, and did not get, was direct, simply phrased refutations of each Japanese innovation, stressing food prices, inflation and other aspects of individual well-being. He also needed constantly repeated assurance that Americans still were interested in his welfare.

Instead, the Office of War Information, during 1943 and well into 1944, fed him long-winded and involved generalities. The policy slowly has been changed toward more practical propaganda, through the suggestions of several repatriates including Dr. Claude Buss, who was appointed head of the agency's overseas division in San Francisco. But the appeal still is directed to the islands' "intelligentsia," an infinitesimal part of the population and now almost wholly collaborationist.

Despite our resurgent power, none of our submarines shelled the Philippine coasts and no aircraft dropped leaflets during 1943. Other activities, which cannot be described now, were designed to influence the upper classes. The field was wide open for the Japanese to reach the ignored masses. The lone pilot who dropped his bombs in 1942 did more good for our position in Filipino opinion than all of Washington's highly paid "experts."

Under these conditions, the remarkable thing is not that a few

hundred thousand ostensibly are co-operating with the Japanese, but that any Filipinos during the dark days still waited for the Americans. In the fall of 1943, the pro-American morale of Luzon residents was still high, although some of the repatriated Americans noted signs of a breakdown and the beginning of belief that the Philippines had been abandoned permanently. It was impossible to gauge the feeling of outside island residents who, more removed from the symbol that interned Americans became, might have been easier targets for Japan's political warfare.

That morale continued so high on Luzon is a tribute to the people themselves. Part of the credit belongs to unsung anti-Japanese agents, most of them self-appointed, who risked torture to fill the breach when American propaganda was so inept. The upsurge of our Pacific campaign unquestionably electrified the Filipinos, wiped out the doubts and gave them new hope and courage which may prove valuable when we assault the islands.

The death of President Quezon in the United States August 1, 1944, undoubtedly was a deep shock to the islanders. The Japanese reported it without comment at first, then claimed the Americans had killed him to further their "imperialistic" schemes.

Although thousands of Filipinos will be forced into the battle against us, behind the front will be sizable groups of both men and women whose hatred could be co-ordinated into effective guerilla fighting, sabotage and isolated attacks. The Japanese expect some wrath to be turned against them, but they may be surprised by its extent, despite the tight precautions they will take.

Reconquest of the largest land area we lost in the war will help redeem our international face among the natives of all Asia. But with equal intentness they will be watching our postoccupation and postwar policies in the Philippines. The problems of that eventuality will be a great challenge to us. They are hedged with a number of conditions and can only be suggested now.

Japanese propaganda in the Philippines failed in its immediate purpose primarily because military brutality denied its every essential. But the program itself was clever. Had it been coupled with a sincere attempt to win the Filipinos' friendship—that is, if the

more intelligent of the civilians had succeeded in controlling the militarists—the Japanese might have undermined our position in the Filipino mind.

We may find, when the passions of hatred and vengeance die, that Japanese propagandists planted seeds more deeply than are at first apparent. Some aspects of the present superimposed society—such as the neighborhood associations, without the compulsory patrols—may remain as a feature of Filipino life. The idea of affinity with other Asiatic races against the West may grow. Today's school children, reaching maturity, may carry with them much of Japan's militarist thought.

We have promised the islands independence, and the demand for it may be expected. If that is what the Filipinos actually want, they have earned freedom by the tenacity of their fight alongside American soldiers. Yet independence would bring a multitude of problems to the young, undefended, economically unstable nation. Whether they would be willing to admit it or not, the Filipinos would need us for years. They would need our money and our resources and, in so far as possible, our markets. Unless Japan were militarily neutralized, they would need our guns.

The United States, on the other hand, needs a position in the Philippines. We need access to their military bases for the geographical guard we must maintain against future Japanese imperialism. Today's battlegrounds will be those of tomorrow, if Japanese militarists have their way. We need a position in the hearts of the Filipino people as our jumping-off point for the leadership of Asia that is being held out toward us and that we must assume if we want permanent peace. But in the postoccupation world the Filipinos no longer will be the international children of 1900, freed from more than two centuries' bondage. War has hardened and matured them nationally. Despite the public enthusiasm we can expect upon our return, we must come as allies, not masters.

Wise, patient, courageous leadership—based upon a sense of international obligation and not congressional politics—can build tight American-Filipino co-operation on the memories of the past two years. It is a moral responsibility we should not avoid. Moreover,

as part of what must be our incessant vigilance against a re-emergence of Japanese militarism, we must make sure that the people of the Philippines and other Asiatic regions are not drawn into Tokyo's orbit through the psychological web now being woven around them, or compelled to turn to Tokyo for the sale of new products, such as cotton. We must work hard and wisely to defeat the militarist dream of a great Asiatic "uprising" against the West, under Tokyo's leadership.

Asia's millions look to America now, more than any other western power, to lead postwar rehabilitation. They are offering us their confidence and trust because, compared with the average Occidental Far Eastern Policy, ours has been almost snow-white. They know also that, for a time, they will depend upon American resources and skill for rebuilding. If we balk at this leadership, or fail its responsibilities, we shall be following Tokyo's plans to the letter. Our first test will come when we reoccupy the Philippines. The magnitude of this initial task is suggested by the problems surrounding our judgment of collaborationist Filipino politicians, many of whom are subject to prosecution for treason. We must judge wisely, in separating the renegades from the patriots, for some of them may be our best friends.

That is the future. At the moment the Japanese program is being accelerated in every phase. But for thousands of Filipinos, neither persuasion nor force can dim one horrible memory—Bataan. They are the parents, wives and sweethearts—and the survivors themselves—of Filipino soldiers who were in the orgy of Japanese madness which followed the USAFFE capitulation.



## chapter eight

# PRISONERS OF WAR

IN DISMAL Philippine war prisoner camps, a handful of men who survived battle, torture and disease are fighting bravely today for their lives. They are the last remnant of the American and Filipino soldiers who provided the longest and most stubborn resistance the imperial forces encountered in their initial drive. Their reward was full Japanese wrath, vengeance and a concerted attempt to break their spirits.

We civilian internees heard some details of their daily lives, and a few hints concerning the thousands of other Occidental and native war prisoners elsewhere in Asia. The information is distressingly incomplete, because most of these captives have been isolated from direct contact with the outside world.

The Philippine "bamboo wireless" reported this list of war prisoner camps on Luzon in late 1943:

Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija province about one hundred miles north of Manila—main camp containing approximately six thousand American and Filipino soldiers; another housing between two thousand and three thousand captives, mostly Filipinos, including army-employed civilian workers and some other civilians accused of aiding the defenders.

Camp O'Donnell, Tarlac province, slightly less than one hundred miles northwest of Manila—a smaller number of both Americans and Filipinos, probably around one thousand men.

Pasay Elementary School, on the edge of Manila—a few hundred prisoners, mostly Americans.



Fort McKinley and the Port Area in Manila—a small number of “able-bodied” Americans who work for the Japanese.

Bilibid in Manila—Exclusively for Americans, including a 1000-bed hospital in which some orthopedic work reportedly is being done.

The Japanese also maintain several “recuperative hospitals” for sick and wounded Filipino prisoners who have been released from the regular camps.

No word reached us concerning the recent situation at the Davao penal colony on Mindanao. Several hundred Americans and Filipinos were transferred there from Luzon for labor. An official American protest quoted reports that, in the autumn of 1943, 50 per cent of the Americans there had a poor chance of living. Japanese authorities had cut their food ration and had withdrawn all medical attention.

Sixty-seven American army nurses, captured on Corregidor, are in the Santo Tomas Camp. The total includes a few uncommissioned civilian women whom the army medical corps had employed.

Twelve American navy nurses, captured in the Canacao navy hospital, near Cavite, were transferred first to Santo Tomas and later volunteered to go to the all-male Los Baños civilian camp, as hospital workers.

Prison centers believed to be entirely for Filipino soldiers are maintained at Capas, near O'Donnell, and Camp del Pilar, a former Philippine army camp, in the same area. Japanese releases apparently are continuing, involving smaller numbers each time.

Several contingents of American war prisoners, including officers, have been transferred to Japan, sometimes under distinctly inhuman conditions. All ranking officers, full colonel and higher, are in a special camp in Formosa. They include Lieutenant General Jonathan M. Wainwright, acting USAFFE commander in chief at the surrender.

No indication reached us of the number of men or the treatment accorded them in camps believed to be maintained on other southern islands, including Palawan, Leyte, Bohol and Panay.

The best available estimate, in late 1943, was that seven thousand American soldiers were still held in the Philippines. Approximately fifty thousand men of both races were believed to have been captured on Bataan. Latest American casualty figures listed purely American losses at nineteen thousand, of whom slightly more than one thousand were known dead. What happened to the remainder cannot be ascertained now.

Day after day, the prisoners live almost entirely on rice—"lugao" or a watery rice gruel for breakfast, dry rice for lunch and supper, sometimes mixed with a thin vegetable gravy. Meat is rare and at most only enough for a dice-sized piece per man. Sugar is rationed at one spoonful every few days, and the captives sometimes go twenty days without salt. Those with funds are permitted limited purchases from the outside. The captives receive some parcels from Manila civilians. Up to the fall of 1943, a maximum of two Red Cross comfort kits per man had been distributed.

At best, the diet barely sustains life without allowing the men to rebuild their strength. Malnutrition and beriberi are prevalent. The food is so monotonous and unpalatable that eating has become a necessary chore.

Disease also continues to plague the survivors of the hundreds who died in the early days from dysentery, malaria and other illnesses, untended because there was no medicine. A diphtheria epidemic struck Cabanatuan in 1943. We never learned how many lives it claimed. Camp O'Donnell is in the center of a malarial belt, and that tropical plague is still prevalent there. The death rate, however, has slackened. In the first ten days of September, 1943, six deaths were reported at Cabanatuan. When the camps were started, the daily toll often was twenty Americans and one hundred and fifty Filipinos. At O'Donnell, escaped survivors said, twenty-two hundred Americans and twenty thousand Filipinos died in the first few months. The major cause was disease, which was bred in the filth of the camps and spread rapidly through the weakened, overworked and overcrowded men. There was insufficient water for cleanliness.

Medical officers fought desperately then, and they are still fight-

ing, for the health of those dependent upon them. They work in bare rooms, without equipment and with little medicine. The Japanese at first allowed them no medical supplies whatsoever; then they permitted an insufficient dribble of confiscated medicines to reach the camps. In one instance enough quinine for ten malaria cases was sent to O'Donnell, but thousands were suffering from the disease. At the same time, Japanese propagandists boasted that six million quinine tablets had been sent to the Philippines from the Dutch East Indies. Medicines are taken from Red Cross packages before their distribution.

Nevertheless, the hospital situation reportedly has improved somewhat at both O'Donnell and Cabanatuan. Some of the worst American cases were transferred to Bilibid. A number of ailing Filipinos were released. Medicines and other supplies have been received from Manila townspeople. The Japanese army, as usual, has given nothing.

The "bamboo wireless" also reported, in early 1943, that the "treatment is better" in these camps. In the war psychoses of the Philippines that phrase did not mean any distinct Japanese trend toward treatment which westerners regard as humane. It meant merely that captives no longer were beaten and tortured wantonly. Also they were allowed restricted communications with the outside world, always at Japanese discretion, to obtain a few essentials.

Food and treatment of the American laborers in McKinley, the Port Area and the Pasay Elementary School confinement centers reportedly is better than in central Luzon or Davao. The Japanese are interested in maintaining their workers' strength and in keeping them comparatively well-groomed to impress passing Manilans. At the outset of captivity labor was forced, and men too weak to stand the pace were cruelly beaten. In one instance two hundred men from three hundred assigned to a detail in Batangas province, near Manila, died from overexertion or guards' brutality. Work now is said to be "voluntary," in that the individual has his choice. Most prisoners prefer to work, because of the better treatment and the chance for temporary escape from the camps' squalid misery. The few pesos they earn can be spent for extra food and cigarettes.

The Japanese have other measures to obtain their services. Many able-bodied war prisoners have been confined in gendarmerie stations or in Bilibid's unpleasant cells, then promised improved conditions if they "volunteer" for labor. Most captives are water-front stevedores, which Orientals consider a degrading occupation for Occidentals. Prisoner-laborers are employed also as truck drivers, mechanics and farmers in sun-blistered fields. They work ten hours a day under sentries' guns, with no protection from the vicious sun.

The Japanese allot American officers 25 pesos monthly or \$12.50, prewar rate. Today this is sufficient for only small amounts of fruits and vegetables. The men receive nothing, except the meager wages given to stevedores and mechanics. Reliable reports said enlisted men at Cabanatuan and O'Donnell were not paid for working in near-by fields, from 6:30 to 11:30 A.M. and 1 to 6 P.M. daily. The ostensible reason was that such labor was a "camp activity," although the conquerors took most of the produce.

Yet the prisoners' morale is still high. The Japanese desire to break their spirits, it seemed, struck a vein of typical American stubbornness. These boys had surrendered as a military unit, but they would never surrender as individuals. And they have not.

Within the first few weeks' internment the prisoners arranged entertainment programs and skits. They were staged usually once a week under the direction of interned chaplains. In his story of that period, Lieutenant Colonel S. M. Mellnik, one of the escaped survivors, reported the men anticipated these shows, "despite what must be sadly admitted as a very low entertainment value."

The programs still continue, with plays, skits and singing. Given on makeshift stages in the crowded barracks, or sometimes in the open air, they express a brave determination to keep alive battered spirits. These shows are their principal recreation, for sports are infrequent, requiring too much energy and strength. Religion also is important—the practical, quiet guidance of chaplains who shared the same experiences. Both Catholic and Protestant services are conducted in open air churches, surrounded by barbed wire.

On Bataan these soldiers battled grimly, always awaiting and hop-

ing for reinforcements that never came. Today they are sustained by faith that American forces will return to the Philippines, completing the job they started. The grapevine has reached them with some reports of the American offensive. The news was good medicine.

The Japanese have made every effort to separate the prisoners and Filipino civilians. They permitted the sending of parcels only after persistent application for weeks by hundreds, both high and low, who were appalled by the story of Bataan. First requests received harsh rebuffs, but the Filipinos continued their efforts. Finally, the conquerors apparently realized how extensively their brutality had alienated the new subjects. Regulations were relaxed on Luzon, but often packages were held up for days, when the medicines some of them contained might have saved many lives. Food, medicine, clothes and money are being sent now to the prison camps, both by the Filipinos and the Santo Tomas civilian internees. Yet the Japanese continually attempt to humiliate the American soldiers, in an endeavor to create Filipino contempt.

One of their most dramatic recent efforts was a boomerang. In the summer of 1943, American prisoners were required to enact roles in a propaganda film entitled "Rip Down the Stars and Stripes." Operating captured American equipment, they were sent "on location" to the Luneta, Manila's bay-front park. The Japanese knew the sight immediately would attract large crowds. The Filipinos watched the scene closely, then, when the opportunity came, they showered the Americans with cigarettes, sandwiches and similar presents. The same stunt was repeated the second day. On the third, both sides were more prepared.

The Filipinos had wrapped their gifts carefully, so they would not scatter when tossed from the crowd. Gendarmes, disguised as Filipino laborers, mingled with the throng. While the presents were being thrown, they moved swiftly, making innumerable arrests. They hustled their prisoners to Santiago prison for questioning—and discovered that many of them were Filipina debutantes, some of whom were related to Filipino government officials.

The treatment in other Asiatic war prisons is on the same level.

Widespread cruelty, viciously enforced labor and starvation rations repeatedly have been reported. Atrocities rivaling Bataan probably will be revealed when the final story is told.

The exact number of prison camps and a precise total of surviving captives have not been announced. War prisoners are confined in every imperial area, possibly except Indo-China. British government reports said the Japanese hold one hundred and eighty thousand British and one hundred thousand Netherlands war captives. Presumably the total includes Occidental civilians and soldiers and native troops.

Besides those in the Philippines, Americans classed as war prisoners include marines and civilian workers from Wake and Guam; marines captured in Tientsin and Peking; officers of the American President Liner *President Harrison*; officers and men from the gunboat *Wake*, taken at Shanghai, soldiers and aviators from several war fronts. They are confined in the Woosung camp, near Shanghai; in several Japan establishments, in Korea and Mukden, Manchuria, where a large prison is maintained.

Conditions apparently are unsatisfactory even in the "top flight" establishment on Formosa. Besides General Wainwright and his staff officers, this camp includes the British commanders and governors-general of Hong Kong and Singapore, the commanders and governor of the Netherlands East Indies.

Several Japanese propaganda stories have been circulated about the Formosa prison, praising its "healthful" climate and its "ideal tropical setting." The generals have been quoted by newspaper "correspondents," who may or may not have talked to them, as saying they passed their time in gardening, playing cards and reading—"through the courtesy of Japanese military authorities."

But a published letter, purportedly written by General Wainwright, gave a clue. He was quoted as saying conditions are not "too bad," but "we could stand a little more meat and we need all the reading material we can get, in English." Published pictures show him lean and worried, as he was at the surrender. A representative of the International Red Cross was allowed to visit the camp for the first time in 1944.

One authenticated story, from a source which must remain anonymous, tells of an unnamed camp in Japan, where many Americans from the Philippines were confined. Captured in the southern islands, they were taken to Manila and loaded on a small vessel which joined a three-ship convoy for the long trip. The Americans were jammed in with Australian captives from Singapore—six thousand men altogether—on the deck, wedged so tightly that they could neither sit nor lie down. Half leaning against each other, but still on their feet, these men traveled for three weeks between Manila and Fusan, Korea, following a slow, tortuous course to avoid American submarines.

During the trip, the prisoners subsisted on crackers and water. Many were suffering from dysentery and malaria. The ill received no special consideration and no medical attention whatsoever; they were unable even to move to deckside lavatories, so tight was the press. In one small section of the ship, sixteen men died and were buried overside. At Fusan most of the Australians were transferred, and the remainder soon reached Japan.

It was winter and bitterly cold. The Japanese gave their prisoners no clothing but took them to camp, sick and weakened, in the tropical uniforms they wore when captured. Their diet was, and still is, two bowls of soup daily. When the men finally received Red Cross packages from the United States, most of the contents had been taken by the Japanese who “generously” distributed some cereal and perhaps one can of corned beef for each ten men.

Most of the prisoners elected to work. For menial tasks, on a new canal being constructed between Tokyo and Yokohama, their pay was 30 sen a day—8 cents in prewar exchange, almost valueless today.

Other reliable stories describe Americans, shivering in inadequate clothes and some shoeless, working as stevedores on the docks of Japan. Most of the Wake Island engineers are employed in Tokyo war factories; and, judging from Japanese propaganda pictures, many other American captives are working in the war plants of Japan and Manchuria. Other pictures show prisoners constructing roads and laboring in the fields.

For special reasons, the Woosung camp, perhaps, is one of the best, yet its inadequacies are apparent. It was established early in the war on the flatlands, a few miles below Shanghai, and houses twelve hundred captives, including a few British.

The Japanese gave these prisoners the usual inadequate food ration and failed to supply them either medicines or clothes. But they allowed Shanghai civilians to send parcels once monthly. Through the American Association and the British Relief Association and a number of private donors, they obtained considerable clothing and medicine, books and athletic equipment, additional food and, finally, enough medical equipment to establish a camp clinic and small surgery, maintained by interned doctors.

In November, 1942, I had a few minutes' conversation with a Wake Island marine who was in Shanghai on a Japanese work project. He told me that, even with civilian assistance, the food at the camp was inadequate to preserve strength, although in other respects "we're pretty well off." After general internment of Americans and British in January, 1943, the packages sent to Woosung decreased markedly. Pellagra and beriberi soon appeared.

These prisoners did not undergo experiences similar to Bataan, but they are under constant gendarmerie surveillance. Two men who attempted to escape were sentenced to several years' imprisonment in Ward Road jail. They are kept in the section generally used for Chinese convicts.

Woosung is one of the few "model" camps which International Red Cross officials have been permitted to visit. Propagandists have widely publicized it, claiming, among other things, that the Japanese army supplied a special Christmas dinner which actually was sent by the American Association. Yet, with the organized assistance of several thousand Occidentals in a great city, still rich despite the war, Woosung falls far short of the fundamental standards of humaneness and consideration that Americans consider elementary.

Treatment of war prisoners and civilian internees varies greatly throughout the Asiatic camps, because it depends largely upon the Japanese commandants. Tokyo apparently has formulated no hard and definite policy. The foreign office, anyway, would be power-



less to enforce a program inconsistent with the viewpoints of field commanders. The war ministry evidently relies upon its field officers' discretion.

International law does not apply to any camp. Shortly after war began, Tokyo civilian officials agreed to abide by the Geneva Convention for treatment of war prisoners, although Japan is not a signatory. Whatever their intentions, they were unable to obtain military conformance to this promise. The militarists believe they would lose great face in allowing themselves to be bound by a document which western statesmen wrote.

Underlining this attitude, various camp commandants told war prisoners and civilian internees that they were captives without rights; that international law did not apply to them; that "we [the Japanese military] make our own international law"; that treatment was better than given to Japanese internees in the United States; that Japan has no commitment to satisfy western standards because she did not sign the Geneva Convention.

(The same government duality, always prevalent in recent years, has complicated efforts to establish a method for regular Red Cross shipments to American prisoners. It also may be responsible for Japan's evident disinterest in further repatriations.)

In every camp, without exception, the Japanese authorities have undertaken at once to convince the prisoners that their "privileges" represent Japanese "generosity," not Japanese responsibility to international practice. The ability to purchase necessary food on outside markets or to send communications thereby becomes a "privilege."

The Japanese have tolerated by sufferance Swiss diplomatic and consular officials and International Red Cross representatives in China and Japan. Their activities are dependent entirely upon the conquerors. Only a few visits have been permitted to military and civilian camps. In each case, the "model" establishments were selected beforehand by the Japanese. The visiting officials never were allowed to speak to the captives alone. The Shanghai Swiss Consulate fought long but unsuccessfully for an opportunity to visit gendarmerie stations. When we left Asia, it was in the midst of an-

other battle to inspect hospitals where Occidental gendarmerie victims often were taken after their inquisition.

In the Philippines, however, the Japanese do not recognize the Swiss consul, and they will not permit appointment of an International Red Cross delegate. Neither the captured soldiers nor civilians have any official representation. They also are denied regular communication with the United States and Great Britain and none whatsoever with other sections of the Japanese empire. A few heavily censored letters, post cards and Tokyo broadcast "messages" from the islands have been received in the United States. Only a handful of thousands of letters from this country has reached the prisoners.

These policies can be construed only as continued Japanese vengeance against both soldiers and civilians for the resistance at Bataan and Corregidor.

International law is specific regarding captured soldiers. Its minimum requirement is that a prisoner be given food, housing, pay and general treatment corresponding to that received by a soldier of the same rank in the victorious army. No such code has been formulated for civilian internees, who never were so numerous as in this war. Literally and legally they are at the victor's mercy.

In practice, the civilian internees, except gendarmerie victims, receive far better treatment than war prisoners in Asia. Most internment camps are under Japanese civilians who, generally, lack the venom and disciplinary sternness of the army officers controlling war prisons. But the basic Japanese ration for civilians is nearly as low as for war captives. In order to sustain health and strength, civilians must purchase considerable food and medicine on outside markets, a "privilege" for which most captured soldiers lack both the cash and opportunity.

Official food allotments are considerably less than the average Japanese private receives. They are insufficient to maintain Occidental strength. Furthermore, the Japanese have supplied virtually no medicines nor medical equipment to any camp. This may be due partially to Asia's growing poverty, but basically it illustrates the militarist desire to humble the Occidental. The rations are determined by the army, and even sympathetic civilian administrators

dare not ask for an increase. "War necessity" likewise is no excuse for refusal to permit regular Red Cross shipments.

For war prisoners, this condition is cause for growing concern, dependent as they are on what the Japanese give them. For civilian internees the danger is that increasing shortages and zooming prices will limit sharply their ability to continue purchasing the supplies which thus far have carried them through. That situation, already existing in Hong Kong, has brought a starvation threat to British civilian internees in Camp Stanley.

Overcrowding is universal in all camps. The average individual space is four by eight feet in a jammed room for the prisoner's personal belongings, his bed and himself. Health dangers are expanding, but the Japanese have made no important attempt to solve the problem.

The militarists are directly responsible for these ills, some of which, such as the brutality, are deliberate. In some cases civilian administrators have made efforts to provide comfortable conditions, within the limits of army orders hanging over them, and often they seem to think they are doing a good job. The Japanese idea of comfort is very different from ours. Military officers, however, generally have shown no such sympathy for war prisoners.

The situation will grow progressively worse, with little chance of improvement. The militarists will pay no more attention to future official protests than in the past. They care nothing about our treatment of Japanese war prisoners who, in their eyes, lost all right to consideration by surrendering. Their sensitivity regarding fancied maltreatment of interned civilians in the United States primarily is a matter of face. They lose face if they lack the influence to prevent such occurrences; but the individuals themselves count little to them. The typical method of regaining prestige is retaliation in kind—or usually worse—on the captives they hold. That demonstrates their power.

The unfortunate truth is that all prisoners, military and civilian, are actual or potential hostages in Japanese hands. Those remaining under civilian jurisdiction doubtless will escape all retaliation, regardless of war results. But there is no guarantee that the army will

not assume control of them. If the militarists believe the execution or torture of hostages will force American opinion to hobble the war effort, they will not hesitate to do so; just as their execution of the Doolittle raiders was intended to discourage Americans from making other attacks. The Mukden war prison reportedly is near industrial targets. It is likely other captives will be held in bombing zones as a possible deterrent. Successive defeats may bring new brutalities from pure venom.

Most of the prisoners recognize this possibility. If necessary they are ready to stand up to it, rather than see any slackening of the Allied offensive. Pride in the victories we have won and the steady hope of eventual repatriation are the sustaining factors in their dreary, monotonous lives.

That is the way it is at the Santo Tomas camp, Asia's largest internment center.



## chapter nine

### "THREE OR FOUR DAYS"

WHEN we arrived at the University of Santo Tomas, hundreds of Americans and British already had been dumped into internment. By bus and truck they came from all parts of the city with only the baggage they could carry. The vanguard of three hundred and fifty men, women and children, mostly Americans, arrived the previous day, January 4, 1942, from Manila's bay-front Malate district.

Slipping through the ominous front gates, our faded blue bus rattled along a two-hundred-yard tree-lined roadway to the administration building, in the center of the university's half-dozen large and small buildings. It was a three-storied towered structure, in classic Spanish style, built around two small patios. We dismounted, then stood uncertainly in front of the arched doorway.

"Inside," said a Japanese officer, not too unpleasantly.

He directed the Americans to the second floor and the British to the third. Then he mumbled something about men and women occupying separate rooms and turned away. The rest was up to us. As soon as we entered the building, we were caught in the uproar of hundreds of milling internees, searching frantically for living space in already crowded classrooms.

Nearly every square foot of the barren whitewashed classrooms already had been claimed. Internees, finding a blank space, dropped their luggage, then sat on it, wiping their foreheads, to recuperate. The high-ceilinged rooms varied in size, averaging perhaps thirty-five feet square. A number of doors already bore crudely-printed

signs—"32 Americans, All Full"; "This Room Is Packed—60 Men."

Gunnison, Mydans and I finally found space for our families in a cramped corner of a women's room. A stern-faced Amazon had assumed command. She firmly ejected us when, after raising mosquito nets for our wives, we tried to homestead alongside them. "The Japanese told us that men and women would have separate rooms," she said. "That's the way it's going to be. Now go."

At length we obtained space for ourselves in a room next door, and I spread a light blanket on the concrete floor, my bed for several weeks. On leaving the hotel, we had snatched up mosquito nets at the last minute, a fortunate bit of burglary. Nets are essential in that section of Manila throughout the year. Many internees, however, arrived without them and spent the night disconsolately swatting B-24 mosquitoes. And many hundreds, young and old, slept on the hard floors or atop desks, because they had been taken from hotels or the houses of friends and were unable to bring cots or mattresses.

The Japanese were content to leave us alone, after making the formal delivery to imprisonment, and only a small guard patrolled the grounds. Knowing them, we expected they would give us no supplies, and we were right. That night, and many months thereafter, the internees depended upon themselves.

When I rejoined the family for a dinner of canned corned beef, eaten off a school desk in the crowded hallway, over two thousand persons had been delivered to the camp. Another thousand arrived during the week. Some forty classrooms in the administration building were jammed. A sizable overflow, principally of men, slept in the hallways or on covered walks bordering the patios. Some rooms, containing valuable university equipment, remained locked.

The confusion and uncertainty continued for days. Internees roamed restlessly through the hallways and around the campus. Long lines formed for the use of water faucets and lavatories. We lived on the canned goods we had brought and, for those with the money, foodstuffs purchased by the visiting Filipinos. It was un-

sanitary and unhealthful, but we later nicknamed this period the “Picnic Era” because of the carefreeness implied by couples sprawling in the shade during long afternoons. We were waiting for something—not being sure what—with a sense the present would end soon. The optimists expected swift release. The pessimists anticipated worse troubles. The Japanese ignored us as individuals.

This heterogeneous collection of people caught by war included every character shading of the normal city, the clergyman and business executive—and the prostitute and beachcomber. Seventy per cent were Americans, most of them permanent Manila residents, with that city’s particular outlook. Camp life developed along American and Manila lines, the only civilian establishment in Asia to transplant so many markedly American characteristics. British totaled 28 per cent and other nationalities the remainder, including twenty-eight Netherlands, thirty Poles, one Belgian, Mexican, Nicaraguan and Cuban.

Approximately 38 per cent were women. There were about three hundred children under 12 years of age. Occupationally the men were primarily businessmen and engineers, the latter including the Philippines’ best mining talent. Sixteen doctors and dentists and twelve lawyers were interned. The camp as a whole was predominantly middle-aged and included several hundred married couples, imprisoned together but required to live separately.

Beneath the universal dread and hopelessness of the situation, internment meant something specific to each individual—worry over friends and relatives with the army in Bataan or isolated in other parts of the archipelago; the empty realization that businesses built in a lifetime’s work were gone, almost overnight and without compensation; the restlessness of young men who had wanted war service but whom the USAFFE could not use before the occupation; the deep, angry humiliation of “old-timers,” who watched the fall of the islands many of them helped conquer, then were driven to imprisonment like common criminals, before the Filipinos whom they had dominated socially; the indefinite interruption of careers; the sudden blow to pride in knowing that former social and business positions were meaningless.

Unknown to most internees at first, a small group of men—designated as the “internee government”—worked amid the confusion to solve immediate problems. That government was principally Earl Carroll, a graduate of Louisiana State College. In his middle thirties, he was a soft-spoken, patient southerner who had returned to Manila four days before Pearl Harbor to become production manager of the Insular Life Assurance Co. Previously, he served as head of that firm’s Honolulu office for eight years, acquiring there some knowledge of Japanese characteristics which was to be valuable.

When the first prisoners arrived, a Japanese captain learned that Carroll had been the Malate representative of the American Co-ordinating Committee, a wartime civilian relief body. He told Carroll to take charge, warned him that he was responsible for the behavior of all prisoners, then left.

With such vague authority, Carroll turned to a committee-type government to run the fledgling community. The internee government expanded rapidly and was patched and repatched. Eventually, Carroll appointed a nine-man executive committee, which he headed, to deal directly with university and Japanese authorities, the British having two members and the secretaryship. It was flanked by an appointive advisory committee of Manila businessmen and engineers. Another group, which included interned Red Cross officials, worked on plans for the mass feeding of the internees, an immediate necessity. Under these central bodies, twenty-six operating committees of volunteers were appointed within a few weeks to maintain camp services.

The original complexities of camp life are suggested by the operating committees—sanitation and health; hospital; building and construction; electrical; fire prevention; discipline; census; work assignment; public relations; information; censorship; suggestion committee (receiving new ideas from individual internees); vegetable garden; roll call; treasurer; messenger service; release and welfare; education; recreation; religion; camp newspaper; entertainment; library; indigent relief; youth advisers; lost and found.

By this time, the prisoners occupied more than one hundred rooms, of various sizes, in four buildings which the university au-



thorities opened to them. Men and women were still separated. Each room was headed by an elected monitor who was responsible for internal discipline. The room leaders chose "chief monitors" for each floor of the larger buildings, through whom they maintained liaison for the individual with the central internee officials. In all, nearly three hundred men and women were involved directly in some way with this sometimes top-heavy administration. The Japanese generally were unconcerned with development of the internal government.

Under the Japanese program of attempting to mollify the Catholic world, final authority for use of university facilities rested with the Dominican priests and their lay representatives. They repeatedly demonstrated their desire to extend the prisoners full co-operation; although, naturally, they also wanted to protect valuable scientific and scholastic equipment. On several occasions they opened additional rooms when Carroll showed them the need to relieve congestion. The internees expanded throughout most of the buildings and the campus. Relations were cordial between interned and university officials.

Several Fathers continued to live on the campus, including a few Americans, occupying the chapel building. The Japanese allowed them freedom to move throughout Manila. Within a few weeks, however, the military administration attempted to sever all contact between the priests and internees. To enforce this, they surrounded the chapel with a barbed-wire fence, prohibiting internee entry into the area; probably fearing the priests would serve as the medium for uncensored verbal messages between the prisoners and Filipino parishioners. Yet they never denied Catholic internees permission to attend Mass. In time some Fathers conducted classes in the internment "college," re-establishing direct contact, although the barbed-wire fence remained.

This was one evidence of the sometimes confused Japanese policy toward their prisoners. It was a strange mixture of co-operation and stubbornness, often varying from day to day. We had been placed in "protective custody," they said, not internment, without explaining the difference or naming the threat which caused us to

need their protection. The Japanese like such euphemisms, because then the rules can be made as they go along. As exemplified by the fence, they also like to establish stern regulations, then gain face by allowing individual Japanese administrators to soften them. The original rules can be reinvoled if necessary.

The first commandant, who installed himself within a few days in the main building's first floor offices, was Lieutenant Hitoshi Tomoyasu of the gendarmerie. Fortunately for their peace of mind, most internees did not know until later his connection with the military police, whose brutalities in the outside city already had been reported by the camp's "bamboo wireless."

Lieutenant Tomoyasu was a stern-faced, old-line officer who frankly told me in an interview weeks later that he had come to the camp determined to enforce rigid discipline and had been surprised when it was unnecessary. The internees were saved far greater hardships than they experienced by the fact that their initial hopelessness and sense of impotency quieted resentment and prevented any mass attempt to escape or to oppose the Japanese. The gendarmerie were awaiting such an outbreak and would have replied ruthlessly.

They proved that in mid-February, 1942, when four men escaped by jumping over the university's low walls. The Japanese never found one of them, an old-time American prospector with friends in the mountains, who had gone alone. But the two young British merchant seamen, Weeks and Fletcher, and an Australian machinist named Leacock were captured together the day after their escape as they walked along a highway a few miles from Santo Tomas. They carried provisions with them and apparently were trying to reach the American lines in Bataan.

Brought back to the camp, the three captives were badly beaten by Japanese soldiers, then were whisked away to a military prison. Two days later they were taken to Cemeterio del Norte, a large cemetery on the edge of town, and marched to an open grave. Until then, they had no idea of their fate. The commandant read a brief statement which said they had been condemned to death by a military court martial—the first they had heard concerning a trial. Seated on the edge of the grave, with their legs dangling in it, the

men then were shot hurriedly by inexperienced marksmen. Filipino laborers were compelled to shovel dirt on them, while the moans of one victim could still be heard. Internee officials, the monitors of the rooms in which the men had lived and an Anglican clergyman from the camp were required to witness the executions.

That was the Japanese warning of what would come if they were crossed.

But the incident had a curious corollary, showing—at least in one man's experience—the ignorance and insularity encrusting the minds of Japanese army officers, most of whom have confined their limited foreign contacts to like-minded Prussians. In our interview Lieutenant Tomoyasu said he had visited the western United States and Canada only as a youth.

"The people seemed pleasant and agreeable then," he said, "but later I met a number of British in Kobe who were arrogant and unco-operative. Then, reading the newspapers, I believed that during the past few years the Americans and British were trying to strangle Japan. So, in coming to the camp, I was resolved to deal with that kind of people.

"But I learned to like you, against my will. I found that underneath you are very much like Japanese people, and you are not at all what the papers say about you."

At the outset Lieutenant Tomoyasu doubtless would have approved the death penalty for the escapees. But when it came, he had changed his viewpoint. The night before the executions, he slipped out of camp dressed in old dungaree trousers and wooden geta. He told internee officials that he had humbled himself, in dress and manner, before superior officers in an unsuccessful attempt to lighten the sentence.

Although his rank was insufficient to swerve stern-minded superiors on that and several other points, the lieutenant succeeded in lightening the original burdens of internment by concessions within his power. His changed attitude was due considerably to Carroll's patience with exasperating Japanese delay in permitting the purchase of such essentials as food. The internees themselves helped by ac-

cepting the situation realistically, without demanding their "rights" or concertedly resisting Japanese administration.

The lieutenant's influence was felt behind the scenes. Outwardly, his manner was strict and uncompromising toward his captives, an inevitable attitude among face-preserving officers. Each concession was labeled as a "privilege," not as an internee right. All "privileges" were suspended temporarily for the entire camp when Japanese authority seemed flouted by such instances as the intoxicated condition of one internee, returning to Santo Tomas after a few hours' freedom, or the complaints made to downtown headquarters by two temporarily released women who demanded full freedom. The February escapes resulted in severance of all contact with the outside for several days.

Only a few internee officials knew that Lieutenant Tomoyasu, under Carroll's patient pressure, was responsible for original concessions which enabled Santo Tomas to become Asia's most comfortable camp.

The system of obtaining individual supplies through the front gate was formalized under an internee plan which eliminated the original confusion and provided that Manilans could bring their parcels to the camp daily. Both Japanese and internee guards inspected the packages, confiscating only weapons, including butcher knives, and liquor. Food and all manner of personal possessions, from beds and furniture to golf clubs, were "imported" this way from all homes which had not been looted. In other Asiatic camps package deliveries are limited to once monthly.

Later, the commandant allowed the temporary release of the aged and ill, on permits good for varying periods, enabling them to go to hospitals or live in their own homes and move with relative freedom throughout the city. Brief releases were granted for several other reasons. Some interned professional entertainers, for instance, were allowed a few hours to obtain costumes from their homes for stage shows which Carroll convinced the lieutenant were essential for morale. Under internee censorship, short messages relating to family matters were permitted, and visitors could collect them daily. Tele-

phone calls and occasional visits by uninterned relatives were allowed eventually.

Regulations concerning these "privileges" are much stricter elsewhere in Asia. Except for hospitalization of the severely ill, no releases are granted.

Possibly Manila's higher authorities were more disposed to approve these concessions from the superiority engendered by their original victories and because the Americans by solving their own problems removed a serious burden from the shoulders of Japanese officers, concerned with reorganizing the city. The original recommendations, however, came from Lieutenant Tomoyasu. Because of his position as an officer, succeeding commandants—who were civilians—could not eliminate his basic policies, even if they wished.

There is no evidence the lieutenant showed this relative consideration from any motive but his changed outlook. The "privileges" in themselves were minute; unless considered against the reality—all could have been denied by a more stubborn man. Most internees, however, considered him as a typical Japanese militarist, which he was in most instances. No American tears were shed when he died months later from malaria contracted on Bataan.

Internal discipline was principally an internee matter, with Carroll technically under personal responsibility for the entire camp's behavior. Roll call was conducted each night. Individuals reported to their room monitors who submitted census lists to the central internee office for transmission to the Japanese. Freedom of movement was permitted throughout the fifty-two-acre campus during the day, except for the chapel area. After negotiations, internees finally were permitted to occupy a restricted area fronting the main building until 9 P.M.—a two-hour extension of first regulations. Thereafter they were confined in their buildings until sunrise.

Two squads of soldiers guarded the camp. Although the officers generally swaggered, the men on the whole seemed to bear us little animosity. Some were peasants so naïve that their first sight of an English typewriter held them fascinated for hours. Sentries, with bayonet-tipped guns, often paused during their regular patrol to watch internee softball games. They attended entertainment pro-

grams and later, when makeshift dances began, hung on the edge of the crowd. No major incidents arose between the soldiers and prisoners.

But at first the situation was delicate. The Japanese lived in the main building and circulated at will through the hallways. In the camp's original tensity, we regarded each wanderer with apprehension, and internee officials feared a hot-headed prisoner might show potentially dangerous animosity. Slow, silent pressure was used to discourage our "hosts."

Privates often watched impromptu card games in the halls. Once a soldier picked up a newly dealt hand and suggested in pantomime that he play. A diminutive internee shook his head definitely and took the cards. The private merely giggled in embarrassment and continued to kibitz. Another time, an intoxicated sergeant wandered into several women's rooms late one night. For such a contingency, the internee "police force"—the discipline committee—maintained a night-long patrol. By prearranged plans, two burly prisoner "cops" followed the sergeant everywhere he went. Their tenacity dampened his apparent amorousness, and he soon left.

In a few weeks, Carroll persuaded the commandant to move the guard to a former gasoline station next to the front gate. Later, to keep them satisfied, internee carpenters constructed a "recreation hall"—a small, plain wooden building—near the gate, using internee-purchased materials. After that, the Japanese seldom visited the building, and the average prisoner had little contact with them.

The camp's most immediate problem was food, for indefinite continuance of the tinned can diet would precipitate grave health problems. Carroll and one of his main henchmen—A. F. Duggleby, a mild-mannered engineer and executive with the Benguet and Balatoc Mining Company—presented the commandant plans for communal feeding of the entire camp. Supplies would be purchased with American Red Cross funds then frozen in the Philippine National Bank, in addition to foodstuffs stored in the organization's sealed warehouses. But Manila authorities adamantly refused. They said they could not break imperial gendarmerie seals. Nothing could be done.

The Japanese were very sorry, but they had no suggestions to help solve the problem; although, when the Manila situation was clarified, they would feed the camp on an Oriental standard. Meanwhile, the internees had brought canned goods which would be sufficient, isn't that so?

Within the camp, several internees had solicited friends for food to give to internees who had neither supplies nor funds. In a few days hot coffee was served each morning to all internees and hot cereal was given to women and children and destitute men. Volunteers prepared these meals from internee-donated supplies on stoves in the university's former small restaurant.

While the Japanese still made no move to help, several internees who had considerable money in the camp, subscribed to loans, secured by American Red Cross promissory notes. These were signed by the interned officials of that organization, T. J. Wolff, the local chairman; Charles F. Forster, Manila manager; and James W. Cullens, a representative of Washington headquarters. The lenders, who remained anonymous to the camp as a whole, included several Manila businessmen, as well as one professional gambler. Representatives of American concerns then sent requests for funds, through the censored communications, to outside friends, pledging the credit of their firms. Many thousands of dollars were raised in this way. Two of the largest pledgers were F. D. Gundelfinger, Philippine representative of Libby, McNeill & Libby, and Carroll Grinnell, Far Eastern manager, The General Electric Co.

With these funds, internee officials began to purchase foodstuffs on the open Manila market, through Filipinos connected with the Philippine Red Cross and internee buyers who received day-to-day permission for a few hours' freedom. They were forced to travel from market to market, to obtain sufficient supplies in the still unsettled city for even the camp's limited requirements. Additional kitchens were established for children and special dietary cases where simple meals were served twice daily. Most internees, however, still depended upon cans or the food they could "import" through the package line, including some hot meals for those whose

houseboys were still faithful and able to utilize empty internee homes.

Internee officials eventually obtained the release of some Red Cross supplies. Finally, they received permission to purchase equipment for a central kitchen in a converted classroom at the rear of the main building, to provide all internees with breakfast and dinner. The initial general meal was served January 31—vegetable stew, with a few pieces of meat. It was the first hot food many internees had eaten since their arrival. More than a hundred volunteers had labored on the food problem, from the financial donors to the former merchant seamen who worked in the main kitchen, some of them eight hours daily.

Communal feeding was a big step toward the security that we all wanted. Even so, internees had to supply their own lunches, and many without funds depended upon the two meals issued by the camp. Breakfasts served from 7 to 9 A.M. to cafeteria lines were monotonously the same—cracked-wheat mush for the few months it lasted, then corn meal mush, and weak coffee. Red Cross canned milk supplies soon became low, and they were reserved exclusively for children. Sugar at first was so plentiful that it was placed in large pans on the open air dining tables.

Camp dinners fluctuated in quality and quantity with the availability of supplies. Vegetable stew, with some meat, and rice was most frequent. Mango beans, a Philippine species of the cowpea, and kidney beans were regular dishes. Once a week the internees received with increasing distaste a dinner of boiled pechay, a discouraged brand of spinach, and hard-boiled duck eggs, of indefinite vintage. Occasional meals of boiled chicken, served sparingly, and hamburger steaks marked the closest the kitchen could approximate normalcy.

Long cafeteria lines formed for these meals, served between 4 and 6 P.M. Usually, the individual waited half an hour for his food, then balancing the hot dish precariously, stumbled past the crush to reach a table outside on the back campus or, in rainy weather, a nook in the crowded hallways. Portions generally were scanty, and the central office issued meal tickets to prevent duplications.



The best cuts of meat, all the milk and bread during its infrequent availability were reserved for the children and hospital patients who were given three meals a day prepared in separate kitchens. No one complained against this enforced sharing.

This diet was inadequate, lacking butterfat, fresh fruits and uncooked vegetables. Yet it was the most tasty and most nourishing in any of the Japanese internment camps in Asia. For six months every centavo was guaranteed or paid by the American Red Cross, and the conquerors even collected regularly for electricity and gas. A continued supply of money became vital, not only for food but to buy medicines, sanitary equipment and other essentials which the Japanese likewise failed to provide. All the conquerors gave us then was the propagandized *Tribune*, delivered free, one copy to each room.

After prolonged negotiations, the Japanese finally allowed the American Red Cross to withdraw some of its bank deposits at the end of February. Finally, on July 1, the Japanese advanced funds, in printing-press Philippine pesos, to finance the camp on its previous basis of two meals a day, paying the cash to internee officials who were allowed to continue purchases on the open market. The budget was about 35 cents a day per person for all expenses, from food to medicine. Even so, the Japanese retained their club over the internees, by granting these funds at the last minute each month, and only after several requests by internee officials. The implication was that, at any time, the conquerors could refuse the pledged advance, if camp affairs did not suit them.

Meanwhile, internees had been scrambling individually to obtain money for the lunches and other necessities they were forced to provide themselves. The majority of long-time Manila residents succeeded in obtaining substantial loans from friends outside. In time also the Japanese permitted withdrawals of \$100 monthly per family and \$50 monthly for single persons from accounts in the Filipino banks; although accounts were still frozen in American and British banks. Many internees continued to pay cooks and houseboys to market for them. Approximately nine hundred prisoners provided

all their own food in this manner, declining to "go on the line" for the breakfasts and dinners which camp kitchens served.

They were the minority. The vast majority received both meals from the central kitchen and, husbanding limited funds, prepared their own lunches with fruit and vegetables bought at Filipino stores which were allowed to operate within Santo Tomas, plus occasional purchases made through the "package line." The two hundred-odd prisoners who were flat broke lived on the food and clothing the camp could give them, the central kitchen eventually providing skimpy lunches of reheated rice or beans.

As a university, Santo Tomas was modern and comfortable, but as an apartment house it was entirely inadequate. Overcrowded rooms and the lack of sanitary facilities presented health problems which required constant vigilance by some four hundred volunteer workers. The main building's six bathrooms, for example, were used by over twenty-one hundred internees, or one hundred to each toilet. When the camp was first opened, there were no bathing facilities whatsoever.

Within a few days, \$5,000 worth of internee-purchased sanitary equipment was installed, including showers and additional water faucets for dishes and laundry. Ditches were dug on the back campus for burying garbage, hauled regularly from the hallways. Squads mopped the corridors daily, and members of each room were required to keep them clean. The internee government issued regulations—actually only suggestions, because it lacked compulsive power—for disposing of waste food and other sanitary measures to minimize the dangers of flies.

Meanwhile, a group of men weeded a scraggly patch of land on the rear campus which harbored thousands of rats. They worked by hand, because they had no tools, and leveled several acres, killing hundreds of rats and removing a definite health threat. Others cleaned the main campus area, worked on improvised fly traps, cleaned the drains and washed by hand the inside of a swimming pool in which a reserve supply of water was kept. These activities were consolidated under Robert Cecil, a young insurance man who headed the sanitation and health committee.

Simultaneously, Doctors Leach and Whitacre started a camp hospital. Aided by volunteers they cleaned out a cluttered former mineralogy building on the back campus and set up shop with a few donated beds and the medicines they had brought in pillow cases, instead of food, from the Bay View.

After steady pressure against the Japanese permission was granted to bring in Red Cross beds and the personal equipment of physicians and dentists. The hospital grew into a sixty-bed institution, clean and efficient; despite the cramped and inadequate building it maintained its own kitchen and laundry. A few Filipino doctors and nurses, still employed by the Red Cross, were permitted daily camp entry to augment the internees who worked in every department, including menial labor. Despite limited medicines and equipment, the hospital treated all types of illnesses and performed a number of minor operations, including a tonsillectomy, on a former laboratory table. Serious cases and major operations were sent to regular Manila hospitals, after the necessity had been affirmed by a somewhat dilatory and frequently adamant Japanese army doctor.

In the first month and a half the camp hospital treated 52 per cent of the camp's population, including clinical patients, three-fifths of whom were gastrointestinal and respiratory illnesses from unsanitary food prepared by individual internees or received from outside sources. Vigilance by both medical and sanitation workers prevented epidemics of communicable diseases, despite the overcrowding. Nevertheless, doctors' surveys disclosed a number of active tuberculosis patients as well as twenty-four venereal cases, who had been jammed into the regular rooms. They were segregated at once in the only isolation wards the camp could produce—two large tents, donated by Eddie Tait, the interned owner of a prewar circus.

Eventually the hospital facilities included, besides medicine and dentistry, service in physiotherapy and optometry, likewise maintained by skilled internees who donated their time and knowledge without pay. Medicines were financed out of camp maintenance funds and soon became higher and more difficult to obtain. Internee patients paid nothing for regular service, but were obliged to pur-

chase special medicines through camp buyers who scoured the city's drug markets.

Access to outside hospitals for major cases required cash. Both births and deaths occurred in Manila and not in the camp. Approximately fifteen babies arrived during early months. Deaths, never officially confirmed, were about the same among internees hospitalized from the camp; but we never fully knew the toll among scattered friends.

Actually, the camp's health was remarkable under the circumstances and probably rivaled any modern community of that size. Dietary deficiencies did not begin to tell until many months later. At the outset, the enforced simplicity of internment life seemed to benefit many prisoners, particularly heavy drinkers, who lost their flabbiness and their nerves, becoming stronger and more keen-eyed with regular hours and physical labor.

Many other camp services, all free to the individual, sprouted under the internees' skill and energy. A vegetable garden, planted on what had been the Manila dump before the university expanded, soon produced enough to supply the kitchens regularly. In the beginning, volunteers had removed rusted automobile skeletons and tangled tin cans by hand. Carpenters, plumbers and electricians made the dormitory buildings as habitable as possible, with limited supplies, and constructed several small buildings, including a youngsters' recreation hall. A library, utilizing donated books, was patronized so fully that the Harvard Classics and histories of religious missions became as well-thumbed as the few available mystery stories.

Professional teachers maintained a comprehensive educational program. Courses from kindergarten to the first year of college were taught in open-air classrooms. High school students, completing their studies in captivity, were given certificates signed by the interned principals of two Manila high schools which, they expected, would enable them to enter American universities. When my daughter returned to the United States, she had progressed beyond most similarly aged schoolmates in nearly all subjects. Adult prisoners studied courses ranging from Spanish and astronomy to

music appreciation and philosophy. Religious services of all faiths were held regularly, with no Japanese interference.

For weekly entertainment programs, professional performers flanked amateurs on a stage constructed by the actors themselves, the lumber purchased by internee contributions. Electricians made footlights from ordinary light bulbs and old Lactogen cans. Sports fans likewise contributed to the purchase of equipment for two softball leagues, enrolling eighteen teams, and for the construction of a boxing ring in which periodic smokers were held until the insufficient diet began to tell on the older fighters. Boxing continued, however, for the youngsters from four years of age until the early teens. Former high school rivals continued competition in basketball, for both girls and boys. The British played soccer and learned softball.

A small mobile loud-speaker, donated by an internee, was used for a nightly recorded musical program arranged by former radio men from hundreds of donated records. Motion picture equipment eventually was brought into the camp, and some American films were shown.

The demand for information was so great, particularly in the beginning, that a regular office staff answered questions throughout the day in the onetime registrar's office occupied by the internee government. To disseminate accurate news and replace distorted rumors, I established and edited a camp "newspaper," called "The Internews," a two-page mimeographed creation which appeared semiweekly at first, then weekly. Censorship was solely by internee officials, and Japanese interference was avoided. It attempted to cover all aspects of camp life, spiced with cartoons by Jim Stuart, a lanky San Francisco architect-artist.

Office workers and volunteer typists mimeographed a census of the camp, collected other data for the internee government's growing files concerning its "constituency" and recorded executive committee meeting minutes. The paper upon which they made their records was financed in the beginning by voluntary internee donations in response to a request for funds—the first internment camp taxes.

Volunteer advisers attempted to solve innumerable youth problems. B. G. Leake, a former scoutmaster, roomed with fifteen fatherless boys who, under his guidance, turned from mischief to helpful camp chores. Mrs. Kenneth B. Day, a Manila clubwoman, organized a "junior league" for 'teen-age girls. Among other activities, "barn dances" were held to the wrinkled melodies of a donated piano in the administration building's lobby. In time twenty-four younger children were transferred to an outside convent, where living conditions were much better.

It was a difficult time for youth. Despite the sacrifices of other internees, their diet was insufficient for growing bodies. Moreover, internment subjected them to influences which normally they would escape during impressionable years—from the philosophy of prostitutes, some living in the same rooms with 'teen-age girls, to evidences of Japanese cruelty witnessed at the front gate. War's uncertainly loosened parental authority, and several youngsters needed fathers then serving on Bataan. Hostilities had bred inevitable cynicism and selfishness, manifested also within the camp, which young boys and girls noted. The influences continue. These some six hundred Americans will lose much as long as imprisonment continues, although the youngsters rebelled less than adults against confinement itself.

Internees also attempted welfare work among several hundred destitute uninterned relatives, mostly Filipina wives and children, most of whom sold furniture and other personal possessions for food. Volunteers under A. E. Holland, a young statistician, obtained permission to visit the city, carrying money and messages from interned husbands and fathers to their families. The Japanese did not require internment of Filipinos, but several later voluntarily entered the camp, rejoining their men in what, by comparison with Manila, had become a haven, because they could obtain food and shelter.

Moneyed internees were able to purchase clothing and similar items through an order branch of Aguinaldo's department store, which was opened daily within the camp. The internee government established an "indigent relief" committee, financed by a 10 per cent

surtax on all purchases through Aguinaldo's, which bought and distributed clothing, essential toilet articles and other small necessities to needy internees.

Within a surprisingly short time, considering the difficulties, most basic problems were solved, for the moment anyway. Housing continued to be a permanent headache, however, growing worse in later months. With the maximum facilities of the university opened to the internees, the average living space was still only thirty-two square feet per person. That meant jammed rooms, with attendant problems of both health and morale.

The average internee was crammed so tightly by neighbors that a half-foot aisle was luxurious. Personal possessions were kept in suitcases under cots and beds or placed on tiny shelves against the walls. At night mosquito nets blossomed, cutting off the feeble tropic breeze. The bustle and restlessness in the hallways were continual until late each evening, a constant buzz that grated on nerves and often prevented sleep.

The main building, with its more than 2,100 men and women, continued to house the camp's densest population. In time the university's newest structure, a modern education building, was opened to 613 men. Approximately 327 women and younger children occupied a dozen rooms in a small frame bungalow on the back campus, where the youngsters' kitchen was maintained. Facing it, just within earshot of the continual youthful clamor, was the hospital, housing patients and 84 workers. Another 500 men pitched their camp cots on the basketball floor of the former gymnasium, also occupying its circular overhead track and bowling alley.

There was nowhere else to expand, and internee officials met constant Japanese refusals in their attempts to obtain the release of more internees in order to relieve the housing pressure. About one thousand Americans and British were still free in the city. They were required to report periodically to the Japanese office in the camp. Many were reinterned when their medical passes expired, and others were released, so the camp population constantly fluctuated.

The accomplishments in early weeks resulted from surprising internee unity and co-operation. All work was done by volunteers,

many spending long hours daily. Executives and businessmen took their turn at menial tasks, without attempting preferment for pre-war positions. A release for pent emotions, labor also expressed the individual's desire to belong to the community whose cohesiveness was common hardship.

In time this spirit weakened, and internee officials were obliged to establish a system providing a few hours' daily compulsory labor for all able-bodied men. It was not backed by force, but public opinion narrowed the slackers down to a comparative few. Women continued on a volunteer basis. Their tasks were various: office work, a sewing project of former Red Cross workers who mended and altered clothing free on donated machines; vegetable peelers and the "de-buggers" who searched cereals before they were cooked for weevils and other "game"; kitchen workers, nurses, teachers.

Camp services were maintained throughout by men who spent a normal full day's work, because of a sense of duty; to ease the monotony of inactivity; because the ingenuity demanded by inadequate equipment challenged them, and in some instances, through the desire for prestige gained in official positions. A few unimportant complaints were made against the government's "bureaucracy" in requiring labor service, but there were no "strikes."

Naturally, "personalities" developed. There was some officiousness in enforcing the numerous internee government regulations for governing this sardine-can life. A clash over authority among the three interned Red Cross officials and between them and internee leaders developed at the outset, but soon was settled. Other small-scale temperamental controversies appeared. None was major, although gossip made them appear so at the time.

Government by persuasion failed in specific instances when public opinion refused full support of internee officials. The most notable was liquor. Carroll's committee banned all intoxicants at the outset, for the dangers were apparent. Under the original tensity, conformance was almost universal. But renewed security brought a craving for normalcy, the most universal method of attempting to soften confinement trials. The men nostalgically remembered the cocktail hour.



Bottles were smuggled into the camp in packages. Those discovered were confiscated by internee guards, although the Japanese at first allowed them to pass. A Japanese who ran a small store inside the camp began to bootleg sales. Some internees made their own liquor, from corn meal mush mash—which tasted just as it sounds—and fermented pineapple juice. "Stills" were maintained in remote campus corners. Weaving prisoners became prevalent, and a few threatened fights were narrowly averted.

Internee officials felt that, lacking popular approval for their offices, they were not empowered to use force in supporting the discipline committee. Universally, they declined to hand miscreants to the Japanese, knowing the methods they might use. When a renewed request for "co-operation" failed, several other measures were attempted to minimize drunkenness, petty thievery, malicious slander and similar misdemeanors. Malefactors' names were listed on a bulletin board and eventually broadcast over the loudspeaker; an appointed "court" judged suspects and sentenced them to special work details and eventually to short periods in "jail," a small former main building storeroom. Finally, K. Tsurumi, the new civilian commandant, issued a statement warning that intoxicated internees would be confined in a military prison.

None of these remedies was successful. Even the Japanese threat was fruitless. So changed was our psychology that it was shrugged aside with the common statement, "Why, Carroll knows he has no control over us, so he got the commandant to issue that warning. Pay no attention to it." Discipline became a lingering, unsolved problem, partly because punishment was too light, mainly as an evidence of our new craving for individuality and minimized restraint. We fought toward normalcy with surprising determination.

Most internees spent all day on the campus, to escape the buildings' heat and bustle. Two-score-odd shade trees provided some relief from the hot sun, but they were insufficient for all homesteaders. The first shelter was a blanket slung between two abandoned trucks. Stray lumber was scarce, but rough wooden lean-to's soon appeared, built from old boxes, bits of salvaged tarpaper and similar materials. The "shanty era" arrived.

By "scrounging"—or unauthorized borrowing, a universal internee occupational ailment—others obtained bits of wood from the classrooms or from piles of lumber brought in for camp repairs. Some even sawed off the balustrades of university stairways for shanty foundations. Finally, arrangements were made for purchasing building materials and tools through camp buyers. More elaborate shacks were built, while "scrounging" almost disappeared.

Fred Cadwallader, a quiet young Manilan whose wife soon would leave the camp to bear their first child, constructed the first pretentious shanty a couple of months after internment began. Instead of the customary unpainted wall-less shelter, with its sagging roof and cracked floor made of old boxes, he constructed a complete two-room bungalow. Painted white and including genuine glass windows, it was furnished with chairs and tables brought from his Manila house. Mrs. Cadwallader made chintz curtains. By tapping an outside main, Cadwallader provided running water for the compact sink he had built in the kitchen.

One by one, many old shanties were torn down and replaced with more finished structures, and newly erected buildings became compact homes. Interned architects received many requests to draw precise plans for these midget houses, "on the usual ten per cent basis." Friends pooled their resources and labor to erect most of them. But two crews of internees, working for hire on the erection of new shacks, were busy for weeks on their "contracts." Filipino contractors from the outside were admitted to construct several nipa shacks, the cool, thatched-roof houses of the islands.

Hallway conversation frequently yielded the feminine lament: "Oh, I do wish we could afford a better shack. But I guess we'll have to get along with the one we have for a while longer." And the inevitable reply: "Well, my dear, we moved into our new place today; and you have no idea how much more comfortable it is."

More than six hundred shacks finally were built on the campus. They crowded available areas so tightly that internee officials restricted further construction. Land at first was occupied by squatters' rights; then the internee government parceled it out free to applicants and gave them "title deeds."

The shacks were grouped together in half a dozen main settlements whose occupants gave them such names as "Glamorville," "Shantytown," "Froggy Bottoms," "Jungletown," "Shanty Waste." Neighborhood consciousness appeared, and long arguments developed over the relative merits of rival "municipalities." Each district selected its own "mayor," "chief of police" and "fire chief." Homeowners paid "taxes" for the purchase of additional trash cans and other essential equipment.

The larger homes dominated their neighborhoods, just as surely as the "big house on the hill" in a normal community. Many had three complete rooms, a few even four. A number boasted running water for the sink, in the Cadwallader style, until internee officials made a partially successful attempt to halt the practice, because pressure became too low to supply the dormitory buildings. One house was famous for the luxury of luxuries—a private bathroom. Several shanties were painted, some had shingled roofs. Furniture usually came from the outside, comfortable rattan lounges and chairs and magazine racks, containing well-thumbed prewar issues.

Nearly every shanty—whether professionally made or the patched and extended buildings of the less opulent—was surrounded by carefully tended flowers, planted from seeds purchased in Manila. Many neat patches of lawn were grown, and a few shacks were old enough to be covered with ivy. Glass windows and misshapen holes in the wall were framed with curtains; pictures were hung; tablecloths were spread on sometimes rough tables; perhaps a flower was placed in a glass tumbler at dinnertime.

The men, after completing required camp labor duty, puttered in the garden or worked on a piece of furniture. They spent most of the day "around the house." Lumber was expensive, and salvageable materials were at a premium. One man, after considerable effort, finally had a crated piano brought into the camp. Chided about its uselessness, he replied: "The piano? Oh, I'll donate that to the camp. But won't that crate make a good addition to the shanty?"

In addition to the some nine hundred persons who never ate "on the line," other shack owners prepared their own meals when camp food promised to be too poor. They could purchase anything avail-

able on the Manila market. Some women, accustomed to servants—universal in peacetime Manila—returned to the kitchen for the first time in years. It was a rude kitchen, usually just an extended portion of the shanty, with a tiny, smoky charcoal stove. They learned Filipino cookery on it, utilizing many native recipes which they would have scorned formerly.

The majority did all their own work. But some of the Negro and Filipina internees who needed the money were hired to take over household duties. One establishment maintained a Negro cook who served meals in a starched white mess jacket. Prewar bridge clubs reformed and held regular “parties” in the shanties. Refreshments were restricted somewhat, but ersatz lemonade could be made from the native *calamencia*, a small lime, cooled in iceboxes which most householders maintained with ice delivered daily. Social cliques became definite, and “party” guest lists were chosen carefully. Donald Dang, a young cartoonist and camp sign painter, earned a small but steady income by making hand-printed invitations.

All this required money. Those with the right contacts formed roughly less than half the population, but between them they brought more than \$1,000,000 into the camp, during the first two years’ internment. Under their influence, Santo Tomas became a booming little community.

Where there were money and Americans, there also would be merchants. Enterprising youngsters had been making a few pennies from the beginning with ambulatory shoe shine boxes, and two adults maintained concessions for shoe repairs and laundry, the work done on the outside. Internee wives soon began to make fudge on their charcoal stoves, using sugar from the plentiful supplies laid out each morning for breakfast. The candy was hawked by small boys throughout the camp. Peanut brittle then appeared on the market. One professional candy maker manufactured luxury chocolates with impeccable neatness, despite the crowded hallway where he worked, selling only to prewar customers on advance orders.

Cakes and pies, baked on the outside, were sent into Santo Tomas for sale; so were sandwiches and ice cream. Within the camp, two internee restaurants flourished, selling coffee, bacon and eggs, hot

cakes and sandwiches, all made on the spot. Another cook, operating in a shanty, served steak dinners—first beef, then carabao—for \$1.50. A former baker invested \$200 in a shanty in which he produced all types of bakery products, including bread, and did a rushing business until shortage of supplies suspended production. Other internees acted as agents for Filipinos in Manila who delivered prepared lunches daily for \$2.50 per week. An “express” service of internees carried packages from the gate to the buildings, for a fee.

Small shops were established in the corridors, selling toilet articles, stationery and tobacco, all brought from the outside. Small rental libraries flourished, maintained by internees who had received personal books from their homes. Internee carpenters, on their own time, made and sold chests, shelves and wooden beds. In all, more than two hundred of the captives earned small incomes this way, obtaining money for lunches and other essentials. The merchants became so numerous the internee government licensed them, for a small fee.

The need for advertising enabled Stuart and me to put out a monthly mimeographed “magazine,” called “The Internitis.” It was printed on cheap paper, folded over and stapled to make a pocket-size “publication” eventually reaching 24 pages, which sold for 25 centavos (12½ cents). We filled each issue with cartoons, two short fiction stories, feature articles and poems, all revolving around camp life, mostly from an allegedly humorous viewpoint. The Japanese did not interfere with the project. A few advertisers were willing to gamble on the first issue, and some three hundred internees bought six months’ subscriptions at slightly reduced rates, with the guarantee that “your money will be returned, if we get out of here before that time.”

With the subscription money, we bought sufficient paper, stencils and other materials for the full six months. This mound of supplies arrived one day in a calesa, shepherded by a grinning Filipino deliveryman from a downtown stationery store. He was amused at my apparent relief over the delivery. “We got plenty paper,” he said. But two months later the Japanese froze all the city’s paper

stocks, prohibiting subsequent purchases without a permit obtained personally from the gendarmerie.

We sold moderately priced advertising and were so deluged with requests that lack of space forced us to turn down many of them. Camp merchants took small ads to promote their current sales. Representatives of several American concerns bought "full page" space. One or two, I suspect, merely wanted to help us along, but most of them wished to maintain good will among past and future customers. Henry Heesch of Eastman Kodak ran a series of cartoon sketches of camp life, "the next best thing to having your Kodak here." Pabst beer kept tantalizing us with Stuart's sketches of well-remembered foaming steins.

Stuart did all the cartoons, I handled the makeup and did most of the text. Stencils were cut by Bessie Hackett, former *Manila Bulletin* society editor; and a young Briton named Richards did our work on the camp mimeograph. Cover cartoons were colored by hand with crayon, but time was cheap and this helped speed the days.

When Stuart and I left for Shanghai, we had completed three editions. We sold the stock, advertising and an average monthly circulation of five hundred to Dave McTurk of Philadelphia, our business manager, who finished the contracts, then was forced to suspend publication because paper was unobtainable. Stuart and I netted over \$100 apiece from the whole enterprise. Previously we both had been unable to purchase lunches, because our accounts in American banks were still frozen.

The merchants became the middle class in our socially conscious community, catering to the "aristocrats" who had the money. As long as a man did his required camp work, no one objected to his earned income. The "submerged" element continued to depend upon the camp for food and the indigent relief committee for other small essentials. That committee actually represented organized charity, financed by the moneyed internees, replacing the early indiscriminate sharing between individuals which had lasted until security brought a renewed sense of personal property. The gulf now had widened.

At night there was still relative equality. Each internee had approximately the same amount of space and lived under similar circumstances. His neighbor might be anyone, desirable or undesirable. The internee government had prohibited widespread moving from rooms populated by chance, to prevent the inevitable confusion.

But during the day, life centered around the shanties. Prewar social positions returned; old cliques reformed. There were elaborate shacks, mediocre shacks and many who had no shacks. Businessmen and executives no longer took their turn with a shovel. They had been absorbed into the government or occupied other "white collar" administrative jobs as accountants or administrators. Barring those who continued in arduous jobs from a sense of duty, manual laborers came from the "draft."

Our capsule city had reached its full development.



## chapter ten

### INTERNEED BUT NOT INTERRED

OUR room became known as "that notorious Room 26." We were thirty-two men, mostly young Manila businessmen, sandwiched between two women's "boudoirs" whose members gave us the notoriety.

It started when we equipped the entrance with a pair of swinging doors, removed from the bathroom, providing the appearance and fanciful mystery of an old-time bar. The dowagers of the hallway, whose conversations were an endless commentary on camp affairs, believed inevitably that such privacy hid great gambling enterprises. Perhaps we furthered that suspicion by our nightly small-stake poker games; played on a highly appropriate round table, scrounged from the university, and covered with gambler's green felt, contributed by one of the charter members.

The reputation grew when, one by one, most of our members became connected with the internee government, to give us proportionately a larger share than any other room. But the ladies were wrong in assuming that this entitled us to any political privileges, beyond the facility of purchasing toothbrushes and other small items from Manila through roommates who left the camp daily as buyers. Our "wild parties" revolved around ice cream and cake, obtained in the same way and financed by any member unfortunate enough to have a birthday.

The room had been transformed from a barren cell into a crowded dormitory. Crisscrossing wires supported mosquito nets which at night mushroomed like army tents. A huge rack of shelves,



constructed by internee carpenters, stood in one corner, perpetually weary under a collection of baskets, bags and boxes; containing the catsup, silverware, tin dishes and cups which the married men carried when joining their families for meals in shanties or on the front campus. Smaller shelf racks or plain boxes held the overflow of personal possessions. Camp cots and wooden beds were lined around the four walls, never more than four inches apart, usually cheek to jowl. It became a precise art to slip over the head of a bed and flip the mosquito net into place, without imprisoning some of the insects.

The poker table was the room's geographical and social center. All of us had given up space to accommodate it. Each night from around 7 P.M. until lights were out at 11, and usually on rainy Sunday afternoons, the chips clicked merrily. There was space for seven players; twenty participated from time to time, taxing Henry Carpenter's elaborate bookkeeping system for postwar payment.

We made many discoveries during these long sessions. We learned that fours of a kind, without wild cards, occur about twice a week, once in probably one thousand hands. Royal flushes averaged one every six months. We learned that men can play thus consistently, without serious argument or assassination, finally breaking fairly even.

During the mornings, when the room was generally half-empty, the table was the cultural center. Stan Lehman of Standard Oil used it for the one-man chess games he played regularly in an attempt to learn the moves of the masters. Bob Janda, a young lawyer, sat muttering over the shorthand he had resolved to learn, despite George Phelps's constant reminder that "you can hire a stenographer for \$50 a month after the war." George Anderson, the druggist, leaned on it for the daily letter he wrote in a fat notebook for delivery after release to his wife, who was in the United States. Frank Neild, a New England textile expert, mumbled Spanish lessons. We all read the *Tribune* around it, irately arguing with propaganda claims that the U. S. fleet had been "destroyed" again. The table also became the chief battleground for John McCord, the millionaire copra man whose white goatee transformed him into a southern

colonel. John probably killed more flies than any adult in the camp, stalking them with a bent swatter.

Except for the evening roll call and curfew, our time was our own. Oversleeping in the morning meant no camp breakfast, but hot cakes could be purchased in one of the "restaurants." Most of us in 26 rose early, starting with George Bissinger's 6 A.M. electric razor shave—our regular alarm clock. The room emptied for breakfast, then work details. Neild and sometimes a few volunteers swept the room daily and mopped it weekly. His precautions were excellent, but still the bedbugs came, part of the millions infesting the old building, despite regular wholesale scrubbing and disinfecting. They crawled across ankles at night and lurked in every chair, so that internees no longer sat—they bounced.

The room was crowded after lunch for the two-hour siesta period, a holdover from prewar habits. Most of the camp slept through these hot, languid hours. Public opinion was more united on the necessity for siesta quiet than on almost any other subject. In the late afternoon, the room's inhabitants spread again, returning to their shanties or shady parts of the campus.

After supper on clear days they joined some one thousand spectators for daily softball games played in the cooling sunset by the eight teams in the "big league." Fans ringed the diamond with collapsible chairs. Baseball was a lifesaver for both watchers and participants. League "championships" were contested closely, with heavy betting.

After sundown, musical programs were broadcast outdoors over the loud-speaker unit, maintained in front of the main building. Until they ended at 9 P.M., the internees attempted to relax, before returning to the buildings' noise during night-long confinement. Latecomers, reaching our room, read under the poker lamp's thin rays or waited for a chance at the game.

Gunnison was "in garbage" and spent free time in the shanty he and Percival had erected. Mydans arose before daybreak each day to join the hospital's scullery staff. Anderson helped clean the bathrooms, a chore I did until starting the "newspaper." But the room's

strangest job was held by Charlie Franks, the dry-humored, smiling "old-timer."

"They put me on the morality patrol," he'd say, "because I'm too old to be influenced by what I see."

The morality patrol was a holdover from early worry that the Japanese would regard our women as they did their own—as subjects of the male will. This was underlined when the first commandant's underlings requested the services of internee women to clean the Japanese offices—an order which Carroll neatly sidestepped by sending men instead, with the explanation, "Occidental women don't do work like that." The internee government prohibited the feminine wearing of shorts, then organized the morality patrol to prevent publicly demonstrated affection between couples, married or not. Officials wanted to give Japanese soldiers minimum encouragement.

"We used to go around," said Charlie, "breaking up clinches in the hallway or in the patios. We even removed husbands' arms from their wives' necks. 'The Japs don't like that,' we told them."

The usual response was, "Well, we do." That touched off long debates concerning our jailers' likes and dislikes. As one interrupted husband said: "The Japs haven't eliminated marriage yet."

The Japanese attitude had been typical but incomprehensible to the average internee. The emphasis was upon secrecy, for they believe demonstrated emotion of any sort, except perhaps military anger, is a cardinal sin. During the "picnic era," visiting officers were upset by evidenced tenderness between married couples on the front campus. So the commandant prohibited "public display of affection."

(These visitors also objected to sports, because passers-by, seeing baseball games through the open fence, would believe the Japanese permitted "frivolity." Internee officials forestalled announced abolition of games by covering the fence with internee-purchased *sawale* matting, so campus activities were hidden from watchers on outside streets. I learned later the Japanese discomfort was prompted largely by German and Italian complaints that the prisoners were being treated too leniently.)

"We don't bother with the married couples any more," Charlie said. "Now we're supposed to watch out for the younger generation." Some of the mothers told Carroll they were afraid for the welfare of their daughters.

Charlie looked at things with a kindly eye. "That doesn't stop romance, though. The kids will fall in love, even if they have to sit in the hallway with a hundred people around."

A few formal engagements were announced. Others were heralded by the enraptured faces that looked the same in an internment camp as on an ordinary college campus. "Mesdames of the hall" also kept track of the separations between husband and wife, betrayed by new heart interests or the separate ways they took.

Most married couples found a new solidarity in a life stripped of country club artificiality. They built their shanties and worked in them together. These little houses became home; so much of a home that Commandant Tsurumi, who lacked his predecessor's practicality, ordered that solid walls be eliminated. The shacks must be open at least four feet from the ground, he ruled, because outsiders, peering into the camp from surrounding two-story buildings, discerned activities which made the internees appear "frivolous."

The edict was enforced only halfheartedly, and the walls crept back toward the ground. In time, we could hear conversations like this outside our room: "But, my dear, to have a baby now! What if she is married? It's scandalous. There are some of us who still remember that we're interned." The ladies counted on their fingers, then clucked some more. They did this for over 16 women, most of them married, whose infants began life under Japanese rule.

The conversation swirling around Room 26 was variable. Bis-singer, a sugar expert, hit one prevalent keynote with his "latest news," usually recited at sundown. "Just heard it," he always said, "the latest thing. A big American expeditionary force is on the way. Maybe it's attacking the southern islands now."

George Koster, the contractor, was hard to convince. "You've just fallen for another rumor, George."

"I have not."

"Don't you know that old internee sport? Some of the boys plant

those stories every day, just to watch them grow. They keep score. The best time is five minutes for a rumor to go all around camp."

"Say, George," someone else usually added. "Have you heard the one about the four hundred thousand Chinese troops who are going to attack from the north? They're planning to swim, because there aren't any boats."

But we always listened to rumors, hoping for something genuine, to fill an ever-present void created by the absence of authentic news. The reports circulated constantly. Sometimes they came from a "reliable outside contact," sometimes they were supposed to have been received on short-wave radio sets still being used in the city. To Bissinger and many others, the "news" softened reality and refreshed persistent hope for the early end of internment. The room's disbelievers often nettled him. "I don't think you fellows are very patriotic."

Patriotic? I remember the first time George Washington's Birthday occurred during internment. How to locate an American flag in a Japanese prison camp? We got one. Barbara, who worked in the camp hospital, made it from muslin, using gentian violet for the stars, mercurochrome for the red stripes. We hung it high and turned the poker light on it, with the rest of the room in half darkness.

The flag stood out like a bright promise, as the room members filed in for roll call. We all stayed, standing in the gloom, while Ewald Selph, the lawyer, gave a brief talk. He told of Washington's life and his courage. "We don't know what Washington would have done under circumstances like these," said Ewald. "But we do know one thing: He would never have given up!" It was so quiet that even the hallway's noises seemed muted. Then, in fruit juice punch, we drank a toast to the flag . . . to the boys on Bataan . . . to home.

We talked of Bataan often while the fight was under way, of personal friends out there at the front, of the guns and planes they didn't have. Japanese bombers flew over the camp every day. They always returned, all of them. At night, tongues of blood streaked the dark skies behind the camp. Gunfire. It was inaudible, but the

silence made it more awful, because death in pantomime blended with our uncertainty. The Japanese guard changed frequently. The soldiers who had been friendly said grave good-bys. "We don't expect to come back." The new arrivals were stern-faced, old-young. They had been at the front, and often they were harsher toward us than their predecessors, although still no major incidents occurred.

There were women who watched the gun flashes more closely than the rest. Most of them sat apart from the crowds, waiting quietly. Some hid their sorrow with brief bursts of temper. Then there was the girl with the perpetual smile, constantly asking for work to do, always trying to be gay, but her laugh was thin. Her father was on Corregidor, her fiancé at Bataan. There was another, laughing with acquaintances in the hallway and suddenly bursting into tears. Her husband and two children were on a southern island, just overrun by the Japanese.

Then the crushing defeat, the open gloating of the controlled press. "But Corregidor will hold out," we said. "They can't take that." Finally, Manila heard General Wainwright's tense voice, broadcasting the appeal to his southern commanders for full capitulation. The story was told to us by friends who came into the camp for renewal of their medical passes. Their eyes were wet.

It was over. The fact was hard to realize at first. The camp was gloomy, the optimistic rumors stopped. Then we tried more desperately to regain the past. New shanties sprang up, more parties were given. Even the most hopeful conceded now that our stay would be long. But we had discovered one thing: Defeat, bitter and sad, was easier to take than uncertainty.

The Japanese had reached their crest. The soldiers smiled at us condescendingly. The office for a time was more lenient with releases, and in some instances Japanese officials granted passes good for more than one year, ending on July 4, 1943. Trust the Japanese to choose that American holiday as the final date. Such irony pleased their sense of superiority.

The days were long and languid. They could not be filled completely with reading or bridge or baseball. Work was an inadequate antidote for boredom. Frustration began to weigh more heavily.

We grumbled about the food, and sometimes an internee would haughtily deposit his full plate of talinum or stew in the garbage can. "Good heavens," some of them said, "I'm used to good living. I can't stomach this stuff." Occasionally there would be a mild flurry in the long meal lines. A woman would draw up, cheeks flushed, and say to the internee who was serving her: "Young man, you must treat me with more respect."

The past always beckoned, the comfortable past, with its servants and luxury and flattering sense of superiority. Dead afternoons were recalled, when men had their golf and their business deals and women drifted from bridge to cocktail parties while servants tended their children. Now, some had faded and their hands were rough. They had discovered their own children, sometimes for the first time, acquiring new and wearing responsibilities for their care.

Political discussions became more frequent, and the demand for a change in the internee government was prevalent. Even in our room, normally less excited about such things, the subject was treated with the gravity of a presidential nomination.

"We're Americans," said Bissinger, "and we have the right to elect our own government."

"We're also interned," I answered him one day. "Do you think we have any rights left?"

"Of course we do. But we won't have any, if we don't ask for them. The Japanese haven't eliminated elections in their own country. Why should they do it in here?"

Democracy had been distilled out of the Japanese electoral system, which merely gave the individual the chance to vote for candidates picked by the government, through the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. This was a nicety lost on most internees as the demand for democracy slowly became more insistent.

"A number of the internees say," reported Arthur Evans, "that they will feel much more responsive to an elected government and will support it more fully. They believe that an elected committee would be able to enforce discipline more effectively. Maybe it won't work, but it couldn't do much harm."

The rains came, two months of intermittent downpours beginning

in June. Shacks were flooded, the baseball diamond became a lake, the internees were forced into restless confinement within the buildings. Political discussions became sharper, and internee officials personally were maligned. "Anybody can get a release," it was charged, "if he pays enough money for it." "The internee officials make sure that only their friends get passes to go to Manila. They're trying to build up a political machine."

Similar complaints were made, echoing one salient fact. Temporary release, not food or privileges within the camp, had become the chief concern. The internees had been able to solve every problem, within bounds, except the fact of confinement itself.

Carroll made little attempt to refute the charges. "What good would it do?" he asked his friends. "These people are criticizing us, but they're really complaining against internment. Some of them seem to think that we're responsible for putting them in here. Nobody can remain popular in this job." He said he was tired and ready to step out.

Finally, Commandant Tsurumi granted permission for a camp election in August, specifying that he name the new committee's chairman from among those chosen. Balloting, he said, must be done quietly, probably to avoid presenting Italo-German critics with another example of face-losing Japanese "leniency."

By secret ballot, internees chose a nominating committee which formed a slate of candidates for the final election. The committee selected leading prewar businessmen, all of them long associated with Manila, either through continued residence there or frequent visits during business trips throughout Asia. Under election rules, two Britons and seven Americans were to be chosen.

After quiet campaigning, by word of mouth and a few sedate posters containing "recommended" slates, the election polled approximately a 75 per cent vote. All adult internees had a ballot. A. D. Calhoun, who had arrived a few weeks before war to manage Manila's branch of the National City Bank, received the highest individual vote. The commandant named as chairman Carroll Grinnell, then a release committee liaison man with the Japanese. He had spent many years in Japan and well knew the conquerors'



psychology. The internees accepted him as an "old Manila hand" because of long residence in the Philippines.

The committee moved in at the top of the former complex committee government, which was retained intact. Members of the previous executive committee did not run for re-election. Those heading departments remained in these positions. Earl Carroll became chairman of a special group to administer the funds provided by the Japanese for camp administration.

Grinnell began his job with quiet seriousness. He brought no markedly new policies and attempted to govern by persuasion, which Carroll had found so discomfoting. There was no apparent change in the government or the internees' reaction to it. Within a month, the same problems and the same difficulties were pressing. "My application for a pass was denied today," said one man. "I'll see that Grinnell never gets a cent of business in Manila when the war is over."

We weren't always serious. The internees laughed easily at themselves and were anxious for the chance. They chuckled over the clothes they wore, their jumbled rooms and the lines they perpetually joined. "When I get out of here," Carpenter used to say, "I'm going to have the servants and the family line up all day in front of the bathroom. That's the only way I'll feel at ease."

Bedbugs, rain, heat, mud, the food—every discomfort brought a smile when properly twisted. Internee comedians used them all during entertainment programs, headed by McTurk, known professionally as Dave Harvey. They furnished material for our supposedly funny magazine. Stuart's cartoons reached the fine line dividing the comic and tragic in our topical, fleeting humor, such as the sketch he drew of a wildly gesticulating internee who was detailing a list of complaints starting with bedbugs and ending with "that #\*!@% committee." A bystander explained to a friend: "All I said was, 'How are you?'"

This sometimes sad laughter spread through the camp and helped speed the days. Practical jokes were rare, for they demanded a buffoonery that few people felt. Stories concerning the outside

world, even those off-color, were infrequent; age had wilted them and nostalgia had made that world no laughing matter.

It could happen only with the sometimes unpredictable Japanese. Commandant Tsurumi announced one day that internees with relatives in Shanghai would be allowed to rejoin them, without cost, by sailing aboard a transport due to leave Manila within a few weeks. This unexplained offer seemed strange because the authorities had refused any reconciliation between several Santo Tomas prisoners and their families, interned in Baguio or the southern islands.

The announcement gave the same idea to several of us correspondents. We felt that repatriation was hopeless from Manila, because it was a captured American city. In Shanghai, however, we might regain the repatriation status of foreign correspondents who normally are exchanged with diplomats; a status which was denied us that summer when the U. S. embassy staff in Tokyo returned on the *Gripsholm*. The commandant agreed with this reasoning and said we could make the trip, if there were room on the vessel.

Many internees considered the venture foolhardy. They believed the vessel would be sunk upon leaving Manila Bay, for rumors of submarine warfare were encouraging. "And," they added, "what if you do arrive in Shanghai—just supposing our submarines miss you—you'll starve to death anyway, won't you? It's much better here." Consequently only a handful of the 300-odd prisoners entitled to the journey applied. It appeared that the commandant's quota of 120 would be unfulfilled. To save face, he virtually propagandized the trip—reporting excellent living conditions and no internment in Shanghai.

Finally, he opened the list to anyone willing for the chance. Most of the 113 internees who left were Shanghailanders caught by war in Manila. But the total included a few beachcombers, dope fiends and similar adventurers. The Gunnisons, the Mydans, Bert Covit of the United Press and I were the journalistic hitchhikers.

On September 13, 1942, I left the camp in an internee-crowded bus; and through its dingy rear window I caught my last glimpse

of Barbara as she turned wearily back toward that life of endless boredom and hopelessness.

The Japanese allowed us travelers to take all the baggage we could carry, inspected so casually that even manuscripts were passed. All of us were well equipped with inoculations of all sorts, a customary Japanese requirement. We were permitted 200 yen each, bought at parity with pesos, which represented a 100 per cent profit for the Japanese who handled the transaction. The peacetime yen was worth about 23 cents.

The *Maya Maru* was waiting for us, when we reached Pier 5. She sat disconsolately in the water, a dirty, smelly Japanese transport of about 4,000 tons. Joining the internees were seventeen neutrals and forty-four British Indians, all waiting impatiently on the pier.

The Japanese, with familiar attention to detail, permitted the Indians to board the ship first, subtle flattery for them, as fifty British were among the internee passengers.

When we finally tugged our baggage onto the vessel, while the perspiration streaked our clothes, we were directed to follow the Indians into the two after holds. Our "accommodations" were double-decked rough wooden shelves, covered with light tatami, running lengthwise. In the general scramble for space, men, women, children, Indians and Occidentals all were jumbled together, each with about enough room to lie down, if he didn't roll. We shared the uneven tatami with thousands of cockroaches and a number of exceedingly bold rats, as well as a few Japanese officers and half a dozen Formosan camp followers. A troop of horses, quartered in a hold below us, received all available wind vents during the succeeding hot days.

An American officer, Lieutenant Wallace Ince, made the same journey, traveling in topside officers' quarters and never appearing on deck. A prewar radio announcer, known as Ted Wallace, he was captured on Corregidor. When I saw him briefly before our departure, he wore his regular uniform, but he was thin and tight-lipped.

During the nine-day trip we were permitted on the crowded

deck, with no protection from a broiling sun, until darkness, when a grunting gendarme ordered us below. Lights were extinguished at 8 P.M. We also were sent below whenever the ship passed strategic Japanese areas, as the exit from Manila Bay or the entrance into Takao, Formosa, where we spent a two-day layover aboard ship. While we were there several Japanese transports assembled, totaling an estimated 180,000 tons. Among them was the former *President Harrison*, the American President Line vessel which had been run aground by her crew near Shanghai in the early days of war. The American Merchant Marine Institute later reported the *Harrison* was destroyed by an American submarine while in Japanese service.

The *Maya* spluttered along in a slow four-vessel convoy, guarded by two destroyers. Our sole protection was a dummy wooden gun near the wheelhouse, but there was no sign of Allied activity. The convoy was so small that it seemed unlikely we had been given the trip as protection to vital cargoes. Instead, most of us believed that the Japanese used the available space to take potential repatriation material to Shanghai. Of the fifty-nine Americans who graduated from the *Maya*, only two failed to make the last repatriation. Both chose to remain in Shanghai with their alien wives, who could not enter the United States.

Although the gendarmes aboard ship treated us as prisoners, the Japanese crewmen were friendly. One walrus-mustache insisted upon giving several men drinks of cold *sake*, the Japanese rice wine. Others bought fruit for us in Formosa—at a neat profit to themselves. We ate surprisingly good Japanese food, augmented with our own canned goods; received beer and cigarettes whenever they were rationed to the several hundred soldiers who lived in forward-hold quarters similar to ours. We used the extremely odoriferous “Chic Sales” establishment placed on deck; and drank gallons of tea, always kept hot in huge deckside cauldrons. The voyage cost us 40 cents a day, all for food.

The vessel tied up at Woosung, below Shanghai, and we waited for hours in our “quarters” while the Japanese unloaded their personal loot from Manila. That included hundreds of food lockers, still bearing the names of American officers who had served on

Corregidor, loaded with all sorts of trophies from the conquest. The camp followers, who disembarked at Takao, also had brought home gifts for their families: numerous cases of soap, which had been a rarity for years in the old Japanese empire.

A brusque gendarme gave us a final send-off. Shouting angrily, he ordered men and women internees to clean the tatami. "How," he spluttered, "do you expect Japanese soldiers to live in this dirt?" We worked sullenly, trying to make presentable the living space which seemingly had been filthy for centuries.

The scene changed suddenly. Chinese coolies carried our luggage to a waiting barge, and we boarded a neat river boat for the two-hour ride to Shanghai. We were met by representatives of the Swiss Consulate and the American Association, an organization which conducted numerous relief activities for Americans. They told us, to our surprise, there was still no internment in Shanghai and that we could borrow enough money for living expenses from the Swiss Consulate.

Finally, on the customs jetty we heard long-awaited words that left us stunned temporarily. We were counted and recounted by Japanese consulate officials. At last, Henry Kay, the American Association man, shouted: "All right, you're free. You can go now." None moved for fully thirty seconds, so surprising was the statement. Then there was a general rush for the nearest exit.

That freedom ended six weeks later for me, four months later for my friends. After another internment period we boarded the Japanese exchange liner, *Teia Maru*, to begin the long trip home. But the irony of war is often great. Henry Kay, a former American President Line official, had spoken the words that set us loose that remembered Shanghai night. But now he still remains interned in the Chapei camp, crossed off the repatriation list for unspecified reasons by Japanese military authorities.

A year and thirteen days after I left Santo Tomas, the *Teia* halted off Luzon's northwest coast to pick up repatriates from the Philippines. The ship rode in a quiet, milky bay on the edge of Lingayen Gulf. Some Japanese forces had gone ashore there. Crowding the

rails we could still see the wreckage of several landing boats, grounded near the beaches, half a mile distant.

Blue mountains spiraled upward to clouds that dappled a peaceful sky. The whole scene, except for the gutted boats, breathed of tropical calmness, and we might have been cruise ship tourists. But Filipino laborers who came aboard betrayed the reality by their seriousness and the guarded glances shot frequently toward the Japanese, always watching them.

Barbara and Coralie were with the 125 repatriates from Santo Tomas. They had traveled by train throughout the night. I knew they both would join the *Teia*, for a friendly Japanese interpreter in Shanghai had discovered their names on the official list. But they had no definite word of my whereabouts, although they felt I would be waiting for them aboard the *Teia*.

Our reunion was like scores of others, hilarious and a bit hysterical. Barbara was thinner and paler than she had been. The Santo Tomas she left was not the same camp I had known.

Food was becoming scarcer. Sugar was the first sharply curtailed item. Then meat virtually disappeared from the camp menus. Breakfasts generally were rice gruel—lugao—served with coconut milk which volunteer workers obtained after hours of shredding the coconuts. Dinners now were principally vegetables and duck eggs.

The scarcity of medicine also was being felt. Simple disinfectants such as iodine were difficult to obtain. Serious epidemics within the camp still had been prevented by continued vigilance, but new cases of consumption and some malnutrition ailments had appeared.

The main thing, Barbara said, was the internees' mental outlook. Continued confinement had bred frightening lethargy. The prisoners still expected American reoccupation, but in preceding months there had been few signs of its imminence. Hopeful rumors were infrequent.

Sometimes the camp shook off this mood. Christmas, for instance, had been as gay as possible. For weeks beforehand, men and women had worked hard to make wooden toys and rag dolls. A tree was purchased and decorated. Each of the younger children was given

a toy, ranging from gay-eyed dolls to brightly painted scooters. For all children there was ice cream and cake and candy.

The camp finally had acquired motion picture equipment, donated by an American picture company representative. Some Hollywood productions were shown, flanked by Japanese propaganda "newsreels" and "cultural" pictures. The loud-speaker unit was continually used for the evening musical programs, augmented by "radio" plays, written and produced by internees. At a farewell program for the repatriates, McTurk's wit had portrayed the "strange lost tribe—the internees," who disdained comforts and chose to live behind walls.

In Barbara's story you could see these efforts were more forced than before. When the lethargy was broken, it grew into restlessness. Disciplinary problems still continued, and insobriety was more prevalent. The conflict over releases was unchanged.

Overcrowding had become an increasingly serious problem. Despite the transfer of eight hundred men to Los Baños, the population reached thirty-nine hundred. Several hundred, previously granted releases, were reinterned when the Japanese policy stiffened. An additional three hundred and fifty men, women and children arrived from the Cebu camp, which was closed.

Cebu internment, said the arrivals, had been fairly comfortable, and sufficient food was obtained by purchase from near-by farmers. But they were crowded, and they lacked the opportunity to match Santo Tomas' relative luxury. For their enforced northward trip, they had been crammed into a small vessel under conditions rivaling the *Maya Maru*.

One of the Cebu missionaries was the first man to feel renewed Japanese efforts for birth control. The third commandant, Kuroda, under military orders, decreed that all expectant mothers be sent to a hospital on a small Manila Bay island, while the anticipatory fathers would be confined to the new camp jail, a former warehouse at one end of the campus. The missionary and a few others served "sentences" before the regulations were relaxed.

Santo Tomas prisoners feared the Japanese would follow announced plans of transferring the entire camp to Los Baños. This

would require abandoning thousands of dollars' worth of improvements, in addition to the private shacks, and would increase discomfort by severing the essential package line. The Japanese motive would be twofold: to separate internees and Manila Filipinos and to use the improved university facilities for troops.

The thought of going to Los Baños had been unpleasant from the first. The initial eight hundred were to be volunteers among single men, who were sufficiently numerous to fill the quota. Fear that the new establishment would be a labor camp limited the response and caused many eligibles to seek exemption by claiming their Santo Tomas work was "indispensable." As a result, the final quota was filled through an arbitrary draft which forced many fathers to leave their families behind in Santo Tomas.

The Los Baños camp actually began as a labor establishment. The men, housed in rough barracks as crowded as their former rooms, were placed under a surly Japanese lieutenant. At first, he forced them to work on additional near-by barracks which he said were for the rest of Santo Tomas. But his policy gradually changed, and eventually he was replaced, through the patient opposition of A. D. Calhoun, the banker, who had become camp committee chairman.

In time, living conditions at Los Baños equaled and in some respects surpassed Santo Tomas. Food was more plentiful in the interior than Manila. Contracts were made with neighboring Filipinos for fruits, vegetables and some meat. The navy nurses had volunteered to go to Los Baños. They maintained a competent hospital under Doctor Leach. Although the camp is in the central Luzon malarial belt, the disease had not appeared with alarming frequency.

Camp discipline was solved by a forthright policy. Miscreants were sentenced to a minimum month's confinement in a camp jail. This punishment was augmented by fewer package deliveries, which limited liquor. The internees played sunset softball games on the regular diamond of a near-by University of the Philippines agricultural school. Several hours' daily work was required for each man.

Conditions in the Baguio camp, totaling about four hundred, had



improved in recent months. The establishment was first maintained at Camp John Hay, the former American army recreation center in that mountain resort town, some three hundred kilometers from Manila. The internees were packed into a few of the camp's bungalows. The place was surrounded by barbed wire and the entry of friendly Filipinos was limited strictly. Discipline had been firm, the result of the commandant's policies. Men and women, for example, were prohibited from associating with each other within the camp. Some forced labor had been required of the men. Food was scarce and medical supplies limited. At least one baby was delivered on a bungalow floor.

In time the situation eased somewhat. The camp was moved a few miles northward to Trinidad Valley. Food was more available, and the internees could grow vegetables. They adopted on a small scale some of the entertainment and recreational measures developed within Santo Tomas. One man was the sole repatriate from Baguio.

No information was available concerning four hundred other Americans, interned in Davao, Mindanao. In 1944, the Japanese reported consolidation of this camp with Santo Tomas.

The Santo Tomas repatriates, all finally named by the Japanese with apparently some suggestions from the internee government, departed amid considerable sadness and doubtless much envy. Some weeks before internee officials had polled the camp on repatriation. Fifty-nine per cent reported they wanted to be exchanged; the remainder wished to stay. Several declined repatriation when it was offered to them.

Three newspapermen were among them—Roy Bennett, Ford Wilkins of the *New York Times*, and Theo. H. Rogers of the *Philippine Free Press*. Bennett, coming into the camp in early 1943 after more than a year's imprisonment in Fort Santiago, was haggard and gaunt, almost unrecognizable, beneath a scraggly beard. But in his eyes burned the same fire that had been noticeable before the Japanese came. He regained his health in Santo Tomas, spending considerable time working in the vegetable garden. Rogers, also a Santiago victim, had preceded him several months and had

recovered from his gendarmerie experience. Wilkins was ill at the time of his refusal.

"But why," I asked Barbara, "did they want to stay there, instead of going home?"

"Theo. gave the answer," she replied. "When the commandant told him that he was to be exchanged, he shook his head. 'I am a soldier,' he said, 'a soldier of the press. I never ran away from a fight in my life. And I'm not going to run away from this one.'"

These men and many others wanted to stay in the islands, enduring imprisonment, to help support Filipino resistance. They believed that so long as Americans were near them, the Filipinos would hold out; once all Americans had gone, morale would collapse and general capitulation to the conquerors would follow. It was their duty, they reasoned, to continue the symbol of American courage and confidence against the day of the islands' recapture.

Theo. H. Rogers and Roy Bennett and the rest realized they were under the conquerors' absolute control while they remained within the empire. Mrs. Bennett realized it, yet she and their two small daughters remained with Roy. They figured they had a job to do, and they stayed with it.

This is the "conquered" Philippines.



# THE SOUTHERN EMPIRE





## chapter eleven

# INDO-CHINA DRAMA

THE thin veil of French sovereignty, in August, 1944, still hung over French Indo-China, the humpbacked peninsula where Japan started her southern drive. This was the only imperial area to say "No" during the previous year. The negative was neither too loud nor too emphatic, but it symbolized a changing tide.

Travelers most recently returned from Indo-China credit this situation primarily to the diplomacy of Admiral Jean Decoux, the French governor general, and secondarily to the complex French colonial organization which has confused the Japanese. At any time, they say, the conquerors could snap the French fingerhold on their own colony, but to do so would invite chaos.

They describe Admiral Decoux as a proud figure from Old World diplomacy who has met, and sometimes defeated, the Japanese in a continual battle of wits. He has played a daring, often personally dangerous game, apparently sincerely trying to save as much as possible of Indo-China.

The admiral was assigned to Hanoi in the summer of 1940, replacing General Georges Catroux. Under German pressure, Vichy removed Catroux for urging armed resistance to Japanese demands for rights to station troops in northern Indo-China. Ordered back to France, he escaped and became important in the de Gaullist movement.

Soon, new Japanese demands were presented to Admiral Decoux, backed by an ultimatum expiring at 10 P.M. September 22, 1940. The new governor ordered mobilization and advocated resistance.

He waited vainly for support from Vichy and the United States; the latter being unwilling to supply planes and munitions while Indo-China was bound to Vichy.

Seven hours before the ultimatum expired, the admiral capitulated, granting limited rights for stationing Japanese troops in northern Indo-China and establishing three air bases in Tonkin. These concessions, satisfactory to Tokyo's representative, General Nishihara, did not mollify the Japanese Canton army, encamped on the border and spoiling for a fight. With the independent action often characteristic of Japanese field commanders, that unit attacked French outposts which resisted, despite their surprise. Hostilities were brief, bitter and hidden by Tokyo's announcement of a "peaceful and friendly entry."

The border "war" between Thailand and Indo-China, which so clearly betrayed Japanese instigation, began in November. It was settled by a final treaty of May 9, 1941, with Japan as "mediator," which "restored" to Thailand land that the Siamese kings had lost to nineteenth century French imperialists.

Japanese encroachment was legalized under a protocol for "co-operation" in Indo-China's "defense," signed in Vichy the following July. In a series of subsequent agreements the colony entered the East Asiatic Exploitation Sphere.

Finally, the Japanese moved into southern Indo-China in late 1941. They established a number of key air bases and took over Camranh Bay, on the southwestern coast, one of the finest potential naval bases in that section of Asia. They were priming their attack on Malaya and Burma.

After two years' exploitation, Admiral Decoux began to refuse the conquerors politely in mid-1943. He still could not afford to oppose them on major issues, but the slowly resurgent Allied offensive enabled him to shake his head on a few economic and administrative matters. The admiral's most effective assistance was the continual presence of some four hundred thousand American-trained Chinese troops on or near the northern Indo-China border. They had been stationed there to prevent any Japanese drive northward into Yunnan province.

The admiral used this threat most effectively in steadfastly refusing a Japanese demand to increase the "sale" of Indo-Chinese rice to Japan by another 400,000 tons. The colony, by its various commercial treaties, already was committed to supply 1,200,000 tons annually, seriously decreasing the amount of food available within the country.

"I have six thousand French troops on the border," he told the Japanese, "opposing the Chinese army. They are enough, because the Chinese do not want to fight to reach Indo-China. But, if you insist upon more rice, I shall remove the French troops and assign them elsewhere. And you handle the consequences."

The Japanese backed down. They wanted to avoid trouble, because Indo-China had become a major military supply base. For the same reason, the conquerors have avoided completely assuming the colony's complex internal organization. Civil and police administration remain in French hands, under Japanese supervision at the top.

The administration is complex. Cochin China, the southern region France acquired in 1862, in her first Asiatic imperialism, is classed as a French colony. It is slightly larger than West Virginia. The remainder of Indo-China, except for a small area leased from China, consists of protectorates over four native kingships, whose monarchs still rule with traditional splendor. The total area is over 280,000 square miles, larger than France and England combined, with a population of 24,000,000. The Japanese realize that maladministration would produce internal confusion.

Even this easily broken veneer of French sovereignty may be valuable, if the Allies eventually invade the colony. The admiral's control over administrative matters, for one thing, would materially assist a friendly occupying army. As the enlarging Allied offensive becomes more important, Admiral Decoux may be able to shake his head more frequently.

One American repatriate from Indo-China predicted that, by his subtle diplomacy, Admiral Decoux "may emerge as the greatest statesman in Asia" during the war period. If so, some shrewd duels must have been staged in the governor's official residence at Hanoi;

for Japan's ambassador is suave Kenkichi Yoshizawa, an old-line diplomat who was recalled from retirement to conduct the important 1940-41 economic negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies.

The Japanese have failed completely to win the support of Indo-China's natives—a striking example of militaristic stupidity. The colony's subject races, particularly the Annamese, long had been dissatisfied with French rule. Annam, in fact, had been one of the first sections to stir with resurgent nationalism in echoing, "Asia for Asiatics," after Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese war. In the crucial days of 1940, the Indo-Chinese natives generally looked hopefully toward Japanese occupation, with an ever-present Oriental faith that the newest master would be better than the last.

Disregarding this sentiment, the Japanese began their occupation with typical callousness. During brief hostilities at Haiphong before the 1940 entry, Japanese planes dropped four bombs on the city's native quarters, "by mistake." Then, officers arrived with customary arrogance, applying the traditional program of force to natives far more disposed to be friendly than, say, the Filipinos or the East Indian Indonesians. They treated the natives with much greater brutality and more overbearing manner than the French. Demands for Indo-China's rice were so large that want within the normally productive country followed the invasion closely enough to show the correlation even to the native.

Nevertheless, the Japanese are attempting with usual diligence and perseverance to reach the natives. They imported several Annamese agitators, who had been trained in Korea, to spread pro-Japanese sentiment. The Japanese-dominated press and radio are used for steady Japanese propaganda, again emphasizing racial "unity" and Oriental solidarity. Japanese and Annamese students are exchanged; and the Japanese control all schools, compelling the study of Japanese and other aspects of Japanism. Religion is exploited thoroughly. Endeavoring to capitalize upon manpower for the future war effort, propagandists have announced that a native army of 150,000 is being raised for the current battle. Other reports state, however, that a serious mutiny occurred among An-



namese troops at Moncay in 1942 when the Japanese attempted to disarm them.

Alienated from their newest conquerors by force and deprivation, the natives have lost hope at present in racial rebirth under an Asiatic leader. They anticipate another western overlord, but they do not want the French again. They are looking to the United States for "deliverance," stirred by widespread reports of American benevolence in the Philippines.

An illustrative incident occurred in one small Annamese town. Without warning, one day a group of natives captured the post office and other municipal buildings, overpowering the local police. Then the revolted remained quietly in control until French police arrived from a larger town near by. They offered no resistance to the French, who, puzzled, demanded an explanation from the ring-leader.

"We heard," said the leader, "that American troops were on their way here. We thought we would help them by taking the main buildings."

Camranh Bay, fifty-nine miles south of Saigon, is the key to Indo-China's war importance. Large fleet units can be sheltered in its spacious harbor, virtually landlocked by two encircling peninsulas, curling like lobster claws around a narrow and easily defended channel. Japanese naval imperialists openly coveted this base long before they acquired it.

The French began to fortify and improve Camranh after the 1938 Japanese occupation of Hainan island. Although much work remained to be done, the Japanese used it to base the estimated eight hundred planes which regularly bombed Malaya and Burma, some eight hundred miles distant. Among them were the destroyers of the British warships *Repulse* and *Prince of Wales*. Camranh was the organization and starting point for convoys carrying assault troops to Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Japanese swiftly intensified Camranh's improvement. Today, it is well-fortified, its waters commanded by gun emplacements on surrounding high ground and on islets in the entrance channel. It has become a major attacking, supply and repair base. Repair fa-

cilities are extensive, and dry docks are large enough to repair 25,000-ton vessels. Bomber bases and aircraft repair shops are strung around the bay on a curve of flat land, connected to the mainland by a narrow isthmus. The base can be blockaded by sea, however, and for that reason Indo-China observers do not expect sizable Japanese fleet concentrations there.

Camranh is an important relay point in Japan's growing overland communications with Thailand, Burma, and many points in Malaya and Singapore. The latter port is connected by relatively short sea pathways to Sumatra and Java. Busy two-way traffic brings raw materials including petroleum to Indo-China for transshipment to homeland industries, while men and war material are sent overland to the Burma front and near-by garrisons.

The chief overland route begins at Saigon, the major city in southern Indo-China. It is connected by the Mekong river and a parallel highway, recently completed, to Pnom-Penh in Cambodia. A Japanese narrow-gauge railroad, constructed since the war, runs from there to Ubol, on the new Thai-Indo-China border. The railway then goes to Bangkok and beyond that to Singapore. Several east coast Malayan ports also can be reached by rail, and are connected to Singapore by coastal shipping.

Camranh is linked to Saigon by a new highway and is in turn tied by highways to other ports on Indo-China's east coast, notably Tourane, sixty miles northward. These ports are favored over Saigon as the terminal for coastal shipping to South China because they are more accessible from the sea; whereas Saigon is reached only after a long journey up the winding Mekong River.

The Japanese are believed to be constructing numerous other roadways in Indo-China and are known to be rushing a highway network in the northern Federated Malay States. Shipping losses off Indo-China's southern tip have been heavy, and this sea route has been abandoned.

The rail-highway system is Japan's attempted answer to Allied submarine warfare in southwestern waters. Although several points, including Bangkok, have been bombed, and railway equipment is of doubtful vintage, overland communications are still valuable to

the conquerors. At present, materials are sent eastward from Indo-China, by sea.

Japanese officials boast of a prospective Singapore-Korea railway, their only possible solution of transportation difficulties if the Allies cut seaborne communications from Philippine or Formosan bases. The rail project, however, depends upon Japanese ability to recapture and hold strategic sections of China lines linking Peking, Hankow and Canton. Apparently, that was a vital objective in Japan's major China offensive, beginning May, 1944. In addition, two spur routes must be completed to connect Indo-China with the north-south China trunk railway. Reliable Americans estimate construction and repair would take two years.

This project, essential from Japan's viewpoint, is difficult but possible. It would enable partial circumvention of the prospective Allied blockade, although the volume of rail-shipped materials would be considerably less than the empire now receives from southwestern production areas.

Camranh Bay is the key both to this system and to Indo-China's defense. The opinion is growing in Asia that once it falls the remainder of the colony will capitulate. For that reason an Allied attack by sea is not impossible, although it would be difficult and doubtless costly.

The best estimate is that only twenty thousand Japanese troops hold Indo-China. They are believed to be well equipped and could be reinforced. This force apparently is primarily for policing and Camranh's protection, for the colony's successful defense would require probably two hundred thousand men. French armed forces once totaled about forty thousand. Most have been disarmed, and they are kept impotent by German armistice prohibitions against importing guns and munitions. The northern Chinese army lacks sufficient supplies for a concerted push into Indo-China.

Japanese economic exploitation has been heavy in Indo-China. In addition to rice present agreements call for these other major resources: wolfram, 80 tons monthly; manganese, 300-400 tons monthly; coal, 20,000-25,000 tons monthly, including much of

Japan's coking coal; good quality iron ore, 5,000-9,000 tons monthly; rubber 3,000 tons monthly.

But shipping shortages have interrupted the program. The repatriates estimated Indo-China now is supplying only about 25 per cent of its pledged commodities because the Japanese lack the bottoms to carry them away. In late 1943, more than 40,000 tons of rubber and 400,000 tons of rice were waiting in Saigon warehouses for ships that never came. Indo-China's enforced production also has been decreased in measure, by repeated American aerial attacks in the north which, among other objectives, have badly smashed coal mines in Tonkin. In 1944, the Brazzaville radio (French Committee of National Liberation) reported the Japanese had taken over the entire Indo-Chinese commercial shipping fleet, totaling 60,000 tons.

Indo-China's reward for collaboration has been increased economic instability. In return for essential commodities, the Japanese undertook to supply textiles, industrial chemicals and metal products. War demands made this impossible, and the colony receives but few of its needed imports. The conquerors can pay only with credits on Tokyo or with such useless items as celluloid toys. Their callousness to this disregard of prior commitments was exemplified by a 1942 Tokyo radio broadcast. "To win," it said, "we must sacrifice everything and not be particular about the method of obtaining vital materials. Hence, we may obtain goods from Indo-China without paying any consideration to that country, if we so desire. If Indo-China is unwilling to co-operate, we may be compelled to make use of every available means, whether Indo-China likes it or not."

The colony has its quota of growing shortages which symbolize the Co-Prosperity Sphere, including such formerly plentiful native products as rice and sugar, the latter going into industrial alcohol. The expenses of the occupying army, meanwhile, are paid in the local piaster, while Japan's payment for materials, beyond the credits extended, is in watered yen, thus creating considerable inflation. Popular confidence is low in the currency. Prices are climbing.

Trade negotiations also have included special benefits for a horde

of Japanese merchants and traders, indicated by a broadcast over the controlled Hanoi radio in late 1942. "In Indo-China," it said, "Japanese merchants have been given an almost monopolistic priority in handling exports of staple products. The trade negotiations concluded between Japan and Indo-China on August 25, 1942, also provide for the granting of licenses by the Indo-Chinese government to Japanese subjects for the export of minor products on the same terms as native merchants."

The Japanese gendarmerie, with its usual thoroughness, maintains a continual watch against "contrary" thoughts not only among the natives but the French themselves. When the Allied offensive in the Pacific began, the Japanese forced the government to intern leading Free French sympathizers. They are still imprisoned under conditions generally worse than the confinement centers for Americans. About two hundred Frenchmen are detained in at least one camp in southern Indo-China, and some assassinations have been reported. The gendarmerie further "investigated" prominent foreigners, including Americans. One American businessman was kept under gendarmerie custody for forty-three days, handcuffed for two weeks of that time, and severely grilled, although he was not tortured.

Most Americans were interned by the Japanese. Some of them, however, remained free for a year after the start of the war. On the whole their treatment was relatively good, because they were confined to small villages, rather than in central camps, and allowed to support themselves. The Japanese, as usual, provided nothing. Approximately forty Americans are still detained in southern Indo-China. Less than one hundred are believed to be in the entire colony now.

Within these circumscribed limits, life continued rather normally in 1943. In 1944, the increased range of Allied aerial activity directly threatened all of Indo-China. No large-scale raids had been staged by August, but it was apparent that the colony's communication centers could be attacked when Allied commanders considered the move essential. After the Allied liberation of Paris and the collapse of the Vichy government in August, Governor Decoux

proclaimed virtually autonomous powers for his Indo-China government. This formally severed the ties with the puppet government in France but, of course, did not alter relations with Japan. There were evidences, betrayed by news broadcasts, that as an aftermath the Japanese might assume control of the colony openly.

A number of opportunistic Frenchmen are said to be openly collaborating with the conquerors, anxious for temporary protection and profit. The colony's general corruption was one factor in its capitulation. But beneath the surface there are many de Gaullist sympathizers, as well as another sizable element classing itself as "Free French" or "pro-French." American repatriates consider the latter as the colony's most pro-Allied French group, because its patriotism apparently is less tinged by the internal politics. Most Frenchmen, however, would welcome Allied intervention to restore the colony.

Numerous Germans are in Saigon, including the armistice commission staff. Generally they go their own way, and their relations are frigid with the Japanese, the result of many incidents. This is one instance: A cargo of wolfram, which the Germans needed badly, was obtained by the Japanese from Indo-China in the early occupation days. It was to be transshipped to Germany by the then operative route across Russia, one of the little services the Japanese were expected to do for Nazi pressure on Vichy. The shipment left the colony aboard a Japanese ship which headed directly for Japan. The Germans saw no more of the wolfram.

Nevertheless, the two "super" races co-operate on the surface. Some of Indo-China's materials have been sent to Europe aboard German blockade-runners which came to the colony. At least three of them, carrying 62,000 tons of rubber, have been sunk by American raiders off Cap St. Jacques, the peninsula's southern tip.

The Italians also had an armistice commission in Saigon, whose members generally were ignored by both the Germans and the Japanese. Their fate today is unknown, but it is likely they were placed under "protective surveillance" at least, following Italy's capitulation.



## chapter twelve

### THE WESTERN BULWARK

THAILAND, the last autonomous state of southwestern Asia, lost her independence, while trying to preserve it. In some respects the Japanese at Bangkok produced their cleverest prewar mixture of power politics and guile. They began years ago, for this heart-shaped country was a strategic wedge between Indo-China, Burma and Malaya.

That geographical position made Thailand vital to the Japanese scheme. It also provided the political key with which the Japanese opened the country to their troops. They did it so cleverly that, until the hostilities, many Americans and British in Asia believed Bangkok's reiterations of strict neutrality. A few hours after that inanity was last broadcast, Japanese soldiers rolled across their new ally's territory toward Burma.

Since the late nineteenth century Thailand's governmental thinking has been conditioned greatly by fear of French or British absorption. The French from Indo-China and the British from Malaya made several territorial encroachments against Siam—the country's name then—ending with the last British concession in 1909. Although both still seemed covetous, they retained Siam as a buffer state between their mutually jealous colonies. Subsequently, their tendency to interfere in Siamese affairs decreased.

Siam's independence also resulted from intense domestic reform, under a series of capable rulers, beginning in 1851, which eliminated the usual pretexts for foreign interference. This internal energy, plus the efforts of several American advisers to the Siamese

king, resulted finally in complete abolition of extraterritorial rights in 1927. Siam then joined Japan in eliminating the West's "humiliating treaties," a status denied to other Oriental nations. In 1936 she abrogated all her western treaties, signing new documents which completely restored her fiscal autonomy and made her, in truth, an independent nation.

On a small scale Siam closely paralleled Japan, in both her ability and her intense desire to remove the western political hand. She also had her share of subjects who looked enviously to the country's rather remarkable past. The Japanese exploited these elements fully. They convinced Siamese leaders that independence could be perpetuated only with Japan's support; for the West, they said, had stopped its aggressions solely for practical reasons, without renouncing further Asiatic imperialism. They turned many eyes backward through their favorite appeal—reclamation of vanished glories by overthrowing "modern" importations, excluding, of course, armaments and other war essentials.

Japanese influence can be detected in Bangkok's 1939 decision to change Siam to Thailand, an ancient name for the kingdom when its domains were far more extensive. The conquerors also aroused a small number of jingoists into demanding war. Behind that smoke screen the Japanese-guided hostilities with Indo-China erupted. Japan's "mediation," enforced upon the French with the aid of a naval squadron cruising off Camranh Bay, resulted in Thailand's first land "restoration" under the Rising Sun. She received approximately 26,600 square miles of territory from the French protectorates of Laos and Cambodia, including some of Indo-China's richest rubber and cotton areas.

Thailand then totaled approximately 224,700 square miles, somewhat larger than France, and had an estimated sixteen million population. On July 5, 1943, the Japanese-controlled Bangkok radio, coincidental with a visit there of Tojo, announced the Thai "annexation" of these additional areas: north Malay,—the states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, totaling 14,770 square miles, containing one million natives and including areas rich in rubber,



tin and rice; from the Shan states of northeast Burma—Kengtung and Mongpan, each about 12,000 square miles.

Thai troops supported the Japanese battling in the Shan districts during the first thrust against Burma, and Bangkok apparently was being rewarded. The four Malay states, British protectorates since 1909, were the last British acquisitions from Siam.

As a Japanese ally, Thailand by "reclamation" and fresh imperialism technically has obtained territory totaling nearly one-third of her pre-1940 area. Behind this national bribery, the Japanese have worked on the Thais through consistent propaganda, incessant burrowing into leaders' confidence, payments to the most corrupt officials, closer economic relations by nearly doubling their normal trade in 1940. These measures have been backed continually by forces—the threat of armed might from Indo-China before the war, its active application today.

The conquerors now completely control the country, through Thai officials who have become puppets. Military and governmental "advisers" direct affairs behind the scenes. They strictly censor press and radio. The gendarmerie is omnipresent. The similarity of its activities with other imperial areas is exemplified by the attitude of the one American repatriate from Bangkok who joined the *Gripsholm*. A school teacher who had resided long in Thailand, she refused to discuss her experiences because "the Japanese could not fail to know who supplied the information, and that would mean retaliation on the Americans still there." Meager reports indicate the conquerors have treated war prisoners there viciously.

The Japanese obtained their control without overthrowing the peacetime government, which remained substantially intact after the occupation. That indicates the combined power of persuasion and bribery. Field Marshal Luang Bipul Songgram, for many years the government's "strong man," remained as premier until July 29, 1944, when his entire cabinet resigned.

Doubtless some of these officials are after personal gain, or have responded to the conquerors' force. The indications are, however, that most of them believed the Japanese story that today's tight control is a wartime necessity. Reports reaching Indo-China say the

Thai government still is interested primarily in the country's independence, hoping for its restoration after the war.

During hostilities, however, the Japanese will keep Thailand in the imperial scheme, using whatever force is necessary. The two countries are linked formally by an offensive and defensive alliance which Tokyo announced December 11, 1941. Thailand declared war against the United States and Great Britain January 25, 1942. She is now an integral part of the western front. Her territory is required for Japanese bases and her railroads for supply lines. Her central position between Indo-China and Burma makes it imperative that she remain in the war, so long as the Japanese defend the west.

The government that Japan perpetuated was a constitutional monarchy. A bloodless *coup d'état* in 1932 ended the absolute rule of King Prajadhipok and forced him to grant a constitution. Three years later, after a similar incident, he abdicated in favor of his nephew, Prince Ananda Mahidol, then eleven years old and a student in Switzerland. A regency rules the country. Universal suffrage for men and women over twenty years was granted in 1938, but the country has no deep heritage of democracy.

Japanese propagandists claim the Thai army, totaling 500,000 officers and men, is being modernized rapidly to "fight with their Asiatic brother, Japan." Universal conscription for able-bodied men between eighteen and thirty has been effective since 1937. There has been no indication of the value or pro-Japanese loyalty of the troops which have been in action. Nevertheless, they probably will give Japan the most stalwart aid of any native army, particularly in defending Thailand herself, if that becomes necessary.

Reports reaching Indo-China said the Japanese entry into Thailand coincided with a severe drought, causing grave suspicion among the highly superstitious country folk. Whether this suspicion has heightened is unclear, although to these people omens doubtless would be more influential than, say, the return of territory which most of them probably have forgotten. Over 80 per cent of the people are farmers, cultivating only about 6 per cent of the land

area. Rice was virtually the sole crop in 1941, despite government efforts to popularize diversified farming.

As usual, the conquerors have made increased production of rice and cotton their principal agricultural goals. All able-bodied men are subject to forced labor. They purchased 600,000 tons of rice in 1941. After occupation, they attempted to make Thailand the main food-producing area for Japanese troops on the western front. Meanwhile Japanese experts reported that Thailand was more suitable for cotton than rice and over one million acres could be turned into cotton plantations. Partially successful efforts had been made to introduce that crop in 1940.

Failure of the agricultural program was indicated in April, 1943, when Premier Luang Bipul Songgram told education officials in Bangkok, "We tried to teach the farmers how to improve their lands and to improve seed planting, but they reviled us instead. The government is at its wit's end." The statement was reported by the Bangkok radio and heard in the United States. It may have been an attempt to place directly upon the Japanese the burden for further efforts to increase production.

Another sentence in the same statement indicated the Japanese had not yet reached every farmer with their familiar monopoly organizations. "The government," said the premier, "has done its utmost to urge Thais to sell rice and pigs, but they refuse and the Chinese are holding the whole trade."

The country's other principal agricultural products include teak, kapok and hemp. The first, an especially durable lumber, is being used extensively for wooden ships.

The Japanese press also reported extensive efforts to exploit Thailand's natural resources, particularly tin and rubber, as well as copper, antimony, lead, molybdenite, manganese, zinc, wolfram, coal and iron. The conquerors have given no indication of success or failure. The Formosa Overseas Development Company holds the exploitation monopoly.

Unable to balance her imports by the manufactures that Thailand needs, Japan forced double-edged credits upon her ally. The Thai government has "granted" several loans for Japanese rice purchases.

One of these, obtained before the war when the Thai baht equaled  $1\frac{1}{2}$  yen, illustrates the Japanese "credit" system. It was for thirty-five million bahts, equaling fifty million yen. After occupation, the conquerors pressured a Bangkok decree equalizing the baht and yen. The loan was repaid on the new basis, saving the invaders fifteen million yen. Tokyo, in 1943, gave Thailand a "loan" amounting to \$46,000,000 most of which was intended for mineral development—for the conquerors' benefit, of course.

The controlled Bangkok radio in 1942 showed growing economic maladjustment in reporting: "The Thais are now consuming their remaining stocks of goods and, with the exception of a very few articles from Japan, nothing is being imported. . . . The Japanese have no time to manufacture things for Thailand."

Enlarging Burma warfare brought new restrictions to Thailand. Rationing of all necessities, including clothing, preceded full economic regimentation, forced on the country in April, 1944. The Japanese-prodded government issued a comprehensive decree which, said Domei, was designed to place "government control over all economic activities on a wartime footing. Under a system of joint control, a committee will be formed of officials from the commerce and interior offices to formulate measures pertaining to official prices and the distribution of vital commodities. . . . The death penalty will be meted out to the most serious violators hereafter."

This was the final development of Japan's economic stranglehold over recalcitrant farmers and the Chinese middleman, who controlled much of all southwestern Asia's prewar business in commodity goods.

Thailand is being groomed thoroughly for a direct role in the war. In 1943 her budget of 270,000,000 bahts included fifty-six million for national defense. Proposed expenditures for the next year totaled 339,000,000 bahts, of which 113,000,000 were for military expenses.

Allied planes repeatedly raided Bangkok in 1943 and 1944, attacking railroad facilities and war industries. Japanese-sponsored defense plans included a decision to move the capital to Petchabun, a mountain-surrounded village 190 miles inland. Petchabun figured in

the political crisis which resulted in Premier Songgram's overthrow in July, 1944. The cabinet resigned *en bloc* when the Assembly of People's Representatives returned an implied vote of nonconfidence by rejecting two of twelve "emergency Royal ordinances" proposed by the premier. One of the rejected measures provided for establishing a special administrative district at Petchabun, a prelude to the proposed transfer.

The major issue in the crisis seemed to be internal opposition to Songgram's one-man dictatorship which he had maintained domestically during his five years' continuous rule. In recent years his position was implemented by Tojo-directed Japanese support. But Tojo's overthrow eleven days earlier apparently gave Thai opposition factions the opportunity to unseat the second "strong man" in Occupied Asia.

The cabinet change also betrayed evidences that Allied war successes, with their immediate threat to Thailand herself, plus growing hardships under Japanese occupation further had discredited Songgram's pronounced pro-Japanism. Finally, the use of the Petchabun measure as a pretext for the overthrow implied resentment among the settled Thais over moving the capital, especially under Japanese dictation.

There were evidences the Japanese would have preferred to retain Songgram but, yielding with typical opportunism to events paralleling developments in their own country, sought to capitalize upon the change. The new premier, Abhaiwong, included among his first statements this sentence: "All the troubles and difficulties that may worry our people must be brought out in the open and fully discussed." This so patently duplicated promises being made simultaneously in Japan and Occupied China that its Japanese source was unmistakable. As in Japan, the overthrow seemed to result primarily from a factional domestic battle, in which the people exerted influence only through mass sullenness, and not by direct participation. The trends are indicative, but not war-vital. The final decision concerning Thailand's continued war role rests with Japanese force. There is no indication that it has been reduced or hobbled.

Whether these trends will carry over into the postwar period cannot be foretold. The memory of disillusionment and hardship has a tendency in Asia, if not everywhere, to fade quickly when relative normalcy returns. It is probable that nationalism and the "retribution" of lands will be important in future Thai thinking.

The full Japanese control policy, from guided education to exploited religion, has been in effect in Thailand. The conquerors have capitalized particularly on the country's predominant Buddhism. "The Institute of Japanese Culture" was established at Bangkok in 1942 to supervise this political warfare. The final stage of a ceaseless propaganda campaign is an attempt to translate Allied attacks into resurgent imperialism.

If any part of Asia responds in the future to Japan's present program, Thailand may be among the first.

### BURMA

Behind dramatic warfare on its ragged edges, Burma is being exploited swiftly by conquerors who already have made psychological preparations for a quick getaway. In early 1943, Japanese propagandists began to warn their people that the west flank might fall eventually. That does not mean decreased intensity in its defense. It merely shows how far ahead the militarists attempt to save face before anticipated defeat.

The Japanese, as they demonstrated in 1944, will fight bitterly in Burma. It is rich, its strategic position is valuable and its terrain is suitable for the toe hold warfare they want. But they anticipate a well-co-ordinated amphibious assault too powerful to resist with the forces allotted to the Burma theater.

That state of mind is illustrated by a Berlin broadcast of February, 1944, quoting a Tokyo dispatch. "The Japanese high command," it said, "is preparing against landings at a number of points in Burma, Malaya and the Andaman islands [flanking Burma] and even in the former Dutch East Indies. In view of the great length

of the coastline, it is thought the enemy might well succeed in establishing one or more beachheads."

For the Allies, Burma's reconquest would permit land transport for badly needed supplies in China, would provide bases for aerial and land activities against Thailand and Malaya, and would end the persistent Japanese threat against India. A successful campaign would be important but not decisive. Even as a supply base, Burma is secondary. The matériel which could be shipped across a re-opened Burma road would be insufficient for any major China offensive.

The prospect of Allied attacks undoubtedly hastened Burma's "independence." It was forecast in Tokyo months ahead of time by government spokesmen who repeatedly predicted an imminent enemy offensive.

The first occupation "government" was a joint administration of Japanese militarists and Burmese puppets, established August 1, 1942, with Dr. Ba Maw as premier. Japanese officials held the portfolios of finance and defense. Contrasted with their disinclination to assume active governmental positions in the Philippines, this policy illustrates the more open Japanese control in view of approaching warfare and shows cautious treatment of the Filipinos' greater developed nationalism.

General Iida, Burma's conqueror and head of the first occupation garrison, explained the new setup by saying in his proclamation, "The continuation of the Japanese military administration in Burma parallel with the Burmese government is necessary in the light of the war now in progress." A month later he was quoted as declaring, "Burmese currency, customs and railways will remain under Japanese control for fifteen years after the war." The Burmese officials served only in administrative, not policy-making, capacities.

"Independence" was announced August 1, 1943, with Premier Ba Maw continuing in office. He had returned from the usual "cultural" visit to Japan, including a trip to the Ise Grand Shrines, center of Shintoism, which the press reported filled him with "awe and respect." The new government immediately declared war against

Great Britain and the United States. The Japanese announced "withdrawal of the Japanese military" administration and said the burden of Burma's defense would pass from their hands to the fledgling state.

Actually, the full Japanese garrison remained intact, the military and gendarmerie continued their tight grip on every feature of the country's life, and the exploitation of raw materials continued apace. As in the Philippines, "independence" was to lure Burmese into "defending" their homeland, while providing the militarists with means for a face-saving departure when necessary.

Ba Maw, long a leader of anti-British factions, was head of the *Sinyetna* or Workers' party under British rule. He served as premier from 1937 to 1939. The British arrested him in 1940 for seditious speeches against war. Under the Japanese, the premier's former party, with its sometimes anti-white slant, has become the backbone of a new totalitarian political group, the *Dobama Sinyetna*, the Burmese counterpart of the Kalibapi, later succeeded by another organization. Its members had been courted by Japanese agents who worked for years before the war in Burma and who were responsible for some of the nationalist feeling which appeared frequently. The party was given control of elections to the puppet legislature, on the Philippine pattern.

The premier outlined his new political philosophy in a 1942 press interview. "We must," he said, "first drive out Anglo-American influence from this country in co-operation with Japan; we must lay the foundation for Burma as a link of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, and we must reorganize the entire country in such a way as to meet these two requirements."

Before the war Burma, as a crown colony, was administered by a British governor and a council of ten ministers who governed seven administrative districts, composing the central section of the country. Of the two-chambered legislature the 132-member house of representatives was elected. Half of the 36-member senate was elected by the house of representatives, the remainder appointed by the governor. The six northern and 28 southern Shan states were ruled by their chiefs under supervision of the commissioner



of the Federated Shan States. The Japanese have attempted to flatter these chieftains into full support, but suspicion undoubtedly was created when some of their domains were given to Thailand, an ancient enemy.

Burma, about the size of Texas, contains approximately fifteen million people. Eighty per cent are Buddhists. Religion is highly important in their lives. The spiritual head of every village is the yellow-robed monk, and the village monastery is usually the school. The Japanese attempted to exploit this situation fully by, among other methods, a direct approach to the people through the village monks. Ba Maw assisted a vigorous campaign against the priesthood, presumably the recalcitrants. "Unless the Burmese follow the example of Japan and develop a strong spiritual life," he said, "we shall never progress. We must put religion on the same basis as it is in Japan. It must help the state, not destroy it."

Burmese and Japanese Buddhism, coming from different sources, vary in some basic tenets. But the conquerors' religious "experts" apparently have breached the gap with their usual felicity. The importance of the religious approach was indicated in April, 1944, when Premier Ba Maw made a special Tokyo visit, Domei reported, with the "sacred ashes of Buddha" which he presented to Japan for safekeeping "as a token of the amity between Japan and Burma." Special "presentation" ceremonies were arranged. Handing this basic religious symbol to Japan—Burma's "national pleasure," the premier said—completed a link that may bind the Burmese faithful to Tokyo long after their country is reoccupied.

The conquerors played heavily upon nationalist elements among other attempts to reach the masses. They tried to foment great anti-British sentiment while maintaining the "Asiatic brotherhood" of the two peoples. They also introduced the full Japanizing program, from control of education to the neighborhood associations. The two countries signed a cultural agreement in 1942, providing for the exchange of students. Further, the Japanese have suspended the land tax, a basic prewar grievance against the British.

Travelers who returned recently from the Burmese-Indian combat zones said the Japanese program apparently has had little effect

upon the Chins of Burma's hill districts. These are the people whose friendship for invading Allied soldiers, even active war collaboration, has been reported in several news dispatches. The travelers noted, however, that residents of the central plains and valleys, called Burmans, evidently have responded to the conquerors' appeals, augmenting their deep anti-British sentiment.

Meanwhile, Japanese control organizations are busy exploiting raw materials, hampered recently by repeated Allied air raids against more than seventy targets in Burma and Thailand. Assaults were aimed at mines, oil centers and cotton mills in Burma, as well as military airfields and railways. Nevertheless, production continues. In addition to rice, cotton and some rubber, the Japanese are obtaining teak, tin, tungsten ore, petroleum, lead and salt. Petroleum production in 1938 was 263,823,265 gallons, the crude oil being of such quality that little refining was necessary. Of Japan's new conquests, Burma is second to the Netherlands East Indies in oil potentialities.

Agriculturally, the conquerors' program followed the usual plan of maintaining rice as the primary crop and attempting to make cotton next important. The monopoly for the latter was given to the Fujii Cotton Spinning Company, under a five-year program, beginning in 1942.

The first anniversary of "independence," August 1, 1944, was preceded by a ten-day "celebration," heavily larded with warnings that war was moving closer to the Burmese. The Japanese hand in the "independent" government became more open, with the dispatch of thirty Japanese "advisers" to augment the wire-pullers who had acted anonymously.

By then Allied forces, braving incredible hardships of terrain and disease, had plunged into northern Burma. The Japanese crossed the India border into Manipur plain March 8, 1944, in an offensive-defensive campaign. Travelers say the conquerors caught the Allies badly off balance, and for some time the situation was precarious. Finally, on August 17, the British command announced that all but small Japanese remnants had been driven from Indian soil, after

bitter defensive fighting. The foray cost the attackers more than twenty thousand men, in battle and jungle dead.

The Japanese thrust into India seemed designed to set back Allied plans, and possibly it succeeded. Strategic attack is fundamental to Japanese militarists, whether on the march or on the defensive. They also used the campaign as part of their intensive political warfare and to train their third native army to be used on the western front. Thai and Burmese troops had seen action before. An official Tokyo communiqué said units of the Indian "national" army were in the Manipur drive. Under their program to win the Indians, the Japanese long have prepared the "national" army as cannon fodder.

It belongs to the "provisional government of Free India," headed by Subhas Chandra Bose, which declared war on Britain and the United States October 24, 1943. "Soldiers" were recruited from among the watchmen, laborers and policemen of Malaya, Burma, Shanghai and the Philippines. Chandra Bose urged all Indians to join him to "fight our way into India and free the country." He claimed a minimum force of 200,000 men would be raised, to be trained and equipped by the Japanese.

I have seen propaganda pictures of the conscripts. Many were elderly, most were flabby and all appeared dejected, despite the captions which said they had volunteered "enthusiastically." Doubtless propaganda had appealed to the majority, but many were forced into service either by economic or physical pressure.

Chandra Bose, a former president of the Indian National Congress, escaped to Germany in 1941 while he was awaiting trial in India on charges of participating in subversive activities. The Japanese, meanwhile, long had maintained as head of the Tokyo-sponsored "free Indian movement" an elderly ex-terrorist named Rash Behari Bose, who had fled to Japan in 1915, later becoming a Japanese subject.

Suddenly Chandra Bose appeared in Tokyo, by what means no one knows, and immediately was placed at the top of the organization, although Rash Behari Bose was many years his senior. The two men are not related, despite the similarity in names. Both come from Bengal province, which borders Burma, and both are ardent

nationalists. But Chandra Bose was far more widely known in India. His appointment apparently has not alienated his predecessor who continues active in the Japanese-sponsored movement, as "supreme adviser" of the "government."

Chandra Bose is exceedingly active. He travels throughout the empire, holding mass meetings and rallies, collecting money from the Indians themselves and broadcasting regularly. During the 1944 drive on India, he moved his headquarters from Singapore to Burma and intensified his efforts to reach his nationals across the border. "News" broadcasts and propaganda appeals are incessant over three powerful transmitters, in major Indian dialects, English and Japanese.

Chandra Bose has attempted to link his movement with Gandhi's powerful appeal. Beyond that, the theme generally is that Japan is ready to help the Indians in their "hour of opportunity," and the Japanese want only a free India. The leader contends that Indian units in the British army have enlisted only to sabotage the British at the proper time.

The presence of Indian troops among the Japanese is designed to bulwark this appeal, to provide additional manpower through which the Allies must cut and to influence Indian battlefield opponents.

The Japanese have spent millions of yen on the "Indian Independence League of East Asia," parent organization of the "provisional government." They have pursued its propaganda theme of an "awakened India" as thoroughly as other aspects of the political war. Travelers from India say it has produced no important results there. Apparently, however, it has won friends among the Indians under Japanese rule. Their future importance is debatable. But the program will be continued intensively. Beyond its immediate effort to create trouble in India, it is part of the deeper, long-range attempt to turn Oriental against Occidental—the distant dream of many Japanese militarists. One of the movement's most active Japanese is General Sadao Araki—"old Tiger Whiskers"—a retired officer known for his blatant jingoism, particularly in the early thirties.



## chapter thirteen

### IMPERIAL TREASURE HOUSE

THE empire's "treasure house"—the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya—belongs almost exclusively to the militarists. Both are ruled openly by army and navy officers, the only imperial areas not governed through puppets. They are being exploited ruthlessly under military supervision. They will be defended bitterly.

Direct information is limited from Malaya, and all available is incorporated at the end of this chapter. A clearer picture of the Indies is possible, however, through periodic broadcasts over the controlled Batavia radio. These broadcasts, recorded by United States monitors, are correlated by the competent Netherlands Information Service. I am indebted to it for details to augment the reports I heard in Asia.

A necklace of wealth strung across the southern seas, the Indies total some 20,000 islands and islets and part of New Guinea's huge land mass. From Sabang, a small islet off Sumatra at the northwestern extremity, it is 2,870 nautical miles across the sweep of the archipelago to Manokwari, in northern Dutch New Guinea. By contrast, the airline distance from New York to San Francisco is 2,568 miles. The archipelago's approximate area totals 735,168 square miles, more than the combined areas of Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, California and Washington. The population of 70,000,000 nearly equals that of the Japanese home islands. In prewar years, Occidentals totaled about 250,000.

Within this expanse are the great resources, notably petroleum, which made the Indies one of Japan's major goals at the outset of

war. Through "military necessity," the armed services have maintained their control, refusing to risk it by allowing any important native participation in government. Their delay in applying the usual face-saving subterfuge of puppet rule emphasizes their determination to defend the islands fully.

The military administration (army) rules on the main islands of Java and Sumatra. The naval landing party controls outlying areas, including the Celebes and Dutch Borneo. Rivalry apparently developed early between the two services to spread what euphemistically was called "local autonomy," possibly to evidence "complete pacification" of their respective areas.

The army program was typical in Java, now called "Djawa." The rulers' ideas of "freedom" were outlined in a Batavia broadcast which said: "Owing to lack of experience due to suppression by the Dutch, it will take a little longer for Indonesians to attain independence than other parts of the Co-Prosperity Sphere." Nevertheless, for years Indonesians had participated in the legislative council, the Volksraad, which since 1925 has shared legislative powers with the Hague-appointed governor general.

Lukewarm and transparent "autonomy" was granted to Java August 1, 1943, coinciding with Burma "independence." According to an official broadcast this meant only the "establishment of a central council which will have the right to advise and submit proposals connected with administrative affairs to the Japanese authorities." Similar "councils of co-operation" were planned for municipalities. Indonesian "advisers," appointed to the Japanese military government, were limited to "participating in conferences in which important government affairs are discussed."

Before this "autonomous government" was announced, however, the Japanese established the local copy of the Kalibapi. Named the *Putera*, a "new life" organization, the society was announced March 8, 1943, on the first anniversary of the fall of Bantung, the island's military center, which ended hostilities in Java. The Japanese extensively propagandized the new group which, they said, was to embrace all Javanese. It had been formed because the natives had

asked "on their own initiative" that existing Indonesian political parties be abolished.

Following their practice in the Philippines and Burma, the conquerors made Putera members the island's sole electorate and announced in September, 1943, that these 22,000 voters had chosen the island's regional councils. These groups, in turn, selected one representative from each province and municipality—a total of eighteen—to form the central council of Java.

That all these checks and balances were provided for selecting a group whose sole function was advisory indicates the militarists' intention to avoid any possible slip that would weaken their tight control. Furthermore, the central councilmen were to serve one-year terms and would meet every three months, thus giving the Japanese a chance to jettison any troublesome member in a short time.

The small membership of Putera, as evidenced by Japanese-announced electorate figures, indicated in itself popular reticence to join the cultivated "movement" and demonstrated the absence of any nationalist movement upon which the invaders could capitalize. Japanese dissatisfaction was plain. Early in 1944, a Batavia broadcast announced absorption of the Putera, the Chinese overseas association and a Japanese-sponsored cultural center (Pusat Kebudajaan) into a new labor service-defense organization.

Nevertheless, the central council was inaugurated October 17, 1943, to this frank declaration by General Harada, supreme Japanese commander in the archipelago: "As the British and American enemy must come back with their counteroffensive, the war situation gradually becomes most serious. . . . The main purpose of creating the central advisory council is to acquire for the military administration the collaboration of the people. The council members must realize that in wartime they must strive to bring the enthusiasm of the people into line with the policy of the military administration, for the smooth enforcement of its military administrative measures."

Its chairman was an Indonesian nationalist named Sukarno who,

with four other Indonesians, was given the customary Tokyo pilgrimage before assuming office. They were granted an audience by the emperor, among other entertainment features, an event which one Japanese-controlled newspaper in Java termed "the highest honor ever accorded to the Indonesian people—an honor which will remain as a momentous event in their history."

Sukarno long had been identified with the Indonesian nationalist movement and undoubtedly had been in contact with prewar Japanese agents in the Indies. The Netherlands information bureau gives this additional summary of his career: At one time, the agency said, Sukarno had apologized to the East Indies government for his activities and offered to deliver to officials the persons who "had seduced him," probably the Japanese agents. During 1939 and 1940 he warned the Dutch government against Japanese imperialism and propaganda. After hostilities began, he appealed to the Dutch government for evacuation to Australia, fearing the conquerors' vengeance for his anti-Japanese activities.

But Sukarno was on hand to bid the Japanese welcome when they landed at Padang, on Sumatra, then promptly was jailed by them. Several months later he was released with "some other interned Indonesians with similarly shady records" and immediately the controlled press hailed them as the country's new leaders.

Although a number of other Indonesians serve as Japanese advisers, the Netherlands say they do not include any of the responsible prewar nationalists.

Army authorities also announced the formation of a general assembly on Sumatra whose 210 delegates all would be appointed. Its purpose was not specified. The navy, meanwhile, said Indonesians would be "allowed to participate" in their local government on Borneo, the Celebes and New Guinea. New laws to that effect, the broadcast added, were already in force, "with the exception of election laws."

In other respects the conquerors have pursued their program of Japanism with intense attention to detail. Neighborhood associations have been introduced, and through them the conquerors hope



to spread their "cultural" programs, including the simulated patriotism emanating from the Putera and its successor. Each association is composed of from three to twenty households, under appointed leaders who meet at least once a month in district conferences.

While the neighborhood associations, in theory, might be applied successfully to the clannish tribal life, the Japanese apparently have not been too clever in respecting some age-old native customs, particularly in administering civil law. In late 1942, the Japanese authorities announced "that the courts on Java, which are being revised under the guidance of the Imperial army, have abolished the old Dutch system and will henceforth administer justice under the banner of the Co-Prosperity Sphere." The Dutch system allowed the natives to observe their own *adat* (Moslem law) in civil matters, although an individual could request that his case be under Dutch law. Criminal law was the same for all, Europeans and Indonesians.

The conquerors installed Japanese judges and evidently attempted to import Japanese law. A Tokyo publication, the Japanese Pacific Society's monthly magazine, said in 1943, that "insurmountable" difficulties had been met in the administration of justice on Java, due to ignorance of the languages and *adat* and, above all, by lack of trust in the Japanese judges. Early in 1944, the military authorities announced the suspension of the island's supreme court pending the "streamlining of the judiciary machinery on Java."

By late 1943, Domei said, a total of 12,000 elementary schools, enrolling 1,900,000 pupils, as well as more than 75 other educational institutions had been reopened for Indonesian students in the Indies. This represented slightly more than half of the prewar native elementary institutions and only a fraction of the higher schools. In the large cities, such as Batavia, the schools are under the "municipal authorities," headed by a Japanese mayor. But the entire school system is under close Japanese army control. The emphasis upon Japanism and the required study of Japanese appeared at once in the all-important primary grades. Indonesians characteristically place great emphasis upon the education of their children.

The Japanese are particularly active in trying to harness potent religious forces. The Indonesians are predominantly Mohammedan and form the largest numerical bloc of the more than 100,000,000 Moslems in occupied areas. This one-fourth of the empire is capable of a fanatical religious fervor equal to the Japanese themselves. Success in winning the Mohammedans of the Indies to the Japanese banner would attract not only the Moros, the Indians and other Islamic races in Occupied Asia, but would give the conquerors a great psychological spear for penetration into India proper.

Insisting upon their own religious "tolerance," the conquerors are attempting to enlist the Moslems in a "crusade against England, the United States and Holland," urging them to join in the "annihilation of those who would suppress religious freedom." In addition to ceaseless propaganda, one way of emphasizing this viewpoint is by falsely quoting the archipelago's religious leaders, which they can do, of course, with no more than lip refutation. Another typical approach appeared in late 1942.

Pilgrims, preparing for their yearly trip to Mecca, the Mohammedan holy city, were told the Japanese would provide vessels and safe conduct, provided the junket had no political purposes. This mild restriction followed considerable polite conversation which finally delayed the departure until it was too late. The Japanese then spread the word that the holy voyage had been canceled, because the British would not recognize the Japanese safe conduct. The actual reason probably was twofold: Lack of Japanese shipping and the conquerors' refusal to allow the Indonesians to journey close to Allied territory.

Later the Japanese became more aggressive and more frank in attempting to unite the Moslem faith actively with the Japanese military effort—as well as Japanese thought. Several conventions of Moslem representatives were held in 1943. In each, resolutions were passed, declaring the eagerness of these "representatives" to "contribute to the Japanese military effort" or to discuss the "various ways in which closer collaboration with the military authorities could be achieved." Another meeting adopted a resolution express-

ing "the need of destroying Great Britain and the United States" and of "continuing the war with greater force than ever."

At the same time the Batavia radio announced adoption of certain Japanese measures aimed at "heightening the level of the Indies peoples by placing them under the influence of Oriental culture." It added that "the Tenno idea [emperor worship] in particular will be applied to the Islamic as well as to other religions."

One of these measures, apparently, was the dissolution of the Moslem Central Council of the Indonesians, the *Madjelis*, to be replaced by a Japanese-controlled Islamic association called *Masjumi*. The purpose was disclosed by an inaugural announcement that "the Masjumi will be most important in connection with the war situation."

Another Japanese broadcast disclosed that all Moslem mosques in Batavia have been centralized under one "controlling" body, which will compose the texts of sermons to be read every Friday. This means a direct insinuation of bits of Japanism in these influential religious discourses.

The December 7 war anniversary coincided in 1943 with an Islamic holiday celebrating the accomplishment of the Fifth Pillar of the Islam religion. The Japanese ordered the Indies Moslems to commemorate the attack on Pearl Harbor. They also have touched a deep Mohammedan concept by requiring their subjects to bow to Tokyo, not Mecca, during prayers.

The Japanese are equally interested in other faiths, with the idea of harnessing them to the prevalent Mohammedanism which, in turn, would be under the precepts of Shinto.

The Dutch, meanwhile, consistently have attempted to refute the Japanese policies with a propaganda program which appears to be more sustained and far more practical than any used by other dispossessed Occidentals. They broadcast regularly from Australia, and doubtless there are other means of communication.

In refuting the Japanese religious appeal, their own native Islamic leaders frequently go on the air, denouncing Japan as the enemy of Allah and declaring that the "democratic countries have proved

to be friends of the Islamic peoples" by providing financial assistance for Indonesians now living in exile and assuring them continued religious freedom.

It would be unwise to underestimate the potentialities of the Japanese religious approach. The conquerors have made numerous blunders, particularly in the required bow to Tokyo. Their brutality is still a potent counterargument. Yet they have many methods of flattery, cajolery and force, used quietly and steadily, which do not appear in their specially prepared broadcasts. The final test will come only when the natives decide for themselves, in face of an Allied counterinvasion.

In preparing for that invasion, the Japanese have used forced labor to tear out the archipelago's resources for the homeland and to erect defenses; while simultaneously attempting widespread mobilization of the people for an active role in hostilities.

On Java they have organized one of the most complete compulsory labor corps, following numerous attempts, which apparently failed, to recruit workers less openly. In February, 1944, the formation of the Java Labor Association (Djawa Hoko Kai) was announced over the Batavia radio, to perfect "the people's sacrificial service system." This was the successor of the Putera.

The organization covers every corner of the cities and tiny mountain villages to embrace each able-bodied man and woman, as well as youngsters of fourteen years and older. Under an army administrator as "honorary president" and with headquarters in Batavia, the labor corps is portrayed as an honorable society to which only workers can belong. "Membership," said the broadcast, "will be comprised of the inhabitants and Japanese, but Chinese and Eurasians also will be included. Those of fourteen years or older, who devote themselves to putting the projects into operation, will be considered members." Women and girls are assigned special tasks. The dragnet was completed by establishment of a series of smaller organizations, under the central body, to embrace every settlement, reaching the individual through neighborhood associations.

The broadcast said the association's "aims are that the inhabitants will put into practice and administer various measures of the military administration in harmony and friendliness, and that the people of Java will devote themselves to fulfill their mission as a member of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Similar "volunteer labor corps," organized in the outlying islands, merely represent euphemistic continuation of the forced labor existing since occupation.

Allied forces encountered Japanese labor slaves when, in April, 1944, they began liberating Dutch New Guinea and adjacent islands. The most pitiful among several hundred freed natives were victims of this Java labor organization. These Javanese were particularly numerous on Noemfoor island, in Geelvink Bay, where they had been sent to build fortifications. They told stories of starvation and brutality. Many were so undernourished they could hardly stand. Hundreds, and possibly thousands, of Javanese have been shipped throughout the southern regions, they said, to work for the conquerors. The imperial program was so thorough that schoolboys often were taken from classrooms, disappearing without a word to their relatives.

Open conscription of a "national" army began, in late 1943, on Sumatra, the northwesterly main island of the archipelago and consequently the area most immediately endangered by an Allied amphibious assault from India. Elsewhere, the Japanese have attempted assiduously to groom a native army, through "volunteer corps" and "officers' training" establishments. From all indications the response was small.

The conquerors have surrounded these efforts with numerous attempts to stir popular enthusiasm, ranging from loudly staged mass meetings to the formation of women's patriotic societies. One broadcast said that an alleged Moslem leader, named K. H. M. Mansoer, had called at army headquarters on Java to petition for "permission to organize the forty million Islamites on the island for the defense of Islam." Another recorded the establishment of a special "volunteer corps" for Eurasians on Java; a move to bulwark

Japanese propaganda calling upon the island's numerous Eurasians to consider themselves as Orientals, not Occidentals. This latter group was headed by S. Goenveld, a member of the Java advisory council, whom the Dutch newspaper *Oranje*, in Australia, said was an "active member of the prewar Surabaya underworld."

The ever-present Japanese youth movement has been projected more closely toward war in an attempt to popularize recruitment. Broadcasts record that drilled school children, in special uniforms, have marched with banners and flags at numerous rallies on several islands; and, of course, they always "paid homage to Japan's emperor." In some cases the juvenile marchers were said to have totaled 10,000 at one gathering. Youth corps units also are engaged in defense drills.

If the program of simulated patriotism fails to create a sufficiently large native army, the Japanese undoubtedly will use more forceful methods. The gendarmerie, of course, has been extremely active among all races, including Chinese suspected of Chungking sympathies.

Japan's economic exploitation of the Indies was pushed with feverish speed to create homeland stock piles. Petroleum, the major immediate necessity, remained under direct army and navy supervision. Other resources were tapped by private Japanese industrial combines holding monopolistic licenses, later consolidated under the Southern Regions Development Bank, the monopolistic combine. Its president, Kenichiro Sasaki, former vice president of the economically imperialistic South Manchurian Railway, has been placed in charge of gearing the islands' economy to the war effort. The bank issues its own watered notes, replacing military currency, which was withdrawn in 1943.

The conquerors extended their five-year agricultural programs for increased production of cotton, kapok, ramie and foodstuffs to the archipelago. Java, the controlled radio announced, was "to play a role as supply base for the entire southern region." All agricultural production was placed under the usual widespread monopolistic "farmers' co-operatives." In prewar years the island was self-

sufficient in rice and exported some food to neighboring islands. The Japanese announced, however, that all waste ground and vacant lots in Batavia were being cultivated to increase production. Strict rationing is enforced for rice and other foodstuffs.

The cotton program, although highly publicized, also appeared to be short of the Japanese goal. Repeated propaganda attempts have been made to convince farmers to accept the "free seeds" offered for production of this crop. Cloth rationing was begun in late 1943 in Sumatra, and later became general.

Nearly all of the world's production of quinine, vital in treating malaria, comes from the Indies. The Tokyo radio has announced all-year gathering of quinine bark on Java, augmenting other evidences that the Japanese are stripping the trees before they reach maturity in order to accumulate huge reserves in Japan. Dutch officials in Australia expressed fear this might seriously hamper future cultivation. At the same time the conquerors reported numerous attempts to obtain a substitute for the drug, indicative of efforts to prepare *sufu* or ersatz substitutes for South Seas products which eventually they will lose.

The Japanese also are razing large stands of timber throughout the empire, including the Philippines, for their wooden shipbuilding program. No attempt is made at reforestation. A two-day conference of "experts," in 1944, discussed means of obtaining more lumber which, said a Japanese report, "is expected to run into tens of thousands of tons."

In every imperial region, except possibly China, the conquerors feverishly are building small wooden supply vessels, using pine, Philippine hardwoods, teak and other lumber. Thousands of natives on Java alone have been conscripted to work in shipyards. They are organized along military lines, given daily "mass drills" to increase their "physical and spiritual" strength and must repeat a solemn pledge that they are working solely to help Japan create "prosperity in East Asia." Within Japan Proper, Tokyo radio reported, convicts have been released for shipbuilding jobs, and forty-five thousand of them now are employed, augmenting thousands of regular workers.

These vessels range between 100 and 500 tons, most of them with the high prow and flat lines of the Chinese junk. They are designed for rapid construction and a short life, slow, but seaworthy. Thousands of native "proah" also are being built, the Japanese say. Although scarcely the size of a lifeboat these flimsy craft have been used to transport hemp on the 600-mile voyage between the Philippines and Celebes. In one instance, at least, the conquerors also experimented with a raw rubber vessel, planning to sail it from the Indies to Japan, then dismantle it and use the rubber.

This is the Japanese scheme to offset the tightening Allied blockade—thousands of small vessels, most of them sailboats, slipping from port to port across wide sea lanes, each carrying small shipments of vital materials. For every ten destroyed by raiders, a hundred more will be on the way. From the Indies to Japan, most sea lanes still parallel Japanese-held shorelines. To replace lost merchant seamen, intense recruitment by persuasion and force is under way among the Japanese themselves and southern natives.

How effective this remedy may become cannot be gauged. It was apparent within Asia that, by late 1943, shipping shortages were acute but not yet critical. Their effect was principally upon the transport of civilian goods and, apparently, war commodities not immediately needed in the homeland. Communications continued between all parts of the empire, but early the next year Hong Kong virtually was isolated. Meanwhile the wooden construction program was being accelerated.

Among other boasts, the Japanese report a "sure" method of maintaining their oil line to the south. Petroleum is being shipped in watertight teak casks, they say, which will drift on prevailing currents to Japanese-held areas, even if the vessel is sunk. Thousands of these barrels have been thrown into the sea, eventually being washed ashore in some part of the empire. Propagandists are enthusiastic about this deep-water mill race.

By now, Japan's utilization of the Indies oil fields apparently is limited only by her communications and refinery capacity. The Dutch reported an extensive "scorched earth" policy prior to their



withdrawal from the islands, in which oil wells, storage facilities and three of the four major refinery centers were destroyed. The most optimistic prewar estimates were that producing areas thus would be useless for eighteen months. There were indications the Japanese had restored many of the wells before that time. The major sabotage emphasis was on the refineries, particularly important in view of the known shortage of capacity within Japan Proper. Nevertheless, the Japanese bought considerable equipment from California distributors in prewar years.

How much petroleum they are obtaining and how much they can refine are military secrets which only a few Japanese know. The Indies exported 6,425,610 metric tons of petroleum in 1939. German estimates say Japan's normal peacetime requirements, now severely curtailed, are 4,000,000 metric tons annually. She now has access to southern areas which totaled about 10,000,000 metric tons in pre-war production.

Japanese oil experts, most of them trained in the United States, followed the troops into the Indies. They worked for more than two years without important interruption from the Allies. Major Indies oil fields are on Borneo, Sumatra and Java. They will be exploited until aerially demolished or reoccupied, an eventuality against which the Japanese are attempting to prepare by creating stock piles at home and by intense efforts to develop synthetic oil.

Other major Indies raw materials include: rubber, tin, coal, bauxite and manganese. Sugar production on Java totaled 3,000,000 tons before the war. Some production curtailment under the Japanese has been reported, although extensive plans for replanting 50,000 acres of cane fields with cotton apparently were abandoned.

The rubber of the Indies and Malaya, giving Japan virtually a world monopoly, apparently already is overproduced, at least for her ability to ship it to the homeland. The Japanese have used raw rubber for the manufacture of aviation gasoline. They also have surfaced some airfields with it. Large stocks reportedly are awaiting shipment in Singapore warehouses. In late 1943, the Japanese announced plans to open a number of factories in the Indies for the manufacture of rubber articles—which still are unobtainable in

Japan. They also completed an agreement earlier that year to store large supplies of rubber and sugar in the Indies, according to German reports, for postwar sale to Germany and Italy, then still an Axis partner. Simultaneously, the Japanese have been accumulating large reserves of this easily preserved commodity for future war needs. Even so, the development of synthetic rubber has proceeded rapidly, the Japanese say, again in preparation for the loss of producing regions.

Japanese preparations for the Indies' defense have been thorough and secret. Forced labor has been employed continuously on defense installations. Propagandists have limited discussion of these activities to laudatory articles about the restoration of destroyed military facilities and communications and the construction of new railway links and highways. Tokyo newspapers say the Allies will not attack the main islands, fearing loss of prestige among the natives if the civilian death rate is high in densely populated areas.

Regardless of eventual developments, it seems unlikely the Indies will "wither on the vine," even if blockaded from the rest of the empire. Able to live indefinitely off the land and possessing sizable armaments, Japanese garrisons on the main islands will withdraw only in the most face-saving manner. That will not be voluntary capitulation. It will mean direct and successful Allied attack, with landing forces once again operating in relatively restricted areas chosen by the conquerors. Semiautonomous officers can be expected to ignore orders from an Allied-dominated Japanese government, even the emperor, under those conditions.

This viewpoint was implied, in a 1943 interview, by Vice Admiral C. E. L. Helfrich, commander of Netherlands forces in the Far East, advocating a direct Indies assault after conclusion of European hostilities. Landings on the archipelago's main islands will be necessary, he said, because the mentality of Japanese war lords would prevent them from giving up conquered areas. He continued:

"Figures on Japanese war production are unknown, so we must be careful in estimating the percentage of Japanese losses we believe are irreplaceable. Japanese shipping and aircraft are our primary targets now, but we must reckon with the fact that the Japa-

nese are building up strong defenses and huge stocks of war materials, in the practically self-sufficient occupied islands, so that they can hold out for a long time."

Within the Indies some guerrilla forces are believed still active, the remnants of sizable bands which fled to the hills during the occupation, later causing the Japanese considerable trouble, especially on the smaller islands. A Domei dispatch in February, 1944, noted the presence of guerrillas on Borneo in a dispatch intended to describe the natives' co-operation there. "The absolute trust and confidence," it said, "of the native inhabitants in the Japanese naval administration, as well as the consequent positive appropriation for the bolstering of the defense against enemy guerrilla attacks, are forming a vital background for intensification of industrial activities. Day in and day out the Banjermasin Defense Corps is busy with construction work, while defense drills are under way for the Youth Corps." Previously, the Japanese periodically announced the capture of Dutch guerrilla leaders. They have reported the "complete pacification" of several islands many times.

The Dutch expect important native uprisings behind the Japanese lines when an Allied attack begins. One of their propaganda broadcasts from Australia attempted to give instructions to these potential forces, while possibly trying to influence other natives with the same idea. Doctor Charles O. van der Plas, head of the Netherlands East Indies Commission in Australia, said in this speech, beamed to the islands: "Do not rise yet. Do not destroy Japanese factories yet, nor attack them. Be prudent and cautious in your underground organizations. Wait for our signals and orders. Do not let your leaders be caught by the Japanese."

From all indications, the economic distress and unrest characterizing the rest of the empire have hit the Indies, through the vicious circle of suspended imports, heavy army demands upon food supplies, high prices and worthless currency. Normal life for most of the natives, except the farmers, has been interrupted and their distress emphasized by forced labor for meager wages, backed by ceaseless brutality. In addition, heavy epidemics of cholera and malaria have been reported on Java, complicated by the shortage of

medicines, including quinine. The majority of more than 30,000 Netherland civilians believed to have been captured in the islands are interned, but little is known of the conditions under which they live.

The Indies have become part of the Co-Prosperity Sphere!

### MALAYA

By force and cajolery, the Japanese maintain their position in Malaya, which is as war-wealthy as the Indies. This spear-tipped peninsula centers the rich vein of rubber and tin which curves from Indo-China to Borneo. It possesses other vital resources, notably small amounts of tungsten, wolfram and scheelite. As under the British, Singapore continues as the major naval port in southwestern Asia.

The conquerors consolidated the former Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States into one administrative section, ruled directly by naval and military officers, through Japanese civilians. Johore, the last remaining Unfederated State—since the others were “returned” to Thailand—continues under nominal leadership of its loudly flattered sultan whom the Japanese dominate. They also proclaimed a new “sultan of Selangor,” inaugurated with great ceremony, while decorating the leaders of the states now supposedly under Thai sovereignty.

In 1943, the Japanese promised “self-government” for the people and followed a few months later with “advisory” councils similar to those in the Indies. Prewar Malaya lacked a developed nationalism. Japanese propagandists noticeably have avoided publicizing any Malayan leader with the intensity they have used for other puppets. As in the Indies, “autonomy” probably will be delayed until the militarists use it to prepare for a withdrawal.

All aspects of Japanism, from strict school control to labor and patriotic organizations, have been introduced on the Indies pattern. “Education” is compulsory for younger children. Gendarmerie activities have been particularly vicious, especially against the more

than two million Malayan Chinese. During the original conquest principal opposition, aside from British, came from Chinese supporters of Chiang Kai-shek. The conquerors' reprisals are brutal.

Numerous defense projects have been reported in Malaya, the conquerors using the labor of British and Indian war prisoners and Chinese conscripts under particularly inhuman conditions. The death rate of war prisoners reportedly was high during their employment on a railroad spur linking Burma and Thailand. Highways in northern Malaya have been pushed, and Port Dickson is being enlarged under a three-year program.

From all evidences, Singapore is being used extensively as a shipping, repair and boat-building center. The Japanese captured undamaged dry dock facilities permitting major repairs for their South Seas fleet. Japanese broadcasts claim wooden ship construction is largest there, and a director of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., boasted, in 1942, his company "will be turning out a big fleet of merchant ships" in Singapore.

The Japanese obviously have refortified this former British naval bastion, without duplicating the British mistake of making it capable of resisting only an assault by sea. Naval guns from Singapore were found on Tarawa island, indicating the conquerors are substituting their own equipment in the Malayan fortress.

Despite reported sabotage of machinery, Malayan mineral resources apparently are being worked fully. Propagandists claim the tin output is high, although the British reported preoccupation destruction of smelters. Rubber, the archipelago's second vital commodity, is produced heavily under short-term methods with little regard for upkeep of the trees. But new rubber trees were planted in 1943.

Chinese who escaped in that year reported large accumulations of rubber and tin awaiting transshipment from Singapore warehouses. They said inflation, controlled economy, food shortages and other familiar blights had struck Malaya. Rationing is general. The Japanese had been particularly intent upon increased food production. Their plans included diversion of 100,000 acres to cultivating wheat, maize, tapioca and vegetables.

Two other universal Japanese measures appeared with particular emphasis in Singapore—now called “Shonan” as part of the de-Occidentalizing process. One is a government-sponsored lottery which nets some Japanese profiteers substantial incomes. The second is easy-term “loans” to Japanese nationals, issued in the local watered currency, permitting business purchases that may precipitate a considerable postwar economic snarl. The allowable amount in Shonan is 5,000 Straits Dollars. It varies throughout the empire.

The fact that relative secrecy is enforced on Malaya indicates the tight military control, as well as the comprehensive extent of efforts for both exploitation and future defense.



# THE CONTINENTAL EMPIRE

.







## chapter fourteen

### "REPENTANT" MURDERER

LIKE a cunning murderer hoping for absolution, Japan, in 1943, began intensive political warfare throughout Occupied China to preach the "friendship" of masters who suddenly became repentant. The program, still under way, was highlighted by a remarkable *volte face* in Tokyo's ostensible official policy. It was underwritten by millions of government yen. The apparent stakes were vital for the empire's future. But in the field the Japanese militarists continued policies which have brought to China the most widespread distress and the most shocking cruelty in all Asia.

By the beginning of 1943, the Nanking government had made little tangible progress in winning the support of perhaps 230,000,000 people supposedly under its jurisdiction. The puppet president, Wang Ching-wei, was still in power, held there by his army sponsors. The richer provinces to the northward were under Wang Keh-min's North China Political Affairs Council which owed lip service, at any rate, to Nanking. Mongolia was ruled by the Japanese Kwantung army through the influential Prince Teh and the puppet United Autonomous Government of Mongolia. The South China army directly ruled Canton and its environs.

With the Pacific war, the Japanese extended their control to the international settlements and foreign concessions of Shanghai, Tientsin and Peking. They robbed these cities as methodically as they had stripped other continental holdings. Throughout the occupied areas, cruel and vengeful economic and militaristic policies were driving the people deeper into hopeless poverty. Swaggering

Japanese colonists and "civilian fighters," the gangster *ronin* or *soshi*, arrogantly held special rights.

All of the familiar control agencies, long operative, were in force. Exploitation was concentrated under several monopolistic organizations, including the North China Development Company and the Central China Promotion Company. Cultural control was exercised by the army through the special service section in the lower Yangtze valley, and in the north the North China Co-ordination Department of the omnipresent Asia Development Board. Their supervision of education, the press and radio and similar agencies was direct.

In Central China the "orthodox Kuomintang," modeled after that legitimate party of Free China, was the Nanking government's totalitarian patriotic party. In the north, the Hsin Min Hui, the "new people's association," paralleled the IRAA and Kalibapi. The Japanese long had attempted to use Chinese secret societies, including a number maintained by gangsters, to spread their influence. The gendarmerie was firmly and ruthlessly established in every city. Society was organized on the neighborhood association principle. The extra policing agency—duplicating the associations' torture-threatened patrols—in this case was the Pao Chia (pronounced Bau Jaw). This system had been used in early Chinese history, then resurrected by Chiang Kai-shek to extend his influence during his struggle to power. It was ideal for Japanese purposes.

The conquerors held the main railways and waterways and a few miles of adjacent countryside. They had occupied major cities and communications centers. By this thin vein running through an extensive country, they attempted to control millions of people. The gendarmerie force was augmented by periodic well-equipped military expeditions into the country. These attacks ranged from confiscation of foodstuffs to the destruction of whole villages and assassination of all their residents.

This, briefly, was Occupied China during the first two years of the Pacific war. But it was evident that China—an integral part of the original yen-bloc—militarily and socially was an undigested fragment of the new empire. Military action was largely bogged down. The persistent Chinese threat had nailed probably 1,000,000 Japanese

troops, with their equipment, in a country which would not give up. China's potential importance as a future springboard for Allied attacks became evident when the Americans took the offensive.

The Japanese needed to consolidate their hold upon the southern mainland. This appeared as an important factor in the 1942 formation of the Greater East Asia ministry, a streamlined Tokyo department, designed to expedite absorption of the new empire, starting with China. In the latter part of that year the Japanese paid new attention to the continent.

On January 9, 1943, the Wang government declared war on the United States and Great Britain; two years after Manchukuo officially had joined the conflict. Traffic became unusually heavy between Nanking and Tokyo, with Japanese and puppet Chinese officials holding numerous conferences. Premier Tojo flew to the Chinese "capital" for the first of several discussions with Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Japanese ambassador. Then, in February, the Japanese announced their intention of relinquishing extraterritorial rights in China and returning to the Nanking government the foreign concessions and settlements.

Shigemitsu was appointed foreign minister April 20, and he immediately tossed the big bombshell. In a long statement he said, "We must radically change our policy toward China." The Japanese, he further declared, must relinquish all privileges of race in China and subject themselves to the same legal jurisdiction, the same taxes and the same position as other citizens under the Nanking government. "We must prove," he added, "that we sincerely want China's friendship."

His appointment in itself was a surprise. As ambassador to London in immediate prewar years he had been considered pro-British and in some respects a liberal; which, in Japan, generally designates anyone opposing unchecked military ruthlessness. Evidently he was appointed against Premier Tojo's personal wishes.

The statement, obviously made with Tojo's prior knowledge, contained perhaps the boldest criticism of the army by any Japanese since the current militaristic era began in 1931. China had been the army's baby more conspicuously than any recent acquisition. Wang

Ching-wei had been placed in power after conferences with the army, not civilian officials. The Japanese people had been convinced that the army's "wisdom" had given stable government to the previously "unhappy Chinese." Some resistance continued, their propagandists told them, because "certain misguided elements" still believed the "false" promises of Chiang Kai-shek, whom the controlled press pictured as an impotent guerrilla leader.

Now, a mere foreign minister—usually one of the cabinet's most discredited positions—told them the army's policy had been a complete failure the moment he was appointed to office, by a man bound to share in the resultant loss of face. The stakes had to be big for such a prologue.

The cabinet change was followed by an intensive publicity drive during which official spokesmen went to unprecedented lengths in assuring China the "new policy" would mean a revolutionary Chinese and Japanese equalization in occupied territories.

Japanese extraterritoriality was "relinquished" formally in an elaborate ceremony at Nanking. One by one, the conquerors ostensibly gave the Nanking government full administrative rights, in the former Legation Quarter in Peking and the erstwhile foreign concessions of Tientsin, Canton, Hankow, Hangchow, Soochow and Shasi. The final "show" was the "return" to Chinese administration of Shanghai's famed International Settlement and French Concession. On the surface, that marked the end of the special rights which foreign nations, including Japan, had obtained during China's weakness a century before. (Sometime previously, Japan went through the motions of restoring her concessions to the Nanking regime.) Simultaneously the invaders loudly reported that hundreds of cotton mills, small factories and mines had been "restored" to their Chinese owners. The Japanese had taken them for "military necessity."

Naturally, this was entirely on the surface. Japanese administrators continue active control of key positions in the "restored" settlements and concessions, and dominated puppets occupy other offices. The gendarmerie, maintaining its complete stranglehold over all residents in occupied areas, can transfer any legal or criminal

case to the jurisdiction of Japanese military courts. Through monopolistic contracts, Japanese businessmen exploit mineral resources and "rural co-operatives" have the same function in agriculture. The Japanese hold at least 51 per cent of the stock of the "returned" factories. Japanese banks govern economy and issue worthless, bayonet-backed currency. Japanese militarists control the railways and waterways. Japanese guns guide the government and rule the people.

By and large, Chinese in the cities seemed unimpressed and even cynical over these alleged acts of generosity. They are shrewd enough generally to detect actuality from fiction. Beyond that, the wanton brutality in China has created an unbridgeable chasm between the bulk of the Chinese and their conquerors.

But apparently it did appeal to country peasants, to the anti-whites and incipient Chinese fascists who long have demanded expulsion of the foreigner. The latter have shown definite response to Japanese propaganda, particularly its anti-Occidental appeal. At the moment, they appear as an inconsequential minority. How many thousands of the same outlook have been groomed in Japanese-controlled schools during the past seven years cannot be ascertained. In future Chinese nationalism, the Japanese action in restoring the concessions may return as an unpleasant ghost for western powers.

The Anglo-American counterpolicy of promising the same things was flatter than the Japanese move. The Chinese realized the democracies no longer possessed their concessions and the majority of Occidentals supposedly under extrajurisdiction actually had lost that status with the application of Japanese military law. However, the subsequent American action in repealing Chinese exclusion laws, occurring after we left Asia, may have been far more effective. These laws to the Chinese were particularly odious. Their elimination marked substantial progress toward the equality they long desired.

The Japanese program marked their most definite support of the Nanking regime and was designed to enhance its "face" considerably. They bulwarked this effort by increased activities to portray that government as autonomous. Enlarging upon the theme of Occupied China's official participation in the Pacific war, the Japanese,

in the summer of 1943, hailed the rapid formation of Peace Preservation Corps throughout the controlled districts. These were Chinese troops, nominally under Wang's control, organized under Japanese jurisdiction and replacing the former Rural Pacification Corps. The Japanese remained in the background, and the officers were Chinese. Smartly uniformed cadets of an officers' training school in Nanking also goose-stepped in review before Wang, and were photographed extensively by newsreel and newspaper cameramen. The Nanking regime acquired a few old airplanes from the Japanese and at least one old gunboat which ostentatiously patrols the Yangtze.

Several Chinese guerrilla leaders, the press reported, "deserted" Chungking and joined the Nanking regime. These stories said they were accompanied by thousands of men. They were placed in the Peace Preservation Corps, where room was made for the erstwhile guerrilla officers. A number of them had been prominent in anti-Japanese activities previously. But the Japanese made a gesture of accepting their services without punishment for the usually cruelly treated crime of opposition. These incidents were puzzling. Many well-informed observers from North China were unable to ascertain the real reason for the alleged capitulations, although there was suspicion the Chungking government had ordered them.

The vast majority of Chinese still see the Japanese hand behind Wang's government. But responsible repatriates reported what might be a significant trend in North China. "The Chinese peasants and even some of the intelligentsia," they say, "are still puzzled about the exact relationship between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Ching-wei. Some of them think Wang is working with the Japanese under orders of the Chungking government. Many other Chinese officials are doing just that, including a number of local magistrates who were ordered to stay on their jobs, as a service to the people. Consequently, to those who are confused, Chiang has not made the situation sufficiently clear. If he completely discredited Wang—to the Chinese satisfaction—he would halt much incipient co-operation which is now discernible."

To accomplish this requires more than a mere public denuncia-

tion or the official placing of a price on Wang's head. These are old Chinese tricks to confuse the situation. The people still remember, as the Japanese intended they should, that Wang once was president of the Kuomintang's executive yuan and a confidant of Chiang. Meanwhile, Wang went to Japan in 1944 for treatment of complications from an old bullet wound and remained there. Japanese propagandists made periodic reports of his "recovery," but by August there were no reported plans for his return to Nanking.

Japan's "new policy" appeared to be more than a belated attempt to win support from people whose opinions the Japanese well knew. It was an evident prelude to new peace feelers in Chungking, reported late in the year from the Chinese capital. This was at least the third surreptitious Japanese attempt to escape the Chinese bear trap. The Japanese apparently used retrocession of the concessions as an attempt to cause Chiang and his pro-Allied supporters more loss of face in Free China than they already had experienced by the original Allied defeats. Furthermore, the conquerors seemed intent upon convincing some possibly wavering Chungking officials that a strong Wang regime would be an important threat to their own postwar political rule over China.

Nevertheless, Chungking held firmly and declined the bait. Cessation of Chinese hostilities, long desired by Tokyo, would free sizable Japanese forces in that country, and handicap Allied efforts to use it as a springboard for future attacks against the islands. The Japanese idea all along was to obtain peace without yielding control. Responsible Chungking leaders saw that, even when the Allied cause was darkest, and refused to be tempted. Now, the Allied offensive undoubtedly has restored Chiang's prestige among his own people.

Typically, the Japanese maneuver was not wasted, and could be diverted to a new purpose. That project seemed to be further consolidation of China holdings, so the Japanese eventually could fall back upon the original yen bloc as an "inner fortress" from which to prolong resistance. That bloc is North China, Manchuria, Korea and Japan. As usual, the Japanese leaders seemed to be preparing psychologically and physically well in advance.

In late 1942, propagandists were telling the Japanese people that soon they would be dependent upon the foodstuffs of adjacent areas, urging them to "sample the joys" of bread and potatoes. Grain is a principal crop of both North China and Manchuria. German press reports from Japan, in November, 1942, said that at the fourth meeting of the Development Council for Great East Asia, it was decided that "from the standpoint of defense, the provision of Japan with essential foodstuffs must be arranged from near-by areas." The problem becomes more immediate as shipping losses disrupt the transport of foodstuffs from the southern regions. Throughout 1943, domestic propaganda for Japan emphasized the need for greater production within the islands and dependence upon the neighboring mainland.

At the same time the army was digging in extensively in North China. It accelerated comprehensive road-building projects, using thousands of forced Chinese laborers. A network of highways was being spun across that vast region, unsurfaced but serviceable, because the *loess* packs well. Also, the Japanese were constructing wide trenches, five to ten feet deep, along both sides of railroads for hundreds of miles out of Peking and doubtless along other railways. Dry moats were constructed around each station, some of which were encircled with two or three trenches. The evident purpose was to strengthen the conquerors' position against the guerrillas while enlarging their means of communications.

The China-Manchuria-Korea area will be more and more important to Japan as the Allies more closely approach the homeland. Severance of shipping facilities to southern producing regions would place the full emphasis of war production upon natural and accumulated resources within the yen bloc. Bombing of factories in Japan would mean greater production schedules for the North China-Manchuria-Korea industrial district. It is conceivable that an Allied invasion of Japan Proper before destruction of this northern stronghold would mean transference of the government to Manchuria, from where continued resistance would be directed.

Through their steady and relentless exploitation, it is estimated



the Japanese have been obtaining annually from China these supplies: 600,000 tons of rice; 85,000 tons of cotton; between 500,000 and 1,000,000 tons of wheat; large quantities of livestock, hides, soy beans, millet, dried sweet potatoes and peanuts; 6,000,000 tons of coal; between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 tons of iron ore and 700,000 tons of salt.

The coal in Shansi province is the best in China, and Hopeh deposits are good. The Japanese have been working the mines as fully as possible, but transportation difficulties sometimes have limited their ability to ship mined coal from Shansi. Iron ore in Shantung is considered excellent by Asia's standards, and good steel can be made from it. The conquerors also have been tapping supplies of tungsten, which are not sizable and only recently exploited. Meanwhile large deposits of coal and iron ore in North China still remain untouched, because of the difficulties in reaching them with railways and equipment.

As long as sullen opposition continues, Occupied China will present a potentially important weakness in the Japanese scheme. The “new policy,” coupled with resurgent gendarmerie force, is intended to insure greater conformance among the people. The policy continued without outward change after Japan's cabinet crisis of July, 1944. These measures have been bulwarked by two Japanese major offensives.

The 1943 campaign, ending in December, was aimed at Changteh, center of China's central “rice bowl” and a flanking position for one of the main railroad terminals at Changsha, Hunan province. The Japanese were driven back after fighting, which Chinese spokesmen characterized as the bitterest since Shanghai in 1937. The conquerors began a more comprehensive attack in May, 1944, throwing more than 100,000 well-equipped men into a battle to capture Chinese-held portions of the Peking-Hankow railroad, to eliminate potential Allied air bases by cutting China in half.

Eventual Allied use of continental battle zones was underlined by Admiral Nimitz' voiced belief, “we can only defeat Japan from China.” The air war from China was intensified by the appearance

of the long-range B-29 bombers. The problems of a land campaign or of China-based bombings on the European pattern are tremendous, although not insoluble. For one thing, major supply lines must come from the sea. Even if a land route is opened through Burma, it would permit an estimated maximum of only 90,000 tons of war materials monthly. This is far less than even an inadequate American army would require for maintenance, in addition to some 6,000,000 tons of freight essential for original supply. But such a land route would permit resurgent Chinese activity in South China, augmenting an Allied landing there, while permitting more frequent bomber raids.

Once in China, with the heavy concentrations of necessary men and equipment, communications will be difficult. China's more than 2,000,000 square miles are dominated in key zones by high mountains. Highways are virtually nonexistent and railroads woefully inadequate. The entire country, exclusive of Manchuria, has 8,270 miles of railways, only 50 miles more than in the state of New York, with an area of 49,576 square miles. Within Free China there are 1,744 miles of rail. Warfare is pegged to the available supply routes and complicated by the terrain. To reach vital Japanese objectives, we face more of the long agonizing work that has characterized the huge staging problems of Burma warfare.

The B-29 and its threat to Japan were preluded by the daring and effective work of Major General Claire Chennault's 14th Air Force, operating with limited supplies flown across the "hump" from India. In widely scattered raids they have ranged over much of China, northern Indo-China, Hainan island and Formosa. Augmenting naval blockaders, they virtually have severed shipping to Hong Kong and have blasted near-by Canton, gateway for river transport to the inland. Often, however, American planes lacked sufficient gasoline to leave airports before Japanese raids.

Within Free China, intensive work is being done to prepare air strips and other installations for Allied use. American officers are training Chinese fliers and troops, and their mettle has been proved in Burma fighting. When equipment is available, and communica-

tions are established, the biggest head-on Allied-Japanese land collision will come on the continent.

Meanwhile, the hope of this grand thrust has grown perceptibly within Occupied China. The people are warmed by that belief, for they have little else.



## chapter fifteen

### TALE OF THREE CITIES

IFE in Occupied China can be sketched through the three cities most widely known by foreigners and their adjacent areas. Hong Kong represents an excess of the man-made deprivation, Shanghai is a center of exploitation, Peking and its surrounding countryside saw the worst brutality.

#### HONG KONG ISLAND

Smug, but charming, Victoria—as the main city on Hong Kong is named but seldom called—was the only foreign-dominated city in China which the Japanese had to take by storm. It fell Christmas Day, 1941, after bitter fighting swirled over the island's 32 square miles. Previously, British authorities sternly rejected a Japanese demand for surrender. The repercussions of that refusal, apparently, have been felt since.

The occupation began amid intense confusion and fear, heightened by the widespread looting of Chinese ruffians. The conquerors entered angry and vengeful. Their atrocities already have been publicized. Since then, the Japanese attitude has been consistent arrogance, particularly toward British captives. Hong Kong's story includes few of the instances of superior generosity which sometimes appeared in Manila.

The former British crown colony and its more than one million remaining citizens were placed under a military governor. Prisoners

of war, including a number of civilian volunteers who had participated in the final fighting, were sent to a military camp located in the former British leased territory in Kowloon, across the bay from Victoria. Civilians were interned at Camp Stanley, a former penal colony near a picturesque cove at the southeasterly end of the island.

Hong Kong has been under strict military rule since the occupation. Japanese propaganda has not suggested "self-rule" or civilian government, nor proposed "restoring" Hong Kong to the Chinese. Its position is too important as the gateway to Canton, which is linked to the interior by river and rail. Between them, Hong Kong and Canton form a highly valuable communications center, potentially one of the most suitable bases for an Allied bridgehead.

Prewar Hong Kong depended upon imports for all food; aside from a small dairy, nothing was produced on the island itself. Among other regular imports, a daily shipment of 52 tons of rice from Burma, Malaya and Indo-China stopped when war began. Since then food has arrived only in dribbles. Victoria still contains about one million Chinese, the remnants of regular residents and refugees totaling nearly two million before hostilities. At first they lived on sizable caches of canned goods which had been stored during peacetime.

By the end of 1943, those supplies virtually were exhausted. The Hong Kong dollar, which equaled the yen before the war, was discounted at 2 to 1, thereby increasing costs. Food was scarce even on the inflationary black market. Frequent cases of starvation and numerous dietary ailments were reported in Victoria. In winter months most residents remained abed during the day, too weak to stir, too poor to buy fuel. The populace, predominantly Chinese, resisted persistent Japanese pressure for emigration to the mainland. The small number of Japanese remaining in Victoria had sufficient food, and their garrisons, on mainland Kowloon, tapped the countryside.

In early 1944, two Japanese reports apparently preluded even more difficult conditions. Regular communications between the island and other imperial sections were stopped, obviously because American air-sea attacks had been too costly. The military adminis-

tration subsequently announced suspension of rice distribution to the populace, a necessity for thousands.

The intensified Allied blockade, since mid-1943, has been a genuine factor impelling the island's starvation rations. Repeated air raids, which do not meet Japanese aerial opposition, also have destroyed military installations in Kowloon and Victoria, causing, say repatriates, more damage than the conquerors' original assaults. The Japanese failure to accumulate public food stock piles beforehand, however, may have been partially an intention to force emigration, eliminating potentially troublesome Chinese from the fortress they intended to make of Hong Kong. The Chinese evidently believed mainland living conditions were equally unpromising.

Behind this slow death, which the conquerors will not alleviate unless it erupts into threatening disorders, the former British bastion was transformed into a typical "New-Order" city. The gendarmerie viciously "investigated" the Chinese. Propagandists, attempting to create anti-white sentiment, eliminated all vestiges of British residence, removing statues and changing names. The widely known Hong Kong and Gloucester hotels, for instance, now are the Kyoto and Matsudera hotels. British war prisoners repaired war's damage in Victoria. Night life continues for the conquerors and profiteers. Pleasures include the reopened race track, near the site of the bitter battle in Happy Valley.

At Camp Stanley about three thousand civilian internees, all British men, women and children, remained after the 1943 departure of repatriates. Their one chance of surviving the 1943-44 winter without numerous deaths from starvation was the prompt arrival of Red Cross comfort kits, shipped on the *Gripsholm* early that year. No word has been received whether these packages were delivered in time.

Since their confinement on January 21, 1942, Japanese-issued food has been sufficient to give the internees only two bowls of poor rice, covered with a thin, almost flavorless soup, daily. Some were able to augment this with a few purchases on the strictly rationed camp canteen or from Victoria's dwindling supplies, at exorbitant cost. In February, 1943, the internees were allowed a ¥25 monthly

loan from the International Red Cross. But sugar in the camp canteen cost ¥12 per pound, and other prices were proportionate. Subject to restrictions in size, packages from the outside could be delivered weekly, but the general food situation limited them.

Father Charles Murphy of the Scarboro Foreign Mission of Canada, chairman of Canadian internees until their repatriation, told me aboard the *Gripsholm* that nearly every Stanley internee was suffering from malnutrition. There was, he said, an alarming increase in 1943 of pellagra and beriberi. Many cases of temporary blindness had occurred, the result of insufficient vitamin B. The patient regained his sight only when some of his physical strength was restored. Thus weakened, the internees survived the hard 1942-43 winter only through comfort kits, shipped from the United States that summer on the *Gripsholm* and delivered to the camp after being kept several months in a Yokohama warehouse. By the end of April, these supplies were exhausted, and the prisoners were forced back to Japanese rations, which provide only about 1,500 calories daily.

This is the individual ration: Eight ounces of rice and four ounces of flour daily; two tablespoons of sugar weekly; small amounts of fish and meat. In one of the camp's three kitchens the daily amount of meat was 40 pounds for 600 persons, enough only for a thin soup. No fuel is issued, and the prisoners spent winter days in bed. This ration noticeably is less than Japanese supplies to other civilian camps in China, where the internees also are able to make substantial additional purchases.

The internees were doing their best to ease the problem but they could not solve it. Although every available plot of land had been planted with vegetables, the total crop provided less than enough for one meal. Interned physicians distributed a spoonful of vitamin B to each internee every three days and gave each a daily spoonful of yeast, made from Japanese-issued flour. These supplies were dwindling rapidly, and the camp also faced a threatening shortage of other medicines, particularly sulfanilamide and quinine, used for frequent malaria and dysentery cases.

The Japanese reply to internee requests for more food always is the same: "We are so sorry. Due to the wartime situation, very little food is arriving in Hong Kong. Even we Japanese are on short supplies." Nevertheless, no attempt has been made to move the prisoners to a more productive area.

By constant vigilance, internee doctors have prevented an epidemic of illness, after several internees died from dysentery during early internment days. But the ordeal has taken its toll. When the Stanley repatriates boarded the *Teia Maru*, they all were thin, the average loss of weight being between 25 and 40 pounds; and most of them were ragged, for clothes were hard to obtain. They were glassy-eyed and uncertain of themselves, the inevitable result of continued pressure from endless days of waiting. Slowly, they regained health and confidence.

Except for food, Stanley's living conditions are tolerable. The internees are housed in former buildings of the Stanley prison—except for the gendarmerie-controlled main cell block—and in the former St. Stephen's school, on a near-by knoll. Overcrowding is prevalent, but married couples are not separated. After several escapes in early days, the camp was enclosed by two barbed-wire fences. The prisoners are permitted during the summer to swim in the bay, under internee guards, but in 1943 most of them were too weak to take the three-minute walk to the beach. For the same reason, British football was eliminated from the sports program. Yet regular entertainment programs range from broad comedy to Shakespearean plays, softball continues, and a small circulating library flourishes. The camp maintains a poorly equipped but clean hospital.

"The morale of the internees is still high," said Father Murphy. "They are desperately hoping for repatriation, but they are resolved to see it through under any circumstances. They don't want their troubles to cause any slackening of the Allied war effort."

Their hopes received an unforgettable boost in September, 1943, when an American plane, returning from a Victoria attack, dived low over the camp, machine-gunning gendarmerie headquarters.



## SHANGHAI

Shanghai still is Asia's city of superlatives—the most comfortable, the brightest, the most heartless. Japanese of all types, repelled by their own country's drabness, jam its hotels and night clubs. Traders make fabulous paper money profits in a vast dog-eat-dog struggle for survival which has left the common man shivering on street corners. It is the Orient's center of intrigue and espionage.

When the Pacific war began, Shanghai consisted of three political entities, totaling well over three million inhabitants. The International Settlement, mostly lying south of Soochow Creek, was bordered by the French Concession—still nominally under the Vichy government—and was surrounded by Chinese sections, governed by Chinese officials. Since 1937 the latter districts and the Settlement area north of the Creek, principally Hongkew, had been under tight Japanese control. The conquerors moved into the main part of the settlement on the first morning of the war, without opposition, except for a British gunboat's token resistance.

On the surface, life continued with little interruption, except that trade, upon which the city depended, was dead. Although Japanese rule was felt immediately by every foreign and Chinese resident, freedom of movement continued for fourteen months within the Settlement, which had become a vast internment camp. Consuming sizable prewar commodity supplies, the city in early months maintained all normal comforts.

Wartime stringency grew slowly. In 1943, the rich still could buy luxuries unobtainable elsewhere in Asia. Night clubs, theaters, the race track and other sports centers still operated. The city's face had changed little, except for decreased vehicular traffic on streets teeming with bicycles, rickshas, charcoal-burning busses and street-cars, and the absence of the usual night skyline, darkened to conserve electric power. Behind this façade, it was a city of fear and want.

Lack of public confidence in bayonet-backed currency and in-

creasing commodity shortages had produced astronomical prices. Printing-press notes of the military-backed Central Reserve Bank stood alone on the currency market, for the former military yen and the prewar Chinese *fapi* had been retired. Foreign money, including Bank of Japan yen, were banned. CRB dollars had been circulated upon occupation at 1 to 2 for the old *fapi*—the familiar Japanese trick of halving the value of existing currency for their own profit. By late 1943, one American dollar brought CRB \$125 on a black market which existed despite gendarmerie vigilance.

While the black market sold everything—including American cigarettes at CRB \$300 per package and gasoline at CRB \$1,000 a gallon—acute shortages of every essential were apparent, notably rice, sugar and cooking oil, vital for Chinese, and the meat, dairy products and canned imports consumed by foreigners. All essentials were rationed. Imports from the neighboring countryside were limited because of sentries' demands, and overseas shipments were infrequent. Shanghai's once-busy riverfront was almost deserted, its activities virtually limited to movements of men and army supplies through the lower Yangtze. Local products kept pace with the vertiginous price level, Chinese-manufactured shirts sold for CRB \$100 each; meat from adjacent areas reached CRB \$60 a pound and fruit was as high as CRB \$40.

Rice, the age-old barometer of China's economic and social conditions, again suggests the actual picture. In 1937, this staple cost 14 Chinese dollars per picul, about 162 pounds. It reached a top price in 1943 of CRB \$2,500 per picul, when available. The Japanese ration is a half-pound per person daily at the official price of CRB \$6. This amount, even if fulfilled, would be insufficient, and all who can afford it are forced to buy from the black market at CRB \$13 a pound.

But the Japanese administration has failed several times to provide sufficient rice for all the ration cards. Moreover, Chinese merchants, even when faced with the perennially long queues of impatient buyers, usually sell only half of their allotment at the official rate, then close shop to dispose of the rest at higher prices, claiming otherwise they could not make a living. The combination of events

has produced a number of rice riots which have become threatening, although they are sternly repressed. As hunger increases, the city will become more restless.

Thousands of beggars—Russians as well as Chinese—roamed the streets, scabrous and sick. The city gave relief to only a handful. Over 1,200 of these destitutes reportedly died each day on the streets during the 1943 summer, double the normal number. The total undoubtedly was higher in the winter, for most of them sleep in building doorways. Inflated living costs, meanwhile, affected even the neutral foreigners whose earnings on the whole failed to match the skyrocketing prices. Employment is limited for the thousands of Russians, Portuguese and uninterned Eurasians still residing in the Settlement, while business morbidity has sharply hit most of the French, Swiss, Swedish and Spanish traders.

Chinese and foreigners alike turn to individual trade for a livelihood. Dealing through one or two middlemen they sold and resold stocks of cotton cloth, large quantities of soap, machinery and dozens of similar products, acquired not for retail distribution but to hold as an investment against a rising market.

Before their internment, Americans and British subsisted this way, or lived on bank accounts or Swiss Consulate loans. Bank withdrawals and salaries for technicians still employed under Japanese supervision were limited to CRB \$2,000 monthly. As inflation increased, even office boys earned more than that, and coolies demanded as much as CRB \$1,000, without being able to afford normal living.

At the outset, the Japanese assumed all foreign businesses, closing some, but maintaining others without compensation to the owners, through Japanese "supervisors." They also assumed several Chinese companies, which had evaded them previously. A favorite was to increase the stock issue arbitrarily, by slightly more than half, then hold the increase for a controlling interest. Payment, when made, was in watered currency.

Swiftly, deliberately, the militarists and their financial favorites squeezed the city dry. The gendarmerie became a huge blackmailing ring, threatening or arresting rich Chinese for ransom. Military

profiteering continued during the summer of 1943 with a vigorous campaign for the forced sale of all cotton yarn to the army at a fixed price far below market value. Payment was half in CRB dollars and half in limited withdrawals from Central Reserve Bank funds supposedly secured by gold bars. Chinese merchants were holding an estimated 2,000,000 bales in the Shanghai area. Cotton is a time-honored Chinese hoarding "investment" during economic distress. In order to obtain both the goods and the profits, the Japanese exerted such economic—and perhaps physical—pressure that a number of prominent Chinese merchants reportedly committed suicide.

Behind the scenes, the Japanese were duplicating their empire-wide factional battle over the spoils. The most notable opponents are army and navy officers, but the gendarmerie, bureaucrats and civilian businessmen all are involved. In Shanghai, the army won a clear victory, finally obtaining control of the city, although the Naval Landing Party had administered occupied Hongkew since 1932. The army also controls such navy bases as Manila, Hong Kong and the larger islands of the Netherlands East Indies. This ascendancy resulted partially from the fact that army forces made the conquests. But the internal battles have precipitated physical combat in several cities between individual officers. Doubtless, the army finally won out by greater ruthlessness, with gendarmerie assistance.

In addition to the desire for a greater share in the loot, these controversies mark the long army-navy conflict over domestic power. The navy, on the whole, is composed of higher-type officers. Many of them deplore the callousness and brutality of their brother officers whom they regard as uncouth products of the soil. The fleet still carries the traditions of the Satsuma clan, embellished by the broader vision which results from wide travel. The army sprang from the Chochu clan, often a Satsuma antagonist in early days, and many of its most powerful leaders were born as peasants. Their narrowness and insularity are heightened by the fact that few of them have traveled.

It must be emphasized, however, that these battles, while often bitter, have no bearing on the war effort. They are purely domestic

and never important enough to disrupt strategy or the battle co-operation of the two services. They are like the quarrels of a family which is instantly united against an outside opponent.

Under these conditions, rackets and chicanery flourished; the gendarmerie enlisted thousands of informers, and increased want became inevitable. Then the Japanese handed the city's problems ostensibly to Mayor Chen Kung-po of "Greater Shanghai" and his Chinese puppet government. Supposedly, they now administer the International Settlement and the French Concession, as well as the Chinese districts. The Japanese have taken Mayor Chen to Japan several times and have decorated him with a minor imperial order. Known as one of Doctor Sun Yat-sen's original Chinese revolutionaries and a close friend of Wang Ching-wei, Mayor Chen was in obscurity for many years before the Japanese dusted him off and billed him as one of Occupied China's top officials. He is considered inept and impotent politically.

The Japanese have demonstrated they want to avoid responsibility for Shanghai's hardening of the arteries, while actually ruling with undiminished control. The city's Japanese-run newspapers in late 1943 began to criticize severely Chen's administration for its inability to solve impossible problems. The implication plainly was that the Chinese had full authority and the Japanese were not to be blamed for increasing distress. But the conquerors still retain their tight grip. They symbolized this when "restoration" of the French Concession precipitated another gendarmerie reign of terror among the French and their Chinese and Anglo-American friends, probing political machinations in the Concession, which the Japanese previously had not invaded so openly.

The first anniversary of "recovery day"—named for the "retrocession" of the Settlement—fell on August 1, 1944. Japanese propagandists took the occasion to announce that Japan had decided to remove from Shanghai all her "one hundred forty-one officials, except police and firemen engaged in maintenance of wartime law and order and fire protection during air raids." The same report said the Chinese "decided to accept thirty-four Japanese officials in order to maintain a liaison between Chinese and Japanese authori-

ties." The implications of this froth are plain. The Japanese, by the way, had more than one hundred forty-one officials in one gendarmerie office.

Intrigue and espionage, part of Shanghai's normal lifeblood, has been intensified by both the war and economic unrest. In mutual mistrust, the Japanese and Germans watch each other closely through paid spies, and both try to win the confidence of potentially useful foreigners and Chinese. Innumerable deals between Chinese and Japanese have resulted in trade between Free and Occupied China. Letters from Chungking have been delivered by the Japanese-controlled post office to Americans in Shanghai's internment camps. They were passed by the Japanese censor. In certain respects this part of the war is being fought the Oriental way.

Japan has made an intense effort to mollify Moscow. As one result, a powerful Soviet radio station operates in Shanghai, with daily news broadcasts concerning European military and political affairs; although Pacific hostilities and Asiatic developments are ignored. This apparent political deal enables the Soviets to disseminate in the Japanese-held city a constant stream of Allied propaganda. They also consistently and bitterly denounce the Germans, precipitating verbal duels with the Nazi radio. The Soviets always win in the Chinese opinion. Repeated German protests to the Japanese have been fruitless.

The Russians also maintain a large consulate staff in Shanghai. The Japanese know the extent of espionage being conducted, but they generally have avoided pressure on Soviet citizens. They have attempted, however, to control these activities by gendarmerie arrest of numerous Russians, most of whom did not hold Soviet citizenship. As a result, large numbers of young Russians have taken out Soviet papers, both for the added protection and because of a renascent sense of loyalty to Russia. These are the sons and daughters of White Russians who fled for their lives during the revolution. Their present safety is precarious for Japanese reprisals will be heavy if the Soviets enter the Pacific war.

Chinese guerrillas have long operated, on a small scale, in areas near the city. Many of them come and go in Shanghai without de-

tection, gathering information, converting young boys and girls for the future "deliverance" of China, and conducting effective counter-propaganda. In the summer of 1943, the Japanese learned that young Shanghai Chinese were being recruited by a large number of guerillas sent into the Settlement. Arms also reportedly had been smuggled, and there were vague reports of a planned "uprising." Nothing came of it, but the gendarmerie stepped up its arrests of known Chungking sympathizers and snatched hundreds of hostages off the streets.

On the emperor's birthday, April 29, at least two bombs were thrown in a large Hongkew theater, causing many casualties. After the gendarmerie had made numerous arrests, the Japanese press reported a "large guerrilla ring" had been smashed. Another gesture of defiance seemed implied by the explosion of a time bomb at a busy railroad station in September, coinciding with the arrival of repatriates from North China.

Italian-Japanese animosity flared in Shanghai after Italy's capitulation, September 9, 1943. The next day the 18,000-ton Italian passenger liner, *Conte Verde*, and the gunboat *Lepanto* were scuttled by their crews. The Japanese, long anxious to use the *Verde* as a transport, had signed a contract for her charter the previous day. They immediately arrested the liner's 1,000-man crew, disarmed Italian marines in China and placed civilians under "protective surveillance," the usual prelude to stricter confinement.

Meanwhile the conqueror's efforts to obtain Occidental propagandists, in which force sometimes was used, failed to attract a single competent man. Perhaps half a dozen Americans, British and Eurasians were working openly as propagandists. The most notorious in 1943 was an American, Don Chisholm, former "publisher" of the unsavory *Shopping News*, whose cleverly worded "news" broadcasts emphasized Allied impotency. Tom Butler, who formerly served with the 4th U. S. Marines in Shanghai, was "news editor" of the controlled *Mercury-Post* and also broadcast less apparently propagandized "news." He claimed Free Irish citizenship. In some internment camps Occidental informers were discovered, most of them doing that work in fear of gendarmerie torture.

Imprisonment, implied for all living within Shanghai, was more direct for thousands, in addition to gendarmerie victims crowding half a dozen fetid jails. Apparently responding to German requests, the Japanese, in 1943, decreed the "segregation" of some 15,000 European refugee Jews, who had received sanctuary in Shanghai after 1940. All "stateless persons," as the Japanese called them, were required to live in specified areas of Hongkew and could visit the rest of the Settlement only by special permission. This was granted, for the moment, to those employed, but small businessmen were obliged to move their enterprises into an area which had no demand for their commodities. The Japanese made no provision for their maintenance.

Approximately 5,000 American, British and Dutch internees remained in the eight principal camps of the Shanghai area after the 1943 repatriation. State department figures list a total of 503 American men, women and children among them, in these camps: Hai-phong Road, 23; Pootung, 191; Chapei, 250; and Lunghua, 39. A small number of other Americans were still free in the city, most of whom were given medical exemptions. The British are confined in the above camps and also in these other internment centers: Ash Camp, Columbia Country Club, Great Western Road and in three separate establishments at Yangchow, about twenty-four hours by steamer up the Yangtze from Shanghai. A few Catholic Fathers and Sisters were being held in large Shanghai houses. In North China, about 1,700 internees, including 175 Americans, are held at Weh-shien, south of Peking.

The internees are entitled to draw "comfort loans" of CRB \$700 monthly from the Swiss Consulate, or they can withdraw a similar amount from their own bank accounts. Rising prices have made this sum entirely inadequate. The consulate, attempting to obtain an increase, met persistent opposition from Japanese consulate authorities who maintained the Japanese food issue is adequate.

The official Japanese food issue, while larger than in Hong Kong, is in itself entirely inadequate to support Occidental life. It is doubtful if it is sufficient for Orientals. Chinese coolies, working at the Chapei camp, refused to eat the rice given the internees. Other com-



modities were of the cheapest grade, particularly the decrepit fish. In most camps the internees devote more than half of their comfort loans to a common pool. Internee officials then buy additional food on the Shanghai market to augment the Japanese ration for meals prepared by prisoner-cooks. Individuals further supplement this diet with their own purchases, obtained through monthly package deliveries or camp canteens. Heating is a continual problem, for the Japanese ration is only enough to supply kitchen stoves and high prices and shortages limit the internees' efforts to buy more.

Although the buildings of every camp were unprepared and inadequate when the internees first arrived, they managed by diligent work to build a life as comfortable as possible in overcrowded conditions. They developed sports, entertainment programs and other recreational facilities. Small clinics are maintained, the prisoners buying all medicines, and serious cases are hospitalized in the city, at the individual's expense, sometimes only after internee officials repeatedly request Japanese permission. Limited communications are allowed with Shanghai and abroad, through heavily censored International Red Cross letters.

The 300 men still in Haiphong Road, the political prisoners, live under constant gendarmerie surveillance. They have been told the establishment is considered an adjunct of Shanghai's notorious "Bridge-House," the main military police station. Only a few instances of actual brutality have occurred within the camp, but several internees have been cruelly treated in outside gendarmerie headquarters. Haiphong is administered by the military commandant who has charge of the Woosung war prison. The internees are required to bow to each Japanese within the camp whenever they meet; the regular guard of soldiers is supplemented by Sikh policemen, an obvious gesture against the numerous British prisoners; roll calls, twice daily, are conducted in Japanese and often followed by required bowing in the direction of Tokyo's Imperial Palace.

These men are the most likely hostages, if defeat turns the Japanese toward their civilian captives. Five of the remaining Americans were among the 42 men throughout China whom the Japanese deleted from the repatriation list for unspecified reasons. Three of

them were in my room—Paul S. Hopkins, president of the Shanghai Power Company, Bishop Ralph A. Ward of the Methodist Church and Hal du Berrier, a young freelance writer. The others were Bruce Jenkins, an insurance agent, and P. W. Giovannini, a retired businessman. The other Americans still confined there, mostly retired U. S. Navy men, declined repatriation to remain near their alien wives. More than 100 inmates are separated from their families. The Haiphong prisoners were snatched from their homes without warning by the gendarmerie early on the morning of November 5, 1942. The military police spread a melodramatic dragnet, which included police dogs to pursue anyone foolish enough to flee.

General Anglo-American-Dutch imprisonment began in January, 1943. The internees were given a week's notice and were allowed to take considerable supplies with them. It was apparent the Japanese move was retaliation for American resettlement centers. Consequently they tried to parallel American methods in some respects, but their lack of organization and general misunderstanding of Occidental requirements made it a poor imitation. The internees were confined in "civilian assembly centers."

Each camp had special problems which the internees attempted to solve largely by their own efforts. At Lunghua, for instance, water was so scarce the internees limited showers at first to one minute per person, by a stop watch. Yangchow's three establishments were supported largely by internee-baked bread from Japanese-issued flour. Although the surrounding countryside is productive, efforts to purchase additional food for the 1,300 internees were only partially successful in 1943. Pootung, an all-male camp in a condemned tobacco warehouse across the Whangpoo from Shanghai's Bund, began with inadequate sanitary facilities, decayed Japanese-issued food, unsafe housing. Conditions slowly improved. Chapei, located on the Great China University campus and predominantly an American center before repatriation, became a miniature Santo Tomas without the shanties. Families lived together in crowded room corners, segregated by blankets.

For all of these people, and those of Shanghai, the future is unpromising. The financial toboggan will plunge onward. Food short-

ages will increase, bringing acute distress to a city which because it is not a major military center, probably will receive scant Japanese assistance. Even the Germans share the general apprehension. They fear a Nazi capitulation will bring them vicious Japanese reprisals.

Shanghai underwent its first Allied air raid August 8, 1944. The principal target in the waterfront attack was the *Conte Verde* which the Japanese had succeeded in raising from the Whangpoo river mud and were repairing.

### PEKING

The conqueror's hand has brought incredible distress to rich North China. Millions of farmers have felt the full measure of Japanese vindictiveness and relentless exploitation. Brutality, confiscation and the repercussions of war have resulted in a situation so desperate that one responsible repatriate expressed belief that between thirty and forty years' postwar reconstruction would be necessary before the farmer could return to his peacetime status. That was near-poverty.

The Japanese blueprint of North China includes Shansi, Hopeh, Shantung and northern Honan provinces. The conquerors estimate its population at 100,000,000. The center of its loose government is Peking, in northern Hopeh, a city of memories and dead grandeur. Sino-Japanese hostilities started at the near-by Marco Polo bridge in 1937, and the city was soon occupied bloodlessly by the Japanese through the capitulation of its Chinese commander.

In 1940, Peking had luxuries then unobtainable in Tokyo. Throngs of Japanese "carpetbag" businessmen flocked there, crowds of tourists gaped at the architectural beauties of the Temple of Heaven, squads of soldiers shuffled uneasily along the city's streets. The Chinese and foreigners smiled and pointed out significantly that assassinations had been so frequent no Japanese would venture into one of the innumerable alleyways.

Behind the scenes the gendarmerie and the carpetbaggers were

squeezing hard. But they kept Peking relatively well supplied, because they enjoyed its comforts. Since 1941, however, the city has known the inevitable result of Japan's cumulative exploitation. In 1943, shortages were acute, prices mountainous and the currency valueless. The German-owned Peking *Chronicle* remarked in that summer that one of Peking's big problems was disposing of dead bodies on the streets. The Japanese tried to solve it by driving hundreds of starving beggars beyond the gates, then confiscating their residents' permits so they could not return. They were to die outside the city. For the first time, soup kitchens were opened during the summer months, feeding between six thousand and eight thousand Chinese daily.

The most immediate reason was tightened Japanese restrictions on food supplies. Peking, a grain-eating city, formerly depended upon millet from Kalgan, Inner Mongolia. Shipments now are prohibited. The conquerors in North China also have enforced tight prohibitions on the movement of commodities between counties (hsien), apparently to simplify confiscation. Traffic is controlled by strategically placed pillboxes, maintained by small Japanese garrisons. Drought and insects destroyed the crops of several hsien. Only when famine was widespread did the Japanese allow the North China Political Affairs Council to lift the restrictions temporarily, so the more productive districts could supply those in want. In some districts farmers have been prevented from planting for a season, apparently as punishment for the activities of neighboring guerrillas. In others, normal productivity has been decreased by required cultivation of cotton and the opium poppy. Between one-fifth and one-sixth of agricultural lands in North China have been diverted to cotton.

Although their garrisons are small, the Japanese maintain their hold over the farmer by requiring him personally to deliver taxes, in either cash or kind. Receipts are checked against registry deeds, and punitive expeditions are sent against defalcators. Other expeditions periodically collect the supplies concentrated within the blockaded hsien.

It was evident the Japanese have taken large quantities of grain,

as well as cotton, from North China; for the people's want was greater than would have resulted from natural calamities alone. However, even the Japanese soldier in that region was underfed and dressed in tattered uniforms. The first troops arriving in North China many years ago were well fed. They disdained Chinese food. Now they are eager to get it.

The best explanation is that much of the grain is being stored against the day when it must be used for the Japanese civilians at home or troops elsewhere. Evidently Japanese soldiers in North China were the poorest, in equipment and appearance, that the repatriates saw anywhere. They include a number of new recruits and possibly many recalcitrants, unsuitable for duty on other fronts. Guerrilla assassinations have made North China a despised post.

Famine conditions in northern Honan province were "terrible" in 1943, repatriates said. With three months to go until the harvest that summer, it was estimated that forty to fifty persons starved to death in each village of seven hundred to eight hundred population. These villages stretch about a mile apart across the northern part of the province. Drought had been intense the two preceding years, even destroying the Japanese-demanded cotton crop, and distress hit every district. The situation was so critical the conquerors allowed cultivation of grain on some exclusive cotton fields.

An economic development of even greater magnitude, in the opinion of repatriates, has resulted from the new course of the Yellow River, perennially "China's sorrow." In 1938, Chinese forces breached the river's dykes beyond Kaifeng, the capital of Honan province. The river now flows southeastward in two or three streams until it reaches the Huai River, which carries its mighty waters to the flatlands of northern Kiangsu province. This development, long feared by engineers in China, was reported by a competent source who said thousands of acres of land have been flooded and thousands made homeless by a "water bowl" comparable in size to America's "dust bowl." Farther north, along the river's new course, the Japanese impressed forced labor into the construction of dykes. It was doubtful, however, if they would hold against flood waters which would threaten adjacent flatlands. Parts of Honan province also still

remain under water from the original breaching of the dykes near Kaifeng. The result has been a great decrease of potential agricultural lands, more homeless thousands, and a major economic problem for postwar solution.

In addition to heavy taxes and confiscatory raids, the North China farmers also are squeezed by the tax demands of the Nanking government, the local governors and even surreptitiously by Chungking government agents who often circulate without detection. Chinese guerrillas have taken tribute from nearly every village. These multiple requirements have bled the peasants of all possible surpluses.

Guerrillas, operating in bands from a few hundred to eight thousand men, are continually active throughout the countryside. Some of them are only bandits, robbing the farmers. Others, however, are under strong leadership, loyal to Chungking, and are attempting sincerely to thwart the Japanese war effort. Their lack of co-ordination and sometimes useless independent action, coupled with insufficient armament, prevent these bands now from being a major military factor. Properly disciplined and controlled, they could smash Japanese communications in North China.

These roaming warriors, nevertheless, have nailed probably 100,000 Japanese troops in North China. The conquerors hold the major cities, railways and between five and ten miles of adjacent territory. Their control is maintained by the ability to transport men fairly rapidly across their newly constructed highways. Occasionally the Japanese range beyond the controlled railway territory in well-organized punitive expeditions, but they never attempt to hold the newly invaded areas. They have tried to crush the guerrillas many times, unsuccessfully. A small force sent against these "shadow-boxing" opponents is usually cut up, a large force finds no guerrillas.

Operating at night, the guerrillas have destroyed many trucks and railroad trains. At one time or another they have been in nearly every North China village, sometimes forcing their way in by arms and taking plentiful supplies. On these occasions it is difficult for the farmers to distinguish between bandits and the needy. Their dilemma is emphasized by the fact that, if they attempt to refuse entry, the guerrillas will force their way; and, if they co-operate

with these bands, the Japanese will retaliate sternly. Legitimate guerrillas are able to occupy any town in North China, exclusive of the main cities, but they lack the armament to withstand counter-assaults.

Disguised guerrillas often pass through the Japanese lines and circulate in the larger cities. Many have been hidden or helped by Chinese officials who ostensibly are co-operating with the conquerors. They have killed so many individual sentries that the army has constructed strong pillboxes for the garrisons to occupy at night. Their most recent gesture of defiance occurred when North China repatriates were traveling to Shanghai aboard a Japanese-guarded train. On two occasions, trains ahead of them were wrecked by guerrillas.

The Japanese explain much of their brutality in North China as retaliation against "guerrilla strongholds." But the range of that cruelty is beyond mere retaliation. In authenticated cases, whole villages in Hopeh and Shansi provinces have been destroyed and all their residents killed or kidnaped for forced labor. Similar incidents have been reported elsewhere.

Well-equipped Japanese expeditions swoop down on unprotected, unwallled villages. Their swaggering officers line up the entire population in the center of town, then go down the line, bayoneting each man, woman and child. There are no survivors. The village then is burned. This has happened in numerous towns in Hopeh province, among them these formerly prosperous county seats—Tsunhua-hsien, Fegjung-hsien, Lan-hsien, Chin-hsien, Yutier-hsien and Chi-hsien. Hundreds of thousands have been killed in this way in Hopeh province alone. An equal number of able-bodied men and women have been captured and taken to Manchuria for slave labor in factories and fields.

In dozens of other instances throughout China, villages have been burned to the ground in reprisal for alleged guerrilla activities. The inhabitants were turned adrift. So thorough are these measures, that the Japanese often have cut down all the trees and called in neighboring Chinese to carry away the firewood, denying even that to the dispossessed villagers. Throughout North China, in addition to

the kidnappings, forced labor has been general. Workers are obtained through the village headmen. They are paid little and given insufficient food to maintain the strength of even these normally frugal people. In some instances labor projects have been started in the planting season, with the obvious intent of taking able-bodied farmers from their fields and decreasing their sustenance crops.

These activities continue on a scale that supports the belief of North China repatriates that the Japanese are, at least in especially designated areas, deliberately assassinating the Chinese, whom they cannot kill through other hardships. The motive is to make room, in a province as rich and formerly populous as Hopeh, for Japanese conquerors who would live in luxury on the slave labor of survivors. Assassination is the successor to two other great demoralizing programs undertaken by the Japanese in China. The first was economic, through the widespread smuggling and forced resale of goods during the twenties. This was followed a few years later by the wholesale smuggling and dissemination of opium, morphine, heroin and other drugs.

Intensive efforts still are being made to spread the drug habit to all Chinese, including school children, with particular emphasis upon heroin, which is deadly. The drugs are disseminated through the Japanese "opium control" agencies, spread by Korean gangsters, peddled in hundreds of Japanese-protected opium dens and fed to children in candy. Profits of hundreds of thousands of Chinese dollars daily go to individual Japanese militarists. Gain is probably a motive equally powerful with the contemplated weakening of Chinese in the occupied areas.

This is the final pattern of Japanese conquest. The consistent brutality and degradation of the conquerors in China demonstrate the potentialities of these imperialists wherever their holdings may be.





## chapter sixteen

### EXPLOITATION LABORATORY

IN THE hot summer of 1939, two miniature armies fought a pocket-sized war across the rolling plains of western Manchuria. More than 100,000 men battled for three months, with war's full panoply, around a grassy knoll called Nomonhan, once a Mongol trading site. They were Japanese and Russian regulars, augmented by Mongols and Manchus.

The skirmish began in June, as another in an eight-year series of border incidents, through which Russian and Japanese commanders probed for weak spots in the military lines separating their restless armies. Hundreds had been fought at nearly every strategic point in the 1,000-mile boundary between the puppet empire of Manchukuo and Russian territory, from the Amur River to the Gobi Desert. This one enlarged and developed. When it ended in August nearly twenty thousand Japanese were dead and the proud Kwantung army had suffered one of Japan's first major military defeats in modern times.

The Nomonhan Incident was only border warfare, but it became extraordinarily important in succeeding years. Today, Manchuria, as the center of the prospective "inner fortress" is growing more vital in the Japanese war scheme. The Americans already have bombed Manchuria. And over its fields and factories hangs the more conclusive threat of Russian power, the gloating ghost of Nomonhan. On the calendars of both nations that battle is marked as "unfinished business." The Russian strength shown then is worth

recalling. It explains much of Japan's later thinking. Someday this long-dead conflict will be resumed, perhaps in this war.

I was with Japanese forces, as an accredited correspondent, when they began their big Nomonhan attack in July, interrupting a momentary lull which followed the previous month's preliminary skirmishing. The Japanese were confident. Their officers belonged to the army's fanatic Russian-hating Kwantung (Manchurian) clique. Its philosophy had been voiced when General Sadao Araki said: "Give me a Japanese division armed with bamboo spears and I'll wipe out the entire Russian Far Eastern Army."

They attacked across gentle hills leading to Nomonhan and, beyond it, to the muddy Khalka River, geographical boundary between Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. The goal was to eliminate Soviet forces which had seeped across the river into Nomonhan, then strike farther against a ridge in Outer Mongolia from which Soviet artillerymen dominated the western fringe of Japanese territory. It was a military salient which jabbed the Japanese like a thumb.

The assault was only partially successful. Crack Japanese infantrymen drove ill-trained Russian conscripts from Nomonhan, but they could not dislodge them from the river's east bank, because of accurate Soviet fire from the dominant ridge. A Japanese expedition sent into Outer Mongolia, against explicit Tokyo orders, was repulsed with heavy losses.

But there, in the front's thunder, I saw the blind obedience and disregard for life which Japanese forces have demonstrated in the Pacific war. Fired by their officers, young Japanese infantrymen fought Russian tanks with gasoline-loaded beer bottles because they lacked the proper guns. They staged wild, yelling, bayonet charges against machine gun emplacements. Cavalrymen rode down the smooth flanks of grassland knolls into territory where every square foot was raked by Soviet artillery. Soldiers slept at night in tiny one-man foxholes, their sole protection against constantly attacking bombers, and lived for weeks on cold rice and dried fish. Not one of them knew the reason for the battle.

With other western correspondents, I spent considerable time

near the front, living in the faded grandeur of a Mongol lamasery or sleeping beneath military trucks, delighting millions of mosquitoes. For hundreds of miles around Nomonhan, the prairies billowed endlessly, crossed only by bomb-rutted dirt roads. Lamas and soldiers were the sole residents, for the migratory Mongols had departed. Forsaken and barren, save for tough grazing grass, this was the region the militarists wanted populated by Japanese immigrants, to form a "living barrier against the Soviets."

While the offensive dwindled to artillery duels and bombing raids, the Japanese claimed they successfully completed their mission. They took us to Nomonhan and showed us the Khalka whose banks still were the battleground. We talked to field generals, sitting on the grass while artillery shells whined overhead. Then the Japanese, who had invited us to see the offensive, politely but firmly placed us aboard a train for the trip back to Tokyo. "It is all over," they said. But it had not yet begun.

The Soviet counterattack started with two airplane flights which tensed all the Japanese in Manchuria. The Russians bombed the vicinity of an important railway bridge over the Nonni River, near Tsitsihar. Then they sent a lone bomber over the rising industrial center of Mukden. Japanese civilians in Hsinking, the Manchukuoan capital, immediately clamored for outright war—the "inevitable" war they had been talking about for years.

Then the Soviets struck at the front. They crossed the Khalka far northward of Nomonhan, completely surprising the Japanese. Reportedly testing Nazi tanks on terrain similar to northern France, Russian armored units drove a spearhead at least forty miles into Manchuria, capturing the lamasery—Kanjurmiao—in which we correspondents had stayed. Then they swung southward, trapped and annihilated a complete Japanese artillery division. The Russians were using first-string tankmen and equipment, against inadequate Japanese mechanization.

The drive could have been pushed farther into Manchuria, but Moscow had more immediate plans. The Soviets granted Tokyo's request for a truce, then turned to Europe. The Soviet-German non-aggression pact and the Finnish war soon followed.

The Kwantung clique had controlled the Tokyo government since 1931. Nomonhan and the Soviet-German pact marked its most severe loss of face, but no opposition Japanese group was strong enough, even with this opportunity, to overthrow the militarist rulers. The army with typical opportunism capitalized upon these battle lessons. A swift and intensive mechanization program was launched, which markedly increased its strength before the Pacific conflict, while fundamental strategy was altered to eliminate many feudalistic holdovers. The officers held responsible for the debacle retired in disgrace but did not commit hara-kiri. The chief of staff at that time, Lieutenant General Rensuke Isogai, returned to active duty as military governor of Hong Kong.

For the militarists, the border verdict disclosed Russian power which, in their cockiness, they had underestimated. It emphasized the vulnerability of Manchuria, their private preserve, and of Japan itself. Russian bombers in Siberia, less than 700 miles away, long had been a persistent threat to Japanese cities. The Kwantung element's original imperialistic scheme was to slice off Siberia, with the parallel goal of acquiring rich new territory and ending the "Russian menace." Now mechanized might also showed how swiftly a major army could overrun the flatlands of western and northwestern Manchuria, while its air force battered the rising industrial districts of the south.

Sobered by the realization, the militarists abandoned their customary Russian-baiting tactics and attempted hasty remedies. They inaugurated a tightrope-walking diplomatic program which attempted to placate Moscow, even by concessions they would not consider previously. Japan haughtily had refused Russian overtures for the nonaggression pact before Nomonhan. But Tokyo noticeably was relieved when former Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka returned from Europe in 1941 carrying the Russian signature on a neutrality pact which is still effective.

Today, it is vital for Japan to keep the Russian Bear off her back. While defenses and vigilance in Manchuria steadily are being strengthened, the Japanese continue diplomatic efforts to mollify

the Russians. The most notable instance is permission for continued Shanghai-Soviet radio broadcasts.

In Tokyo, the Soviet ambassador is invited ostentatiously to imperial functions. A few years ago he found it difficult to see the foreign minister, and Russians generally were treated with contempt and mistrust. Instruction is allowed in the Russian language, formerly actually if not officially tabooed. Russian shops are open in the Japanese capital, and signs in Russian are seen for the first time on the streets. The press has dropped its usual anti-Russian belligerency.

The Russians, likewise, have avoided antagonizing their Asiatic neighbors. As long as German hostilities demand their manpower and resources, they have no desire to risk a Japanese thrust into Siberia, always a threat, even though Tokyo resisted German pressure to enter the war at its outset.

Consequently concessions from both sides were included in the Russo-Japanese protocol of March 30, 1944, for a five-year extension of the fisheries agreement and liquidation of Japanese oil and coal concessions in Northern Sakhalin. By this agreement Japan stabilized what, for her, had been an unsatisfactory year-by-year *modus vivendi* for rights to fish in Soviet waters, an arrangement which the Japanese feared Russia could abrogate at any time. The issue is fundamental and important for the Japanese, who obtain much of their food from these areas under the Portsmouth Treaty which ended the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. Fisheries long have been considered a political barometer of relations between the two countries. Since 1936 the Soviets have refused a permanent agreement, because of antagonistic Japanese policies. The current protocol gives Japan greater security, but she failed to obtain permanence or the extended rights she long wanted. For the duration of war, the Russians also prohibited Japanese fishing in areas bordering the United States bomber route from the Aleutians.

By the Sakhalin liquidation, however, Russia erased the last foreign encroachment made during the Soviet Union's weakness. The issue stems from Japan's intensive participation in the Allied-Siberian occupation during the 1917 revolution. Japanese troops at-

tempted to obtain control of eastern Siberia's Maritime Province. In the face of international pressure they slowly were withdrawn, but another contingent remained in northern Sakhalin until 1925. Then, by treaty, the Japanese obtained 45-year rights to exploit mineral deposits which eventually gave her an estimated 200,000 metric tons of petroleum and considerable coal annually from this Soviet region.

Now the Japanese have given up these rights 26 years ahead of time, with the sole Russian promise that 50,000 tons of northern Sakhalin oil will be sold to them "after the war." Loss of this oil source will hamper Japanese efforts to create stock piles, an item of some importance when they lose southern producing areas.

Moscow's announcement of the protocol disclosed that Matsuoka had promised Sakhalin liquidation as the price of the neutrality pact, a concession never revealed within Japan. It would have been difficult to sell to the confident jingoists in 1941. Moreover, the Russians added that the ex-foreign minister had promised fulfillment within six months. They told the world, therefore, that Japan had been prevented from crawling out of an agreement, a slap in the face which Japanese militarists would not have taken without a whimper in the old days. Obviously, they had temporized, hoping for a Soviet collapse before the German army.

The protocol, predominantly a Moscow victory, underscores the mutual mistrust between the two countries. Both sides recognize the neutrality pact as a temporary expedient in view of more pressing engagements. Each expects the other to break it without formality, by swift, sure hostilities, when the time seems profitable. A Russo-Japanese conflict is a distinct possibility as a corollary of this war.

The issues between them are so deep and so encrusted with hatred and suspicion that, within man's present development, they can be solved only by war. From Russia's viewpoint, she has been humbled repeatedly during the last 40 years by the arrogant islanders, actually starting before the defeat of corrupted Czarist forces in 1905. Step by step the Japanese have pushed her back from tantalizing areas in Korea and Manchuria, where she had strong footholds. They thwarted a colonial urge augmenting the historic Russian

quest for an all-year warm water port, which she once held at Port Arthur. Japanese designs on rich Siberia are plain and were once all but successful. Russia knows these dreams are not dead.

From the Japanese view, Russia has presented a continual threat which must be eliminated for the empire's survival. They recognized her as a colonizing power with energies and skill which, in all Asia, matched and threatened their own. Once they believed she directly menaced Japan from Korea—"the dagger aimed at our heart"—and sought constantly to push her domains so far westward that the homeland would be freed from danger. But each advance brought new terrain under Japanese control which was adjacent to Russian lands, so the expanded empire was in the same juxtaposition. Aircraft has made Siberia as dangerous now to the homeland as Korea once seemed. This fear and a dread of communism have been drilled into the Japanese. They always have viewed Russia as the major enemy.

If she retains sufficient strength from her German struggle, Russia never would be in a better position than now to clean up this cumulative situation, with Allied assistance. Moreover, direct participation in the Pacific conflict would give her a greater voice in the Far Eastern peace conference. It is evident her desires for Asiatic territory, particularly a suitable port, are undiminished.

So it is not surprising that military preparations continue behind the diplomatic niceties now exchanged between them. Large-scale Russian construction in Central Asia, east of the Ural Mountains, was reported in 1944. Several projects then under way apparently were designed to increase facilities for supplying troops in event of a Japanese war, augmenting the already sizable manufacturing and producing regions of Siberia.

Japanese preparations have been thorough in Manchuria, which would be a main battlefield in any such struggle. In addition to airports, troop centers and defense installations in key areas, they have spun the country with communications permitting the rapid shipment of men and materials. Manchuria's railroad mileage has been more than doubled since the Japanese conquest, totaling 15,000 kilometers in 1943, according to Japanese figures. Spur lines point

toward every corner of the country. Double-tracking of the main railroad through Korea and certain sections of the South Manchurian line is completed. Rail transport is augmented by a network of highways. Development of Korean ports has been rushed, notably the one-time fishing village of Rashin, on the northeast coast.

In 1943 the Japanese maintained a crack garrison of an estimated 650,000 men in Manchuria, perhaps the army's best striking force. The troops were well-equipped and well-trained, with considerable air and mechanized support. Inactive in a war which had involved nearly every other section of the empire, they were digging in extensively and perfecting existing fortifications. In times of stress they could be augmented quickly by Japanese units from Korea and North China, the three forces totaling probably 1,000,000 men.

Japanese counterplans for any suspected Russian threat long have been prepared. They call for the occupation and severance of eastern Siberia with a thrust so swift the Russians would have no opportunity of reinforcing the troops already there. In 1941, the Japanese were confident they could capture Vladivostok, despite its defense by the Soviet Far Eastern Army which since then reportedly has sent both men and equipment to the western front. From Manchuria an attempt also would be made to neutralize Soviet air bases deeper within Siberia.

The necessity of swift counteraction against a Soviet threat was emphasized by Nomonhan's example of mechanized speed. The Japanese, therefore, can be expected to invade Russian territory in advance, if they suspect the Soviets are preparing a thrust. It is quite possible the Japanese are awaiting the fullest Russian exhaustion in the German conflict, to launch an assault before the Soviets can regain their strength or regroup their forces. Japan does not want such a war now. But her militarists are ready, if it seems necessary, in order to hold the northern flank.

Against this background, the puppet state of Manchukuo is being prepared for an increasingly important role in the war.

Manchukuo today is a vast and profitable Japanese investment, secured and maintained by force. It totals an estimated 1,303,437 square miles, including the southwestern provinces of Chahar and



Jehol, with an estimated 43,000,000 population, according to Japanese figures. Japanese control is maintained through occupancy of key positions and numerous "advisory" posts in a cabinet-type government under the puppet emperor Kang Teh, who was Henry Pu-yi, last occupant of the Manchu throne. Indicating the complexion of government, Japan's ambassador is concurrently commander in chief of the Kwantung army. The conquerors rule without any important opposition from the people.

The empire's second industrial center is centered around Manchuria, North China and Northern Korea. During the immediate years of preparation for the Pacific war, the militarists foresaw this region's strategic and economic potentialities. In 1939 and 1940, they pressured major Japanese war industries to transfer part or all of their plants from the islands to "the invulnerable districts of Manchukuo." In the latter year the factory district of Mukden alone occupied an unbroken area across the prairie at least twenty miles long and five miles wide, plant after plant less than five hundred yards apart. Built of red brick, these factories made an excellent aerial target. The militarists recognized that, and subsequently are believed to have shifted some of them to North China.

Further industrial moves to this supposedly cloistered region were reported in 1942-1943. It is likely now that every type of war factory, including large aircraft plants, is concentrated there. Japanese reports said most of the newly constructed synthetic rubber and oil plants have been located in Manchukuo, the former at Kirin. Two major hydroelectric power projects to further electrify these industries were said to have been completed in 1943, harnessing the swift waters of the Yalu River, the Manchukuo-Korea boundary, and the Sungari River, winding through central Manchuria.

Manpower includes thousands of the serf laborers from North China and apparently large numbers of Occidental war prisoners, as evidenced by the Mukden prison camp, one of Asia's largest.

Mineral deposits are extensive in Manchuria, including iron, coal, magnesite and oil shale. The Japanese claim producing oil fields have been discovered and also large quantities of alumina shale, for

aluminum. Most current mining operations, say the Japanese, are concentrated within a 150-mile radius of Mukden. Among them are the great open-cut coal mine, said to be the world's largest, at Fushun, 57 kilometers east of the industrial center, and Anshan, 89 kilometers south, where the Showa Steel Works is claimed to have the Orient's largest iron and steel plant. In recent years the Japanese have poured billions of yen into Manchuria on successive five-year plans for the grandiose development of mineral and industrial facilities.

Any attempt to estimate Manchuria's war production capacity would be mere speculation. There is no doubt, however, that the entire district has become an essential and important part of the war effort. In maintaining these factories, the Japanese apparently have ironed out many of the transportation difficulties they have discovered elsewhere. Shipping shortages, however, become important in the transfer of finished products to the various fronts and in supplying specialized industries with the tin, rubber, bauxite and other products of the south, not obtainable within this "inner fortress."

Doubtless many of the Japanese stock piles are concentrated in the continental area, including, perhaps, sizable quantities of sugarcane alcohol for synthetic rubber. Many American observers doubt if the production of these plants, although flanked by partially successful new developments in oil, rubber and steel, would support the war machine fully, without the factories of Japan Proper and southern resources. But as long as they are intact, they at least will enable the militarists to continue resistance, after the comprehensive bombing of the home islands.

The Japanese militarists originally visualized this district as bomb-free, so long as Siberian airbases were not utilized. B-29's from China upset this calculation.

Agriculturally Manchuria also is valuable. Before this war an estimated 11,409,585 acres of rich land were tilled, with another sixteen million acres cultivable. The Japanese have intensified long-persistent efforts to increase production, again using the serf laborers of North China, as well as itinerant workers who annually

migrate from there. Principal food crops are soy beans, kaoliang, millet, corn, wheat and rice. Large stands of timber have been exploited in the north.

After more than a decade's intensive efforts, the militarists created in Manchukuo the pattern of the perfectly controlled and regimented state which they visualize for all regions under their power. Without interference from Japan or the world, they tested theories of government, business and industry, education, religion and social life on Manchuria's subjugated millions. In their final form these control measures have become standard throughout the empire.

The militarists regarded the Japanese islands in much the same light as conquered territory. When their domestic power became sufficiently strong, key Manchurian planners were transferred to important Tokyo positions. Their blueprint of regimentation then was applied to the homeland, through the "new movement" of 1940, in much the same way as it later was superimposed upon military conquests. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, for instance, in theory was an exact duplicate of Manchuria's Concordia Society (Hsieh-Ho-Hui), formed in 1932.

Manchukuo, as the working model, underscores three fundamental points in military imperialistic philosophy. First, the state is primarily for the profit of governing militarists and their financial favorites and is not intended to benefit the Japanese people, except indirectly by increased military power. Secondly, the conquered peoples are to work and live solely for the ruling clique, in perpetual bondage. Thirdly, the militarists count upon time and the cumulative effect of suppression to bring universal conformity among the new slaves, regardless of any original opposition.

In Manchukuo today the "closed door" is locked. Imports and exports are controlled rigidly by the state, even with Japan. Almost all foreign businessmen have been excluded, including Germans whose protests received no attention. All Japanese businessmen must conform to the army viewpoint, if they want to continue in Manchukuo.

The state's exploitation is concentrated in the hands of a vast

control combine, maintained by the militarists and their favorites. In a decade this corporation, the Manchuria Industrial Development Company, has become larger even than the House of Mitsui, which reached financial power after centuries of development. Manchuria Industrial today includes 123 companies and affiliates engaged in every Manchurian exploitation enterprise, from heavy industry and mining to hydroelectric power and shipping. Its 1941 capitalization was about \$490,750,000 by prewar exchange. Yoshisuke Aikawa, the recently resigned president of the combine, rose from relative mediocrity to the position of one of the empire's three leading businessmen in less than ten years.

Force has reached every part of the state, by the gendarmerie, the police and, formerly, periodic military forays. The individual is under the same complex system of controls as in the rest of the new empire, through villages and districts for Manchus and Chinese and "banners" or tribal units for the nomadic Mongols. His labor is taken by the state through impressment or controlled and obligatory purchase prices for agricultural output, by "farmers' co-operatives." The puppet government and "independence" which followed the 1931 conquest were new ideas for Manchurians, formerly ruled by war lords. Since then, the Japanese have made no "concessions" to the populace, for none were necessary. They have attempted, however, to create nationalism among people who never knew it before. The threat of Russian "invasion" and consistent propaganda have sent military conscripts into battle for the "homeland." The current new threat to Manchukuo has been propagandized heavily by the Japanese. Elaborate civilian defense measures against air raids have been announced. The "crucial situation" has prompted the propagandized formation of a Manchurian "Boys' Army" of youths between fifteen and eighteen years old. Universal conscription also has been decreed in Korea.

The unrest, the opposition, the peasants' sullen disobedience, the active hostilities of so-called "bandit gangs" which marked the early years of Japan's occupation have died. The people are not happy or content. But force has made them compliant—force of more direct concern and effectiveness than the previous cruelties

of war lords and thieving tax collectors. The weight of the situation has pinned down the older generation. Among the growing youngsters there already are discernible the vacuous mentality, the regimented emotion and the state-controlled patriotism that the Japanese educational program seeks.

Foreign visitors to Manchukuo in recent years have been prevented by persistent surveillance or, as in my case, by the constant company of a Japanese agent from determining the people's attitude toward their conquerors or their future. But it was noticeable in the cities in 1940 that Japanese officers and the vari-raced civilians mixed freely on busy streets. There was none of the avoidance of the masters now prevalent in the new empire. Children exercising on school grounds or joining in parades, showed the same expressionless acceptance of regimentation as those in Japan. Young Manchukuoan officers were swaggering. They fought long at Nomonhan—not too well, said the Japanese—under such a small number of Japanese officers that mutiny would have been possible.

Given sufficient time, the militarists believe they can create the same compliance among all their slaves, including their own people.





# THE HOMELAND







## chapter seventeen

### "UNTIL WE EAT STONES"

○N KUDAN hill overlooking modern Tokyo, a great Shinto shrine thrusts flared arms over a quiet bit of old Japan. Tall trees and cleanly swept grounds surround it. Plump pigeons argue softly while pecking at grain scattered by the pilgrims. Weather has warped the temple's unpainted wood into a dignified somber gray. It broods patiently, undisturbed by nearby streetcars and automobiles.

This is the Yasukuni war shrine. Here are enshrined all the thousands who have died in their emperor's service. Here is symbolized the nurtured emotion that has made this war possible, that makes other wars possible. On quiet days, it is difficult to correlate Yasukuni with the blood lust it has permitted.

An *ojiisan*, perhaps, has come with his grandson to pay homage at this timeless center of death. The old man is a farmer. His *sufu*, or staple fiber, kimono is ragged, and he draws it closer around him against the sharp wind. His wooden *geta* clatter over the cobbled pathway. Wrinkles run like rivulets down his cheeks made leathery by years of constant toil. One hand, gnarled and blue with cold, is locked in the boy's chubby fist.

The boy wears the severe dark-blue uniform of his primary school, with the high collar and the visored cap, all thin and shiny. In his free hand he carries a wooden machine gun which the grandfather purchased at a little sidewalk shop near the temple grounds. As they proceed toward the shrine, the boy shoots imaginary ene-

mies. But when he sees the temple the gun drops limply to his side. His face slides into seriousness and his eyes open widely.

At a little mossy well they purify their hands with water from a small wooden dipper. Slowly, they approach the shrine and mount worn wooden steps leading to the one open chamber. At its entrance they stop before a money box the size of a cradle. The grandfather fumbles for his purse in his wide kimono sleeve, withdraws two coppers and tosses them loudly into the box. With hands pointed upward before their faces the old man and boy clap three times. They bow their heads slightly, their lips move. In a minute their heads jerk back, they clap again and, with a sigh, turn to go.

One has talked momentarily to the spirit of his son, the boy's father, once a soldier. He has been summoned from all the other thousands of hallowed war dead by the sound of the old man's hands; though that sound, by ritual, is the same for every pilgrim. The *ojiisan* thankfully reports that the farm's debt has been paid at last, with the money given by the imperial house for the son's battle death. The old man inherited that crushing financial burden from his father and grandfather. Only the war prevented him from passing it on to his son.

The boy first voiced respect for his "great and noble father." Then he reported that he is studying hard in school and that after hours he works in the fields with his grandfather. He is trying to make himself strong and loyal so the silent spirit can be proud of him. "See, I now have a machine gun. Soon I will be a brave soldier, like you." He does not say, "like you were," for, to him, the father is not dead, but he has passed to another phase of life, in a world not much different from this one.

Near by a widow in her 'teens has called her husband by the thrice-repeated handclap. She wears a drab kimono, now thin, though the season normally calls for bright colors. Her eyes shine, but not with tears. "The son you wanted," she says, "has been born. I shall raise him as you wish, to be brave and loyal."

The procession has been endless, from all parts of the empire, since the beginning of the modern military era in 1931. The government provided transportation for thousands. They come singly

and in groups, on quiet days and during noisy festivals. Many used slim savings for the trip. The shrine grounds are packed on numerous special occasions. Regularly, long files of school children—the boys in their severe uniforms, the girls in ill-fitting middy blouses and skirts—are marched to the temple. They stand in ranks before it, while a white-robed Shinto priest mutters words they do not understand. At a signal, all bow, and each talks briefly to the spirit of his father, dead in battle. The government orders and pays for these trips, the controlled press publicizes them widely, the details are planned carefully. The militarists know that of such moments future heroes and widows are made.

The periods of enshrinement coincide with special festivals which continue for weeks. Sometimes twenty thousand names are announced at once. At each enshrinement the emperor visits Yasukuni and, with the priests, performs a secret ritual in the inner temple. On huge billboards, lining the main pathway, the country's finest artists have painted dramatic incidents in recent campaigns. Wax figure displays give a three-dimensional view of major Japanese conquests. Near the grounds, dozens of shops sell paper and silk Japanese flags, toy guns, tanks and airplanes. The crowds mill around the temple grounds, eating and talking and gaping like newcomers at a circus. Today the festivals are more frequent, and pilgrims more numerous. The atmosphere is excitement, almost gaiety.

Incongruous? To us, perhaps, but not to the Japanese. Shinto teaches that death is not to be feared but is to be accepted calmly, sometimes welcomed. It is the transition between two similar worlds, an insignificant period in the timelessness of man, as a race or as an individual. The next world is neither heaven nor hell. The man who dies of natural causes enters it upon approximately the level he occupied in life, although he then becomes an ever-present god to his family. The soldier killed in his emperor's service has a special place, far higher than he could normally expect, and his family in this world is honored and repaid beyond all hope from peacetime living.

Shinto is more complicated than that. It is a belief intermingled with thousands of myths, an emotional faith peopled by thousands

of gods, in which the respect for departed ancestors is strong. For the moment these two aspects are the most important: Unquestioning devotion to the emperor, the calm acceptance of death, coupled with the greater glory if that "transition" occurs in the emperor's service. The expression of awe and solemnity that you see most often on the faces of Yasukuni pilgrims is not an outward manifestation of grief. It is respect for the departed, the grandeur of a moment in which, by faith, the individual can bridge time, distance and life itself to converse with the spirit of a god. These people feel grief, of course, the grief of a temporary separation that sometimes can be as acute as any sorrow. The separation lasts only until the death of the one remaining in this world.

Shinto, the "way of the gods," in the beginning was essentially nature worship, in which the spirits of natural forces or objects, *kami*, peopled such universally respected phenomena as the sun, stars, the moon and storms, and certain trees and peculiarly eroded rocks. Majestic Fuji is the country's sacred mountain. In the myths concerning the islands' origin, the land itself was divinely created by the mating of the gods whose more human offspring were charged with the divine injunction to rule this sacred land. To enforce it, they were given the three sacred treasures—the mirror, the necklace and the sword. Jimmu Tenno, pictured as the empire's first corporeal ruler, was, in the complexity of Shinto mythology, the grandson of the son of a nephew of Amaterasu Omikami, the "sun goddess." His rule began in 660 B.C., and the succession of "divine rulers" has been unbroken since then, say the modern propagandists.

Primarily, Shinto is not an ethical religion. It does not seek to govern moral behavior by the promise of reward or punishment in the afterlife. Instead, the central philosophy is filial devotion and loyalty. The emperor is the father of the people, and their response to him is as dutiful sons and daughters. They share in the divinity he reflects.

But that is not an ethereal divinity. The emperor to the Japanese is a human, with human desires and feelings. During recent war years, newspapers have reported "in awe" several times that the

emperor had given up luxuries such as imported foods, to "share the hardship of the people." He is exalted, but not all-wise. Numerous jingoistic assassins have been granted leniency because of the claim that they shot government officials for "giving the emperor improper advice," thus misguiding the nation's statesmanship which the emperor is believed to conduct personally. He can fall ill and die. No divine protection surrounds him in war, for instance. His death from Allied aerial attack would not weaken popular belief in the imperial symbol, but instead would inflame the country more than any other event.

The emperor's person and thoughts are inviolate. Few Japanese would dare oppose or criticize any policy secured by imperial rescript, such as was issued at the start of the war. A similar document quieted incipient opposition to the unpopular tripartite military pact. He is surrounded by such taboos that no Japanese mentions the name of a living emperor. But as an individual he assumes no definite character. The throne is the symbol binding the Japanese together, not the incumbent himself; a symbol of incalculable power.

I have seen amazing instances of emperor loyalty among hardened cynical army officers. Many of my prewar Japanese friends, well-educated and traveled, privately were opposed bitterly to the militarist-created conflict they saw approaching, but all of them were resigned to full participation in it, as their service to the throne. Doubtless there are some Japanese who lack this highly developed sense of imperial devotion. If so, they are amazingly few.

Shinto's insistence upon loyalty, devotion and service is not in itself an expression of militarism, nor is it a bloodthirsty religion. Its basic tenets have been twisted, throughout the modern era, into one of the chains binding the Japanese to war. The *ojiisan* and his grandson, simple and humble on Yasukuni's worn steps, and my educated friends resigned to distasteful war, are the products of intense and ceaseless human sculpturing.

When Japan emerged from more than two hundred years' hermitage in the 1850's she still lived in the seventeenth century. That meant that force and chicanery were considered the major weapons

of administrative power, warfare was an accepted part of life, and the militarist was exalted. The emperor was restored to political power for the first time since a twelfth century upheaval produced an unbroken line of dictators who maintained the imperial house merely as a symbol of spiritual leadership. Restoration leaders regarded the movement as a change in domestic political fortunes, not as a great transmutation. Their country was subdivided into innumerable clans, formerly united only loosely by the shogun's force. To weld them together and consolidate their power, they revitalized Shinto and made it a state religion. Its precepts were taught at the start of each child's schooling, and western importations which threatened the imperial concept were prohibited.

Succeeding battles for internal power mainly have been between oligarchic groups—militarists, businessmen and politicians. The people have had few spokesmen. Most of them were insincere, and all have been silenced. The oligarchs, meanwhile, have perpetuated the feudal conception of society, in which the masses were the rulers' slaves. Most peasants live in virtual serfdom under unpaid debts passed from generation to generation. State-controlled education was distilled carefully in this pattern, the emperor concept retained as the greatest bulwark for men ruling through the throne. The contrary thoughts of a few scholars were silenced by the direct or threatened force of "patriotic" secret society members.

Two of the most notable social movements to invade the tight islands have been suppressed rigorously. Communism, which gained wide interest among students in the twenties, was ruthlessly stamped out by both the secret societies and the gendarmerie, partly because one party plank advocated eliminating the imperial house. Labor unions, strong enough once to precipitate strikes, were abolished, and the gendarmerie keeps a ceaseless vigil against their resurrection.

The Japanese people as a whole have been given no chance to reach a normal, healthy national outlook. Their social development and thinking have been arrested by single-minded leaders who wanted the continuance of blind obedience and unreasoning acceptance. As a result the darkness of feudalism and seclusion-bred inversion hangs over the islands. Individual Japanese have escaped

this blight to become competent and respected international citizens. Some progress has been made during rare periods of liberalism toward a less murky national outlook. But the effect has been slight on the country as a whole.

Feudal thought makes the task of selling wars easier. Beyond that, the militarists intensified their jingoistic training of school children when their domestic power was sufficiently strong. In the modern military era, these efforts have been notable.

Since 1937, Japanese toddlers have been taught the story of the emperor's divinity and the glory of dying for him as soon as they enter into kindergarten. Previously, this instruction began in the first primary year. In the past, students bowed reverentially on special occasions toward the emperor's picture, which hangs in every school. Now they bow each morning toward the imperial palace. Through the eight-year primary course, considerable emphasis always has been placed upon stories of loyalty to the emperor, the daimyo and the clan, and upon the inflated heroism of the early samurai. The classic and most widely known story concerns the forty-seven *ronin*, masterless samurai, who for years plotted to avenge their master's death. They finally succeeded by trapping the victim through espionage methods that obviously are symbolic of the national effort.

The militarists have not neglected nursery rhymes. One of the first taught to the toddlers concerns the "beautiful" national flag with the red sun on it. Another goes this way:

"With the gun over his shoulder the soldier marches,  
To the sound of the bugle he marches.  
The beautiful soldier,  
I love the beautiful soldier."

Toys for the boy in recent years have been monopolized by war gadgets, from airplanes to miniature cannon. More important perhaps are the dolls given to boys on special holidays, all of them mail-armored samurai. The modern war spirit is linked persistently to the romanticized exploits of dead heroes. They are glorified by the superimposed philosophy of *bushido*, a code which made no

appearance in early Japanese history. By it the warrior supposedly lived under a sort of Robin Hood aura, always battling for the right, sometimes taking time out in the heat of a conflict to remark about the beauty of the cherry blossoms, always generous to his defeated foes. Since those foes by the same ritual were obliged to commit hara-kiri, the generosity was hypothetical, even in theory. Actually, such a code does not exist, except in propaganda.

The military exploits of the past are featured prominently in the primary school courses dealing with both history and ethics (the equivalent of Civics in the United States). Since 1937 these stories have become more bloodthirsty, more frankly attuned to the ideas of conquest, more definitely intended to arouse combative instincts and to glorify them. Geography is taught through the use of maps, showing the size of Japan before Pearl Harbor relative to other empires, together with graphic charts describing the raw material poverty of one and the wealth of the other.

From generation to generation the Japanese have been taught, at home and in the schools, other lessons that have been used to enslave them. They were trained to believe that loyalty, in all of its sacrificial manifestations, was the greatest expression of the human spirit. Inflexible duty was its corollary. Frugality is laudable, and the individual is fatalistically bound to a life of service. He can advance to the top, even through hard social lines, but his greatest chance is through the patronage of an influential person, impressed by previously devoted service. Morally, his life is governed by the ever-present thought of bringing honor to his family and saving it from shame. Family honor is impossible without service and loyalty. Throughout his life the Japanese lives under orders. He expects them and in times of crisis looks toward leadership. Furthermore, he must save face continually for himself and his family. To do so he is always conscious of the opinions of his neighbors, his friends and his associates.

This group control is important, for, on his own, the Japanese is highly individualistic. One of the most difficult phases of industrialization, for instance, was to teach workers the necessity for fac-



tory standardization. Each had his own ideas on the proper way of doing the job.

This trait ranges upward. Commanders in the field frequently disregard Tokyo war ministry orders, because more direct action suits their own desires or those of the clique to which they are highly loyal. The explanation generally is they were acting in the emperor's best interests. Likewise statesmen are killed or intimidated because the individual assassin or his secret society independently accuses them of improperly advising the throne. In both instances, and many more, the ostensible motive was emperor service, with the method determined by the individual. Imperialist dreams and international co-operation similarly have been advocated in his name. The brutality of Bataan and the "generosity" of releasing convicted gendarmerie victims resulted from the "imperial presence." In short, there are as many ways to serve the emperor as there are Japanese.

Revolution also is possible, not to overthrow the emperor, but to supplant the dominant group around him with a new faction ruling through the throne. The method would be the same—removing "incompetent" advisers by death, if necessary. But revolutions need leaders. The militarists have long taken precautions against the emergence of any potentially dangerous individual who might command the people's respect. Their own outstanding commanders, for example, are publicized only briefly while alive, even in this life-and-death struggle. Lavish praise and great honors come after death. This twofold policy prevents the creation of a great national hero, while further underlining, in the popular mind, the glory of battlefield death.

This individualism, which might sometimes be an impediment to full control of the society, has been marshaled into group action and maintained for centuries. The clans of old Japan are discernible still in intense prefectural loyalties, the secret societies and the innumerable cliques of business, government and military services. They, in turn, often pull apart, in their collective interpretation of the imperial good and, of course, for their own welfare.

So the militarists, in their 1940 "new movement," attempted to obtain the tightest possible control over their own people by greater

social streamlining which, in theory, would make all Japanese responsive to huge central groups. In the political field, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association was to concentrate members of the abolished political parties, formerly often at cross-purposes, into one union dedicated to serving the emperor as the militarists dictated. The secret societies, which might embarrass the militarist government, technically were disbanded by a government brush stroke. Some had existed for more than fifty years and had been important in the militarist rise to power. Patriotic groups and youth organizations, churches—all were consolidated into central unions.

The goal was a society threaded with parallel agencies of service linking the throne and every subject. It failed in Japan, but the militarists have not abandoned the idea.

While individually the Japanese response to government appeals might vary to a degree causing militarist dissatisfaction, he is a different person in a group—highly suggestible and imitative. So this regimentation was a prelude to the final and intensive effort to sell the Pacific war at home. The big propaganda “push” was a correlated program which no Japanese could avoid. It was thundered from every radio and every newspaper in constant reiteration. Its appeals were attuned to the Japanese mental outlook, which is emotional, rather than logical, and filled with symbolism instead of sharp clarity. This was flanked by additional weapons, from the force of the browbeating *soshi* to gaudy and raucous mass meetings and rallies in which the civilian jingoists shouted themselves hoarse on the slogans of the day.

Behind it stood the gendarmerie and “thought” police, constantly vigilant against nonconformity. A Japanese can be arrested, tried and sentenced for the thoughts he supposedly harbors.

Preparing the mass of the people for war with the democracies employed the fullest collection of control measures ever used in Japan. Both the forces unleashed and the methods used have not stopped but are in full evidence today. Before the war, Japanese commoners were decidedly friendly to Americans. The United States was regarded as a “big brother” nation because of her role in reopening Japan. Americans were liked because those in Japan

generally accepted the Japanese on a more equal basis than other foreigners and because American policies in China were the least competitive to Japan of the western powers entrenched in that country. The commoner's appraisal was largely on the basis of the individuals he met in his country. His attitude toward Britain, therefore, was more frigid, as a result of common British colonial superiority, as well as the more direct conflict of aims in China.

In broad outlines the militarist propaganda drive had the four following basic points, repeated endlessly, with its varying principles interwoven and blended:

1. *Self-sufficiency is essential for the empire's survival.*

Japan was labeled as the poorest of the great powers in natural resources; probably true, except for Italy. She was dependent, therefore, upon the whims of potentially unfriendly nations to obtain the resources essential to her continued existence. (The direct association between “existence” and military operation in the Japanese mind was underlined by the most frequently emphasized example of petroleum, most of which came from the United States before 1940.) Such a state of near international beggary could not be tolerated by a proud and ancient nation such as Japan. She must acquire and control all the areas essential to maintain her, at whatever cost necessary, because ordinary commerce made her subject to severance of these supplies. The “Co-prosperity Sphere” was the answer.

2. *Self-defense.*

Despite Japan's “earnest” endeavor to assure the world of her “peaceful intent” in China, the democracies were preparing to murder the empire. Application of American embargoes and the licensing system marked a concerted effort to strangle Japan economically. Meanwhile, the country was being “encircled” by the ABCD chain of military fortifications. If their economic methods failed to bring “Japan to her knees,” the Allies would not hesitate to make a direct attack. No “honorable” man would yield his “just” position in the face of such opposition, nor would any Japanese refuse to defend his emperor and the empire against this “unprovoked” aggressiveness. (In 1940, a Japanese civilian outlined to me the ef-

fect then of this appeal by saying, "The Japanese people have nearly made up their minds that they would prefer an honorable death on the battlefield than dishonorable death by economic strangulation.")

3. *Rededication to the service of the throne and enlargement of Japan's "historic mission."*

This is the most thunderous and most consistent theme of the entire program. Every subject was made conscious of his duty to the emperor, so he would be amenable to the greater sacrifices of enlarged warfare. The methods were numerous—speeches, rallies, the "voluntary" labor contributions of various groups whose members devoted their Sundays to working on the "improvement" of the Tokyo palace outer grounds, greater emphasis upon devotions at the imperial shrines of Jimmu Tenno and Meiji Tenno, down to the custom of bowing upon passing the palace, now almost universal, enforced by swaggering *soshi* who occasionally attacked those whose reverence they considered inadequate.

Japan's "historic mission," once apparently limited to the creating of the yen-bloc, now forced the empire to reach farther. The militarists dipped into the once sacred and ancient book—*The Nihongi* or *Chronicles of Japan*, completed in A.D. 720—for the symbol, *Hakko Ichiu*. Official spokesmen translated it as "eight corners under one roof." This injunction supposedly was laid upon the nation by the legendary Emperor Jimmu in a proclamation in 660 B.C. upon founding the capital from which he exercised the first concerted rule over the Japanese islands. To the Japanese, the phrase meant variously "eight hemispheres under one rule"—or Tokyo's control over the world—and "under Hakko Ichiu the races of the world will be combined and be brothers." In any case it meant extension of Japan's control, pursuant to the role the gods had decreed, for the brotherhood of races could come only under Japan's leadership.

Finally the propagandists tied these two elements together with the elaborately staged celebration of the empire's 2600th birthday in 1940. The pageantry was augmented by consistent praise of the "imperial line unbroken" and emphatic reiteration that all Japanese

had obeyed and served their emperor since the days of Jimmu. The average Japanese had never thought of this antiquity or of the Hakko Ichiu before. Yet the government made both symbols an irrevocable part of his life in only a short period. They were introduced suddenly through the controlled press. By implication, however, both ideas long have been motivating factors in Japanese life and the current emphasis was merely a part of a re-examination of the past as the basis for the new dedication to imperial service expected of every subject.

4. *Elimination of western "influences" and a return to the standards of old Japan.*

Several times before in her history, Japan had turned to intense reaction to offset national frustration. This inversion reached its ultimate in medieval seclusion. The frustration in 1940 was the China Incident which had caused much hardship in Japan. Since late 1938 the militarists attributed Chinese resistance almost entirely to western help. In the following year the tightened American economic policies enabled them to enlarge upon that theme. The demand for eliminating western influences soon appeared among the extremists and was incorporated into the major program. The theme was that Occidental "frivolities" and "luxuries" threatened to undermine the native Japanese strength and therefore they must be cut out of the national life. Meanwhile, the Japanese were told to look back upon the country's classic antiquity when its power was great and its spirit was clean. Modern comforts were mere cultural encrustations which could be removed to reveal the full strength of *Yamato Damashii*, the Japanese spirit, which, obeying the divine injunction, was to arise and defeat the "decadent" western powers whose materialism had made them weak and flabby. The Japanese was told to be proud of the hardships he could endure, proud of his frugality, his willingness to work long hours, his discipline, his opportunity to serve the emperor. He was expected to be proud that he and his womenfolk had been trained all their lives to avoid displaying personal emotion, and therefore they hid the strain of war behind a mass solemnity. The individual's reaction to enlarged warfare was to be meditation, work and seriousness,

with a minimum chance of forgetting the crisis, even for a few hours, through entertainments and recreation.

Time and again, in prewar months and during the early hostilities, Japanese militarists and government spokesmen boasted of the enemy's weakness and Japan's "unquenchable power" which was based upon "her people's strength." Peace was to be dictated in Washington, after imperial troops had triumphantly marched across the United States. Victory would be swift and sure. Then Japan would become the world's most powerful empire and would be able to accomplish her "divine mission" by "freeing the oppressed races of Asia." (The propagandists have changed their mind in this matter, as I shall discuss later.)

The inconsistencies, contradictions and bald lies in this over-all propaganda campaign are apparent at once to the westerner, but not to the unthinking, illogical Japanese. Furthermore, even if he were disposed to reasoning, the average islander lacks the information or the perspective to see the gaps. Short-wave radios have been banned for a decade in Japan, and the domestic press has been controlled even longer. Most Japanese lack the means, courage, and will to circumvent this censorship.

The drive often became ridiculous, from the western viewpoint, through the fantasy of the extremists; as, for example, the small group which unsuccessfully urged all civilians to discard their overcoats during the bitter winter months, in order to more fully "share the hardships of the front." Its profound readjustment of living produced innumerable personal tragedies. One of the 1940 measures was abolition of all "luxury" production within the country, thus disemploying thousands of craftsmen, many of whom, it was reported, committed suicide in a protest which went unheeded. It created official callousness in the name of patriotism. One country teacher was commended publicly by the education ministry for his "devotion to the new movement," because he had forced all his primary grade students to remove their shoes and stockings and run around in the snow each day "to build up their stamina." The Tokyo *Asahi*, reporting the incident, said "fortunately, only one

child died from pneumonia.” But there was no protest, though the Japanese love for children is deep and almost universal.

Individually, the Japanese reserved the right to believe his country was fighting for self-defense against the democracies, while retaining his friendship for individual Occidentals. He personalized the conflict into protection of his emperor against President Roosevelt and his supporters, just as many Americans have individualized the European conflict to Hitler and the Nazis.

Many Japanese maintained old friendships with Americans in Tokyo long after the Doolittle raid on the capital. Sometimes they visited the Americans or sent them packages in internment, although these gestures were liable to bring reprisals from both the gendarmerie and the extremists. “We must not hate each other,” several told their friends. “Our governments, not we, are fighting.” Before I left the Shanghai internment camp for repatriation, one of the Japanese noncommissioned officers wrote down his address and asked me to communicate with him after the war if I returned to Tokyo. A civilian said: “Whether Japan is beaten or victorious you must go back there. But if we are defeated, I won’t be alive, because I shall fight until the end.”

The outbreak of war was a personal tragedy for thousands of pro-American Japanese and for many more thousands whose regard for Americans was strong. The news of Pearl Harbor was emblazoned in the lighted news reports flashing outside newspaper offices. The stories were jubilant and boastful. But one witness told me the crowds reading these dispatches were apathetic, almost sad.

The enthusiasm comes in organized groups. Patriotic rallies and bombastic public meetings are alien to the Japanese idea of hiding all visible emotion. But since 1939, under militarist guidance, these gatherings have been more and more frequent. They are held now on every possible occasion, and attendance is compulsory for all participating organizations—from patriotic societies to groups of factory workers. The gatherings are spiked heavily with extremists who react enthusiastically to the emotionalism of the government-designated speakers and who lead the shouted “Banzai!” and the innumerable slogans from “Hakko Ichiu!” to “Until we eat stones!”

I have seen them work themselves into a hysterical frenzy over meaningless phrases which later they could not explain to inquiring correspondents. Under the crowd's stimulus, even the most reticent Japanese usually joins. The result is that Japan's normally complacent life is punctuated by the flag-waving of these rallies and the autointoxication that sends tipsy nationalists singing and shouting through the streets. Old-time foreign residents of Japan have noted the remarkable difference between the bombastic air of the current conflict and the repressed resignation which marked the Russo-Japanese war.

This is national hypnotism. But, like clinical hypnotism, it could not compel the people to actions deeply repugnant to their mass nature. The average Japanese peasant is not bloodthirsty or aggressive. He wants to live in peace and be let alone. But he has not been trained away from the medieval acceptance of war as natural to ordinary life. Instead he has been schooled universally to regard battlefield death as his highest goal. These wars are still portrayed to him as essential to free "impoverished races," to extend the emperor's "benign guidance" to less favored people or, as now, to defend the throne itself. He has little conception of their cynical background.

The peasant is insular and ignorant about the rest of the world. He knows only that Japan is the "center of the universe." The prospect that wealthy Britain and surfeited America would attack his poor islands is not laughable, but grimly real. He has been led to believe that every country is as covetous and treacherous as his own militarists.

Among the educated, more able to see the real issues, there are numerous extreme nationalists and opportunists who accepted the war for what it is. For those formerly opposing it, there are two powerful checkreins. The emperor concept obliged the majority, perhaps, to forswear personal viewpoints for the blind obedience and uncomplaining service they always had been taught were their duty. The remainder were subject to cruel gendarmerie maltreatment. Scores still languish in filthy jails. But there are no concen-



tration camps for Japanese on the Nazi model, and there are no sizable or important groups of political refugees living abroad.

The propaganda campaign outlined several other deep Japanese characteristics valuable for war—inflexible pride and sense of honor, or face, reverence for the glorified past and its symbols, a past of frequently recurring warfare; the opportunism that prompted a grab at the European colonies in Southwestern Asia when, as the militarists said, the European war left them dangling. One of the most prominent, however, is the curious Japanese satisfaction in his ability to endure hardship. Sometimes that becomes almost a racial masochism.

Earthquake, flood and fire produced the Shinto conception of death. This has been flanked by a similar resigned fatalism concerning well-being and the impermanence of physical possessions. The majority of homes in the large cities today are flimsy wooden structures, jammed together block after block. If a fire gains headway in one of them before firemen arrive, the houses at each corner of the block, much longer than the American equivalent, are dynamited to prevent the spread of flames. No attempt is made to extinguish the central blaze, which usually broadens out too quickly to be fought. A few days later new homes are erected quickly on the ruins and the Japanese refer to the incident with a favorite phrase: *Shikata Ka nai*—"It can't be helped."

The peasant always has lived frugally because he can afford no better. The reversion to medievalism, recommended during the propaganda drive, primarily affected city dwellers whose taste had broadened. Yet Tokyo and its extremists continue to boast of the hardships the people can endure without buckling, taking a fierce pride in the fact.

Suicide is a prominent theme in classical literature and drama, ennobled by an exaggerated "death before dishonor" idea. Waves of suicides occurred frequently in both medieval and modern Japan, spreading among the suggestible people, until the government halted them vigorously. At the outset of the China war the government proudly publicized the notes of several wives who had killed themselves "so the husbands at the front would have no worries" to in-

terfere with their service to the emperor. That movement also was stopped.

Self-destruction and sacrificial pain are part of a racial neuroticism often displayed by the Japanese. Frequently they become both a defiance and a release for the harried islanders, just as self-denial has been translated into a challenge that must be endured and not overcome. Hara-kiri, now seldom practiced, is a ritualistic and painful method of suicide. Under its code, honor was satisfied not by the man's death but by his ability, before witnesses, to endure the pain without flinching or displaying even a momentary evidence of emotion. Today, death itself—particularly in battle—provides the requisite honor. Yet suicide is still the most eulogized theme in warfare, because the government emphasizes it and because it has more fascination for the people than plain death.

In the Pacific war, the exploits of suicide bomber pilots made excellent material for the propagandists. The practice apparently has been curtailed, partly, because the high command perceived the disastrous cost in trained fliers. But Tokyo's communiqués still say: So many planes "failed to return or committed *jibaku* (crash dived)."

The average Japanese is more fully aware of the last-man fight of the Attu garrison than of the equally dramatic and more valuable sacrifices in breaching the Malaya jungle. Attu was significant in appealing to this morbidity. The same is true of Saipan, Tinian and Guam. It is estimated that probably fifty per cent of some twenty thousand Japanese civilians on Saipan when the Americans attacked committed suicide or were killed by their own soldiers.

The Japanese are gamblers; in fact they have gambled national existence upon the unruly geology of their volcanic islands. Many of them, less imbued with the extremists' prewar confidence, viewed the conflict as a desperate, winner-take-all gamble. My friends had converted themselves to participation with the philosophy: "If we die, we at least will die honorably, both ourselves and the nation. If Japan wins the war, she will be the richest empire in the world." They had much to live for, personally. But in general the commoner contemplates with relative resignation a future of hard work

and frugal living, with little chance of improvement for himself or his children. He lacks the hope and confidence of the American.

The Allied soldier goes to war with the hope and thought that he best can show his love for wife and children, or parents, by helping win the engagement as quickly as possible and returning, whole, to share with them a new life in a better world. The Japanese soldier goes into battle with the conviction that his loyalty and devotion can be shown most fully by dying in his emperor's service, thereby bringing honor to those he treasures. On the whole, he lacks the love of women that, among westerners, is a potent factor in battlefield psychology. With few exceptions, marriages in Japan are still arranged through intermediaries, and the principles scarcely know one another beforehand. Whatever affection arises subsequently is incidental to the main purpose, which is family perpetuation.

The oligarchs have sought persistently to continue this practice by discouraging the “newfangled” love marriages. That is why today they boast of the strength of their women and say that western women by their frivolities have undermined the fighting efficiency of their soldiers.

The womenfolk of a captured Allied soldier take comfort in the fact that he is still alive, and pray that he may survive to return to them. The relatives of a captured Japanese are never notified. If they suspect such a fate has befallen him they would be obliged to show, and generally would believe, that he had brought everlasting dishonor to his family and himself and that it were better if he were dead, for he would be marked as a traitor to the imperial cause.

These elements were mingled in the Japanese soldiers with whom I lived at Nomonhan and later saw under different circumstances in internment. Most of them were conscripted peasants, already marked by the toil they had done since early childhood in the fields. Strenuous military training and deprivation toughened them. Their incipient individualism had been driven from them by stern discipline, including beatings from superior officers. Always accustomed to orders, the conscript acquired a new reason for obedience, for

the beatings meant not only pain, but loss of face before his comrades. Flinching before battle had the same result. To insure its effectiveness he was placed in a unit composed largely of men from his own prefecture. Over all hung the emperor's shadow, so impelling that privates bow to each other because they wear His Majesty's uniform.

There is another factor making him a better soldier for Japanese officers, who consider the conquest of an objective more important than the loss of men. The peasant boy often is desperately unnerved while waiting battle, though he takes care to hide it. He is not afraid of death, but of what precedes it. Continuous gunfire and bombardment, the shriek of bombs, the uncertainty of potential sniper fire—these terrify him, until he can only escape them by actually entering battle, or by dying. Retreat is seldom considered, because loss of honor would be more painful than death.

The waiting preys heavily upon his repressed emotions and his unstable mind. At Nomonhan the constant anticipation of bombs or Russian sniper fire produced an extremely high incidence of insanity. In North China the same cycle has been repeated, because sentries always await a Chinese guerrilla attack from behind. News reports from Kwajalein said that all the survivors of our heavy pre-invasion bombardment were insane or so dazed they appeared to be so.

The peasant boy, in prebattle introspection, has a relatively easy choice. He can escape the horror of bombardment, the cruelty of the officers, the rigorousness of his life by going into battle. The excitement of conflict gives him an outlet for his previously repressed terror or despair. If he is killed, he will do the duty toward which he has been pointed all his life; he will be enshrined at Yasukuni; his family, honored, also will receive an imperial grant which will make them richer than they ever anticipated. With the sum at last they may own the land they love. Pride and relief will erase the hopeless wrinkles on the faces of parents he has been taught to revere. He himself will escape the fate of enchainment to the farm and more debt and work. The cost is merely death, which is nothing.

If he gives in to the enemy, the antithesis of all this will be true. Moreover, he believes the enemy will torture him heartlessly. If he is wounded, honor is great although less than in death. If he escapes uninjured, there will be only more battles, more terrified waiting, more uncertainty.

Death has become such an escape that the inculcated idea of suicide before capture has been overdone in practice. Many thousand Japanese soldiers have been killed in China while, single-handed and without orders, attempting to take impossible objectives, such as strongly defended pillboxes. They tried to hasten their glory and end the nagging uncertainty of waiting. In the Pacific, innumerable instances have been reported of Japanese committing suicide as soon as invading forces landed on their islands, without attempting to take as large a toll of their opponents as possible before the end.

On the home front, the extremists' cries for a last-man fight have been more and more hysterical. By virtually excluding entertainments and insisting upon meditation and intensified devotions at the shrines which perpetuate the acceptance of death, the militarists have thrown a somber, melancholy cloak around the country. They seek to bring the war closer and closer to the civilian, to stimulate him to greater service and greater readiness for death.

One of their methods is to parade wounded soldiers through Tokyo's crowded streets. I have seen whole regiments of one-legged men marched for blocks to attend athletic meets, when the busses which brought them from the hospitals could have driven them to the front of the stadium. Each wore a steel artificial leg. The dolorous clank of these limbs on the pavement made an awful symphony of hopelessness, but the militarists have discovered that it is an argument for wider participation in the war, not a deterrent. In the great war museum near Yasukuni, the bloodstained tunics worn at death by Russo-Japanese war heroes are displayed prominently, along with elaborate descriptions of how each man was killed.

Naturally, the Japanese do not respond universally in the same way to the appeals I have outlined. Nor do they all think along the lines I have described. But the degree of conformity to a national

pattern is remarkably general. Japan is the only major country in which more than seventy million people are contained in a narrow area, speaking a language which is understood throughout, and in which there are no racial minorities. In the last fifty years it has been traversed by excellent communications, and virtually every section brought within the sphere of consistent government propaganda. Training in the home, as well as the school, is surprisingly standardized. Insularity and force have prevented the wide dissemination of thoughts contrary to the central oligarchic theme. Above all this the emperor concept has been used to create an almost religious frenzy on the battlefield and deep, unquestioning devotion on the home front.

This is the background to the militarists' boast that they can hold their people to a hundred-year war. The people have risen in the past—precipitating rice riots and attacks against gendarmerie stations. These uprisings have not been for ideas, but for improved welfare or to eliminate cruelty. Suffering and hardships now have been accepted as essential to serve the throne and to protect the homeland.

The China incident as a whole was unpopular. But the leaders held the country to it without important opposition, although for three years after the 1938 fall of Hankow, Japan did not celebrate a major victory. The triumphs at the outset of the Pacific conflict gave the war effort a stimulus that in itself probably would have been sufficient to carry the country for years.

Despite the increasing hardships, reliable repatriates said, in 1943, the people would support the war effort for at least five more years without a victory and under conditions then unforeseeable. Air raids they said might bring momentary hysteria, but in themselves they would be insufficient to break morale. After the Doolittle raid in 1942 the common people were momentarily excited, then they responded to leadership and repaired the damage with the same impassiveness as though it had been caused by an earthquake or a fire.

In an attack on the Japanese islands themselves, many of the repatriates believe a landing force would have to cut its way through

men, women and children, who would line the shore with any available weapons. Historical analogy is sharper in respect to Japan than most countries, because her past has been so well preserved in the present. The clearest precedent occurred in 1863 when an Allied force attacked the stronghold of the Satsuma clan near Shimonoseki. Even the commoners joined the samurai in resisting Allied forces whose armament and strategy were vastly superior to the Japanese. When a landing finally was made, it was discovered the defenders had continued firing after the exhaustion of their ammunition. They had loaded their ancient cannon with red beans—a last gesture of defiance.



## chapter eighteen

# RAGGED KIMONO

TOKYO is grim, drab and grubby. It personifies resignation and sacrifice. In 1943 it looked more like a besieged fortress, momentarily awaiting occupation, than the temporarily triumphant capital of the world's richest empire. An air of somberness hangs over it, reflected in the solemn and sometimes pinched faces of people on the streets. Life has been stripped down to nearly bare essentials. The government's policies and the growing hardships of war are grooming one of the world's largest cities for an eventual role in the front line of hostilities.

During the day, life continues with the nervous intensity that has marked Tokyo from the beginning of the current war era in 1937. Sidewalks are crowded, but among the pedestrians are many wearing ragged and faded kimonos. Vehicular traffic is scarce, supplanted by bicycles. Newspapers and rubbish blow down the streets, untended because workingmen are unavailable. Buildings and parks are becoming dingy. Many luxury stores have closed for lack of stock. At night, the city lies quietly under a perpetual dimout.

Some phase of the war directly affects every family in the islands. Aside from those who have lost relatives, the modern era has brought profound readjustment and growing hardship. Privations reached the Japanese, particularly metropolitan residents, at the start of the China campaign. They gave up imported commodities, even surgical dressings, so the country's foreign exchange could be used for munitions. Stock piles were being created for the Pacific conflict.



The commoners also accepted greater personal living hardships than the immediate circumstances required. By mid-1940 they wore flimsy *sufu* clothing and ate *mugi*, an unpalatable mixture of unhulled rice and oats. Yet in the occupied sections of Shanghai and in North China, the colonists lived well. The islanders believed they were helping the war by accepting substitutes, so the army could better feed and clothe the fighters. But they also were undergoing the first training in the militarists' far-sighted scheme of preparing for the trials that would come in the last stages of their anticipated Pacific campaign.

The common people at home have seen none of Japan's new wealth. The only concession they have received from conquest was increase of the regular half-pound monthly sugar ration for a short time after the Philippines' capitulation. Little of the rice and grain and none of the rubber, wool, cotton, quinine and similar army-exploited products are available on civilian markets. The basic reasons were war needs, labor shortages and transportation. But even in the early days of ascendancy, the militarists made no pretense of sending a few shiploads of loot home to people. They knew that momentary relaxation would make more difficult the eventual self-denial required when outer reaches of the empire were lost. In late 1943, the government began an intensive program, still under way, to prepare further for this last phase of the war and to make the entire nation a more effective fighting machine.

Communiqués became more accurate in detailing Pacific losses, although they continued to exaggerate the damage inflicted upon the attackers. The people were told to prepare for heavy air raids on the cities. They were advised to acquire a taste for Manchuria's bread and potatoes and to intensify their cultivation of Japan's already exhausted land. "We must depend upon ourselves and the adjacent areas for sustenance," the government shouted. "The enemy wants to annihilate us."

In 1943, Tokyo was under stricter rationing and more restricted living conditions than any city in the overseas empire, except Hong Kong. Every essential was tightly limited, except vegetables, and often the supply reaching the capital was insufficient to satisfy the

legitimate ration cards. These are the official figures for that year:

Rice— $\frac{1}{2}$  pound per person daily, about half of normal consumption.

Fish—3 ounces per person, twice a week, enough for about two bites. (This limitation was primarily due to the restriction on use of fuel oil for deep-sea fishing, as well as shortage of manpower and available craft).

Meat—purchases limited to 30 sen, or about 2 ounces, once a month.

Sugar— $\frac{1}{2}$  pound per month.

Rice cakes—the equivalent of American cookies or cakes and the prevalent dessert, besides fruit: one 20 sen bag or about six macaroon-sized cakes per family monthly.

Soap—one bar per person monthly, but in September, 1943, the government was three months behind on the ration.

Charcoal—limited amounts, but the government also was three months behind the allotment.

Coal—unobtainable, even on the omnipresent black market.

Cooking gas—limited to one yen per family monthly; enough only to cook a supply of rice which is eaten cold for several days.

Vegetables and fruit—unrationed, but available only in limited quantities on markets which are crowned with prospective purchasers.

Agricultural deprivations affect metropolitan residents more directly than countryfolk. On the whole, domestic production has not declined markedly, but military demands on the country's cluttered railways have interrupted normal shipments to the cities. For that reason many peasants, who formerly shipped most of their crops to market for the cash to buy other essentials, have more food than usual, while sharing other privations. Normally, fifty-two per cent of the people are farmers.

The Japanese visibly are growing thinner on this diet, and their resistance has been lowered. Disease has increased so remarkably, the government has shown its concern. The nation is being fed on a scientific basis, each individual eating primarily for sustenance without regard for appetite or taste. Scientists long have investi-

gated diet in relation to war. Presumably, the official ration combines their discoveries of the minimum requirements to maintain life.

They have made numerous attempts to popularize ersatz foods, including native herbs and roots, but few have captured the public fancy. Sweet potatoes, grown in Manchuria, have become increasingly important, however, both as a staple and for byproducts, such as a concoction euphemistically called "coffee." Otherwise, the Japanese clings to his traditional menu—rice, fish, seaweed, spinach, daikon—an odoriferous radish—and tea. Limited supplies of milk are available to the sick, but not children. Butter and cheese have disappeared, as have all imported canned goods. The *mugi* today is even more unpalatable than before; for the unhulled rice is mixed also with corn and barley.

Clothing is a serious problem which is growing worse. In addition to tight rationing, the commoner is faced with rising prices for garments of only brief durability. They include as much as 90 per cent staple fiber and are apt to disintegrate at the second washing or in a heavy rain. Government instructions for washing towels, as an example, specify they should be hung up while wet, because wringing shortens their life. Little use has been made of silk. Nearly all cotton and wool are diverted to war uses.

Clothing is rationed on the basis of 100 points per person annually. In 1943 the government issued ration cards for the next two years and actually decreased their value by increasing the points required for each item. A man, for his points, could obtain during the year: one suit or overcoat or kimono, two shirts, six pairs of socks, two ties, two handkerchiefs and one suit of underwear. The woman was entitled to a kimono or dress of *mompei*, a baggy pair of overalls, worn over the kimono, which the government is trying to encourage, six pairs of *sufu* stockings and a small amount of linen. She could purchase enough *sufu* material for one towel per year.

Western-style shoes required 12 points. They were virtually unobtainable, however, and were made of such flimsy ersatz cardboard composition material that they disappeared on a wet day.

They cost ¥250 a pair, about five-sixths of the average white collar salary in Tokyo. Wooden *geta*, at one ration point, were cheaper and sturdier. But they cannot be worn with the western business suits which are still standard in the capital. One of these suits, or the plain "national uniform" which closely resembles the communist party uniform of Russia, costs ¥150.

The rich circumvented these hardships by extensive trading on the black market. For a price, nearly everything was obtainable, except coal and rice. In 1944 small automobiles reportedly were selling for as much as ¥15,000—nearly \$4,000 in prewar exchange. Black market gasoline was available, as well as fuel for cars equipped with charcoal-burning equipment. Illegitimate traders dealt heavily in luxuries and essential foods, despite the constant endeavors of "economic" police to stamp out the practice. They catered to war-time profiteers, whose paper money profits were fabulous, and to munitions workers, riding the crest of a boom they were unable to visualize before 1937. Some skilled workers in essential plants earn ¥1,000 monthly. Formerly, the best they could anticipate was ¥100.

The government insisted upon solemnity, but the war-rich craved gaiety. In 1943, they kept alive the geisha and red-light districts, whose bright lights burned behind the nightly dimout. Crowds stood patiently in long lines around the city's major movie houses, although nearly all pictures were fully dosed with war propaganda. A few German films were shown, the remainder were Japanese. Ginza beer halls received supplies once monthly. They were jammed for a few days, until the current ration was exhausted, then closed until the next allotment. Professional baseball continued to draw numerous fans. English phrases had been banned, and announcers struggled with such terms as "dame"—"bad"—for "out" and "yoroshii"—"good"—for "safe."

The government long had decreed prohibition in public bars each day until 5 P.M. and had placed maximum prices on all restaurant meals, to curtail their usual elaborateness. Restaurants were obliged to close at 10 P.M. So the "speakeasy" eating establishments appeared. The customer, recognized by peeping eyes through a grilled door—in the best manner of American prohibition days—

could obtain a more elaborate meal or could eat after hours at black market prices. Sometimes liquor was available under similar conditions.

Meanwhile, the common man struggled the best he could to keep abreast of diminished supplies and higher prices. The average white collar worker's salary, around ¥300 monthly, was inadequate to meet living costs, which during the Pacific conflict had risen three to four times over the inflated 1939 average. Official rations were insufficient for normal family needs. Whenever possible, the commoner also bought from the black market.

This situation had been growing since the start of the war period in 1937. The general attitude was patient acceptance. Racketeering always has been a common part of Oriental life. The individual Japanese had little belief that patronizing illegal markets meant sabotaging the war. It seemed all right to him, as long as he could get away with it.

The punishment varied for "black merchants" who were caught. Many of the biggest operators escaped with fines that were sizable in themselves but small compared to total profits. Others less important were badly beaten by the gendarmerie and sometimes imprisoned. Those who patronized the black market for small purchases sometimes were apprehended, primarily to furnish information concerning the merchants.

Throughout 1943 the controlled press was noticeably silent concerning the conviction of black market operators. The silence evidently was intended to minimize the existence of such a breach in national unity. In August, 1944, however, the press complained openly that the black market was a fundamental cause of the country's hard living conditions and accused the government of improper purchasing policies. The pinch had grown tighter, and there was less disposition to regard the situation tolerantly.

As hardships grew, the commoners could not fail to notice the growing wealth and publicly displayed comforts of the war-rich. From their viewpoint the demonstration of these luxuries was more of a sin than their possession. In the privacy of his own home, a man might live as well as possible. Moreover, this was a

weakness in the propaganda picture of a nation welded together by common service and by common sacrifice. A large percentage of the militarists and the extremists have convinced themselves that spartanism is the desirable life. They never have ceased sniping at those who flout it.

The government, early in 1944, made its most comprehensive attempt to extinguish the few remaining bright lights. Paralleling other decrees to heighten the national war effort, the cabinet announced the closing in one year of 9,800 "high class entertainment" places in the capital, as a part of the program to "fit the public mode of living to wartime restrictions." Domei said the ban affected all entertainment establishments charging admission of more than ¥5, which excludes motion picture theaters. The restriction was applied to 4,300 geisha houses, the city's better restaurants, including the Imperial Hotel, and to the legitimate drama. The latter, surprisingly enough, included the famous Kabuki theater which, showing classical plays built around the glorified achievements of the samurai, had been a principal means of perpetuating war psychology.

In place of these entertainments the government offered only the chance for more work in the state's interest, plus the constant plea that in wartime the people should spend their leisure in contemplation and greater devotion to the city's great shrines. The demand for entertainment was to be filled by government-produced motion pictures which monotonously repeated current propaganda themes. The few restaurants allowed to remain open were hobbled by the maximum ¥6 price for a meal, intended to insure that their patrons would eat in the same utilitarian basis as the rest of the nation. All bars previously had been closed. The government planned the absorption of all the unemployed in "essential industries," including the geisha.

At the same time the cabinet increased the size of the gendarmerie in the islands and announced an unspecified extension of its previously embrative powers. This meant a more elaborate vigil against any weakening of the home front. The gendarmerie presumably also

attempted more vigorous elimination of the black market, without notable success.

Under constantly reiterated threat of an intensified Allied attack, the government issued a stream of additional decrees. These included extension of the labor mobilization law to include women; the mobilization of all high school and college students to work in agriculture and factories; more comprehensive air raid precautions, plus the reorganization—"recentralization"—of metropolitan populations and the evacuation of lightly constructed government offices; the use of college and school buildings as military storehouses, hospitals or air raid shelters; further limitation of railway travel with the prospective abolition of all sleeping cars; tightened restrictions on the production of nonessentials; greater streamlining of internal administration and the courts; and utilization of every bit of vacant land to cultivate food.

Simultaneously, government spokesmen increased their pleas for greater industrial production to match that of the West. In numerous speeches, particularly to mass meetings of factory workers, Tojo declared in 1943 and early 1944 that "airpower will determine the outcome of the war." The need is vital for increased Japanese production, he said, while claiming the prewar output of "twenty thousand planes a year" has been doubled. The imperial symbol has been invoked by reports of His Majesty's "concern" over aircraft production.

The entire program is based upon a propaganda *volte face*. The formerly belittled Allied soldier is now a tough, determined foe. The United States has become the major enemy for propagandists who picture American pilots as "butchers" gleefully machine gunning children, the result of the 1942 Tokyo raid. The West is made more formidable by its productive capacity, they say, while also describing the "economic demoralization" of strikes. Japan's "superiority" lies in the abilities of her "valiant warriors" and the "inflexible will of the people."

In modern Japan it is often difficult to determine which of the government's pronouncements result from actual need and which are intended to produce greater service from the individual. Ele-

ments of both, apparently, were compounded in this new Japanese program. The country's internal manpower shortage is serious, and every Japanese hand is needed. Japan's bureaucratic government is top-heavy and incompetent, and the persistent militarist desire has been for a lean administrative system to carry out military orders with a minimum of confusion and no argument. Increased production is a necessity that must be met as far as certain fundamental inadequacies will allow. But the campaign for increased food production is saturated with the unfailing technique of demanding greater individual conformance through the challenge of hardship, encountered in the emperor's name.

The essential point is that the country's entire effort is diverted toward prolonged resistance, and no contrary argument is allowed. The Japanese people have accepted the militarists' contention that the entire empire will fight as long as possible and that the democracies, wanting a short war, cannot last through extended hostilities.

The domestic food campaign has been emphasized as the "Vacant Lots Utilization Program." Already heavily tilled and suffering from a shortage of fertilizer for overworked soil, the islands could not materially increase production. The government therefore devoted its attention to the cultivation of idle scraps of land. Plans, to be enforced through the labor of mobilized students and youth corps members, envisioned planting pumpkins and soy beans along railroad tracks and on small plots of marginal lands.

Simultaneously, the emperor "graciously allowed" the city of Tokyo to utilize vacant areas in the outer imperial palace grounds for produce and the outer moat for raising fish. He supposedly planted the first seeds himself. This was a symbol of the imperial interest in the program and was designed to insure greater participation in the entire campaign. The gesture undoubtedly deeply affected the average Japanese. Competition was keen for the "privilege" of devoting leisure time to this choice project. The relative American equivalent would be the establishment of a Victory garden on the White House lawn, with President Roosevelt turning the first few shovelfuls of earth.

Despite individual hardships, Japan, as an empire, is nowhere



near as poor as this program might indicate. Her own people furthermore will not starve so long as the militarists can draw upon producing areas under their control, particularly Korea, North China and Manchuria. National poverty has been exaggerated into a symbol for wartime conformity.

In 1943, the government further stripped Tokyo of available scrap metal, taking all chandeliers from the hotels, replacing wash bowls with a composition substitute, removing the iron rails from around a number of main buildings and elevators in all establishments which had more than one. Even the Buddhist temple bells were confiscated, to be melted for war materials. The propagandists thunderously reminded the people that their forefathers had sacrificed temple bells during the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century. By 1943, however, the conquerors had access to many suitable ore deposits.

From now on, Japan's domestic propaganda probably will be pessimistic, although she will continue to exhibit a bolder front to the overseas empire. Unless evaluated against the militarists' callousness in driving their people toward hardship, this type of government-inspired "news" might be misleading to the West. It gives the impression that Japan is much closer to collapse than is true.

Air raid drills have been a regular recurrent part of metropolitan life for several years. Through the neighborhood associations, they involve thousands of men and women who are permanent members of an elaborate organization for fire-fighting, first aid, gas control and aircraft spotting. The authorities have adopted intricate schemes for public co-operation in an emergency, down to appointed bucket-brigade squads for every few houses. Drills, formerly held semiannually for a week at a time, are more frequent now. Regular air raid exercises are staged by the workers in all factories.

The efficiency of this organization in a heavy raid would be doubtful. Typically, the Japanese over-man their rescue squads so that, for instance, six men are assigned to each stretcher. Buckets of water, often badly slopped while passing through a dozen hands, would be useless against the inferno that flimsy houses would be-

come under an incendiary attack. The Japanese militarist attitude was frankly expressed by one officer who told me: "Tokyo was built improperly for air attack, and there is nothing we can do if enemy planes get through. The best thing is for the whole city to burn down. Then it can be rebuilt so that decent air raid precautions can be made." Although the capital's newest commercial buildings and government offices have air raid shelters, there are only a few large public shelters, except for the subways. But they are built so close to the surface that heavy bombs might penetrate to them. In August, 1944, the press reported that new air raid precautions had included the "construction of a continuous line of air raid shelters" on both sides of Tokyo streets.

Nevertheless, the average Japanese feels in air raid drills a personal affiliation with the war effort which the government has found valuable. Air raid warden uniforms, which consist of cheap baggy pants and thin wrap-puttees—both a rather sickly olive drab—are worn proudly and orders are given with the civilian's interpretation of military crispness. The job is considered a coveted honor, not a chore, although it sometimes requires many leisure hours.

Because of the evident danger from air raids, the government has attempted the resettlement of "nonessential" civilians in the main cities. This job is tremendous in the overcrowded islands. Country districts have little room for refugees. Moreover, the total of "essential" civilians is rapidly increasing, because of the general involvement of all able-bodied men and women in the war effort. Consequently, only a few hundred thousand of Tokyo's more than seven million residents can and will be removed. Most of them are children. The sprawling capital is home for numerous workers in near-by factories. Removal of government offices, already under way, probably will be the only large-scale evacuation possible under the circumstances. As the Allied offensive approaches more closely it is likely a number of influential businessmen will be granted permission to move to Manchuria.

Japan's labor, badly depleted by demands of the armed forces on young manpower, has worked unusually long hours since 1937 to

keep the war machine in gear. Military conscription allows exemptions for only highly trained industrial workers. To meet the emergency arising from the China campaign, the government exhorted greater efforts by established workers and the diversion to industry of men over military age and of women. Agricultural crops were harvested by students whose vacations were timed to the rural seasons and by small groups of peasant-boy soldiers, granted periodic leaves to return to their parents' farms.

Slowly, the militarists tightened their control over labor, utilizing the stranglehold afforded by the 1938 national mobilization law. Today, every Japanese, technically, is subject to either military or labor service. By decree, all men between seventeen and forty cannot work in light industry, but are required to go into heavy war factories. Actually, there is little apparent hesitancy among able-bodied workers about entering war factories or devoting their leisure to "patriotic" projects. Their sense of duty and the influence of the group are potent factors, along with highly inflated wages in the industries. Japan now is operating on a minimum of production for purely civilian needs. In 1939 responsible observers estimated the country was more than 75 per cent centralized toward military output. It may be close to 90 per cent now.

Under the national mobilization law, the government originally froze industrial labor to prevent the transfer of workers from secondary war plants to higher paid major industries. Industrialists were required to obtain special permission before "raiding" the manpower of other factories. Practicality has decreed a change. Today, industries are classed in these four groups—"must" or vital factories; "may" or secondary war plants; "nonessential" and "industries which should be abolished." Any number of workers can be requisitioned from any lower category group, without government sanction, and can be exchanged between industries of the same category upon mutual agreement of the executives. The munitions ministry arbitrates all disputes.

The workingman has no voice concerning his working conditions. Any spoken outburst would attract immediate gendarmerie attention. Public opinion is set against industrial sabotage or strikes. In

such a case, the militarists could count upon the extremists to move in force against recalcitrant workers. Labor is supposed to conform to the war program under semimilitary restrictions.

Nevertheless, several concessions have been granted in key factories to improve the workers' livelihood. Wages have been raised many times. New housing projects and improved medical facilities have been reported. Workers are granted larger official rations. It is possible some of these improvements resulted from silent pressure, such as a slowing down of production, but there is no reliable evidence of any important strikes among Japanese workingmen since the Pacific war began. However, some sabotage by Korean workers in the islands has been reported in Japanese publications, according to Korean propagandists in the United States who are campaigning for their country's independence. The extent apparently is not important at present.

Although the Japanese have used Korean laborers, particularly miners, for several years in their islands, evidently they are still hesitant about importing sizable numbers of other subject peoples. The militarists do not trust any of their newly conquered races sufficiently to use them in the homeland. Consequently, the manpower shortage is acute in Japan, while Japanese industries abroad draw upon the millions of workers now dominated by the armed forces. This is another reason for the removal of factories to Manchuria.

Government insistence upon the entry of women into business and industry necessitated a profound readjustment of social life. Old-line Japanese strenuously oppose modernistic trends which might take women away from their traditional place in the kitchen. In prewar years the farm girls who strayed to spinning mills were not regarded with approbation. Japanese women now are in almost all types of work. Those between fourteen and forty are subject to compulsory labor.

Newsreels which I saw in internment frequently showed Premier Tojo addressing factory workers who invariably were either well past middle age or were 'teen-age boys. Tokyo's newspapers in 1943 betrayed the shortage of merchant seamen by large advertisements such as these: "Mothers—teach your boys the advantages of the mer-

chant marine." "We can't all be 'wild eagles' (combat pilots). We need you on merchant ships." Recruiting efforts were intensified the next year, and merchant seamen were given many special privileges.

Long before this war, many foreign observers in Tokyo believed Japan's industry was held together, figuratively, by baling wire. Industrial accidents were frequent, and the collapse of vital plants was predicted freely, because essential machinery was not replaced. Shortage of machine tools continues to be a fundamental Japanese bottleneck which cannot be remedied now because the empire lacks the facilities, although Domei reported a process for converting thousands of idle spinning machines into equipment suitable for aircraft production. From all indications badly worn machinery and overworked personnel are being forced into even greater production than during the early stages of the China campaign when collapse was predicted. Just how this is being done and the effect are not evident. The newspapers no longer publish reports of industrial accidents. They boast that German blockade runners have brought vital machinery to the empire. The amount cannot be large, however, even if the Nazis were willing to spare the machines. Only nine German freighters are believed to have reached Japan during the first six months of 1943.

At any rate, Japan continues to produce, through the sacrifices of regimented workers. Always accustomed to long hours, the Japanese factory hand may work 10 to 12 hours daily or even more, seven days a week. This pace has been maintained since the start of China hostilities. Individual inefficiency and exhaustion are overcome by mass energy. The result is a production total far below that of the United States but higher than some American observers believed possible before the war.

Under these circumstances, the average Japanese lives and serves his emperor. The uncompromising solemnity of the times has brought a new air of oppression to Tokyo and sister cities. Even the typically Japanese recreations of moon-viewing or visiting newly blossoming cherry tree orchards have been discouraged by the government, to minimize railroad travel. Families no longer are permitted to bid farewell to army-bound sons at railroad stations, for-

merly a ceremonious occasion with flags and marching troops. Military necessity provides now for secret departures at night. The people at home are supposed only to work, sacrifice and wait. They are waiting now for deadly thunder from the skies.

Since this war began, the militarists have made no major concessions to the people, for their control already was tight. But behind the scenes political battles and adjustments have continued within the framework of the war state.

\*\*\*\*\*

## chapter nineteen

# OLIGARCHIC BATTLES

FOR more than two and a half years, former Premier Hideki Tojo reigned as Japan's modern shogun. Representing the dominant Kwantung army clique, he arrogated to himself more personal power than any commoner had held since shogunal days. In the modern era no commoner, while alive, ever approached the publicity and acclaim which crackled around the empire's first Pacific war leader.

His dethronement, in July, 1944, was swift and sure. In a week he had tumbled from supreme power to oblivion, after a domestic battle precipitated by the loss of Saipan. He had failed. All his own strength and that of the army behind him could not erase his accountability for error. Under the Japanese code, responsibility had to be assumed. Tojo was placed on the army's retired list, a public evidence of defeat which, in some respects, amounts to a mild form of hara-kiri for high-ranking officers. A career is killed, but the man remains alive for future service when public memory of his mistake has dimmed.

Tojo lost in a battle of oligarchs. The people's role was secondary. The struggle was bitter and symbolic of the empire's war wounds. When it ended, the Kwantung element had made concessions, but its grip on the country still was firm. The story of that conflict outlines deep trends within Japan.

The army's power is the climax of a ceaseless battle for domestic control, which has been conducted during Japan's modernity; particularly since the death of Emperor Meiji, in 1912, yielded the

throne to two weak emperors. On the questions of war and peace, imperialism and international co-operation, the oligarchic opponents often split up among themselves, so that, for example, some industrialists supported the army, some the navy and others opposed both. In the main, the issues were method and route—militant conquest against economic infiltration; the northward push toward Siberia against the navy's scheme for obtaining the now conquered southern areas. Opposition to any form of conquest has been relatively limited and ineffective, and no group has been sufficiently strong to halt Japan's imperialism for any appreciable time.

In the end, the army won bloodstained domestic control by greater and more concerted ruthlessness. The Manchurian element is in the saddle, but this is the empire's war. Aside from the battle for survival, which it has become, it marks the coalescence of all the previous conflicts, over imperialistic method and route—under the throne's compelling shadow.

It is doubtful if Emperor Hirohito has any voice in government or any control over the measures promulgated in his name, often over his signature. He seems to be under complete militarist domination. There have been signs that continued war and his people's suffering are personally abhorrent to him. But he lacks both the will and means to escape his present virtual imprisonment.

Son of a warrior and trained to military inflexibility, Tojo was both a leader and a symbol for the Japanese. As head of the government, he provided the will, the energy and the disciplinary ruthlessness to bind the clannish people together for a single method of enforcing the "imperial wishes." As a symbol, he was the hard, determined modern samurai epitomizing the practical military effort, augmenting the conception of the throne as the spiritual motivation.

When Tojo was appointed war minister in the second Konoye cabinet, July, 1940, he was relatively unknown among the Japanese rank and file. His previous army career had been principally administrative. It had earned him a reputation among other officers as a stern disciplinarian, a man who achieved results by hard-boiled intensity. These early positions ran the gamut of routine assignments but also included posts as vice war minister, gendarmerie com-



mandant in Manchuria, chief of the Kwantung army staff and inspector general of army aviation. In the latter capacity he laid the foundation for the army's modern air force. His most notable troop command was a brief period as commander of a mechanized unit in North China, where he won recognition for mobile strategy during early battles of the China conflict. His only foreign assignment was attaché to the Berlin embassy.

The premier's association with the army's fanatic "younger officers," particularly the Manchuria clique, was long and permanent. Tojo himself did not share his cohorts' impetuosity, but he fully supported the dream of ruthless expansion and was an early spokesman for tight domestic control to further that scheme. In 1934, he was preaching the need for arming against Russia and the United States, as well as China. A few years later he was involved deeply in efforts to impose industrial regimentation upon the country, vigorously opposed by the lingering power of business.

One major disillusionment with the China campaign among Japanese civilians was the evident ineptitude of Tokyo's rapidly changing governments. "What we need," many of them used to say privately, "is a strong man, like Chiang Kai-shek." Four Japanese cabinets had fallen since the outbreak of war before Konoye formed his second government in 1940. The main reason was the army's refusal to accept power openly. When the final decision was made to plunge into Pacific warfare, the army at last assumed responsibility. Tojo, promoted to full general, became the first active officer in history to head the government. At once he made it clear that the army, and more particularly the Manchuria element, was in command, by surrounding himself with advisers who had been instrumental in formulating the "model state" of Manchukuo.

Tojo's appointment was a surprise, for he was still not widely known publicly. But he already had received in the popular mind the first gilding as the "strong man" he was to become. In actual character and propaganda, he became the autocrat that the dissatisfied Japanese civilians rather wistfully envisioned. But he also became a more definite and ruthless dictator than they wanted.

The character that the premier presented to the world, as symbol

and leader, was also the army's sketch of the ideal officer. Tojo was a stern, uncompromising general in whom all essential military traits were hardened. His ruthless determination, imperial and clan loyalty and single-purposed intensity were paramount. His decisions were swift and inflexible. Personally, he was temperate, frugal and hard-working. Born in Tokyo, in December, 1884, he was the son of Lieutenant General Eikyo Tojo, considered one of the Russo-Japanese war's greatest strategists.

The premier travelled extensively in his own plane, and his busy schedule included interviews ranging from high industrialists to groups of miners. The sense of equality implied by this performance was as unique for a Japanese premier as the extent of Tojo's journeys and his employment of aircraft. During 1943, he completely toured the empire, made two swift visits to Manila and at least three to Nanking. On each occasion his stay was a triumphant parade, featuring shiny automobiles and top hats, with the gendarmerie constantly patrolling all adjacent streets to prevent any assassination attempt. The press gave few details of Tojo's conversations with Japanese officials, but the implication was plain that his purpose was to hear reports, not suggestions, and to give orders. The premier had two favorite slogans among the many being shouted in Japan—"Make the impossible possible!" and "The whole nation a ball of fire!"

Hideki Tojo was known in the army as "Razor Brains," a tribute to mental agility which, in true samurai style, was not hobbled by conscience. It is said that as a puny but arrogant lad at school he was beaten once by a boy who resented his constant boasting over the samurai tradition of his family. Hideki's mother then used the incident to explain that knowledge and skill were essential to augment brute force. Thereafter, he based his power upon cunning, first as an adept jujitsu wrestler in the brawls of youth, ultimately as the ruler of an empire.

In addition to the premiership Tojo occupied two of the army's three key positions—chief of staff and war minister—and was also munitions minister and titular head of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. These posts gave him a guiding voice in military af-

fairs, a stranglehold on the government, important influence in industrial production and the technical leadership of social thought.

Tojo became chief of staff in February, 1944, apparently completing his consolidation of personal power, as a result of the first American attack upon Truk. It was widely publicized with fair accuracy within Japan, then was followed by the "resignations" of Field Marshal Gen Sugiyama and Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano, respectively army and navy chiefs of staff. Tojo and his navy minister, Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, succeeded them.

Since the army could have avoided direct implication for the raid, which involved a naval base, it seemed evident Tojo took advantage of the situation to oust Sugiyama who previously was considered merely a "front man" for the Manchuria clique.

The Tojo-dominated cabinet ruled the country by decree. The measures it formulated were rubber-stamped into approval by the Diet, when that formality was required. That legislative body has been impotent for more than a decade. Government ministers appear before it periodically to deliver prepared addresses, but any attempt to ask embarrassing questions is throttled quickly, and the public is never informed.

The premier repeatedly reorganized the government's administrative system in an attempt to realize the streamlining which the militarists visualize. The necessity for repeated experiments indicated he was not fully successful in weeding out firmly entrenched bureaucrats. Nevertheless, Tojo tightened his central control by subdividing the islands into nine districts under government appointees holding direct authority over prefectural governors and administering through their organizations. This system, permitting swift action on vital changes in government or social life, was continued by Tojo's successor government.

Several notable trends appeared in 1943. There were many indications in that year that higher officers and shrewder industrialists realized Japan had lost the war. None believed that Allied victory was even a matter of months, against sustained opposition. But they realized that the failure of the original offensive to conquer Hawaii and Australia, coupled with the amazing American recuperative

powers, had decided the ultimate outcome, which, they reasoned, would be determined by productive capacity. War plans, made by inflexible men like Tojo, were based then upon prolonging hostilities. That policy now is in effect.

But others were less determined or less practical in their mixture of ancient samurai traditions and modern battle technique. Three apparent suicides, which are indicative, have been publicized; no one can tell how many others have occurred. Two commanders of the combined fleet have died, identically, while "directing naval operations from aircraft," according to Japanese reports. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, who boasted that Japan would dictate peace in Washington, was killed in April, 1943. His successor, Admiral Mineichi Koga, died in March, 1944.

The parallelism of their deaths, under the unusual circumstances of directing operations from aircraft in a combat zone, points to the generally accepted version that both committed a modern form of hara-kiri. This is seldom done today by high-ranking officers. Whether the two admirals were paying for naval defeats or were demonstrating their conviction of impending defeat never can be determined. At any rate, their loss was costly and wasteful and was inconsistent with the central military plans. Chinese reports, in 1943, also said that Seigo Nakano, a pro-Axis politician and a director of the IRAA, had "committed suicide because of discouragement over the war." A few months previously he had resigned from the Diet.

At the same time big business—a term customarily embracing both industrialists and financiers—showed signs of resurgent strength. Ruled by cliques as obdurate, and sometimes as anonymous, as the armed services, industry always has been the militarists' most effective opposition in the conflict over domestic control. It was cowed completely, however, at the outset of the Pacific conflict.

In his first cabinet, in 1941, Tojo pointedly ignored business by appointing militarists and bureaucrats. The immediate reaction was so strong that he subsequently named Okinobu Kaya as finance minister and Shinsuke Kishi as commerce minister, the latter eventually going into the munitions ministry. Both of these men, osten-

sibly, were business appointees. However, they were Tojo's personal friends and were unacceptable to the faction they were supposed to represent. Still, industry did little in the first year of the war to regain its position.

Slowly, in 1943, it began to sabotage the finance department until all war financing was done through the Bank of Japan whose governor then was Toyotaro Yuki, one of the country's three leading businessmen. Financial matters relating to the new empire were routed through the Greater East Asia ministry, headed by Kazuo Aoki, a poor-born commoner who reached power through being adopted by a prominent financier. Kaya and the finance ministry, formerly one of the most influential cabinet posts, withered on the governmental vine. Finally, Tojo gave in and replaced him in a 1944 cabinet reshuffle. The new appointee was Sotaro Ishiwata, former vice finance minister, whose principal qualification, according to Domei, was "an ability to make friends."

The appointment of an advisory council of ten leading industrialists was another indication of this new strength. There is evidence also that the Osaka financial group forced the 1943 repatriation, against general government disinterest. The industrialists were anxious for the exchange of several of their representatives who had been crowded from the first repatriation list by governmental and semimilitarist officials, such as mining technicians, whose services Tokyo desired.

The conflict over industrial regimentation intensified. The original army blueprint, in 1940, was only one step short of outright confiscation. It was meant to give the militarists tight control over all manufacturing output, for as long as necessary, with the businessmen taking orders from militarist appointees. Part of the scheme, but not all of it, was forced into practice.

Japan's industry is now concentrated in some twenty-three control agencies covering all war production, including a newly created aircraft control organization. All steel mills, for example, are classified together under a "czar" who allots each factory sufficient raw materials to meet its share of the total militarist-designated production quota for the steel industry. Failure of an individual plant to

produce its share means a reduction of future material allotments or sterner measures to guarantee greater output in the future. Any executive refusing conformance would invite gendarmerie retaliation upon himself. The government either would seize his plant, or eliminate it by choking off supplies through its airtight control of raw materials.

The militarists failed in their attempt to appoint their own industrial czars, and were forced to name men acceptable to business. The outstanding example was Ginjiro Fujiwara, Japan's "paper king" and a favorite of business, who headed steel, the number one control group. He was not responsible to the government but occupied a semiautonomous position. So long as his industry continued to fulfill its quotas, direct government interference was avoided, and the industrialists remained in control. No reasons of conscience prevent the militarists from completely taking over, but such a move would result in domestic chaos.

Premier Tojo evidently was dissatisfied with the results. Organization of the munitions ministry in late 1943 was intended to increase industrial efficiency and to place all production more directly under government control. The militarists were not as bold, however, as in the immediate prewar years when they advocated complete subjugation of industry. They merely said the new ministry would guarantee "closer collaboration in Japan's life-and-death struggle." Meanwhile, the premier made numerous trips to Osaka, presumably for more discussion with the dominant business cliques there.

On the other hand, the army forced a radical reorganization of the powerful Mitsui companies in 1943. The ostensible reason was an economic scandal involving the Shansi (China) province manager of its trading subsidiary. But propagandists soon announced that Mitsui planned "positive entry into war materials production," indicating its previous performance had not satisfied the rulers. The militarists also may have been behind the unprecedented move in that year by the oligarchic financial houses in offering their stock on the open market. Shares of Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo—formerly jealously guarded from the public—were listed at ¥250 each on a bearish market ruling the country's two remaining stock

exchanges. The apparent reason was shortage of capital funds. Sales were brisk among the war-rich, impressed by the chance of participating in enterprises formerly closed to them. But the financiers, doubtless, are awaiting the slump they expect with future war developments to rebuy on a bullish market at substantial profits.

The country is pledged to the hilt of its domestic income to finance the war. A Domei report, in early 1944, said the year's budget would total ¥53,415,000,000 (about \$13,353,750,000 in pre-war exchange). The final total probably will be swelled by special appropriations. When we left Asia, Japanese officials were talking of a sixty billion budget, which would equal the anticipated national income. Domei's report said ¥38,000,000,000 had been approved for the year's direct military expenditures, an increase of eleven billion over the previous year. (The news agency also said that more than eight billion in revenue would come from the Southern Regions Development Bank. That indicates the size and growth of that mammoth control agency, for its contribution then would be five billion more than the previous year.) Japan's total budget, in 1931, was between three and four billion yen.

The militarists believe the nation cannot fight a total war without total financial participation, hence, their budgets embrace the full income. In addition to high taxes, on a "soak-the-rich" scheme, they tap the nation's pocketbooks through the obligatory sale of war bonds, which Domei said would reach twenty billion yen in 1944. Each wage earner, from factory worker to underpaid white collar employee, is required to devote a percentage of his salary to bonds; while additional sales are drummed through intensive propaganda campaigns, which include a governmental sweepstakes for holders of "lucky number" bonds.

A Japanese workingman earning ¥50 monthly is obliged to divert approximately 15 per cent to war bonds, a ¥300 monthly income is decreased about one-third. Bonds are not regarded as a safe and profitable investment, but as a necessary obligation. Little return is expected. Financial brokers formerly redeemed war bonds for hard-pressed commoners at about 14 sen on the yen (14 cents

on the dollar). By 1943, the issue was so topheavy they refused to do business.

Attempts to curb overbalanced inflation and the resultant increased cost of living have been ineffective. The output of printing-press money, already dangerously high in 1939, was intensified after the current war began. Quadrupled living costs have appeared despite what was supposed to be a tight government ceiling on all commodity prices. Yet the militarists consistently have rejected the efforts of financiers to apply a checkrein to this trend and often have refused advice from men whose fiscal knowledge and experience are far greater than theirs. The sharp conflict behind the scenes, over financial matters, has been endless.

Meanwhile, Manchuria-styled fascism had failed in Japan. The Imperial Rule Assistance Association, which had lost public respect, underwent its third and fourth renovations in 1943 and 1944. This experiment in political planning had functioned only haphazardly in essential points, but the militarists refused to risk the loss of face by scrapping it. Instead, they patched and repatched the basic organization, granting concessions in the hope, finally, of making it effective.

The most notable was tacit recognition that political activity could not be sterilized out of Japanese life, even in the emperor's name. When political parties were eliminated under the original outline of the IRAA, politicians were supposed to confine their activities to plumping for the cabinet's policies as members of the central body. The Diet no longer was to be subdivided into party factions, but all legislators automatically became members of the Diet Club, under the IRAA more a social than a political adjunct. The ballot was not eliminated in the country, but all candidates had to be certified by the IRAA. They ran on identical platforms of government support.

The politicians and some industrialists sabotaged the IRAA from the first. Finally, after unsuccessful experimentation, a new subsidiary organization was formed, called the Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society, its purpose being to permit channeled political activity under the IRAA. In other words, it was recognized



that there were political differences and that men of varied opinions could not be lumped together under a blanket label. Cliques which had their origins in the former political parties had re-formed in the Diet Club. They became more prominent under the new political association. Militarist hopes of a no-party state, as far as politics were concerned, were doomed.

Nevertheless, the rulers intended to make sure at the outset that, in granting this concession to practicality, they did not permit the political parties to re-emerge to any degree that might be dangerous to them. Leaders and chief organizers of the new adjunct were two old-line generals whom the militarists could trust—Lieutenant General Kisaburo Ando, the home minister, and former Premier General Nobuyuki Abe.

(The IRAA's father, the Concordia Society, had been tested on subject natives whose political sense was little developed and on Japanese colonists who were obliged to conform by direct military pressure. The militarists miscalculated in trying to superimpose it wholly upon the Japanese. Apparently they made the same mistake in the Philippines, or else attempted to prevent it by a thin concession, for in May, 1944, the controlled radio reported the Kali-bapi had been given a "political status.")

Meanwhile, the outlawed secret societies were returning to open prominence. The notorious Black Dragon society advertised its official rebirth with a two-page advertisement in all Tokyo newspapers, calling upon President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to cease "hopeless resistance." Other organizations, including the Japan Reservists' Association, once again held jingoistic meetings which were advertised fully. Few, if any, of these groups died as a result of the official ban. They were driven underground in Japan, although in China, particularly around Peking, their members were unusually active in battling for a division of the spoils.

During their early experimentation, the Manchurian planners doubtless borrowed much from European fascism. But by the time they introduced the new social pattern to the homeland, it had become basically what was called "totalitarianism à la Japanese." To the average civilian, however, the single-party scheme smacked

of Italo-German influences. There was considerable resentment of these foreign importations among people who disliked or distrusted their Axis allies without publicly mentioning the subject.

The 1943 readjustments, therefore, indicated a deep and multiplex trend. Growing war-bred hardships and discipline boiled into stronger opposition to Tojo's one-man rule, which the Japanese long feared, from memory of their cruel shoguns. Only the oligarchs had the strength to oppose Tojo, forcing minor concessions without breaking his power. At the same time the Japanese slowly but definitely were turning away from the Axis and the changes its influence had brought to the country. Japanese are notoriously agile in jumping on and off bandwagons. By early that year most Japanese, including soldiers, no longer believed they were fighting a global war in close concert with the Axis—their original idea of the struggle. Germany's failure to conquer Russia, and Italy's evident weakness, had produced belief the Japanese were battling single-handedly in the Pacific. The ordinary man had ceased to believe Japan was required to lend any assistance in the losing European struggle.

The reaction was typical. Once again the Japanese were looking toward inversion and dependence upon themselves to meet national frustration. The trend pointed toward eventual elimination of Axis influences and restrengthening of national characteristics which are essentially Japanese.

In February, 1944, American forces broke the crust of Japan's outflung mid-oceanic empire by occupying principal atolls in the Marshalls. This, to the Japanese, was serious but not vital. The war still was relatively distant, swirling around outposts. They counted upon distance and Allied preoccupation in Europe to delay a breakthrough into the empire's inner defense lines.

Their scheme was defeated on both counts during June, 1944, a historic and remarkable month. The Allies struck at Fortress Europe and drove an iron fist through Hitler's vaunted steel rim. Japanese were captured in the front lines. Evidently, they were participating observers, gathering firsthand information the hard way for preparation of defenses against the large-scale landings the

Tokyo high command anticipates in the Philippines, China and perhaps Japan.

The first B-29 raid on Japan proved that American air power could penetrate homeland defenses, which the Japanese had been told were impregnable. But the bases were in China, and the supplies which could be ferried by air from India would be insufficient for sustained bombing on anything like the pre-invasion pattern in Europe.

Then came our thrust at Saipan Island in the Marianas group. This was Japan's equivalent of Hawaii, little more than fifteen hundred miles from Tokyo. Its Tanapag harbor so resembles Pearl Harbor, in topography and appearance, that Admiral Nimitz commented upon it in one of his communiqués. It is within bombing range of Japan's factories and also within protected American supply lines.

The Saipan garrison and its defenses were strong. But an island of that size cannot be defended against a sufficiently determined foe without naval support. The Japanese sent a hit-and-run naval force. Aircraft struck from the west at American fleet units off Saipan June 18. Several hundred planes were shot down with no major American loss. The next day carrier-based American aircraft hunted out and heavily damaged the mother fleet, which attempted to escape toward the Philippines when the air blow failed.

On land, after the bloodiest campaign in the Pacific to that time, American forces secured Saipan. Nearly the entire Japanese garrison of some twenty-five thousand men was killed. Among the dead was Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, naval commander of the central Pacific area. He commanded the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the ill-fated second Hawaii-bound expedition which was defeated off Midway. His decision to remain on embattled Saipan in itself was an indication that he accepted certain death, as a sort of hara-kiri. (Capture of Tinian and liberation of Guam followed later.)

These were the military events which gave Tojo's oligarchic rivals the opportunity to dethrone him. Army-navy tension obviously was acute, and doubtless the premier was blamed personally

for the naval debacle. Evidently, he attempted to side-step his downfall by a series of maneuvers.

But Tojo could not save himself. The oligarchs, headed by the navy, forced him from office July 18. Two days later, General Kuniaki Koiso, another member of the Kwantung clique and often its "troubleshooter," became premier. He appointed a compromise cabinet which granted concessions to every powerful faction. Although this was one of the most severe Japanese crises in history, the army's rivals lacked sufficient power to unseat the Kwantung clique, even with Tojo's direct implication. One-man dictatorship, however, had been smashed. The country returned to the more familiar governmental pattern of group dictatorship from behind the scenes, ruling through the emperor.

Koiso's initial assignment as premier was a twofold attempt to bind the country into the renewed effort which the expanding war required. To quiet the people's sullen disillusionment, he had to convince them that Tojoism was dead and rule by a single unbending martinet was over. To mollify oligarchic opponents, he granted the governmental representation which they had demanded and had fought Tojo with increasing strength to obtain. War developments had precipitated the governmental change, but readjustments were entirely domestic and in conformity with the expanding two-year trend. The people's will to fight seemed unimpaired; perhaps it was strengthened by this new challenge of adversity.

All of Tojo's personal friends were dumped, but the clique's ideas, which he advanced, were protected carefully by the appointment of like-minded successors. Fundamental was the move to insure continuation of Manchuria-style imperialistic policies through the civilian decrees issued in Tokyo, as well as the edicts of local commanders.

In August, Koiso announced the formulation of a supreme "war direction" council, and he quoted the emperor in sanctioning and explaining it. The council thereby became an imperial body, removed from political sniping. Its functions, said Domei, would be to decide all "basic national policies," both military and political, and the cabinet was politically bound to carry them out. Its mem-

bers were anonymous generals, admirals and the "cabinet ministers concerned," possibly only the war and navy ministers who, under the constitution, have direct access to the throne. The cabinet, therefore, ceased to be a major policy-making organization and became solely an administrative agency for enforcing policies decided by militarists who remained hidden from public view and removed from criticism.

The emperor's name has been used in the past to justify or extend the militarists' control. Never before, however, has he conferred authority so definitely on the military junta. Obviously, the army will control the council, which will be unaffected by cabinet fluctuations.

The move was so unusual that it was launched amid a heavy propaganda smokescreen. The cabinet simultaneously decided "to arm the entire people at the earliest possible moment," so grave had the war situation become. That implied the imminence of invasion, with the homeland unprotected either by a fleet or home army garrisons. In August that was a distant possibility but not an immediate threat. But it made good advertising to hide the real consolidation of power.

It is unlikely that the Koiso cabinet's promises and policies will lighten the people's burdens or soften their servility to the regimented state. The Kwantung clique will maintain its strict control, including a tightly censored press. But the premier's methods illustrated attempts to erase the memories of Tojoism.

The "new policy" toward China would remain unchanged, Shigemitsu said, for the continent was the basic element in foreign policy. Koiso declared the country would adopt a "flexible" foreign policy, to cope with the times, while propagandists maintained the "inflexibility" of Japan's program. Apparently the premier had the Axis in mind and spoke of the prospective severance from Germany somewhat prematurely.

Most Japanese anticipated Italy's collapse and shrugged it off, accepting the official explanation that it had strengthened the Axis. The majority of islanders always despised and mistrusted their peninsular allies, and felt they were better off without them. Imme-

diately after the capitulation, haughty Italian civilians who were vacationing at Karuizawa, a well-known summer resort in Japan, were apprehended by the gendarmerie, handcuffed together and marched triumphantly down the town's main street. The Tokyo embassy staff was confined within its buildings and denied permission to obtain funds from the outside. Mussolini's "escape" was a brief sensation in Japan, but soon even the official press ignored his puppet government and talked of the Axis as including only Japan and Germany.

Japanese bitterness toward the Nazis also is deep and long-lived. It is based upon mutual mistrust and nurtured by the consistent arrogance of Germans living in the islands. It was evident that after the tripartite pact Berlin thought Japan could be transformed into a Nazi colony such as Italy. Great inroads had been made by hundreds of Nazi agents flooding the country. They went so far as to install Gestapo officials in the home ministry. Then the proud Japanese stiffened their attitude, and further encroachment was halted. Nevertheless, the Tokyo embassy, in 1943, had a staff of about four hundred trained men, active in all phases of the war effort.

While hating the Germans, the average Japanese feels his country must co-operate with them from necessity. A number of influential army men remain strongly pro-German, despite Russian successes. Prussian and Japanese militarists think alike. There can be no doubt the two countries will continue their collaboration so long as both are in the war, Germany supplying technical knowledge, particularly regarding aircraft, and possibly some machine tools and other imports in return for rubber and tin from Japan's southwestern conquests.

But opinion within Japan already is prepared to accept a Nazi collapse without interruption of the Tokyo war effort. In one instance, at least, Tojo made what apparently was a gesture of tacit approval of the Japanese reaction away from their allies. He pointedly remained away from a luncheon to commemorate the tripartite pact, given by Ambassador Heinrich Stahmer in September, 1943. Stahmer, one of Hitler's most trusted agents, was the man largely responsible for inveigling Japan into the Axis. After serving

as ambassador to Nanking, he was assigned to the Tokyo post in August, 1943, possibly to guard against any important repercussions from the Japanese trend, then perceivable.

The story is told by reliable, but unofficial, sources that the well-organized German colony in Shanghai received a harsh setback to dreams of "co-operation" at the outset of the war. The leader of the local Gestapo unit telephoned the Japanese commandant that his men were ready to undertake their share of "policing" the newly acquired International Settlement. He offered to hold a review for the Japanese officer to demonstrate the Germans' training and preparedness. The offer was accepted. The Nazis, smartly uniformed and well-equipped with small arms, stood at stiff attention while the Japanese general and his staff inspected them.

"Splendid," said the Japanese commandant, "but unnecessary."

At a nod, his staff quickly disarmed the astounded Germans. The conquerors wanted no face-losing support from their allies and refused to permit the existence of an armed minority which they mistrusted probably as much as the Anglo-Americans.

In August, 1944, a relayed report indicated the Japanese were cutting economic ties with Germany. The Zurich correspondent of the Stockholm Aftontidningen reported that Dr. Helmut Wohltat, chairman of the Nazi economic mission to Japan, had returned to Germany aboard a Japanese submarine with the report of events which "unfavorably influenced relations" between the uncongenial allies. These included the closure of the Tokyo branch of the German chemical concern, I. G. Farbenindustrie. The report also said that "five hundred fifty German businessmen lost their trading licenses" in Japan. On the basis of past Japanese-German relations, the report might well be true.

In September, Tokyo gave indications that propaganda preludes to the final break with beaten Germany had begun. For the first time criticism of German military and political strategy seeped into news stories. The usual long-winded press discussions of Axis "solidarity" had disappeared. They were replaced by extensive accounts of "Greater East Asia strength and collaboration." Japanese war news from Europe was relatively accurate, including reports of

the Allied rush through France and, more significantly, the desertions of Axis satellites.

The fears of German civilians in Shanghai and Japan that Japanese reprisals will follow a Nazi capitulation appear to me justified, unless the police are unusually active. Japanese resentment would be stronger against the Nazis than the Italians, because Berlin had been such a dominant Axis leader and Hitler's representatives in Japan have been more overbearing. More than one German already has been accosted by Japanese with the accusation: "You're the people responsible for all our troubles." In China, several Japanese army officers betrayed a certain satisfaction over Nazi losses in Russia, despite their ultimate consequences, because it demonstrated to them the superiority of Japanese forces, still able to resist the Allies.

German defalcation would not weaken the Japanese war effort. Instead, it probably would heighten the islanders' determination to continue alone, by tightening the adherence of individuals who silently frowned upon Japan's partnership with the Axis. To them, the Pacific hostilities then would become an unalloyed battle for survival. Military and governmental preparations doubtless were complete some time ago for continuing hostilities alone, with no jar when the Nazis leave the imperialistic train.

It is impossible today to point with assurance to any Japanese, within Japan, who might sabotage the war effort for any reason. Even known prewar opponents of both militarism and imperialism must be counted as "unknown quantities" now, with the issues so vital. It is conceivable, within the emperor concept, that some Japanese could be convinced that their duty to the throne lay in promoting peace and saving the nation. In that case, any moves they made contrary to militarist wishes would be suppressed swiftly.

Against that background a few signs which might indicate a "liberalistic" resurgence, and the many more evidences which probably will appear in the future, become clearer. One of the first was Shigemitsu's appointment. From China appeared scattered reports such as these: Shanghai rumors said the industrialists had usurped power, and mass meetings had been held in Tokyo at which anti-



Tojo placards were displayed; Japanese war prisoners assertedly told Chinese officials that strikes were sweeping Japan; a Japanese "democratic" leader supposedly is directing from China an incipient revolt in Japan. Responsible American government agencies have investigated these reports thoroughly. None was true.

These are the preliminaries to what undoubtedly will be Japan's attempt sometime in the future to win the favorable compromise peace her militarists desire. Briefly, the scheme probably will be something like this: Japan will erect a "façade" government of men whose potentialities for international collaboration are known. They will report secretly to American authorities that Allied victories have cost the militarists so much face at home they have resigned and the "liberals" now are in power, with popular support. Peace terms will be asked. If negotiations are undertaken, the Japanese will explain that only an armistice allowing Japan to retain her continental empire, and possibly some overseas possessions, would be acceptable to the people; otherwise the extremists and militarists would be able to force their way back into power. Behind the negotiators would be the army, navy and industry, relatively intact, and still fanatically committed to continuing the war.

For this pageantry, the militarists will use the liberals against their will or with it. They will prepare elaborately and patiently, employing such stories as those circulating from China to create the belief of war weariness in Japan or the weakening of militarist power. They will play upon every American and British element that seems useful to their purposes and will use any subterfuge to gain their ends. We must maintain constant vigilance against all possible traps. Any peace that is not total and final capitulation will be a Japanese victory. The militarists would have a head start for their next war.

Future developments within wartime Japan must be evaluated against these elements: The strength of Japanese loyalty; the willingness of the people to risk "honorable" death rather than "dishonorable" peace; the prevalent Japanese realization that capitulation means the end of the empire, and therefore they have nothing to lose and everything to win by prolonging the conflict and gam-

bling on a "break"; the conviction that any sort of chicanery is laudable in the emperor's service; a distinction between internal disputes over method and conflicts over the war itself; and finally, the army's power and ruthlessness.

Meanwhile, civilians in the United Nations must be prepared to match Japanese doggedness and patience, if we are to win. This requires constant guard against false optimism, as well as a willingness to endure greater heartache and hardship for any length of time, until the job is finished. The war will be long and painful, despite our successes to date. It will not be won by production figures, but by grim, self-sacrificing men fighting their way into every blockhouse and every gully held by the Japanese. It will not end until Japanese military might is smashed.

This is total war. It demands total participation. At home and on the front we must fight, in fierce union, until they eat stones.

## EPILOGUE

After this war, we will face our greatest need for calm and clear thinking. The peace can be lost easily, particularly in Asia. The future, in that case, would be appallingly vivid.

To my mind, the Japanese militarists, and men of their viewpoint, deserve no leniency nor any sentimental "second chance" for salvation. I think those surviving the war should be tried and executed. Every precaution should be taken to prevent the rise of successors by maintenance of a vigilant armistice commission in the islands and, if necessary, the occupation and fortification of key bases surrounding them. Essential war materials, such as petroleum and steel, should be filtered to Japan in quantities sufficient for peacetime expansion but insufficient for the creation of an attacking military machine.

But, on the other hand, the extermination of an entire race is impossible. The Japanese people, if freed from bondage, possess attributes which could be used for the benefit of their own country and all Asia. That freedom can come only through a comprehensive program of re-education, designed not to cram democracy down their throats but to give them mental equipment to break the cocoon of feudalism themselves.

Our occupation commission should exercise direct supervision in Japan for as long as this education is necessary. If, in two generations, we can eliminate the militarist training of centuries, we shall be doing well. All the while our watch must be constant against countermovements, for today's youth already have been handed the torch for that one hundred-year war. In short, our methods must parallel those of the militarists themselves, without the brutality.

However, if only for practical reasons, the relationship should

avoid a vengefulness that will permit duplication of the Hitler pattern. The Japanese could be marshaled even more easily than the Germans toward revenge. With wise diplomacy, they also could be led toward an honorable place in world society. In the end, I believe the throne must be abolished, because it is too valuable a militarist weapon. But, at the outset, we may find our sole immediate means of reaching the people is through the emperor, if the militarists allow him to live. At the same time, the Japanese should be educated away from the entire superman and super-race philosophy of Shinto.

Such a program would defeat the first part of the militarists' gamble—our postwar indifference.

The "old days" of swaggering Occidental superiority in the Orient are gone. Every race has known a hardened strength and a resurgent nationalism which come through active battle. The Chinese, the Filipinos, the Indonesians and the Indians have fought on our side. They fought for a variety of reasons which did not include a desire to perpetuate the old system. They fought in faith that the future would be fairer to them, some with full belief in the Atlantic Charter. The Allies must expect trouble if they intend to say to them: "All right, men, you put up a good battle. Now let's go back to where we were in 1941."

The militarists, expecting that, have laid their plans deeply. They can be circumvented only through a sane compromise which gives native peoples tangible hope for a freer future. Militant peace requires hard work, perseverance, sometimes sacrifice. Half-hearted measures or indifference, inevitably, would mean war.

It will be natural to desire a rest after the war. But it is neither natural, nor sensible, to adopt deliberately a way of life which favors the enemy and coincides with his plans.

Of all the great powers, the United States has the best opportunity of capturing fully the confidence of Asia, including that of the Japanese people. Our lack of territorial designs has created a trust which will provide the most effective foundation for leadership in postwar rehabilitation. As the dominant Pacific naval power,

we can avoid no longer the responsibilities of maintaining an active and ceaseless guard against the Japanese militarist menace.

It is a matter of self-defense for us to participate actively in post-war efforts to guarantee the future. It is duty—to the boys now fighting for us, to the millions now waiting for us.



## INDEX

- ABCD "encirclement," 279  
 Abe, General Nobuyuki (Japanese ex-premier), 317  
 Abhaiwong, Major Kuang (Thai premier, 1944), 193  
 Aquino, Benigno S. (Philippine puppet official), 75, 77, 83, 85  
 Aguinaldo, Emilio, 77, 88  
 Aguinaldo's department store (internment camp branch), 146  
 Aircraft production in Japan, 299  
 Air raid precautions in Japan, 299, 301-302  
 Aikawa, Yoshisuke (Japanese industrialist), 264  
 Alas, Antonio de las, 77  
 Alunan, Rafael R., 77  
 Amaterasu Omikami (sun goddess), 272  
 American Association of Shanghai, 124, 169  
 Andaman Islands, 194  
 Anderson, George, 157, 158  
 Ando, Lieutenant General Kisaburo, 317  
 Annamese, 180  
 Anshan (Manchuria), 262  
 Antimonan, 17  
 Aoki, Kazuo, 313  
 Aparri (Philippines), 55  
 Araki, General Sadao, 200, 254  
 Army-navy controversies (Japanese), 240, 308  
 Armies, Japanese-dominated native: in the Philippines, 50; in Indo-China, 180; in Thailand, 190; in Burma, 199; Indian "army," 199; in Netherlands East Indies, 209; in China, 226; in Manchuria, 264  
 Arnold, General H. H., quoted, 22  
 Arranz, Melecio, 77  
 Ash internment camp, 244  
 Asia Development Board, 222  
 Assassinations (in Philippines), 76  
 Attu, 286  
 Avanceña, Ramon, 77  
 Axis, the, 321-324  
 B-29 bombers, in China, 230; raid Manchuria, 262; first raid on Japan, 319  
 Baguio, 29; internment camp, 172  
 Balikpapan, 52  
 Ba Maw (Burmese puppet leader), 85, 195-197  
 Bangkok, rail link to Indo-China, 182; bombed, 192  
 Banjermasin Defense Corps (Borneo), 215  
 Bank of Japan, 313  
 Bank of Taiwan, 59  
 Bantung (Netherlands East Indies), 202  
 Baseball (in Tokyo), 296  
 Bataan, 46, 54, 55, 57, 69, 88; USAFFE withdrawal to, 25; last stand, 25; Japanese vengeance, 28, 34; Death March, 46, 104; Filipinos' reaction, 104; civilian internees' reaction, 161-162  
 Batavia (schools), 205  
 Bay View Hotel, 18, 59  
 Beggars (in Shanghai), 239  
 Bennett, Roy, 42, 173; Mrs. Roy, 174  
 Biba (Philippines rice warehouse), 68  
 Bilibid prison (war prisoners), 117, 120  
 Bissinger, George, 158, 160-161, 163  
 Black Dragon Society, 317

- Black market, in Philippines, 65; in Shanghai, 238; in Japan, 294, 296-297
- Blockade-runners (German), 186, 305
- Bohol Island, 117
- Borneo (Dutch), 52; Japanese navy control, 202; local governments, 204; guerrillas, 215
- Bose, Rash Behari, 199
- Bose, Subhas Chandra (Indian puppet leader), 85, 199-200
- Brazzaville radio (Africa), 184
- "Bridge-House" (Shanghai), 245
- Briones, Manuel C., 77
- British Relief Association (Shanghai), 124
- Buddha, 197
- Buddhism (in Burma), 197
- Burma, 194-200; first occupation government, 195; "independence," 195; declares war against United States and Great Britain, 195, 199; cultural agreement with Japan, 197; land tax suspended, 197; economic exploitation, 198; war warnings, 198; territorial losses to Thailand, *see* Shan states.
- Burmans, 198
- Bushido*, 275
- Buss, Dr. Claude, 23, 30, 112
- Butler, Tom, 243
- Cabanatuan war prison, 116-118
- Cadwallader, Fred, 150
- Cagayen valley, 55
- Calhoun, A. D., 164, 172
- Cambodia, 188
- Camp del Pilar, war prison, 177
- Camp John Hay, *see* Baguio
- Camp O'Donnell, war prison, 116-118
- Camp Stanley, civilian internees, 127, 233-236
- Camranh Bay (French Indo-China), 178, 181-183, 188
- Camus, Judge Manuel, 63
- Canacao navy hospital (Philippines), nurses from, 117, 172
- Canton, 221, 224, 230, 233
- Capas, war prison, 117
- Carpenter, Henry, 18, 157, 165
- Carroll, Earl, 132 ff., 148, 159, 160, 164, 165
- Catholic Friendly Society of Japan, 90
- Catholicism, Japanese uses of in Philippines, 89
- Catroux, General Georges, 177
- Cavite, 20, 23, 54
- Cebu, 52, 69; treatment of civilians, 29; attack and defense, 109; internment conditions, 171
- Cecil, Robert, 142
- Celebes, 202, 204
- Central China Promotion Company, 222
- Central Luzon Defense Corps, 52
- Central Reserve Bank (China), 238
- Chahar province, 260
- Chang Ching-hui, 85
- Changsha, 229
- Changteh, 229
- Chapei internment camp, 169, 244, 246
- Chen Kung-po, puppet mayor of Shanghai, 241
- Chennault, Major General Claire, 230
- Chiang Kai-shek, 83, 217, 222, 224, 226, 309
- China (occupied), 221 ff.; villages destroyed, 34, 222, 251; Japan's "new policy" toward, 221 ff., 227; "restoration" of concessions, 224; Nanking "army," 226; as part of "inner fortress," 227; economic exploitation, 228; communications, 230
- China Incident, *see* Sino-Japanese war
- Chinese exclusion laws, 225
- Chins, 198
- Chisholm, Don, 243
- Chochu clan, 240
- Chungking government, 226, 227, 250
- Churchill, Prime Minister Winston, 317
- Clans in Japan, 274, 277
- Clark Field, 22
- "Closed door," in Manchuria, 263
- Cochin-China, 179
- Columbia Country Club, internment camp, 244
- Communism in Japan, 274



- "Comrade groups," 53  
 Concordia Society, 263, 317  
 Constabulary, *see* Philippines  
*Conte Verde*, 243, 247  
 Co-Prosperity Sphere, *see* East Asiatic Co-Prosperity Sphere  
 Corregidor, 20, 23, 54, 55; nurses from, 117  
 Cotton, Japanese attempts to increase production, in Philippines, 61; in Thailand, 191; in Burma, 198; in Netherlands East Indies, 210; in North China, 248  
 Covit, Bert, 166  
 Cullens, James W., 139  
 Cultural war, purposes in Philippines defined by Domei, 98  
  
*Daimyo*, 102, 275  
 Dang, Donald, 152  
 Davao, 29; war prisoners, 117; civilian internees, 173  
 Day, Mrs. Kenneth B., 146  
 Decoux, Admiral Jean, governor of French Indo-China, 177 ff., 185  
 De Gaullists, *see* Free French  
 Development Council for East Asia, 228  
 Dewey Boulevard (Manila), 25, 89  
 Dick, McCullough, 42  
 Diet (Japanese legislature), 82, 311, 316, 317  
 District associations, *see* Neighborhood associations  
 Djawa, *see* Java  
 Djawa Hoko Kai, 208  
*Dobama Sinyetna*, 196  
 Dominican Order, 30  
 Doolittle raid, 283, 290, 299  
 Du Berrier, Hal, 246  
 Duggleby, A. F., 138  
 Dutch New Guinea, 204; liberation begun, 207  
  
 East Asiatic Co-Prosperity Sphere, 184, 279  
 Eba raid, 22  
 Economic exploitation (Japanese), in Philippines, 57-63; in Indo-China, 183 ff.; in Thailand, 191; in Burma, 198; in Netherlands East Indies, 210; in China, 228; in Shanghai, 239-240  
 Economic police, in Philippines, 65; in Japan, 296  
 Emperor (Japanese), propaganda use of in Philippines, 97; divine origin taught in Manila schools, 98; devotion of subjects, 272; characteristics, 273; service to, 277; duty toward intensified before war, 280; concept, 284; plants rice, 300; voiceless in government, 308  
 Espionage, in Shanghai, 242  
 Evans, Arthur, 163  
 Extraterritorial rights, abolished in Siam, 188; Japanese "relinquishment" in Occupied China, 223, 224  
  
 "Face," 11, 276  
 Family system in Japan, 276  
 Federated Malay States, 182, 216  
 Fifth columnists in Philippines, 23, 74  
 Fisheries agreement (Russo-Japanese, 1944), 257 ff.  
 Fletcher (gendarmier victim), 134  
 Foodstuff Control Association (Philippines), 62  
 Formosa, 21, 51, 54, 117, 122, 168, 230  
 Formosa Overseas Development Company, 191  
 Forster, Charles F., 139  
 Fort McKinley, war prison, 117, 119  
 Fort Santiago, gendarmerie station, 37  
 Fourteenth Air Force (U.S.), 230  
 Franks, Charlie, 159  
 Free China, 230  
 Free French in Indo-China, 185, 186  
 Free India movement, Japanese-sponsored, 200 ff.  
 French collaborationists in Indo-China, 186  
 French Concession, *see* Shanghai  
 French Indo-China, 177 ff.; Japanese ultimatum (1940), 177; border "war" with Thailand, 178; protocol for defense "co-operation" with Japan, 178; Japanese control measures, 180 ff.; native army reported, 180; Japanese garrison in, 183; Japanese economic exploitation,

- 183 ff.; Japanese take over shipping, 184; philosophy toward, 184; Americans interned in, 185; raided by Allies, 230
- Fuji, Mt., 272
- Fujii Cotton Spinning Co., 198
- Fujiwara, Ginjiro, 314
- Fushun, 262
- Gendarmerie (Japanese), in Philippines, 31 ff., 64, 79; in French Indo-China, 185; in Thailand, 189; in Netherlands East Indies, 210; in Malaya, 216; in Occupied China, 222, 224; in Shanghai, 239 ff.; in Manchuria, 264; in Japan, 274, 278, 297, 298, 322
- German-Japanese relations, 321-324; in Indo-China, 186; in Shanghai, 242, 323; in Manchuria, 284
- Gestapo, 322, 323
- Giovannini, P. W., 246
- Gloucester Hotel (Hong Kong), 234
- Goenveld, S., Java collaborationist, 210
- Grayburn, Sir Vanderlur (gendarmarie victim), 43
- Great Western Road internment camp, 244
- Greater East Asia ministry, *see* Japan
- Grinnell, Carroll, 139, 164
- Gripsholm*, 11, 65, 166, 189, 234, 235
- Guam, 122, 286, 319
- Guerrillas, punishment of, 41; in Philippines, 108 ff.; in Netherlands East Indies, 215; in China, 226, 242, 250 ff.
- Gundelfinger, F. D., 139
- Gunnison, Royal Arch, 32, 129, 158, 166
- Gunnison, Marjorie, 32
- Hackett, Bessie, 154
- Hainan Island, 181, 230
- Haiphong, 180
- Haiphong Road internment camp, 244, 246
- Hakko Ichiu*, 280
- Hangchow, 224
- Hankow, 224, 290
- Happy Valley (Hong Kong), 234
- Harada, General (Japanese commander in Netherlands East Indies), 203
- Hara-kiri, 276, 289, 312, 319
- Harvey, Dave, *see* McTurk, Dave
- Heesch, Henry, 18, 154
- Helfrich, Vice Admiral C. E. L. (Dutch commander), 214
- Hirohito, *see* Emperor, Japanese
- Holland, A. E., 146
- Homma, General Masaharu, 17
- Honan province, 247, 249
- Hongkew, *see* Shanghai
- Hong Kong, 21, 28, 212, 230, 232 ff., 256
- Hong Kong Hotel, 234
- Hopeh province, 229, 247, 251
- Hopkins, Paul S., 246
- Hsinking, 255
- Hsin Min Hui*, 222
- Huai River, 249
- "Hump" air route, 230
- Hunan province, 229
- Hutton, William (gendarmarie victim), 43
- Igorots, 74
- Iida, General (conqueror of Burma), 195
- Imperial Hotel (Tokyo), 298
- Imperial Rule Assistance Association, 263, 278, 310, 316; elections, 163; Philippine counterpart, 74
- Imperial Rule Assistance Political Association, 316
- Ince, Lieutenant Wallace, 167
- "Independence," *see* Philippines, Burma
- India, Japanese troops enter, 199
- India Independence League of East Asia, 200
- India "Provisional Government," 200
- Indo-China, *see* French Indo-China
- Infantry (U.S.), the 31st, 20
- "Inner Fortress," *see* China, Manchuria
- Institute of Japanese Culture, in Thailand, 194
- Insurrection, Philippine, 70, 88
- International Settlement, *see* Shanghai
- "Internews, The," 145

- "Internitis, The," 153  
 Internment camps, civilian: Baguio, 172; Camp Stanley (Hong Kong), 127, 233 ff.; Cebu, 171; Davao, 173; Santo Tomas (Manila), 30, 104, 129 ff.; Shanghai area, 244; Wehshien (North China), 244  
 Ise Grand Shrines, 195  
 Isogai, General Rensuke, 256  
 Ishiwata, Sotaro (Japanese finance minister, 1944), 313  
 Italian-Japanese relations, 321; in Indo-China, 186; in Shanghai, 243  
 Janda, Bob, 157  
 Japan, 269 ff.; "new policy" toward China, 221 ff., 227; Greater East Asia ministry, 223, 313; "new movement" of 1940, 263, 277; the restoration, 274; education, 274-276; clans, 274, 277; secret societies, 277, 278; pre-war propaganda campaign, 278 ff.; rationing in, 293-295; new "precautionary" decrees, 298-299; food production measures, 300; air raid drills, 301; labor, 302-305; industry, 305; industry's resurgent political strength, 312-314; battle for internal power, 313; munitions ministry, 314; budget, 315; inflation, 316; cabinet crisis (1940), 320; Koiso cabinet, 320 ff.; supreme "war direction" council, 320; "liberalistic" government façade, 325; relations with Axis, *see* German-Japanese, Italian-Japanese  
 Japan Reservists Association, 317  
 Japanese characteristics, 274-290  
 Japanese civilians in Manila, 58  
 Japanese factional disputes, 240, 307, 320  
 Japanese militarists: response toward world opinion, 28; attitude toward propaganda, 34; attitude toward capitulation, 214; imperialistic philosophy, 263  
 Japanese women, 287, 299, 304  
 Java, 201 ff.; Japanese army control in, 201 ff.; "autonomy," 202; Japanese judicial troubles in, 205; schools, 205; labor program, 208; rescued labor slaves, 209; cholera epidemics reported, 215  
 Java Labor Association, 208  
 Java sugar, 213  
 Jehol province, 260  
 Jenkins, Bruce, 246  
 Jesus, Pedro de, 76  
 Jews, segregation of in Shanghai, 244  
 Jimmu Tenno, 272, 280  
 Johore, 216  
 Jurika, Blanche, 110  
 Kaifeng, 249  
 Kalgan, 248  
*Kalibapi*, the, 73 ff., 79, 84, 222, 317  
 Kang Teh, emperor of "Manchukuo," 261  
 Kanjurmiao, 255  
 Kay, Henry, 169  
 Kaya, Okinobu (former Japanese finance minister), 312, 313  
 Kedah, "annexed" by Thailand, 188  
*Keibodan*, *see* "Comrade groups"  
 Kelantan, "annexed" by Thailand, 188  
 Kentung, "annexed" by Thailand, 189  
 Khalka River, 254-255  
 Kiangsu province, 249  
 Kirin, 261  
 Kishi, Shinsuke (Manchurian planner), 312  
 Kneedler, Don, 18  
 Kneedler, Ed, 18  
 Kneedler, Dr. H. D., 18  
 Koga, Admiral Mineichi, 312  
 Koiso, Lieutenant General Kuniaki (Japanese premier, 1944), 320 ff.  
 Konoye, Prince Fumimaro, 308  
 Korea, 227, 258, 264  
 Korea-Singapore railway project, 183  
 Koreans in Japan (sabotage reported), 304  
 Koster, George, 160  
 Kowloon, war prison, 233, 234  
 Kuomintang, "orthodox" (Japanese-dominated), 222  
 Kuroda (Manila internment camp commandant), 171  
 Kuroda, General Shigenori, 78  
 Kwajalein, 288

- Kwantung army, 221, 253, 256, 261, 307, 320, 321
- Labor programs, Japanese: in Philippines, 103; in Thailand, 191; in Netherlands East Indies, 208-209; in China, 252; in Japan, 299, 302-304
- Labor Unions, in Japan, 274
- Laos, ceded to Thailand, 188
- Laurel, Jose P. (Philippine puppet president), 48, 50, 76, 78 ff.
- Laurel, Jose P., Jr., 85
- Leach, Dr. C. N., 18, 143, 172
- Leacock (gendarmerie victim), 134
- Leake, B. G., 146
- Lee, Clark, 24
- Lehman, Stan, 157
- Lepanto*, scuttled Italian gunboat, 243
- Leyte Island, 117
- Lingayen Gulf, 18, 169
- Los Baños internment camp, 105, 117, 172
- Lunghua internment camp, 244, 246
- Luzon, 20, 54-55, 69, 109
- MacArthur, General Douglas, 23
- McCord, John, 157
- McTurk, Dave, 154, 165, 171
- Madjelis*, the, 207
- Madrigal, Vicente, 77
- Mahidol, Prince Ananda (named king of Siam), 190
- Malaya, 216 ff.; areas "annexed" from by Thailand, 188
- Manchukuo, *see* Manchuria
- Manchuria, 227, 253-265; exploitation crucible, 60, 263; part of "inner fortress," 253, 293; railroads, 259; Japanese garrison, 260; "Manchukuo," 260; industries, 261; resources, 261; first Allied raid, 262; "closed door," 263; civilian defense, 264; boys' army, 264
- Manchuria Industrial Development Company, 264
- Manila, 17-32; Japanese occupation, 17 ff., 57 ff.; declared open city, 24; bomb damage, 25; conquerors' "bright spot," 57
- Manila Consumers Cooperative Associations, 62
- Manila Hotel, 25 ff., 59
- Manokwari, 201
- Mansoor, K. H. M., 209
- "March of Death," 46, 104
- March Through Manila, 46, 47, 104
- Marines (U.S.) Fourth Regiment, 20
- Maritime Province, 258
- Marshall Islands, 318
- Masjumi*, the, 207
- Matsuoka, Yosuke (former Japanese foreign minister), 256
- Maya Maru*, 167
- Mecca, 206, 207
- Meiji Tenno, 280, 307
- Mekong River, 182
- Merchant seamen (Japanese) recruited, 212
- Mellnick, Lieutenant Colonel S. M., quoted, 120
- Midway Island, 319
- Mindanao, 52, 109
- Mindora, 110
- Mitsubishi, 60, 314
- Mitsui, 60, 264, 314
- Mongol invasion (of Japan), 301
- Mongolia, 221, 248
- Mongpan, "annexed" by Thailand, 189
- Moros, 50, 91 ff., 206
- Moslem Central Council of the Indonesians, dissolved, 207
- Moslem Congress in Tokyo, 91
- Mukden, 255, 261
- Murata, Shozo, 78
- Murphy, Father Charles, 235, 236
- Mydans, Carl, 32, 129, 158, 166
- Mydans, Shelley, 32
- Nagano, Fleet Admiral Osami, 311
- Nagumo, Vice Admiral Chuichi, 319
- Nakano, Seigo, 312
- Nanking government, 221-225, 250. *See also* Wang Ching-wei
- National assembly, *see* Philippines
- National mobilization law, in Japan, 303
- National Rice Warehouse (Philippines), 68

- Naval Landing Party (in Shanghai), 240
- Negros Island, 52
- Neighborhood associations, 94-97; in Burma, 197; in Netherlands East Indies, 204
- Neild, Frank, 157
- Netherlands East Indies, 201-216; Japanese military control in, 201; exploitation of religion, 206 ff.; youth movement, 210; economic exploitation, 210 ff.; defense preparations, 214; guerrillas, 215; civilian internees, 216. *See also* Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes
- Netherlands Information Service, 201, 204; counter-propaganda, 207
- New Guinea, *see* Dutch New Guinea
- Nihon Cultural Association (in Manila), 97
- Nimitz, Admiral Chester W., 52, 229, 319
- Nishihara, General, 178
- Noemfoor Island, 209
- Nomonhan battle, 253 ff., 287, 288
- Nonni River, 255
- North China, 227-229, 247-252
- North China Co-ordination Council, 222
- North China Development Company, 222
- North China Political Affairs Council, 221, 248
- Opium, 248, 252
- Oranje* (Dutch newspaper), quoted, 210
- Osias, Camilo, 77
- Osmeña, Sergio, 23
- Outer Mongolia, 254
- "Pacific March," the, 26
- Pacific Society Monthly* (Japanese), quoted, 205
- Padang (Sumatra), 204
- Paez, Jose, 53
- Palawan, 117
- Pampanga peasants (Philippines), 69
- Panay Island, 52, 117
- Pao Chia, 222
- Parañaque, 17
- Paredes, Quintin, 53, 77
- Paris (liberation of, effect on Indo-China), 185
- Parsons, Charles, 110
- Pasay Elementary School, war prison, 116, 119
- Pasig River, 24
- Peace Preservation Corps (China), 226
- Pearl Harbor, 319
- Peking, 221, 224, 232, 247 ff.
- Peking *Chronicle*, 248
- Peking-Hankow railway, 229
- Percival, Jack, 32, 158
- Perlis, "annexed" by Thailand, 188
- Petchabun, 192
- Phelp, George, 157
- Philippine National Bank, 60
- Philippine Red Cross, *see* Red Cross
- Philippines (under Japanese), 17-174; Japanese occupation currency, 29; "national" army, 48; national assembly, 50, 80; strategic importance, 51; Japanese defenses, 52 ff.; cabinet reshuffle (1944), 53; economic exploitation, 57-63; public health, 68; "independence," 71 ff.; assassinations, 76; constitution of the "republic," 78 ff.; United States promise of independence, 81; collaborationists, 82; Japanese propaganda, 87 ff.; exploitation of religion, 89 ff.; schools, 98 ff.; forced labor, 103; guerrillas, 109 ff.; American counter-propaganda, 112
- Pnom-Penh (French Indo-China), 182
- Pootung internment camp, 244, 246
- Port Arthur, 259
- Port Dickson (Malaya), 217
- Portsmouth Treaty, 257
- Prajadhipok (deposed king of Siam), 190
- Preparatory Commission, for Philippine "independence," 76
- President Harrison*, 168; officers from, 122
- Price Stabilization Board (in Philippines), 65
- Prince of Wales*, 161
- Propaganda, Japanese: toward Filipinos, 87 ff.; toward Indians, 199;

- domestic, in pre-war years, 278 ff.;  
domestic, anti-American, 299; do-  
mestic, in 1944, 321, 323  
Provisional Government of Free In-  
dia, *see* Free India movement  
*Pusat Kebudajaan*, 203  
*Putera*, 202-203  
Pu-yi, Henry, 261
- Quezon, Manuel L., 23, 72, 84, 85, 113  
Quinine, 211  
Quinto, Leon, 78
- Railroads, in China, 230; in Man-  
churia, 259; in Korea, 260  
Ramos, Benigno, 73, 75, 88  
Rashin (Korea), 260  
Rationing in Japan, 293-296  
Recto, Claro M., 77  
Red Cross, 63-65, 122, 124-127, 138-  
141, 234, 245  
*Repulse*, 161  
Resettlement, in Japan, 302  
Restoration, in Japan, 274  
Ricarte, General Artemio, 88  
Rice Producers' Guild (in Philip-  
pines), 68  
Rizal, Jose, 108  
Roces, Andang, 76  
Roces, Don Alejandro, 76  
Rogers, Theo. H., 42, 173  
*Ronin* (Japanese), 222; the forty-  
seven, 275  
Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 80,  
88, 283, 300, 317  
Roxas, Manuel A., 77  
Russia, 253-260  
Russians in Shanghai, 239, 242  
Russo-Japanese relations: hostilities  
(1939), 253 ff.; neutrality pact, 256-  
257; protocol (fisheries and Sak-  
halin), 257 ff.; issues, 258 ff.  
Russo-Japanese war (1904-05), 257
- Sabang, 201  
Sabido, Pedro, 53, 77  
Saignon, 182  
Saipan, 52, 286, 307, 319  
Sakdalistas, 73 ff.  
Sakhalin, 257 ff.  
*Samurai*, 10, 275
- San Fernando (Pampanga), 69  
Santo Domingo Church (Manila), 24,  
69, 89  
Santos, Jose Abed, 85  
Santos, Pedro Abad, 109  
Santo Tomas internment camp, 30,  
104, 129-174; execution of escaped  
prisoners, 134; repatriates board  
*Teia Maru*, 169; poll on repatria-  
tion, 173  
Sasaki, Kenichiro, 210  
Satsuma clan, 240, 291  
Sayre, Francis B., 23  
Sebastian, Proceso E., 77  
Secret societies (Japanese), 277, 279,  
317  
Seiyukai party, 74  
Selph, Ewald, 161  
Shan states, 189, 197  
Shanghai, 36, 221, 224, 232, 237-247,  
323  
Shansi province, coal, 229, 247, 251  
Shantung province, 229, 247  
Shasi province, 224  
Shigemitsu, Mamoru (Japanese for-  
eign minister, 1944), 223, 321  
Shimada, Admiral Shigetaro, 311  
Shimonoseki, 291  
Shinto, 93, 207, 269, 271-272; teach-  
ings on death, 285  
Shipbuilding, 211 ff.  
Shipping shortages limit Indo-China  
exploitation, 184  
Shonan, *see* Singapore  
Showa Steel Works, 262  
Siam, *see* Thailand  
Siberia, 256, 260; occupation (1917),  
257  
Singapore, 21, 182, 216-218  
Sino-Japanese war (1937- ), 247, 279;  
Japanese peace feelers, 227; Japa-  
nese offensives (1943-1944), 229; ci-  
vilian suicides in Japan, 285; do-  
mestic unpopularity of, 290  
Sinyetna party (Burma), 196  
Sison, Teofilo, 53, 77  
Songgram, Field Marshal Luang Bi-  
pul, 189, 191; overthrown as Thai  
premier (1944), 193  
Soochow, 224  
Soshi (Japanese), 222, 278, 280

- South Manchurian Railway, 210  
 Southern Regions Development Bank, 60, 210, 315  
 Soviet-German nonaggression pact, 255  
 Soviet Far Eastern Army, 260  
 Soviet Union, *see* Russia  
 Special Service Section, Japanese army, 222  
 Stahmer, Heinrich, 322  
 Straits Settlements, 216  
 Street, Justice Thomas A., 84  
 Stuart, Jim, 145, 153, 165  
 Sugiyama, Field Marshal Gen., 311  
 Suicides in Japan, 285, 286, 289, 312  
 Sukarno (Indonesian puppet leader), 203-204  
 Sultan Sa Ragain (Alaoya Alonto), 77  
 Sumatra: army control, 202; general assembly, 204; "national" army conscription, 209  
 Sumitomo combine, 314  
 Sun Yat-sen, 241  
 Sungari River, 261  
 Swiss Consulate, in Philippines, 125-126; in Shanghai, 169, 244  
  
 T-V-T Publishing Company, 59  
 Tait, Eddie, 143  
*Taliba*, the, 59  
 Tanapag Harbor (Saipan), 319  
 Tanauan Youth Movement (Philippines), 100  
 Tarawa, 217  
 Teh, Prince, 221  
*Teia Maru*, Japanese exchange ship, 13, 169, 236  
 Temple of Heaven, 247  
 Thailand, 187-194; independence as Siam, 187; cessions from Indo-China after border "war," 188; troops fight with Japanese, 189; war prisoners in, 189; defensive alliance with Japan and declaration of war against United States and Great Britain, 190; resources, 191; budget (1943), 192; cabinet change (1944), 193  
 Thought police, 278  
 Tientsin, 221, 224  
 Tinian, 286, 319  
 Tirona, Emiliano T., 77  
 Tojo, Lieutenant General Eikyo, 310  
 Tojo, Lieutenant General Hideki (former Japanese premier), 35, 75, 85, 106, 188, 193, 223, 299, 304; as modern shogun, 307-319; Saipan debacle, 319; downfall, 320  
 Tokyo, description (1943), 292-298; bright lights extinguished, 298  
 Tomoyasu, Lieutenant Hitoshi (commandant of Santo Tomas), 134 ff.  
 Tonkin coal mines (Indo-China), 184  
 Tourane, 182  
 Trengganu, "annexed" by Thailand, 188  
*Tribune* (Manila), 59, 96  
 Truk, 54, 311  
 Tsurumi, K. (Santo Tomas commandant), 149, 160, 164, 166  
 Tydings-McDuffie Act, 74  
  
 Ubol, 182  
 Uchiyama, Yoshio, 99  
 United Autonomous Government of Mongolia, 221  
 Unson, Miguel, 77  
 Ural Mountains, 259  
 USSR, *see* Russia  
  
 Vacant Lots Utilization Program, 300  
*Vanguardia*, *La*, 59  
 Van der Plas, Dr. Charles O., 215  
 Vargas, Jorge, 23, 72, 77, 78, 85  
 Victoria, *see* Hong Kong  
 Villamor, Captain Jesus, 108  
 Vladivostok, 260  
  
 Wainwright, Lieutenant General Jonathan M., 117, 122, 162  
 Waithyakorn, Prince van, 85  
 Wake Island, 122  
 Wang Ching-wei, 83, 85, 221 ff., 226-227, 241; government declares war on United States and Great Britain, 223  
 Wang Keh-min, 221  
 War bonds, in Japan, 315  
 Ward, Bishop Ralph A., 246  
 War prisoners: in Philippines, 116 ff.; British and Netherlands, numbers,

- 122; Americans classed as, 122; officials in Formosa, 122; Woosung war prison, 122, 124; in Thailand, 189; in Malaya, 217; in Hong Kong, 233; in Mukden, 261  
"Water cure" (gendarmerie torture), 38  
Weeks (gendarmerie victim), 134  
Wehshien internment camp, 244  
Whitacre, Dr. Frank, 18, 143  
Wilkins, Ford, 173  
Wohltat, Dr. Helmut, 323  
Wolff, T. J., 139  
Yai Liyo Pan, 76  
Yalu River, 261  
Yamamoto, Admiral Isoroku, 312  
Yangchow internment camps, 244, 246  
Yasukuni Shrine, 269-272, 288, 289  
Yellow River, 249  
Yen bloc, 228, 280  
Yokohama Specie Bank, 59  
Yoshizawa, Kenkichi, 180  
Young, Kuangson, 41  
Yuki, Toyotaro, 313  
Yulo, Jose, 77

















